

McGRAW-HILL SERIES IN SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

RICHARD T. LAPIERE, *Consulting Editor*

A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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A Theory of SOCIAL CONTROL

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A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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PREFACE

The theory of social control that is expounded in the following pages is the culmination of nearly twenty years of intermittent effort to devise a conceptual system that would account for conduct that is not wholly explained by socialization and situational interaction. The effort arose from dissatisfaction with the tendency that was so pronounced two decades ago to attribute many forms of individual conduct to the machinations of newspaper editors, motion-picture producers, and other masters of the mass media. In those days there was much discussion of movies and conduct and the propaganda menace. It was my impression then, as now, that whatever men may say, the significant aspects of their conduct are remarkably stable; that, in a manner of speaking, the human being is too sturdy a creature to be swayed in important ways by superficial and transitory forces. I soon discovered, however, that it was one thing to reject the intellectual fashion of the times and quite another to devise an effective alternative. The theory that I here present is new, and some will no doubt find it disturbing; yet during the years that it has taken me to devise this theory others have come, by different routes but quite as surely, to a realization that the individual human being seldom acts irrespective of what I here describe as social control. So what began as a radical departure is now more in the nature of an integration and systematization of established ideas.

Nevertheless it should be remarked that what is presented here is a theory, not a doctrine. It is a logically consistent analysis of a series of specific theoretical concepts—of what Merton characterizes as theories of the middle range. In the opening chapter the theoretical implications of the analysis are explored, and in the later chapters the over-all theory is applied to an appraisal of some of the practices of modern society. The specific theoretical concepts need not be accepted *in toto*. Should subsequent research disprove one or more of them, the whole will not be seriously jeopardized; conversely, the validity of the specific concepts does not depend upon the adoption of the general framework in which I have developed them.

It should be remarked, further, that this theory of social control does not constitute a general theory of social action. It is far less ambitious. It deals with what for the moment may be designated the "third force" that enters into the making of human conduct—a force, or more specifically a complex of forces, that has for long and until very recently been largely neglected by sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and political scientists. The first force, the socialization of the individual, has received much highly fruitful study;

the second, the impact of specific situations on the individual, has been generally recognized, if not so fully studied. But the third of the forces that determine the conduct of men, social control, is only in the process of being discovered by researchers in industry, juvenile delinquency, and other areas of contemporary social life; and although the term "social control" is much used by anthropologists and political scientists, they have as yet no clear and consistent idea of what social control is and how it operates.

As I have come to understand it, social control often mediates between the personality and the specific situation in which the individual acts. Such control is exercised by relatively small and intimate groups, and it induces conformity to the norms or standards of the group by operating on the individual's desire for social status—more precisely, his need for a kind of status that only such groups provide. The striving for such status becomes, in my theory, not the sole but certainly the most common of the motives that enter into the making of human conduct. And in the theory man becomes, not the rational creature of eighteenth-century psychology and most certainly not the unwitting victim of subconscious forces as some current doctrines would have him, but a calculating, because status-seeking, animal.

Theoretical endeavor is arduous, and there is the constant temptation to let the mind roam at will among the many interesting words that our language provides. In an attempt to keep my own verbal feet on or at least close to the ground, I have illustrated each of the many generalizations of which this theory of social control is constituted. The illustrative materials may serve, especially for the student, to give body and hence meaning to what would otherwise be highly abstract analysis.

One further matter before I let this theory of social control speak for itself. The theory was devised in the same geographic and institutional setting in which E. A. Ross conceived and wrote his pioneering work on social control. It would be fitting if I could say that I received my major inspiration from Ross, or at least from the setting in which we both labored. But such is not the case. I am much more indebted to Cooley than to Ross; and there is nothing about the setting in which this is written that either makes one hypersensitive to social control or frees one from the normalizing effects thereof. This theory is the product of a time, not a place; and all those who have contributed to the making of that time have, however inadvertently, contributed also to the making of this theory.

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Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Sociological study of social control is scarcely half a century old;¹ and for much of that half century students of social control have unwittingly dissipated their energies in the exploration of conceptual cul-de-sacs, with the result that our present understanding of the subject is still woefully incomplete. Speculation about social control is, however, as old as recorded history; and what gives rise to the phenomenon has no doubt puzzled men since they first formed social groupings and in the process lost their ability to live—or more likely die—as they might individually prefer.

The problem of ascertaining the forces that induce individuals to conform to standards of conduct imposed upon them by others has been approached in a great variety of ways, in such a variety, in fact, that the universal nature of the phenomenon is easily lost sight of. Through much of the Middle Ages, for example, European social thinkers conceived the problem in terms of the extent to which God prescribes the conduct of the Christian man and of the validity of the claim of churchmen to being the sole representatives here on earth of the will of God. For long it was generally agreed that God's authority was both inclusive and absolute and that the Church had by divine decree an ironclad monopoly on the power to ascertain God's will. In time, however, the official version of God's will became so very irksome to so many men, who wished for various practical reasons to behave in ways counter to the regulations of the Church, that revolts occurred against the Church, though not against God's will. The Protestant sects that eventually emerged held to the view that God had delegated responsibility for the determination of man's mundane conduct to princes and kings. In this view, it was the divine right of kings and their henchmen to exercise authority over the practical affairs of their subjects; and since this authority was divine in origin, the king could in theory do no wrong.

Even as they had with the rule of the Church, time and social changes brought increasing discontent with the rule of kings, and a new approach to the problem gradually emerged. The individual man, it came to be thought, is divinely created and endowed with his small portion of divinity. Such being the case, he is not in truth subject to the authority of kings. In all matters

¹ E. A. Ross (*Social Control*, Macmillan, New York, 1901) was the first to use the term to designate a special field of sociological study. Others had previously used it descriptively, as, for example, did W. I. Thomas in "The Relation of Sex to Primitive Social Control" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 3, pp. 754-776, 1898).

of conduct his own conscience should be his guide. So thinking, the Puritans set sail from England to enjoy in the New World their inherent right to live in accordance with their personal views of right and wrong. So believing, the colonists revolted, a century and a half later, from the rule of George IV. By then, however, the idea had emerged that the conduct of man is, or at least should be, determined by rational calculation of consequences rather than by "conscience." On this assumption, government, which was the crucial issue of the time, could rightly exist only with the explicit consent of those being governed and could exercise only such authority as was voluntarily granted to it by them. Although men were still inclined to look to God for an explanation of their presence here on earth, they had come to absolve Him of all direct responsibility for their conduct, whether joint or individual.

The Social Contract and Social Control. The doctrine of the social contract, the idea that society, and most specifically the state, is a creation and a creature of the joint and "rational" action of those who are constrained by it, might well have served as the seed for modern study of social control. The interpretations that will be developed in the chapters which follow do have, in fact, some slight resemblance to this doctrine; but there would seem to be little if any historical linkage between the two.

The doctrine of the social contract served the practical purpose of providing a rationale for a number of political revolutions, including that of the American colonists, and for the subsequent establishment by contract of parliamentary and constitutional forms of government. But the slight seed of truth that might have been derived from the social-contract doctrine and nourished, by application to it of the scientific method, into a general theory of social control was soon lost in the sprouting of new doctrines of social conduct. Some of these new doctrines left no place at all for what we now term social control; others returned the problem of social control to the metaphysical jungle from which the social-contract concept had temporarily removed it.

THE DOCTRINE OF AUTOCRACY

Perhaps no single man did more to return the problem of social control to the verbal jungle of metaphysics than the German philosopher Hegel. When he wrote, early in the nineteenth century, the German people were still politically disunited and were lagging far behind England and even France in the race to industrialize and to carve out empires for themselves. Bismarck, who was in time to become the symbol—and to some extent no doubt the agency—of German political unification, was still an infant in his nurse's arms. The doctrine that Hegel fabricated might well, however, have served as a murky design for the career and claims of Bismarck and of such later, and less noble, leaders of the German people as Hitler.

Hegel felt that the state, by which he meant government in all its various forms, is per se superior to all other kinds of human organization. All things must be subordinated to it; for upon its coercive powers, both the police

powers that it exercises over citizens and the military powers that it directs toward other states, depends the greatness of a people. To be strong, the state must demand and secure absolute obedience from its citizens; and there is no limit to the demands that the state may rightly make upon them.

Directive power over the state as a system of government is, as Hegel saw it, necessarily embodied in the person of some single individual. For when there is a division of authority, such as occurs when a council of princes jointly attempt to rule their various peoples, dissensions and indecisions make for collective weakness; and when there is a dilution of authority, such as occurs when a parliament or congress of the common people are permitted to express their preferences, the state becomes an agency for the indulgence of its citizens and is totally devoid of strength.

So far, Hegel's doctrine of the state was hardly more than a revival of the idea of absolute monarchy. He did, however, make a gesture in the direction of the then-current concept of the contractual origins of government, *i.e.*, the doctrine of the social contract. It was a gesture that, like the meaningless motions of the stage magician, distracted attention while he drove home his essentially autocratic theory of the state. And it seems to have served its purpose well, for his doctrine as a whole has persisted in one form or another down to the present day.

In simple words—not that he used them—Hegel professed to believe that the autocratic powers of the leader of the state are derived from the citizens thereof, rather than from God, as in the monarchical version. Men, he claimed, are born free and with wills of their own; but individually they can accomplish nothing. They must join together, forming a state, in order to achieve the fulfillment of their individual wills. In doing so, however, they give up their inherent freedom and synthesize their individual wills, which, in the synthesized form, become embodied in the person of the leader of the state. Such being the case, the leader of the state has unlimited autocratic powers over its citizens; and everything that he may do is actually in accord with their collective will, however differently it may appear to any single one of them. Just how the leader of the state comes into his position, what constitutes the will of an individual, when and how men join together to form the state, and by what process their undesigned individual wills become synthesized into something that then becomes embodied in the leader are questions that only a crass scientist would raise. They are not the sorts of questions that would bother a German philosopher.

The crimes against man that have been committed in the name of—not, of course, because of—the doctrine that the political autocrat is the embodiment of a people's will are many and various but will not concern us here. In passing it may be noted, however, that this concept of the source of autocratic power was used by Hitler to justify Nazi dictatorship over the Germans, that it was incorporated with less modern concepts to form the Japanese doctrine of national Shinto, and that, although it was but a slight shadow in

Marxian thinking, it became a basic tenet in the ideological pretensions of the Soviet government of Russia to be a dictatorship "of, by, and for the people."

The Hegelian concept of the autocratic state has appeared in various guises and in some very odd places over the past century and more. Whether these appearances are historically related to Hegel is unimportant. What is important is that many social thinkers—as well as political propagandists—have been enamored of the idea that the state is, or at least is becoming, the essential agency of society and can, or at least should, command unfailing obedience from its citizens because it is the embodiment of their collective will. In a period during which half the people of the world are thought to be under the absolute rule of Russian-type dictatorships and when more than one-fourth of the national income of the American people is known to be devoted to the maintenance of their Federal government, it may seem a bit foolhardy to advance a markedly anti-Hegelian view of the role of government and the sources of its power. Social control does not, however, conform to the Hegelian theory of the state.

DOCTRINES OF SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

Hegelianism intrigued many English philosophers and came in time to permeate the whole of English philosophy. Even as late as the present century some such reputable English social scientists as Hobhouse and Wallas devised their theories of society in the Hegelian mode. English economists, on the other hand, had in the meanwhile evolved an individualistic doctrine in which the state is viewed, not as the ultimate form of organization, but as at best a necessary evil that hampers men in their rightful pursuit of wealth. This theory of political *laissez faire* borrowed the concept of man as a naturally free and rational creature from the social-contract doctrine. The only contracts sanctioned by this theory, however, are those through which business is effected; and the only social responsibility that any individual has is to fulfill such contracts as he may personally have entered into with one or more other individuals—*e.g.*, to pay those whom he has hired the stated wage if they in turn fulfill their stated obligations to him.

The Autonomous Individual. To the student of social control the significant aspect of *laissez-faire* economic theory is that it makes the individual member of society autonomous. The *laissez-faire* economists were not, perhaps, unconcerned with the welfare of men as a whole. They believed, however, that the welfare of men as a whole (one can hardly say "society," since in their view society, as we now understand the term, did not in fact exist) was best served when every individual was entirely free to pursue in his presumably rational manner his own personal interests. The relation between this idea and that of the early Puritans (it differs only in that it substitutes "reason" and personal self-interest for the Puritans' "conscience") has led some social historians to assume that there was a close relationship between the rise of

Protestantism and the emergence of the capitalistic system of economic enterprise which the economists were trying to rationalize.

The laissez-faire economists did not, as a rule, push their individualistic doctrine beyond the economic realm. They seem to have been for the most part responsible fathers and even Christians of a sort. But the logic of their doctrine forced them to accept as "natural," and hence inescapable if not desirable, child labor in industry, the amassing of great wealth by a few and the general impoverishment of the majority, business practices which were profitable to the entrepreneur but disastrous to all others, etc.

Their "iron law of wages," according to which the working classes can never for long secure more than a bare subsistence, however hard and effectively they may labor, gave economics the reputation of being "the dismal science." Laissez-faire economics was, however, something more than a dismal science; it was a doctrine that ignored and by implication denied the effect of social attachments and sentiments on human conduct. In the economist's view, the individual was just a complex calculating machine, perpetually engaged in the search for material wealth and unencumbered by any such uneconomic considerations as the welfare or respect of his fellow men. Social life, if such there was, came about simply as an inadvertent by-product of the economic strivings of otherwise unrelated individuals.

The extent to which the economic concept of the individual as an autonomous entity retarded sociological study of social control is difficult to ascertain. Until well into this century the economists were, however, both the most honored of all the social scientists and almost exclusively of the laissez-faire persuasion. And since, contrary to what their view implies, men are profoundly influenced, intellectually and otherwise, by their fellow men, it seems likely that the idea of the individual as a wholly self-controlled unit spilled over from economics into sociology and at least predisposed sociologists to look to the individual for an explanation of his social conduct. At any event, as will be shown shortly, sociologists were susceptible to the idea that modern society is the "sum" of the actions of numbers of self-determining, autonomous individuals.

Within the past quarter century, the economic doctrine of *laissez faire*, and with it the idea of the individual as an exclusively profit-seeking autonomous entity, has given way to what is often termed "welfare economics." In this new concept of economic life there is considerable, if rather naïve, recognition of the fact that men are creatures of social sentiment and that they live in and through a variety of associational groups, many of which have little "profit-making" function and all of which temper in one way or another the individual's rational calculation of self-interest. As a result, modern economic theory not only provides a place for social control but actually utilizes, in attempting to explain the economic life of modern peoples, some ideas of how society controls the conduct of the individual.

Psychoanalysis and Social Control. In the early years of this century

another doctrine of social irresponsibility had, however, emerged and gained considerable popularity in psychology and later in sociology. This was the instinct theory, whose major prophet was William McDougall. For a decade after the publication of his *Social Psychology* in 1908 it was widely believed that the conduct of men is a direct and unmodifiable expression of biologically determined individual imperatives. And for a decade or so all things social were explained as manifestations of the instinctive drives of the several discrete individuals whose conduct constituted social action. If a man married and raised a family, it was because he was foreordained by nature to do so; and should he in due course undertake to murder his wife, that too was simply an expression of an instinct which he had inherited, along with all the others, at conception.

The absurdity of the simple instinctivistic explanation of human conduct soon became apparent; and by 1925 most American psychologists and sociologists were off on the quest for the social origins of the tendency of given individuals to behave in specific ways under specific circumstances—*e.g.*, of this man to love and cherish his wife and children and of that one to murder his wife and abandon his children. A devious substitute for the instinctivistic theory of the individual's autonomy and lack of social responsibility has, however, gained considerable favor in recent years among some psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists. This is the psychotherapeutic doctrine which was propounded by Freud and which is the foundation of the cult and practice of psychoanalysis.

A distinction must here be drawn between psychoanalysis as a therapeutic procedure and as a purportedly scientific explanation for human conduct. As a therapeutic procedure, psychoanalysis, which professes to uncover the hidden motives of the mentally disturbed individual, may be quite useful. Mental healing is an ancient art and like all arts takes many forms, the efficacy of the form depending upon time and place. In our time and place psychoanalysis is evidently one of the best of the various modes of mental healing that are currently available. The inferences, postulates, and hypotheses by which the psychoanalyst interprets the difficulties of his patients give him confidence in his own powers and in turn inspire his patients to confidence in him. These constructs constitute an interpretive system whereby the devils that hound the mentally distressed may be exorcised. Therapeutically it does not matter whether this system of interpretation is true; what matters is that it appears to be true, comprehensible, and, above all, final and absolute.

When, however, the system that orthodox psychoanalysis uses to interpret the mental distress of a neurotic or psychotic individual is extended to explain the causes of ordinary social conduct, the result is not a scientific explanation but an extreme and all-inclusive doctrine of social irresponsibility.² Through

² The best, although still far from convincing, exposition of the thesis that psychoanalysis is a science is that by W. Hollitscher in *Sigmund Freud: An Introduction* (Oxford, New York, 1947).

the psychoanalytic interpretation of mental distress, the patient is invariably absolved from moral responsibility; his troubles are blamed upon society in the person of a hateful father, mother, or someone else who has, usually in distant childhood, thwarted the patient's innate and hence entirely normal desires for this or that. These desires, which together constitute the libido, are at least for the most part contrasocial; they are also undeniable imperatives. Mental disturbances are the consequence of the clash of these individual imperatives and repressive society.

As a doctrine of social conduct, orthodox psychoanalysis leads, therefore, to the view that the individual member of society is never in any way personally responsible for what he does. He has neither the reason postulated by the rationalists nor the conscience postulated by the Puritans to guide him. His behavior is an uncalculated, even unaware, expression of his libido. If society permits him to express his libido freely, all goes well; but if society maintains prohibitions against such expression, he "internalizes" the conflict between himself and society and in time breaks out with ulcers, with illusions of one sort or another, or with delusions of this or that, or else he murders his wife, his employer, his companion of the moment, or whoever becomes the symbol of his intolerable frustration.

The current popularity of the psychoanalytic doctrine of irresponsibility is fairly understandable. It provides a rationale for many forms of current social conduct that are, or seem to be, inexcusable in terms of traditional social standards. Many of the changes that are occurring within our society involve a violation of traditional concepts of personal integrity and of personal and collective foresight, responsibility, etc. The psychoanalytic doctrine of irresponsibility provides exoneration for those who, acting in the modern mode, might otherwise feel that they were thereby acting dishonestly, disloyally, or unreasonably. To that extent, psychoanalysis is functioning as a general, rather than special, system of social rationalization. And to that extent also it is functioning as a religious cult and is replacing such older and more personally demanding faiths as those of the Protestant sects. It is in this capacity an agency of release from social control but is not a means to the understanding of social control.

THE GESELLSCHAFT DOCTRINE

The theory that society is a contractual arrangement entered into by rational individuals might have served, as was earlier observed, as the starting point for empirical study of social control. That it did not do so may be traced in part at least to one or another of the divergent theories that subsequently arose, some few of which have been sketched in the preceding pages.

At the beginning of the present century two American sociologists published books which, taken together, might have provided a substantial theoretical framework for the development of fruitful research into social control. In

1901 in his *Social Control*, E. A. Ross centered his attention on the role of belief as a determinant of individual conduct. Although his analysis was superficial and loaded with value judgments, it is to his credit that he avoided the then-prevalent provincialism of Western scholars who assumed that modern men, unlike primitives and other uncivilized peoples who believe in ghosts, demons, fetishes, and other fictional persons and magical procedures and conduct themselves accordingly, are guided only by knowledge of the realities of the world in which they live. To Ross, beliefs, whatever their specific form, had everywhere and always the same control function. They were a *universal*, not something peculiar to a given kind of society or a given phase of social development. Ross undoubtedly oversimplified the relationship between what men believe and what they do; but in his insistence upon the universality of the role of belief he avoided the error of assuming that modern society operates in terms of special "laws" of social control, an error that was to delay the development of this aspect of sociology for many decades.

The year following the appearance of Ross's *Social Control*, C. H. Cooley published his *Human Nature and the Social Order*. The work was mainly devoted to an analysis of the development, through social participation, of the individual's "self," an analysis of what would now be described as the processes of socialization through which the individual acquires his personality. Somewhat incidentally to this major concern, he advanced a number of interpretations of social life which, after being ignored for nearly half a century, are now basic concepts in the study of social control.

Among the current concepts that may be traced to Cooley is that of the primary group. Throughout his *Human Nature and the Social Order* Cooley stressed the importance of intimate, face-to-face associations in the development of the individual's self. Although the term "primary group" does not appear in this work (it was not until seven years later in a subsequent work that he used the specific term³), his assumption that in the modern world, as in other times and places, the individual lives mainly in terms of the people immediately surrounding him is clearly evident, if long overlooked by others. As will be indicated shortly, the recent rediscovery of the primary-group nature of modern society was a major advance in sociology and constituted something of a revolution in the study of social control.

Cooley's stress on primary forms of association led, moreover, to his making a number of other interpretations which, still largely unknown or at least unacknowledged, are incorporated in present-day theories of social control. His analysis of emulation as one of the factors that make for individual conformity to group standards of conduct is, except for the terminology used, in accord with the most advanced of present thinking on the subject. And his analysis of leadership as personal ascendancy puts to shame the superficial discussions and the oversimplifications made by many of the current writers

³ *Social Organization*, Scribner, New York, 1909.

on leadership, particularly those who, following the lead of the political scientist Lasswell, conceive leadership to be a one-way process.⁴

Just why the concepts of Ross and Cooley were not promptly acclaimed and made the basis for a scientific study of social control cannot, of course, be ascertained. It is sometimes said that Cooley was a great intellectual innovator but a poor advocate—*i.e.*, that he wrote clearly but without force, stating the most profound concepts in mild and unstriking language. The same cannot, however, be said of Ross. He wrote in vivid and even spectacular style and often expressed what was only the commonplace in fresh and startling ways.

No doubt the prevalence in the early part of the century of the economic concept of man as a rational and socially unrestrained creature helped to make the views of both these men unpopular; no doubt, too, the subsequent vogue among psychologists and sociologists for the McDougallian doctrine of instincts also played some part in distracting attention from the concepts advanced by Ross and Cooley.

But still more important, it would seem, was the persistent tendency of most social scientists to think of modern Western society as different in kind from all other societies, past and current. Both Ross and Cooley sought universal principles of social life; and although they understandably directed their attention mainly to the society of which they were personally a part, they did not imagine that their society was unique and operated in accordance with laws peculiar unto itself.

The prevailing view among Western social scientists was, however, that modern Western society had evolved from prior and inferior forms of social life, much as the human species had evolved from lower forms of animal life. Theories concerning the mechanism of social evolution varied widely, but characteristically they all implied and some stated specifically that modern society was—or, in some instances, was becoming—categorically different from premodern and primitive societies. To Westermarck, for example, monogamous marriage was the ultimate form of sexual relationship and was unique to modern society.⁵ To Marx, the proletarian communistic society that was shortly to evolve (with considerable assistance, he subsequently decided, from revolutionary violence) would be radically different in all respects from the existing system of monopoly capitalism.⁶

American sociologists, too, subscribed to the idea that modern Western society was different in kind from all others. Cooley seriously questioned the validity of this concept in his *Social Organization* and argued that the major

⁴ H. D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (Macmillan, New York, 1936). The Lasswellian view is reflected in most of the essays contained in *The Policy Sciences* (D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell, eds., Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1951).

⁵ E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (3 vols., Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1921).

⁶ K. Marx, *Capital* (S. Moore and E. Aveling, trans., Humboldt, New York, 1890).

units of social life in our times as in times past and among civilized peoples as among "simple" primitives are intimate, person-to-person associations. He did not question the existence in modern society of large, impersonal forms of human association; but he believed that these were no more than social structures within which primary forms of association operated. He even ventured the idea—or, more properly, the hope—that these larger forms of association, including the various agencies of government, were but larger means to the fulfillment of the primary group values.⁷ But Cooley's insistence upon the universality of the primary group, like his earlier implications that person-to-person associations were everywhere and always the major source of the individual's self, was generally ignored by his fellow sociologists, who continued to draw categorical contrasts between primitive and modern society and between urban and rural forms of life in modern society.

Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Hegelianism, with its accent on brute force as the basis for social strength and its worship of the strong man as the autocratic ruler of the state, never captured the imaginations of American social philosophers as it did those of England. Fairly early in the century, however, a neo-Hegelian theory of the evolution of modern society gained currency among American sociologists and provided them with an elaborate justification for the idea that modern society differs in kind from all premodern forms. This was the German sociologist Tönnies's theory that the historical trend of society is from a premodern *Gemeinschaft* type of organization and operation toward a modern *Gesellschaft* form, which differs from the former in both organizational structure and operational processes.⁸

⁷ The same idea is found in Confucianism. In Confucian theory the major unit of social life is the large family. Government is a sort of necessary evil; that evil is minimized when the relations of subject to king are a simple extension of filial loyalty and the king rules his subject in the same spirit as the father rules his sons.

The same idea is at least implicit in much of the writing of J. L. Moreno, founder of what is known as "sociometry," and of his disciples; and it is explicit in G. Gurvitch's concept of "microsociology." In the latter's view, small groups are microcosms involving in miniature all the processes of social organization, and large organizations are but hierarchies of such basic social units. There is an important germ of truth in this view, and it will be explored fully in subsequent chapters.

See J. L. Moreno, "Sociometry and the Cultural Order" (*Sociometry Monographs*, No. 2, 1943, pp. 317–327); and G. Gurvitch, "Microsociology and Sociometry" in *Sociometry in France and the United States* (G. Gurvitch, ed., Beacon House, New York, 1950, pp. 1–31).

⁸ Just when the Tönnies concept was introduced to American sociologists is not clear. As early as 1915, however, it was sufficiently well known to them to be incorporated in a textbook intended for beginning students of sociology. See E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1915). Hayes refers directly to Tönnies and, presumably for simplicity, converts the terms *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* into "natural social order" and "planned social organization." In his subsequent discussion of social control, however, he more or less ignores the implication of the Tönnies concept and presents an ethically watered-down version of Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order*.

Tönnies's major work has been translated into English by C. P. Loomis as *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (American Book, New York, 1940).

Hegel had, incidental to his main theme, developed a quasi-evolutionary version of the emergence of the great modern state through the consolidation and unification of small, weak social units. In the transition, the characteristic dependence of the members of the small social groupings upon tradition as their guide to action gives way, Hegel believed, to reliance upon the autocratic personal authority of the leader of the state. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Tönnies reworked this Hegelian concept of the historical trend in forms and processes of social organization and adapted it to the then-current ideas of human rationality and democratic political processes. All the early system builders, such as Comte, Spencer, and Ward, had discussed at length the historical shift from small-group forms of social life to such large, and presumably modern, forms of organization as the state. Indeed, the idea was anything but new: Plato had contended that the ideal society would be one in which the state would be the sole unit of organization; and he had urged his fellow Greeks to abandon their existing small-group forms of life, including the family, and move immediately into the society of the future.

Tönnies was one of a number of German sociologists who endeavored to devise highly abstract conceptual systems as tools, or frames of reference, for the study of society. Most of these philosopher-sociologists did not profess that their conceptual schemes were representative of actual social phenomena; they regarded them, rather, as what have lately come to be called "models," against which the student can compare the facts of social life as he uncovers them through his researches. But whatever Tönnies's intent, his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* conceptual system came to be used, not as a tool to aid in the study of society, but, rather, as a description of society as it actually is. This use, rather than the conceptual system itself, is what is of concern here.

There are, according to the common use of Tönnies's theory, two basic forms of social organization. The forms of organization existing in any society may be mixed; but each actual organization—a family, a village, a corporation, a state—falls, in terms of each of its attributes, somewhere along a continuum, one end of which constitutes an element of the *Gemeinschaft* type of organization and the other an element of the *Gesellschaft* type. The characteristics of the *Gemeinschaft* type of social organization are those which we commonly impute, however mistakenly, to primitive and peasant people. The number of members in the organization is small, membership is rigorously defined, each member is personally known to all the others, and membership is permanent. In this type of organization there is marked homogeneity within the membership; the members act and think in concert, and how they act and

Loomis and Beegel have applied the Tönnies concept with relentless logic and a fine disregard for the evidence of their senses to an analysis of rural society. They use the distinguishing terms "familistic *Gemeinschaft*" and "contractual *Gesellschaft*" and have designed a scale for rating quantitatively the place along this hypothetical continuum of persons or social situations. See C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegel, *Rural Social Systems* (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1950).

think—i.e., their institutional practices, customs, beliefs, etc.—is fixed and unchanging. In such a society a great degree of social solidarity or cohesion is normal, and it stems from the fact that the various members have been rigidly trained into acceptance of the group's ways and into unthinking loyalty to the group itself. Individual deviation is unknown; as a consequence, crime and other forms of antisocial behavior are unknown; so, too, is innovative behavior. The individual members of a *Gemeinschaft*-type society are, in sum, so dependent upon and subservient to the organizational "whole" that they are incapable of thinking or acting in personal terms.

The *Gesellschaft* type of social organization, on the other hand, incorporates a large number of people—thousands or millions, rather than tens or twenties. The membership of such an organization is vaguely and loosely defined; and members may enter and leave the organization at will—their own or someone else's. In such an organization no member knows any of the others intimately, and he knows very few of them at all. The membership is heterogeneous, involving people of widely varying interests, values, sentiments, etc. Such solidarity or cohesion as does exist within the membership is a product of the individual self-interest of the various members and persists only as long as there is a convergence of those individual interests.

Whatever Tönnies himself may have believed, his theory was commonly interpreted here in America to mean that modern Western societies have evolved out of *Gemeinschaft*-type origins and are becoming predominantly *Gesellschaft* in character. According to this interpretation, the growth of cities, the rise of modern industrial plants, the emergence of the modern state, etc., have all involved a movement from such *Gemeinschaft* forms of organization as the peasant village, the traditional family, the handicraft shop, etc., to *Gesellschaft* forms of organization. And through this transition the individual has, according to this view, been liberated from the bonds of custom and convention and been enabled to express, in largely self-determined actions, his will. He has become a person and has ceased to be a social automaton living, thinking, and breathing in terms of the traditional standards of the group into which he is born, in and through which he lives his life, and by which, after death, he is buried in accordance with ancient rituals and superstitions. In the modern world, the individual is autonomous rather than an automaton; he has personal rights and personal properties, and he enters into associations (*Gesellschaft* in type, of course) voluntarily and in terms of the personal interests that such associations will serve.⁹

⁹ This thesis has been more or less systematically developed, with attention centered on the processes of social control, by J. Dowd in *Control in Human Societies* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1936). To Dowd, the evolution of modern society has involved a revolt from what he terms "paternal" control, which seems to be a sort of benevolent autocracy, and which appears to have left men in a state of general anarchy. Having thus conceptually desocialized man, Dowd then proceeds to put society together again, mainly by law but with some slight reliance upon the good will of individuals who have been properly educated into their social responsibilities.

Variations on the Theme. The *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* dichotomy has appeared in various guises, under a variety of labels, and with the accent on this or that specific aspect of the concept. Simmel, another German sociologist, stressed the materialistic aspect—or, as he termed it, the “sensualism”—involved in the transition to the *Gesellschaft* type of social organization.¹⁰ In this form of social organization, he said in effect, men calculate their relations with others in preponderantly materialistic terms, using money as the counters; and when they calculate that a profit is to be made by engaging in a given association, they contractually enter into that form of association.

The American version of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy that has been most persistently and ably sponsored is that of MacIver.¹¹ Like Tönnies, but with more reference to concrete factual evidence and less reliance on pure logic, MacIver makes the distinction between community and associative forms of organization (his terms for what Tönnies designated *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*) the core of his analysis. Community organizations are small and highly traditional in character; custom—expressed as habit in the individual—is the major control; and little opportunity exists for the play of individuality in group activities. By contrast, the “great associations” through which modern men mainly live are voluntary and deliberate in origin; they operate on the basis of appeals—including coercion—to the self-interest of the members; and their structures and procedures are essentially rational. MacIver has been especially interested in evaluating the extent to which the historical trend away from community forms of organization toward the “great associations” has liberated the individual from social domination and in trying to ascertain how the individual can be at once free and an integral member of society.

Of recent years, and largely through the efforts of Becker, the terms “sacred” and “secular” have come into American sociological usage.¹² Derived largely from the works of still another German sociologist, Max Weber, the concept underlying the use of these contrasting terms is that in a *Gemeinschaft* type of society men look upon their social practices as inviolable, whereas in a *Gesellschaft* type of social life the participants view their social practices,

¹⁰ G. Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes* (Leipzig, 1900). For translations and analysis of Simmel's works see N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925); H. E. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (2 vols., Heath, New York, 1938, vol. II, pp. 889–891); and R. Heberle, “The Sociology of Georg Simmel” in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (H. E. Barnes, ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948, pp. 249–273).

¹¹ MacIver represents in American sociology the English version of the Hegelian “great society” as developed by L. T. Hobhouse and G. Wallas. See R. M. MacIver, *Society* (Rinehart, New York, 1937) for the concepts discussed above. In a subsequent edition of this work (R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society*, Rinehart, New York, 1949, pp. 212–229) the idea that modern society consists almost exclusively of “great associations” has been considerably modified, and the existence and importance of primary forms of group life is recognized.

¹² H. Becker, “Sacred and Secular Societies” (*Social Forces*, vol. 28, pp. 361–376, 1950).

many of which are embodied in and enforced as law, critically and with a rational regard for their utilitarian value. A society such as our own, in which, presumably, the scientist or, at worst, the practicing politician is the authority on what constitutes sensible conduct, is thus secular in type.

THE DOCTRINE OF COLLECTIVE AUTHORITY

All those who have adopted, in some form or other, the idea that modern society is, or is becoming increasingly, *Gesellschaft* in character, with a consequent liberation of the individual from the restraints of tradition, custom, etc., have ultimately been faced with the problem of what holds the *Gesellschaft* type of organization together. Having, in effect, taken society apart and reduced it to an aggregation of autonomous individuals, they have been constrained, by the self-evident fact that modern people do live in social ways, to put it together again.

Hegel, it will be recalled, believed that in the modern state the will of the various individual members is somehow synthesized and embodied in the person of a leader, who then represents them in exercising autocratic power over the state. Tönnies completely reversed this concept; to apply a current label to his position, he was democratic rather than totalitarian in his point of view. *Gesellschaft* forms of organization arise and are maintained, he thought, through contractual agreements entered into freely and in terms of their own personal interests by the various members. Social solidarity in a *Gesellschaft* type of organization stems, therefore, from the fact that there exists among the many, independent, and otherwise varied members a congruity of interests.

The early French sociologist Durkheim¹³ came through the course of his studies of the historical rise of modern industry to doubt that there is in modern society sufficient community of interests among the individual members to explain the fact that they do, often quite unwittingly, work together in highly organized ways. Durkheim was disturbed by the declining importance of family and other traditional forms of organization. In his view, the members of a multitude of family and village groupings could be formed into a nation, for as individuals all had in common membership in a family and a village and shared the loyalties, values, sentiments, etc., that are common to all such groupings. But the members of modern societies lack attachment to groups of this order and have, as a consequence, no such basis for unity on the national level of organization.

The industrial revolution had given rise to an increasing division of labor among the members of society, with the result that the individual was becoming attached not to groupings of the same kinds as all other individuals,

¹³ E. Durkheim's major works include *De la division du travail social* (Alcan, Paris, 1893) and *Le Suicide* (Alcan, Paris, 1897). His theories are presented with evident approval by H. Alpert in *Emile Durkheim and His Sociology* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1939).

but to a specialized occupation or other work group with special, hence distinctive, interests, values, etc. All villagers would have in common interest in the preservation of the village form of life; but the highly specialized worker in modern industry was predominantly interested in the preservation of his particular aspect of the total productive process and uninterested in all other aspects. The economists, with their great faith in the inherent rationality of man, might believe that the workers and managers of a gear-making plant would support, politically and otherwise, those in such other specialized activities as wine making, leather working, steel producing, etc., because they would recognize that the making of gears depends upon the welfare of all such other specialized activities—*i.e.*, that what the economists like to term “enlightened self-interest” would lead those in one segment of a modern industrial organization to subordinate their own immediate self-interests to the welfare of the whole because in the long run their own welfare is dependent thereon.

Durkheim, however, could find no evidence in support of the concept of enlightened self-interest. On the contrary, the division of labor had, he concluded, wrought an increasing “division” of the members of modern societies into markedly divergent and antagonistic work groupings. The worker in one specialty was bound to his fellow workers by common interests, sentiments, values, etc.; but he was by that very fact set apart in these same terms from all the other members of the society. How, then, could it be that national and other forms of large-scale unity existed in the modern world?

To solve his conceptual dilemma, Durkheim posited the existence of suprarational “collective representations,” each of which is a system of ideas and concepts concerning the nature of a group and its relations to other groups. The collective representation is generated through the interaction of the individual members who come into association (presumably as a consequence of individual self-interest); but, once established, the collective representation dulls—or perhaps one should say lulls—the self-interest considerations of the various individual members and induces them to subordinate themselves to the welfare of the group as a whole. A certain similarity will be observed between the concept of the collective representation and Hegel’s idea of the collective will. Hegel used his idea of the collective will to justify political autocracy, in which the collective will is embodied in and represented by the leader of the state. Durkheim, on the other hand, had no more faith in the wisdom and integrity of the great man than in that of the common man. His collective representations are impersonal and need no personal representation; they constitute the mechanism by which the authority of the group as a whole determines the conduct of each individual member.

Durkheim was by no means clear as to the nature of collective representations, how they generate in modern forms of association, or the way in which they control the behavior of individual members. But he demonstrated to his own satisfaction their existence and efficacy with evidence showing that it was impossible to explain some forms of human conduct in any other way.

The suicide rate is remarkably constant in a given society year after year. Neither such external variables as climate nor such psychological factors as individual motivation, interests, etc., can explain such consistency; therefore, he concluded, a social and suprarational force must be at work.¹⁴ This behavior-determining force is a collective representation.

Mass Media and the Mass Society. Although Durkheim's concept of collective representations as the force producing social solidarity in large modern forms of association has contributed considerably to the befuddlement of American sociologists, many of them have nonetheless in recent years adopted a simplified version of it. This version, which for convenience may be termed the "fiction of a mass society," begins with the observation that the new means of communication, such as the metropolitan newspaper, the radio, the motion picture, and, now, television, enable one or a small number of men to communicate with tens of thousands or even tens of millions of persons. Because these means of communication can reach such large numbers of individuals more or less simultaneously, they have come to be designated, collectively, as "mass media," *i.e.*, the instruments by which large numbers can be addressed.

It is characteristic of communication via mass media that the communication process is, on the surface at least, one way: the newspaper editor addresses his readers, but how they respond to what he writes has a very limited and belated effect on him; so, too, with all the other mass media. Moreover, the many individuals who constitute the "mass" that is reached via a specific communication are for the most part isolated from one another, with the result that the response of each one to that communication is presumably unaffected by the fact that many others are also responding to the same communication.

To those sociologists who are enamored of the *Gesellschaft* concept of modern society as an aggregation of at least semiautonomous individuals, the development of the mass media has proved a godsend; it has provided them with an explanation for the fact that an otherwise amorphous aggregation of individuals can live together in highly complex organized ways. The mass media, they believe, provide the tie that binds; what is disseminated via the mass media constitutes the directive force which guides—for good or evil—countless otherwise isolated individuals into paths of conduct which are collective rather than just individualistic. And to this uniquely modern form of society they have given the term "mass society."

¹⁴ The idea that the suicide rate can be explained only in terms of some collective force, since it is rather consistent for given groups of human beings, is very much like saying that since death rates are quite stable, while the weather, the incidence of specific diseases, etc., are highly variable, the death of individuals can be explained only in terms of a constant "will to die." Actually, of course, the comparative stability of the death rate in any given society is, like that of birth and other rates, a result of the fact that death is a consequence of a wide variety of nonconstant factors which, being so very many, tend to cancel out one another's variability.

Mass society is categorically distinct, according to this concept, from pre-modern societies in a number of dimensions. It is composed of very large numbers of socially unrelated individual members; it is held together by impersonal communications via the mass media; and, most distinguishing of all, it operates on the basis of one-way communication rather than "interaction." Mass society is, therefore, peculiarly susceptible to autocratic control by the few, *i.e.*, by those who determine what shall be disseminated via the mass media. In such a society, propaganda both crass and subtle determines who buys what and when and where, who is elected to political office and the nature and extent of the power he can exercise over the masses, what the masses believe and think, and how the masses act. In such a society, the dominant means of control are the press, the radio, the motion picture, and television; and the individual in the mass responds almost automatically to symbols, in mechanical concord with his millions of fellows.

REDISCOVERY OF THE PRIMARY GROUP

The current tendency to see communications via the mass media as the tie that binds the members of a modern society is simply a reflection of the conceptual dilemma posed by the assumption that modern society is qualitatively different from the primitive, peasant, and other societies of the past. This assumption is a part of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* doctrine and of all variants thereof. In the *Gemeinschaft* form of social organization the individual is habituated to and hence enslaved by the customs, traditions, etc., of the group. In such a society social control and culture are synonymous; to put it another way, the culture that is maintained and transmitted through the generations by the members of the society controls the conduct of the individual member.

By assumption, however, the historical trend toward organizations of the *Gesellschaft* type has progressively liberated the individual from subservience to culturally designated customs, traditions, etc. He can, and to a considerable extent does, act in ways of his own devising; he pursues his personal interests, calculating the personal profit—material or otherwise—to be derived from various alternative courses of conduct. Unless it be assumed, further, that a multitude of such individually determined courses of conduct somehow converge to produce organized social activity, one must either deny the existence of social life or conclude that it arises through restriction of the very freedom that the trend toward *Gesellschaft*-type society has brought about. The use of propaganda to induce the individual to mistake the interests of some group for his own would be one means by which such restriction could be achieved. Law or physical punishment would evidently be the only other. For only deceit or threat of physical punishment would induce a free, self-determining individual to subordinate his own interests to those of groups.

The *Gesellschaft* Fallacy. That modern society is not primarily a product of propagandistic or legal controls, or both, will be shown in detail in subse-

quent chapters. The dilemma that is posed by the *Gesellschaft* concept arises, not from something inherent in modern society, but from a fallacy inherent in the *Gesellschaft* theory.

No one can question the fact that modern society differs quantitatively in many dimensions from the societies of primitive and peasant peoples or from that of Western peoples even as little as a generation ago. Villages have given way to or have swelled into towns and cities; cities have expanded enormously and continue to grow in size. Without any doubt a tremendous and continuing enlargement of the units of economic sufficiency has occurred, if, indeed, we can any longer think in terms of "units" of economic organization. There still are, in diminishing numbers, groups of a few hundred primitives or a handful of peasant families who themselves produce all the goods necessary for their maintenance. But today almost all the people of the world are bound together in a web of economic interdependence. There can be no doubt, either, that quasi-independent peasant households and similar small units have been largely displaced in the modern world by large and ever-enlarging corporate organizations or that the small band of primitive warriors, the medieval knight and his henchmen, and the bandit gang of former times have given way to huge organizations of fighting men maintained by nations numbering tens and even hundreds of millions of citizens. Nor can it be doubted that most modern men move about among their many fellows more freely than the individual in times past; or that the modern man can, and occasionally does, communicate with his fellows at great distances and thus form associations in which the members seldom, or perhaps never, meet face to face.

All these and related changes from the social life of other times are, however, *quantitative* changes. As the village has grown in size, becoming in time a great modern city, and its numbers have increased, many of its organizations—e.g., the political system—have grown proportionately, even, in fact, disproportionately. But that growth, like an increase in simple numbers of inhabitants, has not brought about new and unprecedented kinds of political life. Politics is, presumably, as old as human history; and although the size of political organizations has certainly varied among societies, the arts and consequences of political action are everywhere much the same. The fallacy inherent in the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy and all its variants is the failure to distinguish between changes that are quantitative and those that are qualitative; it is a mistaking for qualitative differences of the many and significant quantitative differences between modern society and primitive, peasant, and other premodern modes of social life.

This mistaking of the quantitative for the qualitative is particularly disastrous when interest centers on the controls that operate to maintain organized social life. It has, for example, led to the conclusion that, while culture is the major controlling force in *Gemeinschaft* societies, no cultural control is operative in *Gesellschaft* forms of society. In fact, however, the historical trend from the former to the latter type of organization has meant at most

no more than a modest reduction in the degree to which modern peoples are culture-bound.

It may be argued that, although the differences between a primitive or peasant society and a modern one are quantitative, the difference in degree between the two is so vast as to constitute in effect a difference in kind, *i.e.*, a qualitative difference. For some small purposes this may be so; but the difference in degree between the controls that operate in primitive or peasant societies and those that operate in modern societies are by no means so vast.

The very idea of a *Gemeinschaft* type of social organization was conceived at a time when knowledge of primitive societies was extremely limited and by men who, we must conclude, actually knew no more about life in the peasant village than they did about life in distant—and primitive—Nigeria. That ignorance led to an extraordinary oversimplification of premodern forms of social organization, to a most naïve and unrealistic concept of the “simple” primitive and peasant, a concept which has been preserved by those who have accepted and have thought in terms of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy.

In respect to the social control that operates in premodern forms of social organization, there is in actuality very little that even vaguely resembles the attributes imputed to the *Gemeinschaft* type of society. The members of such societies are not homogeneous, not “as like as peas in a pod.” They are differentiated in as many ways as are the members of a modern society, although to a somewhat lesser degree. Their normative conduct varies in accordance with such factors as sex, age, occupation, social rank, etc. They all deviate in some ways and to some degrees from the norms for their class within the general population. Among them, as among modern populations, some few deviate so far and so generally that they stand out as criminals, eccentrics, or psychotics or as innovators or individual ascendants. The members of such societies are, on the whole, somewhat more culture-bound than are most modern peoples, but they are hardly slaves to culture; and the presumed solidarity of such social groupings is an illusion bred of ignorance.¹⁵ A primitive tribe,

¹⁵ Such ignorance was, perhaps, excusable in the sociologists of a half century ago. Their source of information on life in the rural hinterland may have been restricted to music-hall characterization of the country bumpkin; and the anthropologists of the time were prone to look upon their primitives with the indulgent air of adults toward the antics of naïve children.

Today, however, sociologists need not depend upon secondhand information for their knowledge of rural society; they can, if they will, drive out into the hinterland and see for themselves. And there is now available a vast anthropological literature on the subtleties and complexities of life in primitive and peasant societies which makes the *Gemeinschaft* version seem closely akin to Rousseau’s philosophical concept of “natural” man.

Whatever their predecessors may have thought, modern anthropologists are almost uniformly impressed with the wide range of individual variation that occurs in primitive and peasant societies and with the total lack of mechanical solidarity. Anthropological discussions of social control in primitive societies often correspond in some respect or

a peasant village, or any other premodern social grouping generates its traitors, its shirkers, and its dissidents, just as modern societies do, though possibly to a somewhat lesser extent. The idea that the members of such societies live in absolute, if somewhat mechanical, harmony is in fact ridiculous; here as everywhere wives nag husbands, husbands contradict wives, both scold children, and the latter taunt one another.

The first error, as distinct from the major fallacy, in the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy is the assumption that folk society is in any respect simple. The second, and equally great, error is the assumption, which could have arisen only out of ethnomypia, that modern people are not folk. Even as the *Gemeinschaft* idea of primitive and peasant people is about as close to reality as is the old urban-folk stereotype of the countryman as a "hayseed," so the *Gesellschaft* idea of the modern man is about as unrealistic as the old rural-folk stereotype of the "city slicker." Modern science has greatly extended human knowledge of the universe, and modern technology has tremendously increased man's ability to put physical and biological nature to his own purposes. This is the age of miracle drugs, of airplanes, radio, television, and atomic fission. Most Western people do reside in vast urban aggregations, most use and rely on the devices of modern technology, most work in great corporations or equally large governmental bureaucracies. But their independence as individuals, their social sophistication, and their selfishness and rationality have been greatly exaggerated.

The Primary Group Is Rediscovered. Cooley, it will be recalled, had indicated as early as 1902 that the individual is socialized mainly in and through direct and intimate association with other human beings—parents, siblings, playmates, etc. He implied that this is true of all peoples at all times; and in 1909 he examined directly the relation between the rise of large, derived forms of social organization and the primary groups which, he thought, were almost, if not quite, as important in the life of modern as of premodern peoples. In the years following, sociologists occasionally stressed the role of small intimate groups as it applied to some special class of persons, usually

other to the concepts that will be presented here; and in such anthropological discussions there is almost always the implied assumption that the various means of social control operative in primitive society are local versions of the same kind of control that operate in our own society.

For examples of the anthropological approach to social control see R. Firth, *Human Types* (Thomas Nelson, New York, 1938, Chap. V, "The Regulation of Conduct," pp. 126-149); P. Brown, "Changes in Ojibwa Social Control" (*Amer. Anthropol.*, vol. 54, pp. 57-70, 1952); and E. A. Hoebel, *Man in the Primitive World* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949, "Social Control," pp. 359-423).

A massive collection of materials on social control in primitive societies is provided in the *Outline of Cultural Materials*, prepared by the Cross-Cultural Survey, Institute of Human Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938, category 42.

A forceful denial of the idea that primitive and peasant societies differ in kind from modern society has been made by the anthropologist M. Opler in "Cultural Alternatives and Educational Theory" (*Harv. Educ. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 28-44, 1947).

criminals or juvenile delinquents. But for the most part, attention was directed to the larger forms of associative life; and the existence of the primary group in modern society was either ignored or, in accordance with the *Gesellschaft* concept, specifically denied. Only within the last few years have sociologists begun to recognize, and to that extent to rediscover, the fact that modern men do live in and are controlled in considerable measure by small "primary" groupings.

This rediscovery began, interestingly enough, with an elaborate research conducted under the direction of Mayo to ascertain why modern industrial workers were not behaving in accordance with the theory that the worker in modern industry is an independent entity motivated by the prospect of personal gain and guided, at least to some extent, in this endeavor by considerations of a rational character.¹⁶ Industrial managers, operating on this assumption, had endeavored to increase worker productivity by such "rational" incentives as bonuses for exceptional efficiency; but on the whole, industrial workers had not responded in the expected ways. They tended to maintain a constant level of production in spite of improved working conditions (better lighting, clean washrooms, etc.), mechanically more efficient work procedures, and even the promise of higher pay for higher productivity. Mayo's studies were undertaken to ascertain why this was so; and the finding was, in brief, that the workers operated, not independently, but as members of tightly knit work groups, each of which developed and maintained a group norm of productivity. Psychologists seized upon this finding and were soon talking in learned fashion of the "group factor" in individual conduct. Sociologists, notably those who were drawn into the study of what came to be called "human relations in industry," began, more cautiously but perhaps more solidly, to explore the possibility that the individual in modern society was influenced more than had been thought by membership in small groups and less by law, by the formal regulations of corporations and other large organizations, and by the ideological impact of such modern means of communication as the radio and motion picture.

The sociological rediscovery of the primary group was, apparently, greatly accelerated by wartime studies of American soldier morale, undertaken at the instigation of the Army by a group of sociologists and social psychologists.¹⁷

¹⁶ The now widely known Bank Wiring Observation Room study that was carried on between 1927 and 1932 in the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne Works in Chicago. These researches have been reported in E. Mayo, *Human Problems of Industrial Civilization* (Macmillan, New York, 1933); T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1938); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dixon, *Management and the Worker* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939); and many other books and technical articles.

¹⁷ These studies were reported in S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (2 vols., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1949). The two volumes are now commonly referred to as *The American Soldier*.

For an indication of the way in which these findings contributed to the rediscovery of

The findings, which will be referred to in various connections later, indicated (1) that the willingness of soldiers to fight was not significantly affected by indoctrination in the ideological justifications for American participation in the war or by the prospect of securing medals and other rewards for exceptional valor; and (2) that in small, intimate group associations soldiers developed norms of conduct not unlike the production norms of industrial workers. The publication of the masses of data that were collected through these studies has not only provided materials for sociological analysis but has given impetus to the attempt to find in the existence and operation of small primary groups the explanation for the fact that modern men do not live up to the *Gesellschaft* interpretation of how they should behave.¹⁸

The analysis of social control presented in this book is necessarily tentative and exploratory. The hiatus in the meaningful study of social control that existed from early in the century until well into the third decade of it has greatly retarded the accumulation of useful data and the evolution of effective conceptual tools. Moreover, the ghosts of the various doctrines that have here been described are still too lively to be entirely ignored. Nonetheless, it is now possible to demonstrate that all men are always and everywhere subject to social control and that this control is qualitatively the same, whatever the size or the form of the society. It thus becomes possible to develop a general theory of social control—or at least a body of consistent theories about social control—applicable to all peoples and all times.

the primary group see E. A. Shils, "Primary Group in the American Army" in *Continuities in Social Research* (R. Merton and P. Lazarsfeld, eds., Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1950, pp. 16–39)

¹⁸ For a more systematic and detailed analysis of what is here termed the "rediscovery of the primary group," see E. A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group" in *The Policy Sciences* (D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell, eds., Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1951).

Almost every recent issue of the various journals of sociology, social psychology, and psychology contains one or more articles on primary, or, as they are alternatively termed, "small" groups. The following books and monographs, representative of the growing literature devoted to primary-group life, indicate the growing interest in the subject and constitute major contributions to either materials on or theories of the nature and role of primary forms of association in modern society: B. Brownell, *The Human Community* (Harper, New York, 1950); G. C. Homans, *The Human Group* (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1950); H. Guetzkow, ed., *Groups, Leadership and Men* (Carnegie Press, Pittsburgh, 1951); and W. F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943).

THE CULTURAL BASIS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The behavior of any human being, whatever his society, is invariably influenced by a variety of forces. No act, however simple, is *caused* by this or that; it is, rather, produced through the interaction of a multitude of factors, no one of which is a constant. Such a trivial act as that of drinking a Martini at a cocktail party presupposes so many things that their sheer enumeration would be a major task. Only in a culture that provides for the production, distribution, and consumption of alcoholic beverages and of that particular mixture known as a Martini can such a cocktail be consumed; only where the social arrangements are conducive to the occurrence of cocktail parties can a Martini be drunk at such a party; only when circumstances and individual interests and motivations have led to the giving of a specific party can a cocktail be drunk there; only when time and circumstances and the interests and motives of a given individual have led him to attend the specific party can he drink a cocktail at it; only if there is no alternative or if his personal taste runs to Martini cocktails will he drink a Martini at the party; etc.

The foregoing should at least suggest the futility of attempting to ascertain and describe the particular factors and special combination of factors that lie behind a given act of a given individual. It should also suggest the absurdity of explaining any kind of human action—such as a person's voting Republican rather than Democratic, saving money rather than spending it, or buying X's soap rather than Y's—as the result of some simple, one-factor "cause." Just as the suggestion of his hostess might swing an otherwise undecided guest to accept a Martini rather than a Manhattan, so a political speech might swing an undecided voter to the Republican camp. The speech does not, however, explain the behavior of the individual in voting Republican; still to be accounted for are the socially provided opportunity to vote at all, the individual's interest in voting and his ability to vote, and the reasons why he was uncertain which party to vote for when he came to hear the speech.

THE PERSISTENCE AND CONTINUITY OF SOCIAL ACTION

Actually, the major problem of social psychology is not to explain why people change from doing this to doing that, but rather, to explain why they persist in doing very much the same things generation after generation. For the quantitatively dominant fact of social life is continuity. Kings come and go, dictators rise and fall, and wars, revolutions, famines, and pestilence sweep

the land; but the basic patterns of social life change very little. When, for example, a war is over, the life of the town, the village, or the great city gradually returns in most salient respects to the prewar normal; and in many instances, as was the case in postwar Europe, the new village or town is rebuilt in the very image of the old and out of the rubble of the old. The war, well past, becomes but a memory, data for the historian, a monument in the public square, and a reminder, never heeded, that no war is the war that ends all wars or the war that ends mankind.

Continuity in the basic patterns of social life is well illustrated by the persistence, generation after generation, of the spoken language. Language is by no means the most stable aspect of a society. Learning a new language is comparatively easy for the individual; certainly it is easier than learning to live in a different kind of family system. Moreover, new words and new usages of old words can be incorporated into a language without disturbing the language as a whole. Thus a language can be changed bit by bit; and, in fact, all languages are so changed. Nevertheless, the various languages of the peoples of Europe have remained so constant over the past five hundred years that the early ethnologists often assumed that language was a criterion of race—*i.e.*, that one's mother tongue was a certain indicator of one's racial origin. And it has been largely on the basis of the proved continuity and the obvious differences between languages that the very idea of racial continuities and differences has been justified. In view of the fact that during the past five hundred years the peoples of Western Europe have been intermixed and brought into constant if superficial association by recurrent wars, by revolutions, and by developments in trade, transportation, and communications, the great puzzle is why they still speak such a variety of widely differing languages. For centuries the Flemings of Belgium, who have been living with the French-speaking Walloons and next door to the Dutch, have nonetheless retained as their base language an archaic form of Low German.¹ The peoples of Brittany, who have been for many centuries a part of France, fighting along with the other French in war after war, and who have been interdependent economically and otherwise with the rest of France, still speak a dialect which is almost incomprehensible to other Frenchmen. And so it goes, in all lands and among all peoples. English has perhaps become more widely spoken during the past few centuries; but the number of non-English languages has not noticeably diminished, and the varieties of the English language now spoken are unquestionably greater than they were when English was spoken only by the English.

From the foregoing, which is only suggestive of an easily demonstrated

¹ For a detailed analysis of the persistence of cultural differences, including four distinct languages—French, German, Italian, and the archaic Romansh—among the Swiss people, see K. Mayer, "Cultural Pluralism and Linguistic Equilibrium in Switzerland" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 157-163, 1951).

commonplace, it should be evident that the first requirement of a satisfactory explanation of human behavior is an explanation of the historical persistence of forms of behavior.

The Cultural Explanation of Behavior. Probably the simplest explanation that has been advanced is the biological one, in which the forms of human conduct are presumed to be biologically transmitted from generation to generation in much the same manner as is eye color and sex. This explanation has, however, been thoroughly discredited by anthropologists and sociologists. As an alternative to it, most anthropologists have until rather recently accepted the cultural explanation; and many sociologists have adopted it at least in part. In this connection culture is defined as the heritage of "wisdom," or more properly, the total of inventions and discoveries, that is added to and passed on by each successive generation. From the evidences of archeological, anthropological, and sociohistorical researches, it has become evident that the additions made by any generation to what it has inherited are very small in relation to the culture as a whole and that changes in the culture come about very slowly. Developments in tools, for example, where the evidence is fairly continuous over some thousands of years, have been found to have occurred quite gradually; perhaps for centuries no appreciable changes will have occurred in a given tool; then over the course of two or three generations that tool will have been considerably modified, the new form becoming in turn fixed for long periods. In the evolution of tools and other artifacts, such as pottery, a hundred years is no time at all and a thousand years is just a little while. Although there is no detailed evidence, the development of such social devices as forms of human relationships, morals, and manners would seem to be equally slow and noncontinuous. Each generation in the history of a given society has, apparently, passed on its forms of social life as it has its tools and techniques—more or less intact.

Our own period has been one of comparatively rapid cultural change, especially in the technological aspect of our culture. In one generation, for example, there occurred in America an almost total shift from major reliance on the horse and wagon for private land transportation to almost exclusive reliance on the automobile. The succeeding generation witnessed the development of the airplane from an experimental toy to a major instrument of war and of peacetime transportation. Even so, the changes wrought by that generation were small in comparison with the totality of what they had inherited from the past. Within the past quarter century the United States has developed tens of thousands of miles of paved highway where there was none before. The skill, thought, and materials that have gone into the building of the present road system are imposing; but that achievement is small in comparison with the total of what previous generations of Americans did in exploring and settling the continent, displacing the aborigines, chopping down and burning out the forests, breaking the prairie sod, building towns and cities, laying down

railroads, and the like. After all, even in America most of the physical plant (the buildings, canals, drainage ditches, etc.) is a half century old or more. And in old countries, such as England and France, the physical plant is mostly a heritage from a century or more ago.

Moreover, the new—whether it be highway or automobile or whatnot—is invariably built out of elements that are old. The ancient Romans contributed a great deal to our modern road-building techniques; and the automobile was developed out of preexisting elements, some of which, like the wheel and metallic iron, had been invented centuries before.

It should be evident that to explain the persistence and continuity of forms of social action by pointing out that most, if not all, of what the members of a society do is determined by their cultural heritage is really no explanation at all. It is but a shift of terms. Culture is simply a socioanthropological designation of the fact, now thoroughly demonstrated, that what the members of any society do changes very slowly from generation to generation (or from decade to decade and century to century). The cultural "explanation" has not, however, been without value; for it shifted attention from the idea that behaviors are biologically transmitted to the idea that the transmission is social.

The Sociopsychological Explanation. The idea that most of what men do has been transmitted to them socially from the past gave rise to social psychology, a field of science that has been largely and sometimes exclusively devoted to the discovery of the processes by which culture is transmitted. It is in those processes, *in toto* designated socialization, rather than in the fact of culture, that a partial explanation for the persistence and continuity of social actions has been found. The salient aspects of those processes are now well known. Today it is possible, for example, to explain with considerable confidence why it is that a child born into an English-speaking family in an English-speaking community will come in time to speak English rather than French or Chinese or some entirely new language. Because it is possible to explain this and many other more complex and subtle aspects of the transmission of culture, it is also possible to make some rough predictions, such as that the latest proposal for a universal language or the simplification of English spelling is certain to wither on the vine.

The Missing Factor. As sociopsychological exploration of cultural transmission has proceeded, it has, however, become increasingly evident that socialization does not provide a complete explanation for the observed persistence and continuity of social actions. Socialization, the processes by which culture is transmitted and by which the individual is inducted into the modes of thought and action that are normal for one of his eventual status in his particular society, is extremely complex. Moreover, the individual is not a passive recipient but an active participant in those processes. For these, and other reasons that need not be detailed here, every individual acquires some attributes that are contracultural—some values, attitudes, motives, and manual skills that make him in these respects a poor representative and transmitter

of the culture.² From the cultural point of view these deviant attributes of the individual may be described as errors in the processes of socialization. The very complexity of socialization means that the culture cannot possibly be transmitted accurately; there will always be many errors, whatever the society. And in a relatively dynamic society, such as our own, where socialization is haphazard and poorly organized, the errors are many and various.

The question arises: Why is it that the errors of socialization—the deviant attributes of the members of a society—do not accumulate and do not get transmitted through the generations and so replace in a relatively short span of time the preexisting culture? Why is culture not renewed every few generations? Why does it, in view of these facts, have persistence and continuity?

The general problem can perhaps best be illustrated by a specific element thereof. There have been, it would seem, a considerable proportion of “bad” boys—boys with socially atypical concepts of property rights, etc.—in American villages, towns, and cities for as far back as there are written records. Juvenile delinquents are not, in other words, a peculiarly modern problem. Such boys represent a major failure in the processes of socialization, a failure demonstrated by their overt violation of law and local social sanctions. Contrary to those who currently view with alarm, there is, however, no reason to believe that the proportion of juvenile delinquents is much larger today than it was a century ago. The forms of delinquency have changed somewhat; the delinquent of a century ago would have stolen a horse and buggy for a free ride, whereas today he would steal an automobile. The delinquent of a century ago would have been thrashed by his father or by a neighbor who caught him in the theft, whereas in the modern community he is run through the courts and is punished, if at all, by detention. But, although the forms of delinquency are different, both instances of delinquency involve a violation, presumably resulting from malsocialization, of culturally indicated modes of conduct. If any considerable proportion of delinquent boys grew up to be criminals, as some few of them have done and do, and if they then transmitted their contracultural attributes to their sons, the number of criminals in the social population would increase geometrically; for these socialized criminals would, each generation, be an addition to the number already created by malsocialization. Long since, America would have been a society of criminals; and crime, as it has long been defined, would be normal—*i.e.*, the cultural. But the fact is otherwise, as is evidenced by the persistence and continuity of the legal definition of crime.

Something, then, operates in our and in every other society to correct for

² For an analysis of the various reasons why socialization is always imperfect see R. T. LaPiere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (3d ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 59–73 and 183–199).

A description of the actual transmission of culture through socialization is provided by J. M. Whiting in *On Becoming a Kwoma: Teaching and Learning in a New Guinea Tribe* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941).

the inevitable errors of socialization, to make the deviant individual conform rather closely to the dictates of his social heritage. That something, which has as yet been little studied, constitutes the field of social control, as the term is here used, and it is the subject matter of all the succeeding chapters.

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

Since social control operates for the most part to correct for and to supplement the processes by which culture is transmitted from one generation of social members to the succeeding generation, basic to even a tentative analysis of the nature and operation of social control is an understanding of the culture which it substantiates and supplements.

Most of what any human being learns as he grows from an infant to an adult is culturally indicated. Just how much is "most" depends in the first place upon his particular society; it is less in a comparatively dynamic society such as our own than in a relatively stable one such as premodern China. It depends in the second place upon the particular individual; it is less with the poorly socialized than with the well-socialized one. But whatever the society and whoever the individual, most, but not quite all, of his tastes, his values, his motivations, his skills, etc., will be a personal embodiment of elements of the cultural milieu into which he was born and reared. This fact has long been recognized by sociologists, although at times ignored by them in their preoccupation with other matters, and has recently been discovered by anthropologists.⁸

It is not, of course, *culture* that determines so many of the personal attributes of a human being. As has been indicated, culture is a concept, an abstraction, a way of designating and dealing with the fact, discussed above, that there is much continuity over time in the things that people do. The child who is frightened by the sight, or even by the thought, of a snake may be responding culturally to snakes. There is certainly nothing innate (biologically determined) about fear of snakes, and at least in our own society snakes have been feared by most people for hundreds of years; the snake has been a symbol of evil throughout Christendom (did it not encourage Eve to tempt Adam with the apple?); and although most snakes are really very helpful to man, living as they do mainly on rodents, the snake is about the only creature that has not been the object of a Society for the Protection of. What makes the child's fear of snakes a cultural phenomenon is the fact that the people who have taught the child to fear snakes learned to fear snakes from other people, who in turn had learned from still other people, etc., no one of whom

⁸ This distinctly labored discovery of what had long since become commonplace concepts in sociology and social psychology is recorded in the following works: A. Kardiner and R. Linton, *The Individual and His Society* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1939); A. Kardiner et al., *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1945); R. Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1945); and C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (Knopf, New York, 1948).

may actually have been bitten by a snake and thus learned through direct experience that snakes are to be avoided. Most of what any child learns is of this order—cultural in the sense that it is learned from people rather than by direct experience. Thus, perhaps, the child may learn that pork is not good to eat without actually eating pork; and he may learn that his tribe or nation is the best in the world without having actual experience in another tribe or nation.

Although what he so learns may fruitfully be described and analyzed under the rubric "cultural," it must not be supposed that culture is an active force, a self-maintaining system of behaviors which moves down the generations under its own steam much as a wind moves through the trees of a forest. Culture has often been so conceived, with the result that all contact with social realities has been lost. Although a culture has continuity through time and may be figuratively said to have a life transcending that of the people living at any given time, it lives only in a figurative sense. Without people to learn the cultural ways, to live in those ways, and to teach those ways to their descendants, there would be no culture.

The Basic Culture and Social Control. Considered abstractly, a culture consists of skills whereby tools are made and used, of patterns of human relationship, of symbolic devices, such as words and concepts, and of the appropriate motivations, sentiments, values, and other human attributes which result in the use of such skills, patterns, etc. Considered abstractly, a culture is a system in that each of its multitudinous elements has a more or less functional interdependence with all the others. The individual member of a society does not, however, acquire the totality of the culture of that society. What he acquires through socialization is but a small, highly selective part of the total. The particular elements of the culture that he will learn to make his own are determined, whatever the society, by a variety of factors, among the most common of which are his sex, his age, and his locus at birth within the society. Such other factors as his level of physical vitality, the occurrence of childhood illnesses, or the premature death of a parent will have some sort of effect on his socialization, although the particular effect of any such factor will vary considerably from society to society and from individual to individual.

Every individual, however, invariably acquires some attributes of the culture that are shared more or less in common by all members of the society. The commonly shared elements may for convenience be designated the "basic" culture. The idea of a basic culture is necessarily vague, for the realities that it is intended to represent are themselves complex and variable. For modern peoples, at least, there are in fact a number of basic cultures. Americans, for example, share with all Western Europeans the same general technology, a historical attachment to the patriarchal family system, Christianity (or Judaism), the corporate system of economic organization, parliamentary government, and countless other cultural elements. At the same time, the American

version of these common elements differs from that of the English, and both of them differ from that of the French. Thus while all three make bread and potatoes (rather than noodles or taro) the principal source of starch, typical American bread is different from typical English bread, and typical French bread is distinct from both. Likewise, while Americans and Western Europeans are basically monogamous, at least in the sense that concubinage or polygamy is not sanctioned, the occasions and circumstances when the monogamous principle may be violated with impunity differ considerably in the different Western countries.

Little effort has as yet been devoted to ascertaining the basic cultures of the peoples of the world, and the variations on them. In a casual way, Western and Oriental civilizations are often contrasted, which would suggest that all Western peoples have some things in common and that these things distinguish them from Oriental peoples, who also have some, but different, things in common. What these things are is seldom indicated; and in practically all the attempts that have been made to isolate things that distinguish the people of the West from those of the Orient, the results have turned out, upon close examination, to be creations of prejudice rather than matters of fact. Thus the long-standing Western idea that Orientals are characteristically "calm of face and manner" can be explained only by Western ignorance of Orientals; perhaps the idea was originally derived from stylized pictures by Chinese of Chinese that were brought back to Europe by traders—in any event, it is far from the truth. And so, too, are most Western ideas, past and current, of the things that distinguish us of the West from those of the East. Even such a tangible fact as that Westerners are grain eaters and Orientals rice eaters is subject to so many qualifications that in the end the contrast becomes so indistinct as to be almost meaningless.

Anthropological studies of small, isolated peoples, mainly preliterate, have, however, provided a wealth of validated data that illustrate the concept of a basic culture and that demonstrate the existence of differences—sometimes large, sometimes small—between the basic cultures of different peoples. A great variety of often striking cultural contrasts appear in the anthropological literature—that this people relish roast ants for dinner, whereas that people enjoy nothing so much as the well-rotted head of a fish; that in this society the child loves his father but is indifferent to his mother, while in that society the child typically dislikes his father and loves his maternal uncle.

The few attempts that have been made to gather comparable data on the cultures of literate peoples have been profound failures.⁴ Nevertheless, that there are differences in the basic cultures of literate peoples comparable to

⁴ Notably the attempts to describe and analyze "national character." For examples see G. Gorer, *The American People* (Norton, New York, 1948); and M. Mead, *Soviet Attitudes toward Authority* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1951). On the other hand, the less pretentious study by F. L. K. Hsu, *American and Chinese, Two Ways of Life* (Henry Schuman, New York, 1953), provides a useful contrast of two dissimilar cultural systems.

those of preliterates can hardly be doubted. To the student of social control the existence of these differences means that it can never be assumed that a leadership device or a group control device that operates in such and such a manner in one society operates in the same way in another society. The elaborate mechanism of the police state was used effectively in prewar Japan and Germany, as it is still used in Russia, to keep a politicomilitary elite in power; but it does not necessarily follow that a would-be dictator could make a similarly effective use of police-state methods in France, England, or the United States. In fact, such evidence as is available indicates that among the latter peoples strong-arm tactics tend to arouse more resistance than they override. It should, at any event, be self-evident that the offer of a drink of whisky is certain to have a quite different effect on a Moslem than on a Christian because of differences in their cultures; such an offer may be an excellent way to lull the suspicions of the latter and reduce him to a friendly state, whereas it is a certain way to make an enemy of the former.

The basic culture would seem, as it were, to set the stage for social control and, at the same time, to determine the limits within which other forms and means of societal control—legal, military, etc.—can be effective.⁵ The culture of colonial America, for example, permitted the development of slavery as a system of labor procurement; the culture of contemporary America precludes both the reestablishment of slavery and the attainment, by law or any other directive means, of full equality by the Negro descendants of the slaves. The basic culture of China, on the other hand, does not permit any mass enslavement, for that would run counter to many traditional values and sentiments. At the same time it does permit, although it does not dictate, the selling of girls into domestic servitude, into prostitution, and into concubinage. The culture of the Middle Ages permitted the Church to resort, through secular authority, to torture and death to coerce heretics into acceptance of the faith and more particularly into obedience to Church law. The culture of Spain still gives the Church considerable power, mundane as well as divine. Elsewhere, however, the basic cultures tolerate but hardly grant power to the organized Church. A political inquisition is perhaps conceivable even in democratic America—indeed, the treatment that has sometimes been accorded so-

⁵ This point has been explored by J. K. Galbraith (*American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1952), who advances the thesis that advertising, which is unquestionably a factor in the market demand for certain kinds of products in the modern world, is strictly a phenomenon of what he terms a period of "social opulence" and would be of no effect at all in a society of scarcity. G. Friedmann (*Problèmes humains de machinisme industriel*, Gallimard, Paris, 1946) has likewise argued that a specific form of control that may be operative in one social context may be inoperative in another; thus, he says, the findings of the Hawthorne study cannot be considered applicable to industrial labor in France and other countries. The studies of "democratic" and "autocratic" leadership made by K. Lewin and his followers have been subjected, with good reason, to considerable criticism. See K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates'" (*J. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 10, pp. 271-299, 1939).

called Communists by Congressional committees is almost that, although the torture is verbal rather than physical; but it is quite improbable that American society as now constituted could generate religious persecution of the medieval type or even of the sort that developed during the witchcraft scare in colonial New England. The basic cultural values, sentiments, and beliefs of the American people would not permit intense discrimination in the name of God.

SUBCULTURES

Although the vast and largely indefinable system of skills, patterns, values, sentiments, beliefs, and the like that constitutes the basic culture of the members of a society may distinguish them as a whole from the members of a society with another basic culture, it does not preclude the existence of clear and marked cultural differences among the members of each society. The basic culture serves, rather, as the foundation for a variety of subcultures. In small, relatively stable primitive societies there are few subcultures, and each is closely related to all the others, much as the cottages of a peasant village are few and are both spatially and architecturally akin. In modern societies, on the other hand, and, indeed, in all the great civilizations of history, there are a great many subcultures; and the differences between them are often wide and marked, even as the business, industrial, and residential areas of a modern city are many and varied. It is perhaps this great number and wide diversity of subcultures in modern societies that makes difficult any attempt to ascertain and describe with assurance the basic culture that underlies the whole.

A subculture is any complex of values, sentiments, beliefs, etc., which is at once derived from the past and transmitted to the future (hence, is "cultural") and which at the same time differentiates those who acquire it from the rest of the societal membership. The subculture of the Amish of Pennsylvania provides a simple illustration.⁶ The Amish share with most Americans such base sentiments as those which give superior value to the territory of continental United States and even the government thereof; they share with most Americans access to and some ability to use the English language; they share with other Americans certain aspects of Christianity, respect for formal education, resignation to the progressive income tax, and countless other cultural elements. But to be Amish means, in addition to being an American, being culturally distinct from the majority of Americans in a great many ways. Thus the Amish have their own peculiar version of Christianity; they cling to rural-life values and sentiments that for most other Americans have been replaced by urban-industrial values and sentiments; and they have some beliefs, such as that which leads them to wear buttonless garments, which have survived from the seventeenth century when the Amish were a fanatical religious cult. So markedly distinctive are the subcultures of such people

⁶ F. Klees, *The Pennsylvania Dutch* (Macmillan, New York, 1951).

as the Amish, the Mormons, and the Chinese of New York City and San Francisco, that these people are sometimes said to constitute "cultural islands."

In the main, however, subcultures are more or less subtle variations on the basic culture; and they differ one from another in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, some subcultures cut across others; and the personality of a given individual may represent a considerable number of subcultures. As a consequence, it is by no means easy to ascertain and describe the various subcultures of a given society.⁷ The following analysis does not, therefore, attempt to describe the various subcultures but rather to indicate some of the more important bases for the subcultures that are found in modern Western societies and that exist in some form and to some degree in all societies.

Regional Subcultures. Perhaps the most common and obvious cultural differentiation of the members of any large society is regional, the most evident, although perhaps least significant, element of which is the linguistic. Regional variations on a common cultural base are thought to have been historically produced by social isolation and, to a lesser extent, by the impact on cultural development of peculiar geographic factors. Once established, regional subcultures persist in spite of such leveling influences as modern means of communication and transportation. For more than two thousand years, for example, the people of China have had in common such cultural elements as methods of land ownership and use, agricultural tools and techniques, Confucian ideology, a written language, and the bureaucratic examination system. Yet regional dialects, food preferences, folklore, and prejudices have given markedly distinctive characteristics to the people of each of the provinces and of the districts within each province. Similarly, while through the past few hundred years all the people of England have been "English" (*i.e.*, they have shared a common cultural base), they have been and still are very much regionalized. The people of Cornwall and Devon, for example, dividing between them a small peninsula, have significantly different dialects and architecture, as well as significantly different cultural elements of a more subtle and more important order. The same is true of all the peoples of Europe, as of all modern peoples. In America, the major regional subcultures are those of the Old South, of the Deep South, of the Southwest (including all of west Texas), of New England, of the Middle West, of the Intermountain states, and of the Pacific Coast. Within each such region there are numerous

⁷ The difficulty is clearly demonstrated by the attempts that have been made by Warner and his associates to describe and analyze the class subcultures of a New England town. See, for example, L. Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Status System of a Modern Community* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1942). The use by Warner *et al.* of the terms "structure" and "social system" does not aid materially.

Where, as in some of the older societies, the class subcultures are both categorically distinct and highly differentiated, it is much easier to describe them. See, as one such description, B. Ryan, *Caste in Modern Ceylon* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1953).

subregional subcultures; thus the people of the Pacific Northwest (Oregon and Washington) are in some respects distinct culturally from those of California, and those of northern California from those of southern California.

The differences between regional subcultures are seldom so great that the individual who has been socialized into one will find it very difficult to adjust himself to another, although in some instances his acceptance by members of the other will be qualified. Almost any American can become in the course of a few years a "native" Californian, for the regional subculture of California is a potpourri of indigenous and imported elements. A Northerner who settles in the Deep South, on the other hand, will most likely remain a Northerner by local definition, even though he adopts the local modes of speech, dress, etc.; for in the Deep South, as in many other regions, regional pride remains strong.

Some pride in and loyalty to place, supported by appropriate values and beliefs, are common to all regional subcultures. Such pride and loyalty are fostered by the regional dialect, by regional clothing habits (e.g., the ten-gallon hat that is the trademark of the proud Texan male and the shapeless black felt hats of the Georgia Crackers), and by other things that mark out the members of one region from another. Each region tends, moreover, to have something of its own cuisine. Thus, while all English cooking may be "bad" from the American point of view, there are wide regional variations in English food tastes and practices. Devonshire cream, for example, is favorably known throughout England but is made only in Devon, although cream is available everywhere and the technique for converting cream into Devonshire cream is extremely simple. Although some regional specialization is related to local natural resources and climate, as is the wine making of various regions of France and the citrus culture of Florida and southern California, most regional specialization in agricultural and industrial production is a reflection of the existence of regional subcultures—the existence in a given region of values, sentiments, and skills that make for the production of this crop rather than that and these goods rather than some others.

Class Subcultures. Cutting across regional subcultures are invariably two or more class subcultures which differentiate the members of the society on the basis of socioeconomic status. The particular nature of the class subcultures depends first upon the basic culture and second upon the regional subculture. The only possible generalization is that, whatever the society, there will be some differentiation of its members into class levels and that the characteristics associated with each class level will be culturally indicated. In our own society material possessions constitute the most common and important determinant of class position; but this statement is subject to innumerable qualifications, such as, for example, that in New England and in the Old South family lineage may give a person of little material wealth a class position that is in many respects higher than is accorded someone of great material wealth or social accomplishment but lowly family background.

Whatever the class system and whatever the criteria of class position, each

of the several classes has something of its own subculture. The extent to which the various class subcultures differ one from another determines in part the extent of mobility of individuals and of families up and down the class system; in general, the greater the differences between the class subcultures, the less social mobility there is, if only because the greater the differences, the more difficult it is for an individual to acquire the cultural characteristics of a class above or below that into which he was born and socialized.

A class subculture, like a regional subculture, characteristically includes pride in membership. Pride in class is, however, much more complex than is pride in place. The values, sentiments, and beliefs that enter into regional pride and loyalty constitute a single integrated system, to the end that a good Texan, say, considers Texas the best place in the world and Texans the best people of the world. The values, sentiments, and the like relating to class position, on the other hand, constitute three distinct, although interrelated, systems. The core system of values, sentiments, etc., constitutes a rationale or justification for the individual's acceptance of and submission to his particular class position. Even in contemporary American society, where there is relatively high mobility among the classes, where class criteria are rather vague, and where the basic cultural ideal is mobility upward through the class structure, most persons accept their class position, however low in the scale, quite passively. The reason is that the class subculture into which the individual has been more or less effectively socialized provides him with a system of values, sentiments, and beliefs which makes that class position at least tolerable and, in many instances, all that can be hoped for "under the circumstances." Thus while a poor tenant farmer of the South may vaguely wish that he owned land of his own, his value system is such that, when he gets a spare dollar, he is likely to spend it for some trifling and momentary luxury rather than to save it toward the distant goal of land purchase.

The class also provides the individual with one more or less integrated system of cultural values, sentiments, beliefs, etc., that operates in his relations to members of higher class position and another system that operates in his relations to those of lower class position. The cultural orientation toward a superior class may range from extreme reverence, untainted with envy—the way in which the commoner has in most instances looked upon the aristocracy—to envy and strong motivation to climb up into the superior class position. The cultural orientation toward a subordinate class and its individual members has in general ranged from benevolent disdain to intolerant contempt. More than anything else, it is the view that a class takes toward the class above it that gives to the latter its position and that provides the values the individual members derive from that position. To be looked up to, envied, respected, and accorded the rights and privileges (mainly ethereal) of their class position is probably more important to the members of each class than are the material advantages, if any, of that position.

A class subculture always includes, in addition to what might be termed

its prides and prejudices, a special version of the base language, special food preferences and habits, and special dress, habitational, and other values. In a so-called closed class system these aspects of the subculture may categorically distinguish the class members from the other classes; in modern American society they generally make for subtle differences in degree rather than marked differences in kind. Gross or subtle, the differences are very real, as the individual who strives to move out of his class position into a higher one (or to gain, from necessity, acceptance into a lower one) soon discovers. To an outsider, the only apparent differences between the people who live in an upper-class neighborhood and those who live in a middle-class neighborhood in a small American town may be differences in the sizes of their houses and automobiles; but the people themselves are aware of differential values, sentiments, and beliefs and even of differential modes of speech, dress, and mannerisms. Moreover, they are also keenly aware of and place a high value on the superior status that is accorded members of the upper class by those of the middle and lower classes. Often, in fact, it is that accordance of superior status that is the main distinction of the members of an upper class.

Sex Subcultures. In every society, large or small, primitive or modern, cultural differences of some sort exist between the sexes. These differences cut across regional and class differences, although the feminine subculture of one class will of course differ considerably from that of another class; *e.g.*, all females may wear skirts, but the cut and material of the skirts and the occasions for and manner of their being worn may differ somewhat from class to class and indeed from region to region.

There would appear to be little if anything that is universal about masculine and feminine subcultures beyond that which is directly linked to the physiology of sex. Everywhere women bear children and, in so far as children are nursed at the breast, nurse them; and in most societies, past and present, the feminine subculture has centered about homemaking and child rearing. But feminine subcultures vary widely one from another, and there are many exceptions to the generalization. In most societies, masculine subcultures, in contrast to the feminine, have placed a high value on physical prowess, courage, and aggressiveness in sexual and certain other fields of activity and at the same time have defined as "feminine" a variety of contrasting attributes. As a rule, both the masculine and the feminine subcultures make the same definitions, whatever they may be, of the occupations, of the person-to-person roles, etc., that are appropriate to members of each sex. Thus in America a century ago both men and women seem to have considered that it was both right and proper and personally desirable that women should do the work of the household and that household tasks were feminine and definitely beneath the dignity of respectable males.

Although the present American sex subcultures are in many respects non-categorical, to the end that today a woman may enter the field of medicine and a man may wash the dishes without loss of self-respect, there still are very

clear ideas of sex-linked cultural attributes. Today a woman can upon occasion wear trousers, long the prerogative in Western societies of the male; on the other hand, the male cannot wear skirts; women can smoke, but men cannot use lipstick; women can fall in love with men and cohabit with them, but when men do the same they are socially ostracized and forced into a marginal social group with its own peculiar subculture. The extent to which there still are categorical sex subcultures and the importance to the individual of being socialized into the appropriate sex subculture are most strikingly indicated by the distaste and even revulsion which the majority of people feel toward the male homosexual. The male who consorts with males, especially if he plays the role of the female, adopting her cultural, including sexual, values, sentiments, and beliefs is to all normal males a disgusting phenomenon. This attitude exists only because in the American male subculture, as in that of most societies, men are measured against a masculine scale of values which differs in many significant respects from the scale of values applied to women. This masculine scale of values permits men to be interested in such recreational activities as fishing, hunting, and, before marriage, courting women; but it does not permit them to be greatly concerned with such esthetic matters as the curl of their hair, the hang of their trousers, or the *décor* of their bedrooms.

The sex subcultures of a given society are for the most part complementary; they make for a sex division of labor, for complementary sex and other social roles, etc. At the moment there are some small areas of conflict between the sex subcultures of our society; thus men are perhaps generally more conservative regarding the desirable—if not permissible—occupational and other roles for women than are women themselves. The modern American male may, as a reflection of his cultural training, prefer as a wife a girl who is interested in house and garden rather than a career; and, although he may accept women as near equals in other relationships, he may resent the fact that the girl he marries refuses to stay in her place and live up to his ideals for her. Such conflict is a consequence of the slow changes that are affecting the whole of modern American culture, and it is far less significant quantitatively than are the areas of agreement in American sex subcultures.

Occupational Subcultures. In the older societies, the sex subcultures usually included considerable occupational specialization. In modern societies the relation between sex and occupation is somewhat blurred, although it is still true that most American women are domestics by occupation and most American males nondomestic. On the other hand, occupational as distinct from sexual differentiation has greatly increased over the past two centuries as a consequence of industrialization; there has been an increase both in the number of specialized occupational groups and in the differences between one occupation and another. It was this particular kind of cultural differentiation which, it will be recalled, posed the problem of national and other large-scale solidarity that Durkheim solved by hypothecating suprarational forces which he designated "collective representations."

In the contemporary world at least, the members of each occupational grouping, and to some extent their wives and children, have something of their own subculture. This fact is obvious in the case of American farmers. Their work generally requires that they live in spatially isolated farm establishments, eat luncheon as well as breakfast and dinner at the family table, etc., in distinction to city businessmen and workers. But even more important than the home-centered character of their work is the fact that farmers have a system of values, sentiments, motivations, and skills which, although directly related to their work life, carry over into their entire way of living. The occupation of the professional criminal colors his entire life to an even greater degree, for he and his dependents have a subculture that is clearly differentiated in many respects from that of society as a whole. In some instances, on the other hand, occupational subcultures are largely limited to the occupational role. Thus whereas lawyers, doctors, academicians, accountants, and other professionals all have something of their own special occupational values, sentiments, skills, and the like, these are only occasionally and incidentally carried over into their nonoccupational activities. As a result a professor's daughter and a doctor's son will, all other things being equal, share much the same set of values concerning where and how to live, how many children to have, and how to bring them up, whereas the differences in the occupationally linked values, etc., of a farm-bred girl and the son of a city businessman may lead to an uneasy marriage.

The recent historical trend has undoubtedly been toward a continuing increase in occupational specialization; and as a man's work activity becomes narrower, his economic interests become more sharply focused upon one small element of the productive activities of the society, and his political and other interests, if not his entire way of life, also become narrower and distinct from those of other occupations. In later chapters frequent reference will be made to the effects of occupational subcultures and of membership in an occupational group upon the behavior of the individual. Here it need only be observed that each of the multitude of specialized occupations in modern society has something—in some cases much and in others little—of its own culture.

Family and Household Subcultures. Modern American society includes, in addition to the subcultures indicated above, a host of others; each of the age groups in each of the several regional, class, sex, and occupational subcultures has something of its own subculture; moreover, many socially deviant groups, such as homosexuals, drug addicts, prostitutes (an occupational group with a markedly atypical social position and very much its own way of life), and professional radicals, have some cultural characteristics that distinguish them from the social membership at large.

Perhaps the most widespread of the remaining subcultures, and certainly the least remarked yet often most significant for individual behavior, is that which is limited to the members of a single household or, less frequently, those of a family line. A family subculture, like a regional subculture, centers around

pride in membership—in this case pride in the family name and what it is supposed to represent. That pride is maintained by a variety of family legends concerning the greatness of its ancestors, the inherent superiority of the family line, etc. A household subculture usually includes, in addition, some special food and other tastes, a few special values such as those which may be accorded family heirlooms, and occasionally some socially atypical family practice, such as incest or exceptional miserliness in economic matters. A family subculture may have considerable continuity in such family systems as that of the Chinese, where a wife is brought to and inducted into the family of her husband. In our society, on the other hand, both family and household subcultures tend to change with considerable rapidity, if only because of the fact that a husband and wife in our society tend to blend and compromise the elements of their respective family and household cultures that each brought to their marriage. Nevertheless, family and household subcultures in our society are occasionally quite distinctive and important to their members, as is indicated by the persistence of such signs of family pride as naming a son "Junior" and the prevalence of interest in family genealogy.

INFRACULTURAL DETERMINANTS

The foregoing should at least suggest the very large variety of cultural factors which may enter into the socialization of any individual and the futility of attempting to explain the conduct of a given individual simply by reference to the basic culture of his society. It may well be that contemporary Americans are by and large more highly motivated in respect to the acquisition of material wealth than are the peoples of Europe, to say nothing of the peoples of Asia. From this and a multitude of comparable observations about the American people, a description of their basic culture might conceivably be achieved. Such a description would, however, be an abstraction so far removed from the specific that, however useful for some purposes, it would aid little if at all in explaining the behavior of any one, ten, or a thousand Americans. The conduct of any actual American is only in part a reflection of his basic culture and is in far larger measure a reflection of the various and quite varying subcultures into which he has been socialized. As a result, such a concept as that of a basic personality type for each society, a concept that is popular with some anthropologists, has none but poetic value.⁸

Cultural Relativity and the Search for Absolutes. The idea that there is for each society a basic personality type is one of the more recent of a long series of attempts to establish a fixed standard, or base, against which to measure or compare the behavior of individuals. Apparently it is exceedingly difficult for the human mind to cope with what are currently called "multiple

⁸ The concept originated with Kardiner (A. Kardiner and R. Linton, *The Individual and His Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939) as an ideal-type construct but has since been used as a literal representation by many anthropologists.

variables," that is, two or more related factors, neither of which is constant. A variety of devices, the latest of which is the electronic computer, or "mechanical brain," have been developed to manipulate mathematically complex problems of this order. The normal thought process, however, proceeds in terms of some fixed point of reference; thus gravitational pull is measured in terms of standards of weight, distances are measured from a fixed point, and conduct is judged in terms of a standard of behavior.

Each basic culture and subculture provides fixed points of reference by which the members of society can measure—*i.e.*, evaluate—the various things in the world about them. It is in terms of such cultural standards that a mountain is high, that the sky is blue, that water is cold, that life is worth living, that a man is old, that an act is sinful, and so on. But however convenient and necessary such standards may be, they have no universality. The mountain that is high to those who live on the plain is low to those who dwell in mountains that are higher still; the act that is sinful in one society may be virtuous in another.

Scientific exploration of the universe has disposed, one by one, of all the fixed points of reference provided by our culture, not because scientists have wished to dispose of them, but simply because the realities are not measurable in terms of fixed points of reference. Thus the earth is not, as "common-sense" observation once indicated, the center around which move the sun, the moon, and the stars. The earth turns out, in fact, to be an insignificant speck moving around the sun, which is itself a minor object moving through space in relationship to a vast number of other moving suns and clusters of suns and their planets. Nor does the earth consist of "matter" as man long defined it. Matter, it turns out, is mostly space; and in that space there is nothing fixed, nothing absolute; there are just electrons, protons, and other as-yet-unidentified particles which are racing around in relation to one another and which, apparently, are not really particles but forces, or, as one philosopher has despairingly termed them, "twists in space." Fortunately, the increasingly incomprehensible findings of astronomy and physics need not directly concern the student of human behavior. But those findings do illustrate the scientific principle of relativity; in fact, they gave rise to it. The physicist has at the moment—and perhaps he will not have it for long—only one fixed point of reference, the speed of light. Against this "constant" he can measure all other physical phenomena as relative motions and forces.

Social scientists, like the astronomers and physicists before them, started out with the assumption that there are fixed points of reference for the study of social life—that, for example, the patriarchal form of family life is the ultimate toward which all societies are moving and against which all other forms of organization may be measured. As more and more has been learned about the social life of different peoples, what were assumed to be fixed points of reference have, however, turned out to be relative to something or other, which in turn is relative to something else. In simple terms, what is good in

one society may turn out to be bad, or simply nonexistent, in another; what works in one way in one society may work in quite a different way in another. Sociologists and anthropologists have, therefore, been forced to recognize the relativity of all things social, hence the relativity of culture. An acceptance of the relativity of things social does not, of course, preclude the idea that there are laws or regularities in the relationship of sociocultural factors, any more than the relativity of things physical has necessitated the abandonment of the law of gravity. But it has led some sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and social psychologists to seek in the innate nature of man the animal a fixed point of reference for the measurement of all things social.

The Biological Absolutes. The search for a fixed point of reference in the nature of man resolves into a search for some universal and biologically determined need, drive, wish, or other demand of the organism which must be satisfied by the society if that organism—the human being—is to maintain good psychophysiological health. It is an obvious fact that the society must operate to provide food, shelter, and protection from physical attack for its members, or they will die out, and the society will eventually disappear. A great variety of social systems have, however, served these ends, as witness the wide variety of social systems now extant; in so far as these functions are concerned, one society is just about as “good” as another, and no one of them is any “better” than the noncultural social organization of the ants, who have also managed to keep alive over countless generations. Is there not, then, some need or desire common to all men which is above that of just animal maintenance and which one society may satisfy a little better, perhaps, than another? In answer to this question, the mystics have offered man’s “spiritual” need and have contended that Christianity, Democracy, Communism, or some other social doctrine or form of government serves this need better than another. But study has already demonstrated that what is defined as man’s spiritual need and what will satisfy it depends upon the particular culture and subculture—that it is, in sum, a relative matter.

The most durable of the biological fixed points of reference for the study of human behavior has been the one that is posited by the psychoanalytic doctrine. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Freud, in attempting to explain neurotic and psychotic behavior, hit upon the idea of inner psychological conflict between the individual libido and socially imposed restraints on action. He conceived the libido as an essentially sexual drive, a biologically determined factor assumed to exist in every human being in approximately equal intensity. In his system of interpretation, not only are all forms of neurotic and psychotic behavior symptomatic of the struggle of the libido to gain expression in a repressive society, but sex is the motif of all life; even the most commonplace human act, such as that of carrying a cane or saving money, is made, via tenuous reasoning, some sort of sexual expression. Here, then, is a fixed point of reference in biology, one from which everything that man may do can be measured. A number of anthropologists have taken the

Freudian libido as their point of reference for the evaluation of various cultures and have regarded as "best" that culture which gives freest expression to man's sexual drive and hence induces in him the fewest possible (consistent with the maintenance of social life) neurotic and psychotic disorders of personality.

That man is born with the ability, maturing after many years of life, to procreate and that the act of procreation is or can be pleasurable no sociologist or psychologist would doubt. It is obvious also that unless the members of a society engage sufficiently in sexual behavior, their number will rapidly diminish and their culture eventually disappear. But that the capacity to procreate is a biological "must" in the way that tissue needs for nourishment are a "must" is doubtful; and that this hypothecated "must" underlies every action that man takes is certainly untrue. In fact, the many attempts that have been made to demonstrate this thesis have actually demonstrated that anything, and hence nothing, can be proved by the method used.

Less spectacular than the psychoanalytic sexual fixed point of reference and somewhat more earth-bound was the four-wish platform that had a considerable vogue among sociologists during the early 1920s.⁹ In this system, all human behavior was interpreted as stemming from one or another of four fundamental wishes (the term "wish" can be rendered as "need" or "drive"): the wish for security, the wish for adventure (the converse of that for security), the wish for recognition, and the wish for response. Some psychologists offered comparable lists of drives, and all lists underwent considerable refinement and elaboration before the approach was finally abandoned as a scientific cul-de-sac. The underlying assumptions were that the four wishes, or their alternatives, are innate and that they constitute the wellspring of all individual and, collectively, of all social action. Time and accumulating evidence demonstrated that the wishes, like the instincts before them, explained nothing, that they were just names for observed forms of social behavior, for what was to be explained.

Of recent years social psychologists, both those who have come to the field from sociology and those who have come from psychology, have generally agreed that the motives, emotions, needs, tensions, and other internal drives to specific action are acquired through social experience. Even the biological need for food is now thought of as no more than an activating force, a force that may lead to learning but that does not itself determine what is learned. In effect, the same relativity is found on the sociopsychological level as on the cultural; what, as a social being, a man is *depends*, just as how high a mountain is *depends*. Complete acceptance of this relativistic position gives the social psychologist no fixed point from which to measure (or view) the extraordinarily variable behaviors of men.

A few of the psychologists, perhaps more reformistic than scientific in their

⁹ First advanced by W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (5 vols., Badger, Boston, 1918-1920).

outlook, have posited some one or another drive as the common denominator of all mankind.¹⁰ Of these, the need or drive for social status seems to the present author to have the widest applicability as a descriptive device; *i.e.*, in every society a great variety of actions can be subsumed under the category "protection of or attainment of status." There is, however, slight reason to think that such actions express a universal biological force.

Status Need as an Infracultural Phenomenon. Throughout the following discussion the thesis will be developed and demonstrated that one of the vital factors, but not the sole factor, in the determination of an individual's behavior is his regard for status in one or more discrete social groupings. Regard for status, a term that will be given more specific meaning in due course, is therefore considered to be a universal—something common to all men at all times. This constant in human behavior is not, however, considered to be of either biological or cultural origin. It is not instinctive, in the old or in any meaning of that term. It is not in any way comparable to animal hunger, whether hunger is defined as tissue need for nourishment or involuntary contractions of the stomach. It is not, in fact, something that the human animal brings with it into this world.

Nor is regard for status basically cultural.¹¹ As we have seen, culture is a variable, differing between different peoples, differing between various groups within the same society, and changing through time. Although regard for status takes innumerable and contrasting forms, most of which are no doubt cultural, the regard itself would seem to be a constant. Whatever the culture and subculture, the individual acquires to a considerable degree a regard for his personal status among the people with whom he is culturally brought into association. What is there that is common to all men, whatever their culture, that might conceivably instill in them this regard for social status?

Long ago Aristotle observed that man everywhere lives in some sort of society, from which he assumed that man has an instinctive need for the presence of human companions. The existence of that or any other instinct is not demonstrable; but it is demonstrable that (1) the human animal is born wholly incapable of surviving without human aid and (2) the period during which the human animal must be provided with food, protection, and guidance is far longer than that required by any other of the animals, includ-

¹⁰ H. Cantril, for example, has advanced the theory that what he terms "enhancement of the value attributes of experience" is the most generalized goal of man. See his *The "Why" of Man's Experience* (Macmillan, New York, 1950). It would seem that that "enhancement" comes largely through what is here designated as "status."

¹¹ The qualification "basically" is necessary in view of the fact that in any society every child will be more or less deliberately taught to value the good opinion of others. That training is an incidental product of adult efforts to induce the child to conform to cultural standards but is not itself cultural. Thus the mother who admonishes her child with "What will people think of you if . . ." is not transmitting to the child a culturally designated regard for what people think but is using the incipient regard of the child to force adherence to some cultural pattern and, perhaps, in the process furthering that regard.

ing his "next of kin" the simian primates. What this means is that, irrespective of the cultural forms by which the infant is provided for, the animal needs of the infant are directly satisfied through one or a number of human beings—his mother, his uncle, a hired nurse, etc. Through the years of infancy, childhood, and youth, animal dependency upon people diminishes; but through those years the individual acquires, by processes not difficult to discern, a growing psychological dependency upon them. That psychological dependency, which in its later manifestations has here been designated as "regard for status," has only a historical relation to such organic needs as that for food. At the same time it is not the product of any specific form—family, tribal, clan, or whatnot—of socially organized treatment of the infant and child. Thus it is not a product of culture per se. In this respect it differs from such culturally prescribed and hence nonuniversal acquisitions as regard for one's automobile or for one's status in heaven. It is, rather, the common product of the universal fact that the human animal must, if it is to survive, be fed and otherwise taken care of in some fashion by some human beings over many years. Thus *regard for status is an infracultural phenomenon rather than either a cultural or a biological one.*

The concept of regard for status as a universal infracultural phenomenon is considerably more complex than is the assumption that man is born with a need for or drive to social status. At the same time, it is considerably less complex and more tenable in view of known facts than are such concepts of cultural universality as those which were advanced by Cooley. Cooley regarded human nature, a body of social sentiments and ideals, as a universal product of socialization in and through primary-group association. Since primary-group forms have been found to vary widely from society to society, and since social sentiments (*e.g.*, the love or loyalty of a child for its mother) have been found to vary just as widely, the whole idea of human-nature universals has fallen into disrepute. There was, however, a germ of truth in Cooley's thesis. Every child from biological necessity lives in some sort of primary group. Out of such living there develops, if not a common body of sentiments and values, a need for or psychological dependency upon the presence of human beings.

It is not here assumed that the intensity of the need for human associates is the same in every individual. That need no doubt varies somewhat from individual to individual, even as do such physiological factors as blood pressure and body temperature. Nor can the forms of action that are taken to preserve or enhance status be explained by the regard for status; factors in addition to that regard, many of them external to the individual himself, enter into the determination of every act. The position that is here taken and that will be documented in the chapters which follow is that all men place some value on their status in some groups of men and that this regard for status is one of the important factors that enter into the determination of their behavior.

Chapter 3

THE COMPONENTS OF BEHAVIOR: PERSONALITY, SITUATION, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The individual's regard for social status makes him subject to social control, the nature and operation of which will be the focus of attention in all the chapters that follow. Before that analysis is undertaken, it may be well to indicate in some detail the role that social control plays in the determination of individual behavior; for although in any instance social control may be the decisive factor, it is never the sole "cause" of human conduct. It would be quite as fallacious to explain behavior as the result of this or that kind of social control as it would be to seek the explanation in culture.

For purposes of analysis all the many interdependent and variable factors that may enter into the making of human action can be treated as falling into one or another of three general categories: those factors that are embedded in the person of the one who acts, a category which comprises the consequences of socialization and which is usually termed "personality"; those factors that are external to the individual and that constitute the immediate occasion for action, usually termed the "situation"; and those external factors which transcend the immediate situation and are operative only because of the individual's regard for social status, *i.e.*, the category of social control, which, in a sense, mediates between the individual and the situation.

PERSONALITY

The primary component in the interaction of factors that produces human conduct is the personality of the individual who acts. That personality consists of all that the individual has learned through prior experience, and it constitutes his preparation to respond to external circumstances. Each personality is unique; for, as will be shown shortly, although many of the elements of an individual's personality may as elements be common to most of the members of a social group—*i.e.*, they may be cultural—the particular combination of elements is unique to him.¹

Personality is, of necessity, inferred from the observed conduct of the indi-

¹ The concept of personality that follows has been presented at greater length and with full documentation in *Social Psychology* (R. T. LaPiere and P. R. Farnsworth, 3d ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949).

vidual; for there is, as yet, no means by which personality as a whole can be subjected to direct measurement. The particular personality attributes involved in the making of a given act can be ascertained only by eliminating the external variables involved in that act. In theory, and to a considerable extent in actual practice, this can be accomplished by observing the individual behave in a wide variety of circumstances and over a considerable period of time to the end that external factors are more or less canceled out. The procedure is complex and far from satisfactory, but it is the only way so far discovered for ascertaining the actual attributes of a given individual's personality.

The Elements of Personality. A great variety of terms and descriptive devices, most of them borrowed from the folk language, have been and are currently used to designate the various inferred attributes of personality. The simplest generic term is "habit." More impressive, but hardly more meaningful, is "a tendency to act, positively or negatively, toward a value, or toward a total situation or complex of values." Neither such a complex general definition nor the term "habit" take into account the functional differences between various kinds of preparation to behave. The following distinctions, only a few of a number of kinds of distinctions that might be drawn, are made in terms of the functional role that each of the various kinds of personality elements plays in the making of behavior.

Manual skills constitute the simplest kind of preparation to behave. They include such learned abilities as those involved in walking, driving a car, eating, writing (the act of writing itself, not the determining of what is to be written), etc. It is through the application of skills of this order that the human body is moved from place to place, is fed, and is otherwise cared for and that the routine work of society is accomplished. Manual skills do not, however, operate irrespective of other kinds of personality elements.

Verbal and gestural skills, which are much more complex, are the preparations of the individual to speak and smile and otherwise relate himself symbolically to the people around him. Speech symbols are culturally determined, and the individual's skill in manipulating such symbols is mainly a consequence of his social training. The use to which he puts that skill, however, is at times wholly and is usually to some extent a calculated matter; e.g., a professional politician can tell his listeners, whoever they may be, what he considers to be, under the circumstances, in his own best interests. The manipulating of gestural symbols, on the other hand, is a far more difficult matter; and there is considerable doubt that people can as a rule control their facial gestures with any accuracy, although there is no doubt at all that people do upon occasion try to do so or that facial gestures influence the judgment of others.

Manual, verbal, and gestural skills constitute the preparations of the individual to act overtly, but they do not assure his acting overtly. They make it possible for him to say "Let me drive you home" and then to do so. But whether he will make such an offer, whether he will utilize any of his verbal,

manual, or gestural skills, depends upon what is often described as his "willingness" to do so under the given circumstances. That "willingness" is a function of a variety of *intervening variables*—covert factors that operate between the stimulus and the overt response, *e.g.*, between the occasion which provides the opportunity to offer to drive someone home and the individual's offering to do so or, as might be the case, his excusing himself for not making such an offer.

Some overt acts, such as the mechanical smile that a saleswoman gives to a customer and the blow that a carpenter gives the nail that he is driving, are acts that have been so often repeated by the individual under roughly comparable circumstances that the action is almost automatic. The individual does not in any perceptible degree think out the action or feel impelled to act. Most human actions, however, involve a significant measure of calculation and of feeling. A man who offers to drive another person home may do so on the "spur of the moment," in which case he may very likely regret the action. Usually, however, he makes such an offer—as he does most things—because he feels that he should do so (as might be the case if the other were a feeble old lady) or because he wants to do so (as might be the case if the other were a charming young girl) and decides that he can do so without jeopardizing some other duty or desire. The feelings and thoughts involved are then the variables that have intervened between the situation and the act of making the offer.

All intervening variables operate on the covert level. *Motives*, those which operate as directive activating forces, are, according to current theory, disequilibriums of the neuroglandular system which can be resolved only through action that leads to some goal. A simple illustration is the "appetite for pie" which the smell of freshly baked pie arouses in almost any healthy American boy. That appetite is an inner disturbance which operates as a spur to action, the nature of the action being determined by a complex of other factors, and which terminates when pie—or some acceptable alternative—is obtained. The mechanics of motivation are as yet little understood, but it is now generally agreed that all the motives that operate in social life are acquired. This is obvious in the case of complex motives, such as those that presumably lie behind the recurrent daily struggle of the individual to earn a livelihood, to win a certain girl for a wife, to achieve fame, or to paint a picture that satisfies the painter if no one else; such motives may be aroused and, perhaps at the beginning of each working day, rearoused by self-symbols (*e.g.*, the idea of making a million dollars).

Emotions, those intervening variables which, like motives, serve as a spur to action but which, unlike motives, are unchannelized, are also thought to be internal disequilibriums. The overt behavior which expresses emotional disturbance is characteristically unpredictable and erratic. The desire aroused by the smell of pie might lead a hungry boy to cut himself a piece; but fear that he may be caught, an emotional disturbance, might then result in his

stuffing the piece of pie into his pocket rather than his face. Although it was once thought that there were a number of specific innate emotional responses, each provoked by a specific circumstance, social psychologists at present consider emotional responses to be learned responses to socially indicated circumstances. Possibly all emotions are of the same order; the distinctions in kind that we attempt to draw between love and fear, etc., may simply be distinctions in degree. Certainly loving behavior is often as random and erratic as, although usually less violent than, that which is described as fearful.

What is important to the student of social control is the learned character of most, if not all, emotional responses.² Most Americans feel what is termed fear at the sight of or thought of a snake, a fact that is indicated by their characteristically disorganized overt behavior when they encounter snakes. Most Americans also seem to feel some degree of what is termed love for their children, a fact that is indicated by the tendency of American parents to act inconsistently toward their children—*e.g.*, to lay down rules of conduct and then fail to enforce them, to spank or scold and then to nullify the effect by making up to them, etc. Snakes have not, however, everywhere been feared; in some societies they have been regarded with disdain—as angleworms are regarded by Americans—and in some societies they have even been revered and worshiped. Children have not everywhere been loved, at least they have not been loved to the same degree that seems typical of contemporary Americans. At some times, as in early industrial England, children have been treated as a source of income by their parents and have been worked to death at an early age by factory managers. What the parents felt about their children is of course only a matter of inference, but certainly parents who treated their children in somewhat the same manner as a modern farmer treats the pigs he raises could hardly have felt the same way about them that the farmer does about his children.

Love, fear, rage, anger, disgust, envy, and many other terms of the lay language are used to indicate presumed emotional antecedents to various kinds of observable behavior, and they will be so used in subsequent discussion here. It should be kept in mind, however, that given emotional states cannot be inferred from given actions, for there are evidently no fixed outward signs of specific emotional disequilibriums. A smile may, for all that can be told, hide fear; an expression of admiration may be a disguise for bitter envy. Only

² The major exception would seem to be the tensional by-products of conflicts within the personality, as when aroused motivations are in opposition, or between the personality and external circumstances, as when the expression of a strong motivation is discouraged by legal or other sanctions. The latter condition is usually designated "frustration"; and some psychologists are inclined to think that a good deal of human behavior, which they term "aggressive," is the unreasoned expression of tensions produced by frustration. See J. Dollard *et al*, *Frustration and Aggression* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1937) for a theoretical exposition of this view; and for various applications of the theory, see T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (Holt, New York, 1947).

prolonged observation of a person's behavior in a series of roughly similar circumstances warrants any inference regarding the emotion felt by that person in such a circumstance. To infer from a man's attending a symphony concert that symphonic music arouses in him pleasurable emotions may be far from the truth. Subsequent observation might indicate that he actually hates such music and that he attended this particular concert out of consideration for his wife's feelings, *i.e.*, that the emotion involved was love of his wife rather than love of symphonic music. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that emotional, like motivational, terms are as unstandardized as are external expressions of emotions. Whether the emotion that is inferred from the ways in which a man treats his wife is affection or love is a matter of literary terminological choice rather than scientific discrimination.

The Calculative Process. Motives and emotions are seldom given direct overt expression. Intervening between these intervening variables and the overt act is usually some covert symbolic manipulation, *i.e.*, thinking; and in many instances it is the covert symbolic manipulation that arouses the motive or emotion in the first place. Thus when a person who has been strolling through the woods in a peaceful state of mind suddenly starts, stands transfixed, or breaks into a run, what may have happened is that he has defined an unusual sound—a rustling in dry grass, perhaps—as a snake, that that definition has aroused fear, and that fear has disordered his overt behavior. The defining process involves covert symbols—self-told words and, possibly, self-made graphic images—through which the individual interprets the sound and gives it meaning, in this case the meaning “snake.” It is, in fact, by converting stimuli into symbols that the individual perceives those things in the world around him to which he adjusts or fails to adjust.

Perceiving is not, therefore, an automatic or innate process. The ear can be stimulated by sound waves, the eye by light waves, and the skin by pressure and temperature changes; but the socialized human being, and to a lesser extent the lower animals, responds not to sound waves, light waves, etc., but to meanings. This fact is illustrated by the different interpretations that two individuals may make of the same stimuli. For one individual the sound of dry grass rustling may mean snake; for another, field mouse or simply a gust of wind. How any given individual interprets or perceives the various stimuli in the world about him is determined primarily by his culture and secondarily by the definition that he makes of them at the moment through manipulating culturally prescribed symbols.

The manipulating of the symbols, like the symbols themselves, tends to follow culturally indicated channels. Thus in the sort of arithmetical calculation that is involved when an individual makes change or decides how soon to leave home in order to catch a train, two and two almost always make four, simply because that is the cultural method of addition. Somewhat similarly the calculation that an individual makes in jumping to the conclusion that a certain sound means snake and then to the further conclusion that he is

in danger follows culturally indicated channels. Such thinking, although highly routinized, plays a vital part in the determination of most human acts. It is through covert calculation that all so-called choices are arrived at and decisions reached, and it is by covert calculation that social control often gains its effectiveness.³ Strong motivation seems to facilitate such calculation, *i.e.*, to speed the process of covert symbolic manipulation toward a choice or decision, whereas strong emotion seems to inhibit or at least disorder calculation. Thus a boy who very much wants a piece of pie may rapidly evaluate—always, of course, in his own terms—the possibility of getting it by asking his mother for it, by helping himself to it, by such complicated and tedious stratagems as doing some chore in the hope that his mother will then offer it to him, etc. What overt action he will take, if any, will depend upon the outcome of his calculation. Should he decide to help himself and proceed to do so, knowing full well that he should not, his subsequent calculations may become disorganized (he may think erratically of this and that way out but arrive nowhere) by the emotion aroused when he hears the sound of his mother's step outside the kitchen.

NORMATIVE VERSUS DEVIANT ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONALITY

The personality of any individual includes a great variety of manual, verbal, and gestural skills, of motivational and emotional sets to respond, and of abili-

³ The idea that man is calculating, an idea which is fundamental to the theory of social control which will be developed in the following chapters, is not to be confused with the nineteenth-century concept of man as a rational creature, a view that T. Parsons endeavored to rejuvenate in his *Structure of Social Actions* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1937). Rational psychology, which has been largely rejected by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, involved the assumption that human calculations invariably proceed in accordance with the rules of Aristotelian logic. Logical thought processes were believed to be an innate characteristic of the human mind; as a result, if two men have similar interests and comparable knowledge, they will behave in much the same way. A qualification of this view was that advanced by L. Levy-Bruhl (*Primitive Mentality*, L. A. Clare, trans., Macmillan, New York, 1923) and some other disciples of Durkheim, in which logical thought is the distinctive characteristic of Western peoples, all others, including Asiatics, being prelogical.

"Calculation," as the term is here used, refers to symbolic trial and error rather than to the logical deductive procedure which was assumed by the rational psychologists. It does not assume that the symbols used in calculation are operationally valid or that the calculator follows any certain system—or any system at all—in distinguishing the "errors" in the calculation from the "successes." What it does assume is that in many circumstances the individual attempts to ascertain through symbolic trial and error the probable consequences to him of a given act before embarking on that action. In this endeavor he uses whatever symbols ("knowledge") may be available to him and such skill at calculation as he may happen to possess. There is no significant relation between the calculating process involved and the highly systematized, mechanically predetermined computations that make it possible for electronic calculators to solve complex mathematical problems. In the latter, the trial-and-error process does not occur; in human calculating, it is the essential characteristic.

ties to symbolize covertly the elements of the external world and manipulate such symbols. Although, as was indicated earlier, the totality of the personality elements of no two individuals will be quite the same, every individual's personality will comprise a high proportion of elements that represent his socialization into his basic culture and his various subcultures. These elements are the normative attributes of his personality, the respects in which he is normal for an individual of his society and of his special class, regional, sex, age, occupational, and other positions in that society. The other elements of his personality are for him deviant, although they, or some of them, may be normative for other individuals.

The distinction between normative and deviant attributes of personality is especially pertinent to the study of social control in that social-control factors operate in general to force the individual to behave normatively on the overt level, whatever his covert inclinations. In other words, social control is by and large a normalizing influence in the determination of human behavior.

The normative attributes of an individual's personality represent the successes in his socialization. They are his preparations—motivational, emotional, manual, symbolic, etc.—to behave in the socially prescribed ways in each of the many circumstances that normally arise in his society. In our society it is socially acceptable for an adult male to experience some emotional excitement in the presence of an attractive young female—the definition of what is an attractive female being also a matter of social determination. The adult male who has learned to define females in the socially designated ways and who then feels some emotional excitement upon defining a specific one as attractive is in these respects normative. These same attributes of personality would be nonnormative, or deviant, for an adult female in our society. For her the parallel normative attributes would be the feeling of some emotional excitement in the presence of an attractive male. How much of the personality of a given individual is normative is dependent upon the extent to which he has been successfully socialized into those attributes socially defined as appropriate to a member of his sex, class, occupation, etc., in his particular society.

The term "normative" suggests, in contrast to such older terms as "human nature," socially determined and hence variable and changing standards of measurement. It also suggests that the appropriate personality attributes of the individual more or less approximate the social standards in degree. Folk thinking tends to deal in absolutes; a man is honest or dishonest, kind or unkind, etc. In actuality, however, the differences in the personality attributes of various members of any society are usually matters of degree. Those personality attributes, such as tonal and other forms of simple perception, that can be measured with some accuracy have been found to vary from person to person within a given culture by almost imperceptible degrees; and casual observation suggests that the same is true of such complex matters as musical tastes, food tastes, motivational drives for this or that, and emotional responses

to this or that.⁴ Thus, although in our society it may be normative for people to like popular music, it is probable that under given circumstances and with all other things, such as general state of health and of mind, being equal, no two individuals will feel quite the same emotional response to a given piece of popular music. Most, perhaps, will feel more or less pleased by it, some will feel to some degree displeased, and some will feel to some degree elated or otherwise emotionally gratified.

The more-or-less character of individual conformity to the social standards reflects on the one hand the fact that socialization is an extremely complicated process, in which a great many interdependent variables operate, with the result that no two individuals can possibly be trained into exactly equivalent responses; and, on the other hand, the fact that the members of society measure the conformity of an individual with crude and limited tools. The members of society are, in effect, tolerant of most minor variations from the standard and are forever ignorant of many. The tolerance that grows out of crudity in observation can be illustrated by the ways in which a strongly religious community may judge the religiousness of any individual member. If that member goes to church regularly and without clear overt protest, if he contributes regularly to the collection plate, if he acts as though he were singing the hymns, etc., he will most likely be judged a godly man by his friends and acquaintances. But for all that they really know, he may be making *sotto voce* fun of the Church and all its works. He may be singing to himself parodies on the hymns; he may be using churchgoing as a cover for some illegal trade or as a means of forcibly sobering himself up after a Saturday-night drunk. Thus his wife, who is able to observe him more intimately and continuously, may have an entirely different concept of his religiousness than has the community at large.

The members of any social group not only have limited ability to measure the conformity of an individual, but, more importantly, they cannot possibly know with certainty the motives, emotions, and calculations that lie behind apparent conformity. Not even a wife can ascertain whether her husband acts lovingly and responsibly toward her because he feels so or because of interest in her money if she has money, fear of eternal damnation if he does not act so, or some other ulterior consideration.

The Private Self and the Public Self. In the socialization of the individual it is possible for the members of society, in the persons of parents or others directly responsible for child training, to evaluate to some extent the success of their efforts to establish the socially appropriate overt elements of personality. If the child mispronounces a word, they can try to correct for that mistraining; if he speaks when he should be listening, they can punish him; if he is inept in tying his shoes, they can set up a training regime. But

⁴ For an evaluation of the various attempts that have been made to measure the musical tastes of the American people see P. R. Farnsworth, *Musical Taste: Its Measurement and Cultural Nature* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1950).

they cannot directly observe what he is meanwhile acquiring in the way of covert attributes; they can only infer from his outward conduct what he feels and thinks. Hence they cannot be sure that they are correcting as they go along for errors in his emotional, motivational, and mental training. The covert attributes of personality are private; and in every society the child soon learns the necessity and the personal advantage of keeping them private, *i.e.*, of thinking before speaking, of playing up to his elders, and the like. The extent to which the individual learns to conceal or repress his inner self varies from society to society and from individual to individual; but everywhere there is considerable contrast between the individual's private and public selves.

It is, thus, on the covert levels that failures of socialization are usually most pronounced, failures that result in the establishment in the personality of socially deviant attributes. An attribute is deviant when it differs either in degree or in kind from the socially normal for the particular individual. The deviation is one of degree when the individual has a socially prescribed attribute but to a subnormal or abnormal extent. In every society there is, for example, some sort of vague idea of the amount of food a child of a given age should eat; if a child eats very much less or very much more, his appetite differs conspicuously in degree from the norm and is socially defined as a "problem" for correction. Any attribute that is so defined by society is deviant.

Deviation in degree is apparently commonplace in all societies. Every language has terminological parallels to our "lazy," "aggressive," "unstable," "apathetic," "sentimental," "excitable," etc. All such terms are used to characterize observed or imputed deviations in degree from the social norms. They are usually applied categorically, the implication being that the individual termed lazy is undermotivated in many or all respects. Actually, however, deviation in degree may be quite segmental; an individual who is undermotivated in regard to one normal activity may be normatively motivated in regard to others and overmotivated in still others. Likewise, an individual who is overly sentimental about, say, his mother may be relatively unsentimental about all other women.

Deviation in kind, which involves either the lack of a socially prescribed attribute or the possession of an attribute that is not socially sanctioned, is perhaps less common than is deviation in degree. But personality deviation of this sort exists in all societies and is especially pronounced in a dynamic society such as our own.

In a society in which mutton is the only meat eaten, practically everyone learns to eat mutton. Where, as in modern American society, however, the normal diet is composed of a great variety of meats, grains, and vegetables, most people acquire during their socialization a number of food idiosyncracies. Accidents in training and, often, peculiarities of family subculture may in our society result in an individual's failing to learn to like one or more of the normal elements in the diet, perhaps mutton, perhaps pork, or perhaps

any meat at all. There are so many alternative foods that there is no inherent compulsion to learn to like any one of them. Consequently, a given individual may in respect to food tastes deviate in kind in one or many respects. In other aspects of life there may also be so many alternatives that failure to acquire all the relevant personality attributes may impose no great strain on either the individual or his associates. Thus the fact that the son of a physician in modern American society does not learn to want to be a physician is of small moment to all except, perhaps, his father; he can just as well become a lawyer if he wishes to. By contrast, in a society where farming is the only occupation, the son of a farmer who fails to learn to want to be a farmer is an occupational incompetent. Only when the individual in our society lacks any effective occupational motivation does he become in this particular respect a problem to society.

Deviation in kind that involves the possession of an attribute that is not socially sanctioned for the individual, however, almost always constitutes a problem either for the individual or for society, or for both. In our society a boy who fails to acquire normal interests in girls may be baffling to girls and trying to his parents, and he may live out his life a bachelor. But he will not irritate society to anything like the same degree as will the one who acquires the socially atypical desire for sex relations with other males. As a rule, the absence of an indicated attribute is less disturbing than is the presence of an atypical attribute. Thus a man who lacks an interest in manly things is only "odd," whereas the one who has an interest in feminine things is socially defined as abnormal.

Social control operates, as will be shown in detail later, to force the individual who deviates in any disturbing degree or respect from the prescribed norms to conform outwardly to those norms. The motives, emotions, and calculations that operate wholly within the individual are neither directly ascertainable nor the concern of society.⁵ People are constantly speculating about the motives of those around them, about how their friends and acquaintances feel or think about this or that; but *de facto* their concern is with how these people act overtly, with their public selves rather than their private selves.

Most of the deviant attributes of any psychologically normal individual—both those of degree and those of kind—are covert, elements of his private self. And it is these elements which are most deeply and permanently estab-

⁵ The psychoanalysts believe that they can ascertain by certain esoteric procedures the "unconscious" motivation of their patients; some primitive magic men profess to be able to determine such covert phenomena as the "will to kill"—*e.g.*, who cast the spell that caused the wife to poison her husband's food; theologians traditionally claim ability to read the mind—the "will"—of God; and modern law bases some distinctions on the assumed ability to ascertain the intent of those who have committed crimes. Upon close examination all such assumptions would seem to be rationalistic devices for the control of overt conduct. Like the so-called "lie detector," they are used to flatter, frighten, or otherwise induce the individual to conform outwardly to some prescribed norm.

lished in the personality. Almost anyone can learn to correct for gross errors in his overt socialization if he applies himself to doing so; he can learn to speak clearly and properly, to say the polite things, and to use his hands and other body parts with reasonable—in terms of the standards set for him—skill. But to learn to want to do so is evidently quite another matter. An individual who deviates in some important regard motivationally or emotionally may, through social control, be brought into outward conformity, but only at considerable expense to his private self; for neither self-retraining nor social retraining can do much to normalize established deviant covert attributes. This point should be kept well in mind throughout the subsequent discussion, for it is basic to an understanding of another kind of personality factor—psychological tensions—one which may upon occasion cancel out the effect of long-established elements of the personality and lead to a marked violation of social control over overt behavior. The behavior that then occurs, which is usually designated “abnormal,” is in fact an attempt to bring the private and public selves into harmony.

Personality Organization. Until rather recently, psychologists were prone to think of behavior in terms of stimulus-response. A sound or other stimulus was supposed to set off in the individual a specific pattern of response. The various specific response patterns were termed “personality traits”; and the total personality was conceived of as a simple aggregation of such traits, each one of them operationally independent of all the others. The trait concept was an attempt to account for the varied kinds of behavior that any individual will exhibit under varied circumstances; to explain, for example, why in terms of his outward behavior a man may be kind to his dog and cruel to his wife, honest with his employer and dishonest with his card-playing friends, generous about big things and stingy about little, etc. Time and further study, however, brought the realization that, although a personality may consist of a great variety of relatively specific traits, a considerable number of such traits always enter into the making of any action. Behavior is now thought to involve what is termed an “organization” or “structuring” of personality elements, normative or deviant as the case may be. What particular elements of personality will enter into a given organization depends in the first instance upon the content of the personality itself, in the second instance upon the situational factors that are involved, and in the third instance upon the nature of the social-control factors to which the individual is subject.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS IN BEHAVIOR

A situation, as the term will be used here, is any set of external circumstances in which a given individual finds himself at any given moment and in relation to which he behaves. The simplest kind of situation is that in which the factors are static, as is a room or house of which a person is for the moment the sole occupant. In such a situation, the personality of that occupant provides the

dynamic variables. Alone in a hotel room, for example, a man may do a variety of things; he may remove his clothing, take a shower, brush his teeth, and go to bed. The room and its equipment provide him the opportunity for doing all these things—obviously he would not and could not do the same things in a tent in the wilderness. But within the limitations of this static situation what he does is self-determined; only one variable, his personality, is involved in his behavior. Thus if he brushes his teeth before going to bed, he does so because of what he as a person is; the next occupant of the room may skip this ritual because of what he as a person is.

When, however, the situation is itself dynamic, the behavior of the individual then involves two sets of variables—his personality and the dynamic aspects of the situation itself—and a different kind of process comes into operation. The behavior of the lone occupant of a hotel room can be analyzed as a series of responses, including both overt and covert elements, to various, but unchanging, aspects of the room; he may, for example, see the bathtub and decide to take a bath. When, however, another human being enters the situation, even by so tenuous a means as the telephone beside the bed, the situation is no longer static; for the other person is as variable as the occupant himself. Each reacts to the other; but since the reaction of each affects the response of the other, the process is *interactional*.

If, for example, a man in a hotel room were to be interrupted in his preparations for bed by a knock at the door, knowledge of him as a person might permit the prediction that he would hastily put on his dressing gown and answer the door. But what he would do thereafter could not possibly be predicted on the basis of knowledge of him alone. One must know in addition who is at the door and what that person is going to do and say; moreover, what that person is going to do and say will almost certainly depend in considerable part upon what the occupant does and says; for the visitor will shape his behavior in terms of the occupant, even as the latter will shape his behavior in terms of the former.

Dynamic situations, those involving two or more persons, are the subject matter of collective behavior, a special field of social psychology in which attention is directed toward the total field of interaction.⁶ The present concern is limited to the effects of situational factors upon the personality of a given individual and, hence, their role in the making of his behavior. The situational factors may upon occasion be static, as they would be with a lone man in a hotel room. More often, however, they are dynamic and interactional in that the situation includes people who are affected by the behavior of the individual even as he is affected by theirs.

Situational Definition. Whatever the nature of the situation, its initial effect upon the given individual is to lead him to make some sort of definition

⁶ General discussions of this field include R. T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1938); and H. Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (A. M. Lee, ed., Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York, 1946).

of it. That definition depends upon both the situation itself and his own personality, and it may or may not be a valid one. Whether his definition is valid or not, it is in terms of it rather than of the situation per se that the individual organizes the personality elements that enter into the determination of his behavior. Defining the situation is the first step, or phase, in the behavior-making process.

A man who is preparing himself for bed in a hotel room may be proceeding in accordance with a long-established organization of some of his personality attributes. What may be thought of as his going-to-bed-in-a-hotel-room self may be in operation, and the organization of personality attributes may be so highly integrated as a consequence of previous repeated performances that he need make few decisions or other mental calculations. As he bathes and brushes his teeth he may, in fact, be thinking about tomorrow's interview with a prospective customer or something equally distant in time and place. But a knock on the door will interrupt both covert symbolic manipulations and his going-to-bed organization. For an instant he may be disorganized, a condition that may be overtly indicated by the startle response, by a momentary total cessation of action.

Normally the first active response to a situational change of this sort is a rapid calculation of possibilities. What possibilities will occur to him will, of course, depend mainly upon the individual himself. A knock on the door of a hotel room in the early evening could be interpreted as meaning any one of a great variety of things—a policeman with a warrant for arrest, a bellboy bringing a telegram, a friend come to pay a call, etc. From what are, to him, the reasonable possibilities, the man in the room selects one as his tentative definition of the new situational factor, and this tentative definition determines what aspects of his personality will be aroused and will contribute to the making of his subsequent behavior. If he happens to be a criminal and hence occupationally disposed to expect the worst, he may conclude that the police have tracked him down; and, acting on this definition of the situation, he may grab his clothing and make for the fire escape outside his window. If he is, on the other hand, a law-abiding citizen and has no reason to be alarmed, and if he is disposed under such circumstances to be incurious and unexcitable, he may define the knock at the door as an error—he expects no one, therefore no one should appear—and just ignore it. If he is a young and romantic man, he may hopefully conclude that the girl toward whom he made overtures in the elevator has decided to respond to them.

At any event what motives and emotions would be aroused and what subsequent calculations and overt actions the individual would take would depend in the first instance upon the definition that he had made. All other things being equal, quite different attributes of personality would be mobilized if he were to define the knock at the door as a policeman with a warrant rather than as a friend come to call.

Stereotyped Definitions. The initial definition that an individual makes

of a situation is usually a categorical one. The exception is the definition of the situation as one requiring exploration. Faced with unusual circumstances the individual may so define a situation and then proceed on a trial-and-error basis to try first this and then that overt adjustment, as, for example, he might if he were venturing into unfamiliar woods. Even a characteristically cautious person is, however, prone to define most situations initially in a categorical way, on the basis of some stereotyped elements. This is the sort of initial definition that is made when, in looking for a restaurant in a strange town, the individual defines one at a glance as likely to be overly expensive, another as likely to serve bad food in an unsavory manner, etc. The whole of the situation is evaluated in terms of some stereotyped element or elements. More complex, but involving the same procedure, is the stereotyped defining of a person or an entire group of people upon first encounter. The individual who deduces from something in the expression or manner of a new acquaintance that the new acquaintance is untrustworthy and the housewife who in effect closes an interview with an applicant for the position of maid almost before it has begun because, as she might say, "I knew she was slovenly the moment I saw her," are defining in terms of stereotyped elements. So, too, is the man who concludes at first glance that a girl he has just encountered is looking for a husband and should, therefore, be studiously avoided.

Many of the stereotypes that are used in these initial definitions of situations are cultural in origin. The ideas that the members of each social class have about members of other classes and that they tend to apply when they encounter members of those other classes are usually cultural. The same is generally true of the ideas that are held by the members of one region regarding those of another, of each sex regarding the other, etc. Even some nonsocial situations may be defined in terms of cultural stereotypes; *e.g.*, a ramshackle house may be deemed "haunted" just because it has fallen into disrepair.

In addition to a variety of cultural stereotypes, every individual has at his command some more or less personal stereotypes, ideas that have been derived from his own experience but that are not necessarily any more valid than are those of cultural origin. From a brief and distressing encounter with an old man with a long beard, a child may conclude that all old men with long beards smell strongly of tobacco and whisky, have yellow teeth, and like to kiss small children. The result is a stereotype that may be used to define any man with a beard whom the child encounters. Adult stereotypes are likely to be somewhat more complicated but equally unjust to the individuals to whom they are applied.⁷

⁷ A great many factors of personality, in addition to the existence of a given situational stereotype, usually enter to some degree or other into the defining process. The general nature of some of these factors can be suggested by reference to the existing state of health and of mind of the definer. For example, the man who has been cheated in a business transaction will be for a time more than normally inclined to define as dishonest the people whom he encounters.

The child who defines a man who has come to call as smelly and unpleasant because he has a long beard may then act on that definition and simply slip out of the house. If he does so, he may never learn whether or not he has misdefined the situation. An adult usually, but of course not always, stays on to test his initial definition of each situation as it arises. Thus a man in a hotel room may define a knock at his door as, say, a bellboy with a telegram and hurriedly and with some alarm open the door. If it is a bellboy and if the bellboy has a telegram and if the telegram brings news of disaster at home, then the initial definition is the final one. Should the person who knocked turn out to be someone other than the expected bellboy with a telegram from home, then a redefinition of the situation is in order. If the visitor turns out to be a bellboy with ice water, the new definition will be but a modification of the old one; should the visitor turn out to be a fireman or someone else wholly unexpected, however, the new definition will be a radical redefinition of the situation.

The ability to redefine situations varies, both from individual to individual and from one kind of situation to another. In some kinds of person-to-person relationships the initial definition—a highly stereotyped one—tends to persist although it may be quite invalid. This tendency is most notable when persons of different races, nationalities, and classes are situationally involved with each other; here prejudgment (prejudice) is likely to be final judgment, with such results as that an upper-class, highly educated Negro may be denied a room in a third-rate white hotel or motor court. Conversely, members of the same subcultural group (the same race, region, class, or other social category) may initially overevaluate (show a bias toward) one another and fail to revise the evaluation in terms of actual experience, as when a person is accepted on the basis of his family name rather than on his actual character and conduct.

Most people in our society as in any society find it difficult, if not impossible, to redefine certain kinds of situations in terms of situational developments. The individual who has learned to regard Negroes as persons having such and such characteristics tends to perceive those characteristics in anyone who is defined a Negro. Some individuals tend to hold to their initial definitions under all kinds of circumstances; they are those who are ordinarily defined by others as rigid or uncompromising or, more simply, as stubborn and stupid. Rigidity or tenacity of this sort is a quality that is perhaps rightly associated with provincials—whether they be upper-class Bostonians or Arkansas Hillbillies—people who have had limited experience with varied kinds of people and conditions. Some individuals, on the other hand, can and do redefine situations in terms of their experiences; they are those who are often characterized as urbane, sophisticated, or adaptable.

Self-definition: Role Taking and Role Shifting. Situational redefinition is significant only to the extent that it leads to the mobilization of a set of personality elements other than those that were brought into operation by the initial definition. The simplest way to describe the processes involved here

is in terms of self-definition—*i.e.*, of role taking and role shifting. As he relates himself to any situation, the individual tends to select, on the basis of the definition he has made of that situation, one of his more or less stock definitions of himself. The self-definition that he selects consists of a symbolic organizing of the motives, emotions, and other personality attributes that have been mobilized by the situational definition. It is a concept of the role that he should play in the particular situation, and it provides him with a guide to overt conduct that in this respect is not unlike the script-designated role that an actor assumes when he comes on stage in a play. The role that the individual assumes may be a very familiar one to him, in which case he will play it out with ease and little further calculation, provided that his definition of the situation was a valid one. The role that he assumes may, on the other hand, be an ideal role—a goal or model which he strives to achieve—in which case his performance will tend to involve considerable trial and error; and whether or not he is successful in playing the role will depend upon a variety of factors, including the validity of his definition of the situation. For example, should the man in the hotel room define the knock at the door as a sign of bad news from home, he might assume as his momentary role the ideal role of the man who keeps a stiff upper lip and, so fortified, subordinate any dismay that he feels to the requirements of the role that he has adopted. He might thereby succeed in accepting the telegram without showing his dismay, tipping the boy, and saying a cheery “Good night” as though the message were gladly received. Should it turn out, however, to be a maid at the door, he might quickly shift roles; his apprehension about matters at home would recede, and perhaps, concern for his purse taking its place, he might quickly shift into the role of the sophisticated traveler who is too wise to fall for the old hotel “gyms.” Thus in response to her “I have fresh towels for you, Sir,” he may merely snap, “Why didn’t you get them here before I took my bath?” and close the door in her disappointed face. On the other hand, he might be unable to assume immediately a role which he considers appropriate to the unexpected appearance of the maid; and having somewhat mechanically given her a tip for the towels he does not need, he may later tell himself that he was a fool and should have done so and so.

Every individual has a repertoire of more or less clearly delineated self-roles, some, like some of his situational definitions, cultural and some of his own devising. When a situation is familiar to him—*i.e.*, susceptible to quick and categorical definition by him—the individual may simply step into the role he associates with such a situation and thereby achieve an easy “overtization” of the aroused motivational and emotional attributes of his personality. Small children do this sort of thing when, frustrated by parental refusal to give what is demanded, they go into the “act” which experience has taught them most often wears down parental resistance. The act—a sort of little playlet—may be a violent temper tantrum, a coy appeal to sentiment (as when a little girl plays up to her father’s idea that she is sweet and innocent), a storm of weep-

ing and wailing, or whatever. The point is that the overt act is the expression of an established role which the child assumes in the particular situation because it seems to the child likely to produce the desired results. An adult usually has a sufficiently large stock of roles so that only his most intimate acquaintances will have an opportunity to observe and note the repetition of any given role; moreover, an adult is often sufficiently skilled and sophisticated to be able to vary the performance of a given role each time he plays it.

When, as is often the case in the modern world, the individual does not have a preformed role with which to meet a given situation as he has defined it, he either has to apply, knowingly, a stock role that is not appropriate—as when he assumes his genial role at a funeral simply because he does not know how else to meet this particular kind of situation—or else has to work out an appropriate role by trial and error. If in the latter case the self-role that he has assumed is not beyond his ability to enact overtly, his performance will perhaps be somewhat halting but otherwise satisfying to him. But should he take as his self-role one that is well beyond his ability to enact overtly, he will no doubt fail miserably, both in his own terms and in the eyes of the situational members. Thus, for example, a person who is unskilled in public speaking and who is without warning asked to address a gathering at which he is present may be content to express such clichés as happen to come to mind; but if he defines the situation as an opportunity to make a speech and takes as his self-role that of one who can rise to the occasion, his inept efforts to perform overtly in accordance with this self-role will probably embarrass him and will certainly mortify his audience.

In the recurrent and routine circumstances of daily life, the self-roles assumed by an adult are usually performed overtly with considerable ease and effectiveness. A contrast arises, however, between the self-role and the overt performance—between what an individual feels and wishes to do and what he actually does—in any “learning situation,” as psychologists term the circumstance. The small boy who is striving to keep up with the neighborhood gang, the youth who is striving to act adult, and the adult who is pretending to a wisdom that he does not yet possess have all assumed for these particular situations self-roles that they cannot live up to overtly. For the child and the youth, such gaps between self-role and overt performance are incidental to the acquisition of more adult personality attributes; for the adult, the distinction between what he wants to be and what he actually achieves may be, variously, an incident in the fulfillment of his ambitions or a source of frustrations.

Situationally Imposed Roles. More common, perhaps, in the daily life of any adult than failure in playing a self-role is conflict between a chosen self-role and a situationally imposed role. A man who is asked to give a speech, who wishes to do so, and who makes a heroic effort and fails has been attempting to play a self-role that is in accord with the situationally indicated role. A man who is well versed in the arts of public speaking, who is asked to speak,

and who reluctantly gets to his feet and does so is, on the other hand, playing a situationally imposed role that conflicts with his chosen self-role. This is a way of saying that some of his emotions and motivations are at the moment opposed to his assuming one or another of his "public speaker" overt roles. Perhaps he is enjoying his dinner, if the occasion be a dinner, and would like to finish it in peace; perhaps he is physically ill or weary; perhaps, as might often be the case with a professional public speaker, he is satiated with public speaking; perhaps he fears that in view of the gathering he would be certain to offend more than he would please, whatever he might say.

When the situationally imposed role and the self-role are at variance, the individual may, in so far as circumstances enable him to do so, play his self-role and disregard the imposed role. Thus a reluctant speaker may refuse to rise to the occasion, a boy caught raiding the cookie jar may defy his mother, and a girl who is bored with her escort may demand to be taken home immediately. Much of the conduct which is situationally defined as "rude," "ill-tempered," "disrespectful," and the like stems from the individual's adhering to a self-role that conflicts with a situationally imposed role. Such behavior is, on the whole, the exception rather than the rule. In most social situations, each of the several members adheres more or less rigorously to the dictates of situational conventions, if there are any that apply, or to the role demands imposed on him. Playing a situationally imposed role, whether in accord with or opposed to the self-role, may stem from one or more of the following attributes of the personality, each of which, if the individual possesses it, is a consequence of his socialization: (1) regard for and a sense of responsibility toward the maintenance of what is socially deemed right and proper conduct under the circumstances; (2) consideration for the feelings of the other member or members of the situation, a function of sympathetic identification with them; and (3) concern with the long-run consequences of meeting the demands of the particular situation. In the last instance, the situational imperatives constitute social control when the individual's concern with long-run consequences is a concern for his status in some durable social grouping.

Although a self-role and a situationally imposed role are frequently somewhat or much at odds, they may, of course, approach unity. Such is the case when an experienced public speaker hopes to be asked to speak on a given occasion and is asked to do so, when a girl out on a date wants to be made love to and is made love to, when an ambitious lad is given a responsible task by his employer, and when a man who sees himself as lord and master of his home is treated as lord and master by his cowed wife and children.

SOCIAL CONTROL: THE THIRD DIMENSION OF BEHAVIOR

In many instances the factors that determine the behavior of an individual can be fully comprehended in terms of the concepts of situational definition and redefinition, self-role and situationally imposed role. Occasions frequently arise, however, in the daily life of any individual when factors that transcend the specific situation in which he behaves enter into the determination of his

situational conduct. In such instances, three rather than two sets of factors are involved in the production of behavior: personality factors, situational factors, and those that constitute the central concern of the present analysis—social-control factors.

Social-control factors, like situational factors, operate upon and through the personality of the individual who behaves; as has been indicated, they appeal to the individual's regard for his status in a social group. Like situational factors also, they originate outside his personality. To indicate this latter characteristic of the social-control factors that in a given instance enter into the determination of an individual's conduct, they may at this point be designated as the "status-group role" which is imposed upon the individual. Situational role and status-group role are, as was suggested above, sometimes but two aspects of the same thing. This is the case when the situational membership constitutes the total membership of the group in which the individual has valued status. When the situational membership includes no member of a group to which the individual is or would like to become attached, the situationally imposed role and the status-group role are unrelated, however similar they may happen to be.

The operation of social-control factors as the third category of factors that enter into the determination of behavior is most clearly evident when the situationally imposed role and the status-group role are both unrelated and dissimilar and when the individual's initial self-role is more closely akin to the former than to the latter. Under these circumstances the individual must choose between what might be described as "giving way to the temptations of the moment," at some hazard to his status in a group he values, and resisting the situational temptations in order to adhere to the role imposed upon him by membership in the valued group. Circumstances of this order sometimes arise; and occasionally an individual encounters a circumstance in which his self-role, the situationally imposed role, and the status-group role are all both unrelated and dissimilar. In most instances, however, the three sets of factors that enter into the determination of conduct are so blended and interwoven that, however sophisticated he may be, the individual cannot possibly explain even to himself exactly why he acted under the circumstances in the way he did.

Since social-control factors are, as the foregoing suggests, *interdependent* rather than *independent* variables, their conceptual isolation in the analysis that follows is necessarily artificial. Conceptual isolation of one kind, order, or form of what is in actual operation an interdependent variable is a normal scientific procedure. The resulting analysis is, however, abstract and does not purport to give full representation to what the layman might term "reality." In the analysis that follows it should therefore constantly be kept in mind that social-control factors are never the sole cause of human conduct. Rather they frequently, but not invariably, enter to some degree or other into the complex interaction with personality and situational factors out of which individual conduct emerges.

THE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL STATUS

"Status" is a legal term used to denote the position in the eyes of the law of a person relative to the state or another person or number of persons. In contemporary societies there are so many legal enactments which in theory if not in practice affect the individual and define his legally sanctioned relations to the state—*i.e.*, his position as a citizen—and to individuals and classes of individuals that no attempt is ever made to define *in toto* his legal status. His legal status is, rather, defined for him as occasion arises in respect to some specific matter. Thus he may consult a lawyer regarding his legal rights should his wife pack up and leave him or when he is doubtful concerning his obligations as a taxpayer; and he may be charged by the police with having exceeded his legal rights or violated those of another person and be brought, in due course, before a court which will determine, again in due course and by specified legal procedures, whether he is or is not guilty as charged. If he is, he then acquires a new legal status—that of criminal; if not, he resumes his former legal right to go freely on his way.

The legal status of any member of a modern society is *in toto* so complex that he must seek expert counsel to ascertain in detail his legal rights and obligations in any single regard. It is, moreover, constantly being modified in specific respects by the various legislative bodies that have jurisdiction over him. The result is that the individual can never know with any certainty his exact legal status as a person. Fortunately, he need not know; many of the laws to which he is in theory subject are unenforceable or at least unenforced; many of the laws to which he is in fact subject become operative only in circumstances that are, for him, unlikely to arise; and the remainder of the laws that apply to him are for the most part legal reinforcements of what he has long since learned to take entirely for granted.

Every society has had its laws that affect or define the permissible conduct of its various members. In respect to the legal status of individuals, modern societies differ from primitive and peasant societies only in that the laws are more numerous, are on the whole more explicit, and are made, changed, and enforced by more highly specialized social agencies. Even so, the legal status of the individual in a modern society constitutes only a minor aspect of his social status. Moreover, that aspect of his social status which is legally defined and, upon occasion, enforced is usually determined in considerable part by the nonlegal aspects of his social status. However equal in theory two men may be before the law, other aspects of their social status may differ to such

an extent that one is legally defined as a criminal and the other is set free with the blessings of the court.

The Biological Ability versus the Social Right to Live. It is stated in the Declaration of Independence ". . . that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This statement is a declaration of contractual intent and represents an eighteenth-century theory about men in society rather than men per se.

Most men are born with the biologically determined capacity to live and, it now seems, with roughly similar abilities to learn how to live and pursue happiness. But whether they will live, how long they will live, and in what condition they will live are determined mainly by other men. The right to live is everywhere and always socially granted. Nothing in biological or physical nature assures that any individual will live more than a few hours after birth; left to nature, an infant will be rapidly dehydrated by air and sunlight, soon attacked by myriads of insects, killed by any large predatory animal that should happen by, or, should he perchance live long enough, die of starvation. Men may fondly imagine that the world and everything thereon has been designed for their special benefit, that nature is bountiful, that in the natural state—whatever that may be—men live in childlike innocence and happiness, and that all the evils of life are a result of the artificiality of civilized modes of living. But the truth is just the opposite.

All humans who have survived beyond the first few hours of life have been protected and provided for, *i.e.*, they were at birth and continuously thereafter granted the social right to live, a right which depends upon the existence of a society able to maintain their life and willing to do so. The conditions under which the right to live will be granted and the guarantee that under such conditions the right to live will not be denied are in all societies embodied in moral, ethical, and legal codes; but these codes are symbolic constructs that must be translated into conduct by members of the society to make them effective. It is through people that every human animal—and, indeed every domesticated lower animal—secures the satisfaction of his body needs. And, with rare and unimportant exceptions, it is through people that he will continue to secure the means of his maintenance throughout his entire life.

A society, or those particular persons who represent it to a given individual, may fail through misadventure or incompetence to preserve the individual's right to live; hence, the high infant mortality in premodern societies, the high death rates from starvation, malnutrition, and disease. The possibility, high or low, of such failure is, in a sense, a qualification on the individual's right to live. It is, however, a possibility generally taken more or less for granted. For the various hazards to which a given individual in a given society is subject are generally considered to be beyond the control of man—to be the "will of God," "acts of fate," decrees of some higher authority. Such hazards are evidently accepted without much awareness on the part of the individual

member of a society as he is inducted into the ways of life in his society. In this respect modern Western society is a partial exception, but only partial; for while most modern people are aware of and anxious to reduce some hazards, such as death from cancer, most also at the same time accept complacently such risks as that of death on the highway.

Every individual, however, whatever his society, is aware of the fact that his society may, through the persons of its direct representatives, withdraw for cause his right to continue living. For every individual learns through direct experience that those around him can and at times will withdraw their support; that the flow of material satisfactions is regulated by the will of those around him—by acts of man as distinct from the will of God; and that what he himself does influences their willingness to feed and otherwise care for him. Such awareness is no doubt developed out of incidents, certain to occur in any society, in which variations in the quality and quantity of food and care given the individual are associated with variations in his own behavior. This is not to suggest that everywhere and always the individual lives in fear that he may at any time lose the social right to live, or even to suggest that the right to continue living is a high and universal human value. Except perhaps in subsistence societies and during times of widespread famine, the adult does not have much occasion to reflect upon the fact that he would go hungry were it not for the good will of others.¹ No child can fail to perceive, or at least emotionally sense, that the level of life, if not life itself, is dependent upon the will of other human beings. But, although it is in a sense self-evident to the child, it is usually lost sight of by the adult in the confusion of the secondary and supplementary social rights that are normally the primary concern of adults. Unlike the child, the adult cultivates the fields, fishes in the sea, and haggles in the market place. And it is in these activities, rather than in the good will of persons, that he sees the reason why he eats well or poorly. It should, however, be recognized that the adult values which are satisfied through the good will of others are a superstructure that is built, in accordance with the particular culture, upon the infracultural and universal base of the individual's dependence in infancy and childhood upon the socially granted right to live.

Status: a Social Grant. Given the socially granted right to live, a right that is always subject to withdrawal, the level of life that any individual enjoys is mainly dependent upon his social status. Social status is commonly thought of as the position which an individual has in his society. It is not, however, a position comparable to the position that a building occupies

¹ The relation between the good will of others and individual survival may also become apparent to adults during times of political unrest, economic disaster, and revolution. The anti-Semitic policy of the German Nazi Party, for example, made every German with Jewish antecedents aware of the danger to him of this element of his social acceptance. The German extermination program constituted a *de facto* political withdrawal from Jews of both civil rights and the right to live.

relative to other structures in a city. In the first place, the individual has not only one but many positions in society; he may be king to his subjects, but he is also husband to his wife and father to his children. In the second place, the social status or position of an individual is not a static condition, as is the location of a building. It is, rather, the product of a dynamic process of interaction, a process that is somewhat analogous to the vast complex of molecular behaviors which determine the position of a given molecule relative to all the other molecules which make up a fluid at a given moment.

Like his right to live, the status that an individual enjoys in his society is socially granted. The individual has no social status in subsocial nature. The fictional castaway Robinson Crusoe was devoid of social status until he discovered his man Friday and was wholly dependent upon his own efforts; for nature—the fishes in the sea, the plants and animals of the land, etc.—never bows to man's will, never caters to his needs, responds to his pleas, or even concedes him the right to survival. Man can and often does domesticate lower animals; and in so doing he gains a kind of status with them. Thus the farmer's cows may come at his call, and the master's dog will probably welcome him home with wagging tail and other indications of affection. But the status that can be accorded the individual by his cows or his dog is a trifling thing compared with the social status that may be and usually is granted him by his parents in infancy, his siblings in childhood, and his wife and children and neighbors in maturity. Man's truest friend may possibly be his dog; but his best friends are his fellow men. Without fellow men to grant him social status, and unless they do grant him status, he is somewhat less than human.

Many factors determine the particular kinds of social status that a given individual will be granted, and some of these factors will be considered shortly. The provision of any particular status is accomplished through the relevant personality attributes—the sentiments, values, etc.—of those human beings who are involved in social interactions with him. The elements of such interaction are symbols (such as a welcoming smile) which reflect esteem in which the individual is held; services (including gifts and other tangible contributions to his welfare) which are evidence of the responsibilities that are felt toward him; and demands (such as the share of the crop that a landlord may take from his tenant) which are evidence of the responsibilities that he is felt to have toward others.

The evidences of social status are for the most part manifest in social situations, *i.e.*, through the conduct toward the individual of persons with whom he is for the moment situationally involved. But whereas social situations are always transitory, the social status of an individual always has considerable and often great stability through time. The maintenance of a given order of social status through many transitory social situations is accomplished in one of two ways: either through the fact that the varying personnel of successive situations accord, for whatever reason, the individual the same status position—as men may everywhere and upon all occasions recognize as and treat a

woman as a lady; or through the fact that successive situations are composed of the same persons. Both these conditions presuppose the existence of organized social life, the former of such large forms of organization as those of class, and the latter of such smaller forms of organization as family, community, club, and the like. Social status may therefore be defined as the position granted an individual in the organized activities of his fellow men.

Status and Self-definition. The social status that a given individual enjoys—or, more properly speaking, the various status positions that he is granted—tends to determine in large measure the definition that he makes of himself. This fact has long been recognized; and various terms—*e.g.*, “the looking-glass self,” “the reflected self,” “ego involvements,” etc.—have been used to describe the resulting phenomenon. It is evident that, other things being equal, the status accorded a child by those who are mainly responsible for his socialization determines the personality attributes that the child will acquire. Thus a parentally idolized child will most certainly acquire, among other attributes, a much higher concept of his own value than will one who is unwanted and is so treated. Such long-run consequences of status are, however, of less interest to the student of social control than are the comparatively short-run effects on an individual’s self-definition of a change—for better or worse—in any status to which he has become accustomed. Any considerable change in an individual’s status, such as that which occurs when the fortunes of war or intercollegiate football result in an inconspicuous lad’s being acclaimed a hero or that which occurs when a respected man is caught in a scandalous activity, is likely to lead the individual to redefine himself (a process which the psychologists sometimes describe as “restructuring” the personality).

There is not, as will be shown in detail later, a one-to-one relationship between social status and self-definition. But the tendency of the individual to see himself more or less as others see him is what, under most conditions of life, makes him sensitive to social control. As was indicated earlier, it is only under exceptionally adverse conditions that the individual is conscious of and concerned with his physical dependence upon social status. Under normal circumstances the major and immediate effect on him of a loss or a gain in social status is an emotional one—*i.e.*, it is in that realm of the covert feeling states which is referred to by such terms as “self-confidence,” “self-respect,” “discouragement,” and “demoralization.”

ASCRIBED AND ACHIEVED STATUS

Those who grant status to an individual seldom if ever do so with the calculated regard for their own personal self-interests that is supposed to determine the market-place exchange of goods and services. All sorts of “irrational” values, sentiments, beliefs, etc., may enter into the granting of status; and some grants of status are made on the basis of antiquated cultural rules which make the grant an outright gift for which society receives no compen-

sating return. Even as a devoted daughter may personally grant her aging mother constant care and attention, although in doing so she herself sacrifices her normal right to marriage and a family of her own, society at large may grant a man the status of prince and enable him to live in parasitic splendor, although the political system no longer puts princes to good use.

For Value Received or Receivable. On the whole and in the long run, however, grants of status are functional; they must be if the society is to endure through time. The status is granted, whether by a group or by society at large, as a means of obtaining values equal to or greater than those given; *i.e.*, the grant of status is not a gift but is one side of a complex social exchange. What is given may be of the same order as what is received; thus a good companion gives companionship in return for companionship. More often what is given differs in kind from what is received in return; thus parents, in granting their child the status of son, may provide him with physical protection and care but secure in return only such intangibles as the pleasure of watching him grow to manhood, the vicarious satisfaction of seeing him enjoy life, and the gratification of having someone to carry on the family name after their death.

The exchanges effected through the granting of status are always devious, usually involve many intangibles, and are subject to considerable error. On the surface at least, parents who idolize and give everything possible to their child may get nothing but trouble and disappointment in return; whether their pleasure in the giving is equable compensation to them for the evident disutilities of having an overindulged child is something no one, least of all the parents themselves, can judge. That the slave (or peasant or indentured servant) normally secures something in return for the services he renders the master (or landlord or whatever) is quite evident; but whether what he gets is at all commensurate with what he gives is quite another matter. To the professional soldier sudden death is an occupational risk, and presumably the rights of his status are therefore greater than they would otherwise be. The status of the conscript, however, might seem to be one exclusively of obligations and no rights; for about all that he appears to be offered in return for his life is brief posthumous acclaim as one who died for God and country. Nevertheless, an exchange of sorts has been made: the conscript was as an infant granted the right to live, and through the years to maturity he lived parasitically; whether he repays his debt by dying in defense of his country (or tribe, as the case may be) or by raising a crop of children is, in a vague sense, for society to decide.

One of the reasons why it is impossible to equate, in the manner of an accountant, the exchanges effected through grants of social status is that a grant of status may be in return for past services or in anticipation of future services, or both; another and related reason is that those who grant the status may not be the same as those who received or who in the future will receive services in return. Under the old patriarchal family system one of the normal

rewards for bringing a male child to maturity was the prospect that he and his wife and children would take care of his parents in their declining years. In granting him the status of son, his parents were more or less effectively assuring themselves that they would be granted the status of respected parents by him when he became a man. On the other hand, in many forms of family life, including our own, where sons and daughters tend to gain independence and comparative freedom from filial obligations upon reaching maturity, the exchange of values is from parents to children down the generations; *i.e.*, the parents of today, through raising children of their own, are paying for the investment of time and effort made in them by their parents, and today's children will pay for their support by assuming the responsibilities of parents in the future.

Ascribed Status. Even as a merchant may extend credit to a customer, giving goods in return for an implied promise to pay in the future, so a number of individuals or society at large may ascribe status to an infant, a child, or an adult who in terms of certain cultural or other criteria seems a good social risk. The fact that a human being is alive is, as has been indicated, *prima facie* evidence that at birth he was ascribed the right to live. That right to live is always qualified, and the level or way of living (*e.g.*, as a female, as a slave, as a member of the social elite) is more or less rigidly specified.

The ascription of social status is, like the extension of credit by a merchant, an act of faith; but whereas the credit extended by the merchant is usually based on some empirical experience with the customer, such as, for example, a report on the customer from the local credit bureau, "social credit" is generally given in accordance with either cultural formula or personal sentiment. Cultural formulas most commonly center around nativity. In all societies the status ascribed a male infant is different from that ascribed a female; in most societies parentage determines the complex of kinship status relationships which the infant is granted—*e.g.*, that he is son to so-and-so, nephew to so-and-so, grandson to so-and-so, etc. Upon his parentage depends, further, his initial and often his permanent ethnic, class, national, and other status positions. Moreover, it is largely nativity that determines his particular status with his particular parents; thus if he is the first-born son he may be accorded quite different status from that which is accorded his younger brother. Finally, certain "accidents of birth," some of genetic determination, some not, may profoundly affect the status accorded him. Thus a girl who, in the terms of her society, is exceptionally beautiful may be ascribed by her parents and others a quite different status from that ascribed to a girl who by the same standards is ugly.

The status that is ascribed to an individual at or shortly after birth largely determines the directions his socialization will take—whether he will be brought up to be, in terms of his culture, masculine or feminine, a lower- or upper-class person, etc. He will be, in sum, more or less effectively socialized to fit the status that has been ascribed to him. Once granted, ascribed status

tends to endure, irrespective of the individual's own conduct; thus the individual may be able to enjoy throughout his life a status for which he never pays. The idolized son may, for example, remain a son to his parents—evenually, perhaps, inheriting their wealth—although he fails in every way to be a proper son to them. Conversely the man with the ascribed ethnic status of Negro will most likely remain a Negro, although he may strive to escape the stigma, as he might come to view it, that was attached to him at birth.

In most instances ascribed status can be either modified or withdrawn for cause; for nothing social is ever final. Parents can, for example, disinherit their wayward son, although they seldom do so. The status of a man may be modified should it become known that he is a homosexual. Even the hereditary and hence ascribed status of king can be revoked through revolution; the wealthy aristocrat can be reduced to poverty, the landed gentry made landless, etc. But for the most part, the risk of losing an ascribed status is so slight that the possibility of such a loss has comparatively little direct effect upon the conduct of the individual.² Ascribed status is, therefore, more important in the socialization of the individual than as a basis for social control of him.

Achieved Status. Achieved status is status that is granted as a social reward for some sort of personal accomplishment and, usually but not invariably, on the assumption that the services rendered in the past will continue to be

² Moreover, ascribed status is largely taken for granted and in this sense not highly valued by the possessor. The individual born into a position of wealth and esteem—*e.g.*, the son of one of the "old" upper-class families—will tend to acquire the relevant motivations and values of that status and to that extent be personally well adjusted to it. He has always enjoyed the rights of his status and consequently feels secure, and feeling so is under no internal compulsion to strive to maintain his status. The self-made man, on the other hand, is never quite secure in his achieved position, if only because he knows from past experience how hard it is to reach that position from one of inferior ascribed status. Moreover, he will probably place a much higher value on his achieved position than does the one who had a comparable status ascribed to him; after all, he must value what he has achieved highly, or he would never have struggled to accomplish it; and he will, therefore, resume the struggle should occasion warrant—*i.e.*, if his status is threatened, he will do, so far as he can, what is required in order to retain it. Similarly, the child who because of a broken home or because he is unwanted and somewhat unattended lacks ample companionship often displays in later life greater need for status—in this case mainly status in companionship coteries or clubs—than does the one whose ascribed status was normal. Just as the child who was undernourished in childhood may place an atypically high value on food in adult life, so the one who was lonely in childhood may be an avid "joiner" as an adult. In general, then, it seems likely that there is a relationship between insecurity consequent upon inadequate ascribed status and sensitivity to social control. It is to be observed in this connection that the middle classes—the disdained bourgeoisie of the Communists—have been on the one hand subject to competitive displacement and recurrent liquidation and, on the other hand, exceptionally conventional—*i.e.*, much concerned with conformity to the moral and other norms of the society at large. The established elite has always, however, tended to feel so secure in its position that members could, should they wish, indulge in deviant forms of conduct.

forthcoming in the future.³ Thus a man confers upon a certain girl the status of wife (and she upon him that of husband) on the assumption—not, of course, always valid—that because she was a pleasant companion during his courtship of her she will be equally pleasant and companionable in the future.

Since achieved status is granted as a reward for past conduct, the prospect of obtaining it is an inducement to the individual to behave in such ways as to earn it. Moreover, achieved status is always subject to withdrawal for failure to live up to the requirements of that status. A king may rule badly and still die on the throne; but the achieved status of President, like that of any elected politician, is subject to periodic review. Parents seldom disinherit a son for bad conduct; but in most societies the achieved status of wife is contingent upon continued good conduct. Achieved status is thus a far more effective basis for social control than is the ascribed variety; and it is, therefore, mainly with achieved status that the analysis in the subsequent chapters will be concerned.

Ascribed status never determines the status that an individual will achieve; it does, however, usually limit the character and number of achieved status positions to which the individual is eligible. Obvious is the fact that anyone born a female cannot achieve a status that is limited exclusively to males and vice versa. No man can become a wife, no woman a husband; in most societies, including our own, the female is excluded from the status of priest and the male from that of nun. Although a woman may, in certain societies, gain the ascribed status of queen, none has as yet achieved that of President.

The relationship between ascribed and achieved status is seldom, however, as simple as the above illustrations might suggest. The only generalization that can be made is that nativity invariably determines in one way or another the *opportunities* that the individual will have to achieve status. Thus in contemporary American society the ethnic status of the individual—as indicated by such signs as name, accent, or skin color—sets fairly rigid limits upon the other status positions that he can secure. Negroes are discriminated against in politics, business, and many social affairs; in the political life of many of our cities only those with a certain ethnic background—*e.g.*, the Irish in Boston—have much chance of success; in many Southern towns the man with Yankee manners and accent is forever precluded from attaining full social standing.

In many societies, moreover, the class structure is so rigid and the differences between the classes so wide that ascribed class position is final—*i.e.*, the individual stays throughout his life in the class to which he was born. Thus

³ An undesirable status, such as that of criminal, may be looked upon as one that is given to the individual as punishment for socially undesired conduct. For simplicity in analysis, the “granting” of undesired status will here be treated as the consequence of the social withdrawal of acceptable status; *e.g.*, a person convicted of a crime has his civil liberties taken from him, or at least curtailed, and thus achieves the status of criminal.

under feudalism the individual born of serfs lived and died a serf; he could not possibly achieve the status of aristocrat. But in our own society the class system is to a significant extent open, as it is and has been in all the great civilizations; and under some conditions the individual born in one class level is able to move into a higher or descend into a lower class. This possibility considerably intensifies the effects of social control upon the individual, for it dangles before him the prospect of status promotion up the class scale and holds the threat over him of demotion down that scale. Where class status is entirely a matter of birth, there is no such incentive for the lowborn to strive to achieve better social positions and obviously no incentive for those of high estate to strive to keep what is already assured.

In our own society (with some qualifications the same conditions obtained in premodern China) class origin is not a determinant of the various status positions, occupational and otherwise, to which the individual is eligible; but it does weight the chances—favorably or unfavorably—of his gaining this or that status position. In America as elsewhere today, the man who obtains monetary wealth—and there are few qualifications upon how he may obtain it other than that he not be caught in too flagrant violation of law—thereby secures the right to live in the best hotels, eat at the most expensive restaurants, wear fine clothes, and, perhaps, even mingle in some respects as a comparative equal with the “best” people. Many well-known but unconvicted criminals do. Nonetheless, the man born to wealth starts with a considerable advantage over the one born in a lower economic class, not alone because he inherits wealth but because he is ascribed at birth status as a member of the upper class and as a result does not have to earn or worm his way into acceptance by the members of that class. Likewise, while it is possible for any man who can earn a degree from a sound medical school to gain acceptance as a physician (country general practitioner, honored specialist, highly paid “society” physician, or whatever), the chances that he will do so are considerably less if he was born into the lower class than if he was born into the middle class, both because the cost of a medical education is high and because the motivations, aptitudes, mannerisms, etc., that make for success in medical practice are less often acquired out of a lower-class background.

GENERIC AND SPECIFIC STATUS

The distinction between ascribed and achieved status hinges upon what constitutes the basis for the granting of the status, *i.e.*, on whether status is granted on faith and in hope that the individual will in due course pay for it or whether it is granted on the basis of his past performance. Equally important is the distinction between generic and specific status grants. This distinction depends upon how many are involved in granting the status and the nature of the individual's relations with them.

Any status, whether ascribed or achieved, that is granted by all, or at least most, of the social population is *generic*. Ascribed ethnic, class, and sex status

are invariably generic; and age status, especially the status of child and of elder, is ordinarily and for the most part generic. In some instances occupational, regional, or even family status is so widely recognized that it may be considered generic in type. In our own society, for example, a Negro is a Negro wherever he goes; a woman is a woman; a child is a child; and, if he makes himself known, a physician is a physician. It is true, of course, that the particular status granted a Negro, a woman, a child, or a physician varies considerably from place to place, from class to class, and from circumstance to circumstance. Nevertheless, Negroes are almost everywhere and regardless of their personal characteristics excluded from white hotels, restaurants, etc., and are welcomed—as whites are not—to Negro establishments. Women—provided that they belong to the right ethnic and class position—are almost everywhere eligible for admission to “ladies’ rooms,” dress shops, and many other places from which men may be excluded. And the achieved status of physician commands a certain amount of respect everywhere in the United States, as does that of magic man in most primitive societies.

Generic status is often an important initial determinant in situational interactions. Upon the individual’s generic status may depend his eligibility to enter into a given situation and, to some extent, how he is defined by the other participants. Ascribed generic status—*e.g.*, ethnic, class, or sex—may also, as has been indicated, preclude the individual’s entering some of the achievable status positions provided by his society and predispose him to entering others. For the most part, however, generic status is never so highly esteemed by the individual as status which—whether ascribed or achieved—is specific in character.

Specific status is status that is granted by a comparatively small number of persons who know the individual personally, rather than just recognize him as a member of a category of persons, and whose regard for him is both intimate and detailed. Kinship status is the most common form of specific status; a boy is son to his father and mother and, as a rule, to no one else. To have the specific status of son to parents is, in most instances, far more important to the individual than simply to have the generic status of “white male, twenty-one years of age.” Likewise, to be granted the specific status of friend by half a dozen well-known fellow students is usually more meaningful and highly valued than to be granted the generic status of student of such and such a college, although the latter is prerequisite to the former. On the whole, the value that the individual places on his generic status derives from the specific status which it enables him to secure.

In a society such as our own where the individual may be highly mobile, associating in many ways with people who respond to him mainly and perhaps entirely in terms of his generic status, such status is not without its control functions. Because he is and conceives himself as a Negro, a man will be more or less restrained and estranged in association with those who are by generic status white. Because she is and conducts herself as a woman, a woman

may confidently enter a corset shop but hesitate to go into a barber shop, etc. Since, however, the individual in any society—including our own—ordinarily places a higher value on his specific than on his generic status, and since achieved status is subject to improvement and loss while ascribed is not, social control operates mainly and most effectively on the basis of achieved specific status.

THE STATUS ROLE

The individual who is granted status of any sort, whether ascribed or achieved and whether generic or specific, is expected to act in certain specified ways, even as he can expect others to act toward him in certain specified ways. He is in a sense expected to play a role, specifically the role that is prescribed for and associated with the particular status position that he has been granted. The role may range all the way from that of slave to that of king, from that of indentured servant to that of pampered daughter of the family, from that of hunted criminal to that of wealthy and respected banker. Whatever the role, he is expected to live up to its requirements, to behave in terms of it. If he is granted the status of king, he is expected to behave as king, to play the role of king, not that of slave or something else. In the analysis that follows, the term "status role" will be used whenever attention is focused, not on the status itself, but on the behavior of the individual in the particular status position that he has been accorded.⁴

Status Rights. Each status role involves a variety of more or less clearly defined and rigidly maintained rights. The tribal elder may have, among other things, the right to food—and perhaps the choicest bits of food at that—although he himself no longer hunts or works in the fields. Some of the rights accruing to a given role are obvious; the right of the female in our society to ornament herself is, for example, in marked and evident contrast to the social requirement that the adult male keep his hair cut short, his face clean, and cover his body with drab clothing. The male who, because of atypical training, aspires to the female role in respect to ornamentation thereby isolates himself from normal masculine association. To the normal male nothing is quite so disgusting as the "third sex"—the male who uses perfume and cosmetics, wears "daring" clothes, speaks in an affected (*i.e.*, feminine) way, and drapes himself on a bar stool in a manner appropriate to a graceful woman but, in our current role concepts, ill suited to any male.

In addition to and, generally, more important than the obvious rights of a given status role are the subtle and intangible ones. The status of professor usually has a number of obvious rights that distinguish the professor from students and from all others who do not share that status, such as a salary from the institution, a place in the curriculum (only members of the faculty give courses), an office, listing as professor in the directory, the privilege to

⁴ When the status is specific and is granted by a status group (to be discussed in the subsequent chapter), the status role is more exactly termed "status-group role."

use the title Professor of Such and Such beneath his name on stationery, a place in the various councils of the faculty, and, often the most prized of them all, the right to park his car in the restricted parking zones of the campus.

But, like most status roles, that of professor has in addition many complex and intangible rights, some of which may be valued far more than any of the obvious ones. Status as professor, for example, normally gives a man the right to speak his mind, at least in the classroom; and this is a right which is almost exclusively his and for which he more or less willingly sacrifices many things, including the possibility of high income. He has the right to question the authority of tradition and to disagree on intellectual grounds with his economic and political superiors. Functionally related to this right is that of tenure in his academic position, a right which means that he cannot be punished economically for failure to agree with his superiors on intellectual matters. Even more subtle, but quite significant, is the right to say "I do not know" or, as it is usually put, "The facts are not yet evident." This right, the right to withhold judgment, is peculiarly academic; most occupational roles—*e.g.*, that of politician, priest, physician, or businessman—do not grant it.

The aforementioned and all the other obvious and subtle professorial rights are, of course, subject to considerable variation. Some institutions demand comparative subservience of the individual faculty man; thus in a religious college an agnostic either holds his tongue or loses his position. A young instructor—an apprentice professor—has somewhat fewer rights and holds even these in lesser degree than does a mature and established man. All of which is another way of getting at the fact that a given status role—professor, housewife, or priest—is actually a status category within which a variety of specific roles exist, each with something of its own special rights. Thus a professor of biology has greater right to speak freely (even to the point of contradicting one of his noted colleagues) on biological matters than does a professor of psychology, who as an authority on psychology is granted greater right to speak his mind on this subject.

What has been said of the rights, obvious and subtle, of the professorial role in our society applies in principle to all of the more clearly defined status roles. The good neighbor may, for example, have the right to address his fellow neighbors by nickname, joke with their wives, borrow their garden tools, mow his lawn on Sunday, and give a big and noisy party for his business acquaintances once in a while; the store clerk who is liked by his fellows may have such rights as his choice of women customers (where an informal rotation system operates and he is, perhaps, exceptionally successful with women) and the right to borrow a few dollars from his coworkers when he is running short of money; the member in good standing of an informal club may have the right to play bad golf and joke about it or perhaps even the right to break a few rules in order to keep his score down, the right to assert his opinions in conversation with fellow members, and the right to a warm welcome whenever he turns up.

Individually the various rights of a status role may appear trivial, and to value them may seem a matter of petty personal pride. *In toto*, however, the rights of a status role may actually constitute the individual's most prized "possession," the direct source of most of the psychological satisfactions that he secures in life, and in many instances an essential part of his basic right to live at all.

Status Symbols. One of the rights of every clearly defined status role is the use of some particular status symbol or symbols. The military, for example, wear uniforms distinctive to their particular service, thereby distinguishing themselves from brother services and from civilians. Within any particular service the clothing of officers is, moreover, sufficiently different from that of the ranks so that officers and men are distinguishable at a glance; still further differentiating both officers and men are the symbols of rank—the bars and oak leaves, the stripes and chevrons, etc. Status symbols of nonmilitary groups are somewhat less obvious but are usually meaningful to the initiate. Clothing, in its design, color, or quality, is a common status symbol. For example, no one could possibly, even at first glance, mistake a bobby-soxer for a fashionable woman; and among fashionable women there are all sorts of meaningful symbols indicating their rank relative to one another. The businessman's uniform—currently the double-breasted wool suit—is on the one hand easily distinguished from the workingman's denims and, on the other, from the garb of the priest. Among businessmen certain vague but still important rank differences are reflected in the quality and cut of the business suit; the junior executive may buy his clothes ready-made, his superior may have his made by an expensive tailor, and the superior's superior may secure his from an "exclusive" tailor.

Badges, tags, and a great variety of more elaborate devices either worn on the person or displayed—such as a chauffeur-driven limousine—are used to indicate status position. Even verbal mannerisms and gestures often have status significance; thus Oxford University bestows on its graduates—along with other if less evident things—a distinctive mode of speech. Class status invariably carries its verbal and gestural indicators; as a consequence, the lowborn origin of an individual who has gained wealth and position can often be detected in spite of fine clothing and grand manner. Regional status, likewise, is often symbolized in speech and gesture. In some instances deliberate efforts are made to indicate region of origin, as when a Texan visiting in New York City wears the wide-brimmed hat of his homeland. The clothing and other symbols of the sex roles are so evident that they need not be described here.

Status symbols serve various functions. Within formally organized groups they are commonly used as token rewards for good behavior, thus constituting a simple social-control device that will be discussed in another connection later. Somewhat more complex in function is the use within groups of symbols of

differential rank or office.⁵ In formal groups, such as military organizations, these symbols assure that the individual will receive—or, if he does not, can effectively demand—the rights of his role: that the officer will be saluted by the men, that the orders he gives will be obeyed by anyone who is his subordinate, that anyone with whom he deals will know his place in the military hierarchy and accord him the respect and prerogatives of his special office. At the same time, symbols of rank or office help to keep the individual within the confines of his role; *i.e.*, he is in effect labeled “not a general” when he is labeled “Captain.”

Visible status symbols of rank or office are perhaps most commonly associated with large, relatively impersonal, regimentally organized groups, such as the military, police forces, firemen, marine services, etc., which operate under conditions of crisis and in which there is, for functional reasons, a rigid structuring of personnel into various ranks and a strong emphasis upon discipline and uncritical obedience to orders. The members of small, intimate groups do not need visible status symbols to enable them to identify a fellow member or the rank or office which he occupies; they identify the person and through him his particular role, a sequence which is reversed in military and other similar organizations. Nor is there much need for or use of visible symbols of rank or office in large, impersonal organizations, such as corporate businesses and civil government agencies, that do not operate under crisis conditions. In such organizations orders flow from the top downward in a relatively channeled and impersonal way. The subordinate does not need to identify at sight the president, vice-president, or whatnot; for governmental bureau chiefs and corporation executives do not mingle “in the heat of battle” with common workers, as may generals, police and fire chiefs, and even captains of ships at sea. Rather, when there is occasion in such organizations for a subordinate to meet one of the “big bosses,” he usually goes to that person’s office; if anything is needed to make identification complete, the name and title on the office door will serve.

The emphasis that is placed upon symbols of rank and office, however, is not always proportionate to the function that they serve. Many nonmilitary organizations with no functional need to do so nonetheless stress and mark out rank within the membership, as does, for example, the Masonic order; on the other hand, some organizations in which rank differences are functionally significant do not stress ranks as such. Within the academic world, for example, a professor is a professor whether he is in fact an assistant or an associate or a full professor; and the use of the title “Professor” is usually

⁵ “Rank” and “office” will be distinguished and analyzed in detail later. For the present it should suffice to say that rank is that aspect of status which relates to position within a hierarchy, as distinct from position *per se*, and that office is a special kind of status which carries with it designated responsibilities for the welfare of the members of a group or organization—*e.g.*, the “rank” of an enlisted man and the “office” of President.

limited to formal occasions and relations with nonacademic people. Thus whereas a captain and a general are clearly distinguishable by the obviously indicated difference in rank, and neither would ever refer to the other without putting him in his special role by using his military title, the members of a university faculty are most clearly distinguishable in terms of age, which does not correlate closely with rank; and they usually address one another, including their president, as "Mr." if they are not intimately acquainted and by first name if they are. An odd form of status indicator has developed within the past twenty years in business and, most especially, governmental bureaucracy. Referring to and in some instances addressing a superior by the initials of his given names (*e.g.*, "L.M.") is taken to indicate a sort of respectful intimacy on the part of the subordinate.

In many instances the most important function of status symbols is the maintenance of group morale, a subject that will be considered in a subsequent chapter. Briefly, the function of the uniforms of the military, the police, etc., of the clerical garb, and of many other forms of special dress is, on the one hand, that of enabling outsiders to recognize members of the group and grant prerogatives, if any, and on the other hand, that of impressing upon the members the fact that they are distinct from nonmembers. Dress and other visible symbols of group membership are not necessary when the members of the group represent a distinctive subculture, as do criminals, or when there is no special need for quick discrimination between member and nonmember. Craftsmen, for example, can soon enough determine by his speech, his knowledge of craft techniques and legends, and his ability to do the work assigned to him whether or not the stranger in their midst is a fellow craftsman. The policeman in need of help, on the other hand, cannot "feel out" the casual passerby to ascertain whether he is a fellow policeman, a criminal, or just an ordinary citizen.

Status Obligations. Where status is not simply a matter of the accident of birth—*i.e.*, ascribed—the rights of any status role constitute the reward—in terms, of course, of the local cultural-personal values—for playing the role. Where, as is always to some extent the case and is most noticeably characteristic of contemporary society, the individual is eligible for a variety of status positions (*e.g.*, a man might become a doctor, lawyer, or priest; a woman might become a housewife, schoolteacher, or prostitute), the number of individuals who strive for each kind of status role is a rough indication of the values placed upon the rights appertaining to it. Thus a century ago one of the most honored and hence most valued occupational roles was that of minister; aspirants for the ministry were many; and, although economic income was comparatively low, few who achieved the status of minister left the profession for another occupation. Today, however, the status of minister is held in mild disdain; competition for the role is anything but keen; and many of those who do qualify for the ministry either do not enter upon the task or become discouraged and drop out in the course of time.

Although it would be an oversimplification to say that the clearly defined status positions of a society can be scaled in terms of their desirability to the members of the society, it is true that women have rarely competed for masculine roles, that the majority of the members of even our own laboring class make no effort to climb into the middle classes, and that only an exceedingly small proportion of America's young women go to Hollywood in hope of achieving stardom. Actually, the values that a given individual places on the various status positions of his society depend in the main upon his subcultural training; for each of the many subcultures there is, perhaps, a special system for evaluating the various status positions. In a dynamic society such as our own, most persons who are not wealthy may vaguely wish that they were; but only a few strive to become so. Most are, if not content, at least more or less reconciled to gaining promotion within their class, occupation, and other subcultural status categories.

One reason for this limited competition is that the particular values of an individual make only a few of the many status roles of his society operationally attractive to him. To the middle-class youth, the rights accruing to a Mason may be attractive; to the lower-class youth, being a Mason may seem far less desirable than being a member of some local baseball club. Moreover, ethnic, class, sex, and other limitations on eligibility to a given status role will either preclude or at least discourage efforts on the part of many individuals to gain admission to it.

But perhaps the major reason for the very limited competition for higher status roles is the fact, central to social control, that status rights tend to entail compensatory obligations. Ascribed status roles, such as that of prince and rich man's son, are only partial exceptions to this general rule. They are partial in that both a prince and a rich man's son do have at least the obligation of living up to the social standards set for them. To the outsider such social parasites may seem to get much and give nothing in return; but under most circumstances they must dress up and play up to their roles, whether they personally wish to do so or not.

Status rights and obligations are not, of course, nicely balanced in terms of some abstract principle of social justice. A generation of economists attempted to prove that a man's financial income is a fair index of his economic contribution to society, but without notable success.⁶ Even ignoring such facts as that thieves often wax rich while honest and industrious men stay poor, that fortunes are often made through such sheer inadvertence as happening to be the owner of land on which oil is discovered, and that some of the most important contributions to social welfare have no economic implication or

⁶ This effort culminated in and was more or less terminated by F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn's *American Men of Business* (Macmillan, New York, 1932). The view that people of wealth are not necessarily worth their cost to society was earlier developed by the liberal economist T. Veblen in the now classic book *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (Vanguard, New York, 1926).

reward, it is still difficult to demonstrate a consistent relation between economic income and economic productivity. For the fact is that economic values are everywhere intermingled with noneconomic values and are often canceled out by them. A scientist may gain renown but no wealth, whereas high economic reward may be given for the most intangible and uneconomic of services—witness, for example, the high incomes of successful professional gamblers who offer their patrons nothing but an illusory hope of quick and easy wealth.

In the long run, however, the obligations of any status role (obligations which will subsequently be discussed from the control point of view as group norms) are, from the point of view of those who strive to enter or to remain in that role, nearly but not quite the value equivalents of the rights. Status obligations cannot for long exceed status rights, for the role will disappear for lack of competitors for it; the obligations cannot for long be far less than the rights, for excessive competition for the role will lead to its being accepted at a cut price, *i.e.*, the status obligations will be accepted for less than the going status rights. An understanding of the balance of status rights and obligations depends upon realization of the fact that the value placed upon any right and the disutility placed on any obligation is a matter of social definition; the balance of rights and obligations therefore varies between different societies, between different subcultural groups within the same society, and between different individuals within such groups; and it is, moreover, subject to change through time. There is no inherent reason why as many men as do should aspire to become President of the United States; and there is no inherent reason why so comparatively few should set themselves up as professional gamblers. The income of a successful gambler is far greater than that of a successful politician, whereas the chances of sudden death are probably not much greater, the demands upon one's time are certainly less, and each in his own circle has high prestige. But currently to be Senator, Governor, or President is respectable, whereas to be a wealthy gambler is not; just as currently to be a general, and perhaps direct the slaughter of tens of thousands, is respectable, whereas to be a gangster and kill only a few is not.

Reciprocal Rights and Obligations. The balance of status-role rights and obligations is perhaps most evident when the obligations of one status role satisfy the rights of another, and vice versa. To the extent that the members of a group occupy equivalent status positions (*e.g.*, housewives in a community, workers occupying the same jobs) status-role obligations are simply the obverse of status rights. The individual member of a group who has, for example, the role right to take a hand at the bridge table whenever a place is open must, as one of three who need a fourth for bridge, extend the same right to all others of the group; the stock boy who has the role right to slip out for a smoke now and then must in return protect any fellow worker who is out for a smoke (*i.e.*, cover up for him when the boss comes around); the stenographer who has the right to take a day off for shopping occasionally on the grounds that she is ill must validate a fellow worker's excuse for a similar

absence when the occasion arises. Support of the rights of individual members of a group usually involves rather devious actions and, often, the exercise of considerable ingenuity. The stock boy who just says vaguely, "Oh, Joe's somewhere around" when his employer or the departmental manager inquires will probably not be living up to his role obligation in this matter; his obligation is to save Joe from being caught or even suspected by his superiors; it is Joe's "right" to protection while off the job, and it is the obligation of his fellow workers to provide him with the best possible protection under the circumstances. Likewise, the stenographer who is taking her turn at being ill expects full protection. The minimum obligation of her coworkers is to support the idea that she is ill; really adequate performance would be the more or less subtle proffering to the office manager of some "evidence" confirming her illness—e.g., a slightly embarrassed reference to the phase of the moon.

The reciprocal type of status-role rights and obligations is very common.⁷ One thing required of a physician, for example, is that he defend his fellow practitioners against any charge of malpractice; e.g., his personal opinion of diagnosis or treatment by another physician should never be revealed to any layman. Similarly, the college teacher is expected by his colleagues to divert student criticism of any colleague and never to reveal to students any adverse views that he may hold of the teaching ability or scholarly proficiency of a colleague. Likewise, if it is his right to expect the blackboard in a classroom to be clean when he takes over that room, then it will be obligatory for him to erase the marks he has put on the board before leaving at the end of the hour.

Where, as is often the case, the membership of a group is differentiated into ranks, the obligations of each rank may differ somewhat, and they are sometimes but not always the obverse of the rights. Thus a superior may have the right to be addressed as "Sir" by his inferiors; obligatory to their roles is, then, addressing the superior as "Sir." The same is true of all the special rights of a superior; his rights are satisfied only to the extent that his inferiors live up to their obligations vis-à-vis him. But he too will have obligations, different in kind yet essential to the satisfaction of at least some of the rights of his inferiors. The newcomer in a work group may be assigned the dullest and dirtiest work tasks; but in return for doing these tasks, his seniors will ordinarily aid him in a variety of ways—perhaps by inducting him into their skills. A young physician, just starting practice, is often given—"has referred

⁷ G. Simmel was perhaps the first sociologist to explore in detail the phenomenon of reciprocity in human relationships. He did this, however, mainly in terms of the function of money in modern society; and like so many of the German sociologists, he considered modern society different in kind from premodern. See his *Philosophie des Geldes* (Leipzig, 1900). That reciprocity is not limited to people who have a money economy was demonstrated by B. Malinowski (*Crime and Custom in Primitive Society*, G. Allen, London, 1932). Among the other anthropologists who have stressed the function of reciprocity are H. I. Hogbin (*Law and Order in Polynesia*, Methuen, London, 1934) and J. W. M. Whiting (*On Becoming a Kwoma*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941).

to him" is the polite phrase—the unwanted patients of established practitioners—those who are just tiresome neurotics, the less important seniles, and perhaps even some nonpaying incurables. He must, moreover, show respect for the age and wisdom of his seniors and in a variety of ways cultivate their good will. But if he does, he will usually receive in return a variety of services—expert help when his skills prove inadequate, protection from outside criticism, suggestions on how to build up a profitable practice, etc. Similarly, a young instructor in a college or university is often given tasks which the older men on the staff may feel beneath their dignity or which they have outgrown. To some extent it is the basic obligation of the young instructor to relieve his elders of irksome responsibilities. But in return those elders usually are obligated to show consideration for his youth; perhaps in such ways as assisting him in working up course materials, showing him how to handle student problems, and even covering up for him when he makes a mistake.

Whether the role obligations of a superior to his inferior or inferiors are the equivalent of their obligations to him is perhaps in every instance debatable. In general, it would seem that the obligations of a superior are more difficult to fulfill, if not so numerous and so demanding of time and energy; *i.e.*, they require greater skill and longer experience than do those of the subordinate. Where the role obligations of the superior are more or less the equivalent, in terms of the scale of values of the members and in their demands on the individual, to the obligations of the subordinate, the superiority of status consists in the greater rights that accrue to that role. It is to be observed that in many instances administrative officers in business, in clubs and other organizations, and even in colleges and universities spend far more time on the job and work at a higher level of intensity than do their subordinates, and that the most respected members of the local medical fraternity are likely to be the hardest worked as well as the best paid.

Personal Status. Social control is accomplished mainly, as will be shown in detail later, by increasing or diminishing status rights, either in prospect or in actuality, to encourage the individual to adhere to his status obligations. In the simplest and least important type of such operation, the individual who is not adequately fulfilling his status obligations is threatened with a reduction in status rights by demotion down the status hierarchy, as is the case when a noncommissioned officer in the army is threatened with reduction in rank. Actual lowering of status position, with concomitant contraction of status rights, normally follows when the threat has proved insufficient to bring the individual into conformity with his obligations. The promise or actuality of demotion and its antithesis, promotion for exceptional behavior, is, however, limited to formally organized groups. On the whole it is probably a less effective mode of social control than is the threat or actuality of lowered personal status.

There is always a distinction between the status rights of a role that an individual occupies and the rights that are actually accorded him as a person

in that role.⁸ Even in the relatively mechanized relationships of military life, where status rights and obligations are rigidly specified, the treatment accorded two men of the same rank may be quite different. Thus while each of two company commanders may be obeyed without overt question by his subordinates and given all the obvious rights of his position, one may have high personal status with his company and the other low personal status with his. In lay terms, the one is *as a person* respected and admired, while the other is *as a person* held in disdain and contempt. Differential personal status of this sort will be reflected in a multitude of ways, all external to the rights accorded the status role itself. For example, the officer who has high personal status may be obeyed with some zest and with some tendency on the part of his subordinates to protect him from the consequences of errors of judgment or misadventure. The rights of his status role will often be fulfilled beyond the letter of the law; perhaps his staff car is kept in exceptionally good condition, or perhaps in officers' mess he is served the thickest and tenderest steak. The officer whose personal status is low, on the other hand, may be obeyed in a somewhat apathetic manner; when occasion arises he may be shown up in the worst possible light; and although his car may be maintained in the prescribed military manner, it will probably not receive the conscientious attention that makes for trouble-free operation.

Every human act can be played in a wide variety of manners. An act that is supposed to signify respect, such as the military salute, the bow of a headwaiter, the "Yes, Sir" of a servant, and the "May I help you?" of the store clerk, can in actuality be made to convey anything from honest admiration to outright contempt. A service act, such as that of filling an order for a dozen eggs, fitting a suit, painting a house, or mowing a lawn, can be performed more or less promptly and more or less well. A friendly greeting can be a welcome or a rebuff; a companionable silence can be anything from warm to cold; an honor accorded a notable can be empty or sincere; a laugh accorded a joke can be perfunctory or hearty; the protest "Oh, it's early. Don't go yet" can be an invitation to stay on or a strong hint to get along.

The individual who occupies a defined status role is generally given his rights in accordance with the letter of the law; but the satisfaction that he secures from those rights ordinarily depends mainly upon his personal status as an occupier of that role. Unless he is as an individual abnormally crass and

⁸ It is, perhaps, in regimental or bureaucratic systems that the clearest distinction between status role and personal status appears. Frequently the person who occupies an important role is himself of almost no importance. For example, the parish priest is a functionary of the Church and as such serves certain ritualistic purposes for the devout in his parish; but unlike the English clergyman and, more spectacularly, the American minister, he is a sort of impersonal fixture; whether his parishioners like him as a person makes little difference; they go to the Church, not to his church. (See D. W. Brogan, "The Catholic Church in America," *Harper's Mag.*, May, 1950, p. 40). By contrast, the congregation of an American Protestant church is more like a theater public; it is the minister as a person who attracts or repels people to his church.

unfeeling, the way in which his rights are fulfilled considerably affects their value to him. And the way in which the rights of his role are fulfilled—whether willingly or reluctantly, as it were—is dependent upon his personal status. This, in turn, is determined in the long run by the way in which he fulfills the obligations of his role.

For example, all the regular patrons of a given restaurant may pay the proper amount for their food and, if such is the local custom, give the proper tip to the waiter. Such payment is the basic obligation of the patron. But some patrons may endear themselves to the management and staff (acquire high personal status as patrons) by the way in which they conduct themselves, while others may not. A patron who has more than fulfilled his obligations—at, perhaps, no financial cost, but rather through kindness and consideration in manner—may be accorded, in addition to the rights of his role as patron, such humanly gratifying signs of respect as the best available table, prompt service, helpful suggestions in ordering, and a sincere “Thank you” or “Good night” upon leaving. Conversely, a patron who has earned low personal status may be told off in a variety of more or less subtle ways; he may be placed in a crowded corner, served in a slightly delinquent manner, thanked in a toneless voice, etc.

In the relations of peers—*i.e.*, persons who occupy equal status roles—personal status is of major importance. An individual who belongs to the best club and plays as good a game of golf as any member but has low personal status with his fellow members may gain some satisfaction from his status as a club member by boasting of it to nonmembers; but he will gain little satisfaction from the membership itself. Although he will presumably have all the rights of a club member, he will find little pleasurable companionship within the club, he will be excluded from many of the more intimate and informal member activities, and he will be the victim of more or less covert disparagement. Conversely, the member who has exceptionally high personal status can figuratively—and upon occasion literally—“get away with murder.” He will be included in all club activities, and his company will be sought rather than avoided.

The individual’s personal popularity or unpopularity, to use common terms, with his peers is mainly determined by the way in which he fulfills the obligations of his role. Manner and other attributes of personal charm may even offset failure on the part of the individual to live up to some of the less important of those obligations. Even as a waiter will often take in good grace a substandard tip from a favored patron, peers will often forgive minor delinquencies on the part of the one who has through ease and affability of manner endeared himself to them. On the other hand, the one who is unpopular with them is normally held to strict accounting and given no more than the “law” requires.

Personal charm and consideration for the personal feelings of others does not always, however, determine the extent to which the status rights of a

role are fulfilled. In some instances an individual with high personal status may be less effective in his role than is one with low personal status: a hated employer may secure more work from his employees than a beloved one; a disliked officer may have more power over his troops than a well-liked one; an inconsiderate and despised gangster boss may rule with fear where he could not rule if he were admired but unfearful. In some instances, moreover, high personal status is the consequence of proved efficiency in a role rather than personal charm—*i.e.*, what the individual has accomplished, rather than how he has gone about doing it. Although they may not like him as a person, the crew of a ship may admire their captain as a leader and grant him high personal status because he has brought them safely through a perilous voyage; and although a scientist may be brusque and inconsiderate, his assistants and advanced students may be loyal to him and grant him high personal status because they respect his intellectual ability and his integrity. What particular personal qualities will earn high personal status for the occupant of a given role depend upon the nature of that role, which is to say, upon the values and other criteria by which the occupant of the given role is evaluated. Personal charm is, perhaps, always an asset; but most roles require more than a pleasing manner and consideration for the feelings of others.

STATUS ASPIRATION AND CONFORMING BEHAVIOR

The individual is more or less effectively held to the obligations of his status role by the fact that his rights can be overtly or covertly contracted if his performance deteriorates. How this operates to secure conformity to group standards of conduct (*i.e.*, norms) will be discussed in detail later. A contrast should here be drawn, however, between the individual who strives to protect the status that he actually has and the one who aspires to a higher status position.

Status aspirations vary widely both in degree and in kind. An individual may, for example, simply wish to obtain higher personal status within the status role that he occupies or to secure a higher rank or office within a group to which he belongs; or he may wish to gain entry into another group, *i.e.*, to secure status of a different kind from that which he possesses. In the latter case the individual is what is generally termed an "ambitious" man or, less kindly, a "social climber."

Status aspiration may be rather generalized. An individual may, for example, seek to rise up the class hierarchy in all dimensions—financial, residential, local prestige, etc. More often, however, status aspiration is quite specific; the individual seeks to secure promotion in his occupation, to gain recognition in his profession, to secure membership in a certain country club, to win acclaim in some hobby or artistic circle, or to become a member in good standing of the local café-society set.

In many instances in primitive and premodern societies promotion from role to higher role has been largely a matter of seniority. In the patriarchal

family, for example, the first-born son took precedence over his younger brothers in all matters and ascended to the role of patriarch upon his father's death. In this family system it was also often the right of the first-born daughter to be the first daughter of the family to enter marriage; and until she was married, her younger sisters could not be. In most societies, the senior of a number of individuals has been granted precedence in many matters, both large and small—such, for example, as the right to first choice from the serving bowl or platter at meals, the right to precede his juniors through doorways and down narrow streets, the right to dominate discussions with his opinions and prejudices, and the right to many other concessions “due his age.” Ordinarily, seniority rights have adhered to age per se (or, more specifically, superior age) and have not carried with them offsetting obligations.

In modern society there is a marked tendency toward a similar granting of special status rights on a seniority basis. Seniority in our society is, however, less often a matter of age, even relative age, than it is of length of time as a member in good standing within a given organization. In governmental, business, academic, and even military organizations the individual usually accumulates rights as the years pass; *i.e.*, he gains higher status as a function of time alone. The change in status may be gradual and almost imperceptible, as it is in the case of a university professor who acquires the patina of authority along with his gray hairs and in that of the old-timer in a craft who is respected not so much for what he is as for the history that he represents. The change in status may, on the other hand, be rigidly structured, as it is in most governmental bureaus, in long-established businesses, and in military forces. Here the individual gradually moves up a hierarchy of ranks (and, perhaps, offices), each of which has its specific rewards “for service,” its special rights, and, often, its special symbols, such as the service stars of the railroad conductor or the rating of the civil service employee.

Status rights granted on the basis of seniority are sometimes segmental and may be limited to preferential employment (*i.e.*, the oldest worker in point of service is last to be laid off and first to be reemployed), to preferential job assignment (*i.e.*, the senior worker has his first choice of the available work tasks), or to tenure, the acquired right to retain status irrespective of performance. Some organizations, *e.g.*, scientific societies, grant life memberships on the basis of long and satisfactory prior service. In most universities, in many public-school systems, and in many governmental bureaus, the individual secures tenure upon the completion of a specified period of service; thereafter he cannot be dislodged from his position without cause, if, indeed, he can be dislodged at all.

Seniority versus Merit. No doubt the granting of status rights on the basis of seniority often has a functional basis. Under some circumstances the eldest of a group will generally be best qualified to provide leadership, counsel, or other valuable service to the group. The rights granted to a soldier upon each successive reenlistment have their evident organizational function; they

encourage men to make a career of military service; moreover, they probably pay for themselves in that the additional pay, etc., given an old serviceman upon his reenlistment is more than offset by the fact that he does not have to be trained as does the "rookie." In government and industry, the granting of rights on the basis of seniority may somewhat lower labor turnover, which is always costly to an organization; but that it everywhere and always, or even generally, increases the operational efficiency of groups does not follow. On the contrary, the granting of status rights on the basis of seniority is most often a means by which some group members profit at the expense of the remainder, with the consequence that the organization is less efficient than it otherwise would be. Moreover, it also imposes various restrictions on the effectiveness of leaders and in general makes the entire organization less adaptable to changing circumstances.

The individual who, because of the nature of the organization of which he is a member, can in time acquire seniority rights is as a rule encouraged by that prospect to stay on in the organization, even though he has an alternative that is currently more attractive but that lacks the promise of future seniority rights. Thus he is in effect induced to make current sacrifices in the prospect of gaining future benefits and is to this extent subject to control pressures. By making current sacrifices he is to some degree fulfilling the seniority rights of his elders in the organization, who in a sense constitute an elite that is being rewarded for past rather than current performance. Since, however, his promotion within the group is a function of time rather than merit, the individual is free from the need to strive for personal status beyond that which is just necessary to assure continued membership in the group.

By contrast, wherever the progression of an individual up a hierarchy of ranks or offices is determined by the consent of his peers or superiors rather than by simple seniority, the individual who wants to advance in rank or office must strive for higher personal status; for it is his personal status that largely determines his rate of progress. If he wants only to maintain his achieved status, he is relatively free from control pressure; for he need only conform minimally to his status obligations—*i.e.*, live up to the letter of his responsibilities and avoid doing anything which will jeopardize his personal status with his peers and superiors. If, however, he wishes to gain a higher status—*e.g.*, to secure promotion to a better-paying job, to be elected to a higher office, to be invited into a more exclusive club than the one to which he already belongs, or even to marry into one of the "best" local families—he will be highly susceptible to control pressures; and these pressures are often conflicting.

On the one hand, he must conform to the obligations of the status role that he occupies; on the other hand, he must at the same time acquire a higher than normal personal status within the role. The latter requirement may mean that he must conform, or somehow seem to conform, to two somewhat different sets of standards. Thus if he is a bookkeeper aspiring to the office of head bookkeeper, a position that may eventually become open as a consequence

of the promotion of the present occupant to a higher office, he must maintain the personal status appropriate to a bookkeeper with both his peers and his superiors; for if he should gain the reputation of being "bossy" or excessively efficient he might disqualify himself for promotion in the eyes of his peers, with the consequence that his superiors may then doubt his ability to get along with his fellow workers. Yet he must at the same time prove to those superiors that he has the personal qualities which are essential to effective operation as head bookkeeper—that he is, in fact, superior to his fellow workers in energy, diligence, skill, loyalty, and personality. Almost anything that he might do to demonstrate the latter will certainly lower his status with his peers; for it is difficult, if not impossible, to be at once a "good fellow" and a superior one. In a like way the man who seeks an invitation to join a better club must somehow make himself known to and agreeable to members of that club without, however, hurting the feelings of the members of his own club or otherwise jeopardizing his personal status with them. He must maintain the latter, since he may not secure the desired invitation, in which case he will need his membership in the old club, and since the desired invitation may be contingent in part upon what members of the better club learn about his reputation among members of the other one. A man who wants to marry above his station in life usually faces a similar predicament; to the extent that he conforms to the standards of the higher class and thus demonstrates his eligibility, he may lose personal status with his own class, in whose terms he may be putting on airs or behaving snobbishly. And, as is the case with others who aspire to higher status positions, his acceptability in the higher class may depend in part upon his personal status in his own class.

TRANSFERABILITY OF STATUS

Whereas the prophet is without honor in his own country and his own house, the individual is without status except in his own country and his own house—*i.e.*, where he is known either in person, by role, or both. For in the main, status is specific, as regards both the kind of status and the social area in which that status exists. The truck driver who has high status as such—whose judgment on trucking matters is listened to respectfully by fellow truckers, who is warmly welcomed to their company, etc.—will find himself a nonentity when he wanders about a university campus. Similarly, the university professor who is highly respected in academic circles will find himself an unprivileged character when he goes into a truckers' stop, and he may be treated with forthright contempt when he flags a truck driver on the highway and asks for enough gas to get him into the next town.

One qualification to the foregoing is what is often called "halo prestige." In some instances an individual who has gained renown in one walk of life and among people associated with that activity is accorded initial respect by others who have learned indirectly about him; they "see his halo" as it were, the reflection of his true status on other groupings and in other regards. Thus

a man who has earned repute as a physicist may be listened to respectfully when he makes pronouncements on theological matters; a man who has become renowned as a motion-picture actor may be accepted by the "international set" on the basis of that repute; and a famous gangster may intimidate total strangers by his very presence.

Such transference of status from one context to another and from one field of activity to another is, however, narrowly limited. In the first place, the granting of status in the new field or context is tentative; it is more in the nature of a predisposition toward accepting the individual than an actual acceptance of him as a person of eminence. Unless the man who has the reputation of being a brutal and ruthless criminal soon demonstrates the possession of these qualities to those who know him only by repute, he will acquire a different status with them; unless the physicist lives up to expectations of what an authority on theology would say, he will soon be defined as an ignoramus in theological matters. Moreover, the halo of prestige can be seen only by those who not only have learned in advance that the person is noted for this or that but who also consider such note important. Although they may know that he is a noted theologian, scientists are unlikely to listen respectfully to the churchman's comments on either God or science. And if they do not identify him as a notorious gangster, people will not be impressed simply by a gangster's presence.

Somewhat different is the according of personal status to the individual who occupies a high office—particularly a political office—on the basis of the prestige of the office, rather than any qualities of the individual as a person. Even in the United States, where there have never been any hereditary offices, the foreigner who has a title—King (no matter what he is king of), Prince, Lord, Sir, etc.—is given some preferential treatment wherever he goes. Respect for high office seems to be almost universal; since in all societies there are high offices of some sort, king, chief, president, or whatnot, those who occupy a high office in one society are accorded something of the respect due a high office in other societies. Such transference of status may in some cases have some functional basis. During times of war the military may designate the traveling senator a Very Important Person and treat him accordingly because he might conceivably affect military appropriations. But the respectful treatment of a prince of a royal house that rules nothing stems from sentimental regard for a traditional office which no longer has functional meaning.

The Status of Stranger. All groups, even the most isolated of primitive tribes, have among their cultural stock of status roles one or more into which the stranger or outsider can be put—a sort of social guest room.⁹ The role defines the individual as a person and indicates his rights, if any, and his

⁹ Two recent sociological discussions of the role of the stranger are J. L. Greifer, "Attitudes to the Stranger" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 10, pp. 739-745, 1945) and A. Schuetz, "The Stranger: an Essay in Social Psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 59, pp. 499-507, 1944).

obligations. Among some peoples the stranger—any person unknown to the members of the group who comes into their presence—has been given the role of enemy and dispatched forthwith. In legend, if not in fact, some primitives have given to the stranger the role of meat-for-dinner. At the opposite extreme is the practice, reputed to have existed in the Old South, of considering the stranger as an honored guest, with the right to friendly hospitality. Most of the peoples of the world have now had sufficient experience with strangers—explorers, travelers, or whatnot—so that they accept as travelers those strangers who are clearly transients and provide them with the necessities of life, usually for a price.

Where this occurs, the role, or stereotype, of traveler is quite different from that of stranger. The traveler has status of a sort; he is "understood"; and, depending in part upon his own behavior and in part upon the community in which he finds himself, he may be welcomed as an object of economic exploitation or tolerated as an inevitable nuisance. The French, for example, have a variety of roles for travelers: all travelers are welcomed for the money that they bring; but the English are considered difficult to please and shrewd about money, while the Americans are generally considered easy to please (actually, indiscriminating about foods, wines, etc., which is very much in their disfavor) and wantonly extravagant. Within such general stereotypes there are, furthermore, subcategories; an American traveler may, because of his appearance and actions, be accorded more friendly respect than normal—he is a "good American."

Nontransferable Status. The role of traveler, or stranger-in-transit, carries with it the right of passage and the right to receive or purchase maintenance. The role of true stranger, on the other hand, carries no status rights; and the individual who occupies it must earn for himself the right to existence, if he can. The migrant to a new land, for example, is often without status among the people native to that land. If many of his own kind have preceded him, they may have achieved some sort of status—that of the immigrant—in which case he will be accorded recognition as immigrant. If, however, he is a new kind of immigrant, he may simply be tolerated until his presence has been socially defined and his status thus determined. In this process his status in his old social context plays no part; it is what he is personally, as evaluated by the new community, that counts.

The nontransferability of status from one social context to another is most strikingly illustrated by what happens to political refugees and other displaced persons.¹⁰ When the recipient population is opposed to the events which have occasioned the displacement of the refugees, the refugee stranger is usually granted at least the right to make his way among them. But he will bring with him little if any of the status that he enjoyed in his homeland. He must start from an essentially statusless position to earn new status, and he

¹⁰ For a variety of materials on this subject see F. J. Brown, ed., *Refugees* (American Academy of Political Sciences, Philadelphia, 1939).

must earn new status in terms of the standards of his adopted land. The fact that he was a noted physician in pre-Hitler Germany did not assure a Jewish refugee of a welcome as a physician in the United States. In fact, high status in Germany, whether as a physician or lawyer or whatnot, often hampered the refugee, if only because it inclined him as a person to expect and ask too much in America. In some instances, the differences between the values and standards of the members of a given occupation in Germany and here in America were so great that the individual of high rank in that occupation in Germany found himself totally incapable of gaining acceptance at any rank in the same occupation here. Refugee chemists and physicists were, on the whole, able to establish themselves occupationally without great difficulty; German social scientists, on the other hand, often found that their skills and concepts were valueless.

To the extent that an individual is a statusless stranger in a new land, in a new region, in a class to which he does not belong by birth or achievement, in an occupational group to which he is as a person and as a worker foreign, his survival within that community of persons will depend almost entirely on what he himself does. His personal status, as he acquires such status, will determine the role that is granted him. Though an adult, he starts in a position somewhat comparable to that of an orphaned child.

GESELLSCHAFT: THE ILLUSION OF A SOCIETY OF STRANGERS

The core of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* concept, it will be recalled, is the assumption that industrialization and urbanization have brought about a unique form of social organization in which each individual is free from direct dependence upon his fellow members and is able to conduct himself as an autonomous unit. In this view, the modern individual is supposed to belong to and participate only, or at least largely, in vast, impersonal social machines (corporations, political bureaucracies, municipalities, classes, and nations). He may have many acquaintances; but he has few friends, and his relations with these few are tenuous and exceedingly fragmentary. He goes about his affairs—he does his work, he eats his meals, he enjoys his pleasures—in comparative and presumably splendid isolation from the affairs of other men. He is, ideally, born in a great hospital operated with mechanical efficiency by doctors and nurses who are but names to one another and to whom he is but a number; he lives out his life in the anonymity of public schools, corporate businesses, and slum dwellings or apartment houses; and he is eventually buried with meticulous regard for the law but without regard for the fact that he was a human being. From birth to death he enjoys, in the terms of the preceding analysis, but one kind of status—that of stranger.

It is true, of course, that most of the members of modern Western societies reside in cities, that a considerable proportion of them earn their livelihood through employment in large corporate or political organizations, and that they move much in the company of strangers—e.g., on trains or buses as

they go to and from work, in the crowded city streets, and in theaters or ball parks where they may seek recreation. But it does not follow that they are social monads, that they have each with all the others the status of stranger.

On the contrary, the member of modern society, like the member of any society, whatever its organizational forms, belongs to and participates in a variety of social groups.¹¹ And in many of these groups he has—indeed, he must have if he is to survive—status other than that of stranger. He may be but another statistic—"male, white, etc."—to the clerk who records his birth; but another job of work to the physician who serves as midwife at that birth; but a name on the rolls of Public School No. 12 to the superintendent of schools and his administrative staff; but another registered Republican voter to the local politicians; and but one of a thousand employees to the personnel manager of the organization in which he works. He will certainly be only a quickly forgotten face to the thousands of functionaries—salesmen, clerks, streetcar conductors, ticket sellers, etc.—with whom he deals during the course of his lifetime. The clerk who sells him a marriage license, the judge who grants him a divorce, and even the physician who treats his ills may know him not at all as a person and grant him only formal status, and that quite brief. And to the countless strangers whom he passes in the streets and aisles, in the crowded corridors of life, he will be but an object to get by—hardly more important than the lampposts and other inanimate obstructions that they must circumvent.

All this, however, is of the surface, it is what meets the hurried, unperceiving eye. Underneath this *Gesellschaft* surface of his life runs that life which is of fundamental importance to him, as it has been to all men in all societies. In this life he is a human being, a son, a husband, a father, a neighbor, a fellow worker. In sum, he is a man with a number of status roles, ascribed and acquired, generic and specific, and with status as a person which is peculiarly his own.

The individual in the modern world may to a somewhat greater degree than in most times and places be a social nomad; *i.e.*, he may during his lifetime move about, socially as well as spatially. He may not, although most still do, die in the region of his birth and in the class to which he was born. But with few exceptions, wherever he goes, he has or soon must gain acceptance as a member in good standing in a considerable number of groups. It is through such groups, as characteristic of modern society as of societies in times past, that he secures the status and leads the life of a human being. In such groups he is anything but a stranger among strangers.

¹¹ Even in military life, which is probably as depersonalized and mechanized as any mode of life man has yet achieved, the individual belongs to one or more intimate groupings which have profound influence over his conduct. See Anonymous, "Informal Social Organization in the Army" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 365-370, 1946); P. L. Berkman, "Life Aboard an Armed-guard Ship" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 380-387, 1946); R. C. Stone, "Status and Leadership in a Combat Fighter Squadron" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 388-394, 1946); and the massive evidence to this point contained in *The American Soldier*.

STATUS GROUPS AND THEIR NORMS

Status may be granted by any number of persons, from two to many millions; the rights that are granted may be many or few; and the grant may be made for as long as the individual lives or for no more than an hour or two of time. The status-granting group may be anything from a father and mother who provide their offspring with durable and continuous association and life-long and relatively inclusive status to a vast radio public that grants only momentary and limited attention to a speaker on a nationwide broadcast.

Status that is sufficiently valued by the individual to constitute the basis for effective social control can, however, be conferred only by relatively small, intimate, and enduring groups. It is such groups that grant the individual specific status; other orders of human association at the most grant him generic status, which is only indirectly related to social control, or constitute the situation in which behavior occurs. Groups that grant significant specific status will for convenience be termed "status groups."¹ There is, however, no simple means by which to distinguish them from other status-granting groups or from groups that constitute situations. In the phrase "relatively small, intimate, and enduring groups," the key word is "relatively."

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE STATUS GROUP

The term "group" is used by sociologists in its broadest sense to indicate any number of human beings who interact with one another in any manner. Many and varied attempts have been made to classify and characterize the

¹ The term "status group" has become somewhat shopworn, but no other term in the English language better designates what the present author has in mind. The term was apparently first used sociologically by M. Weber (see *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, trans. and eds., Oxford, New York, 1946, pp. 186-188), who, like many subsequent writers, was primarily interested in the position within the larger society of what he termed the "status group." The concern of the present author is with the group as a provider of status within its confines to the individual member.

In recent years the term "status" has become central to an elaborate attack by L. Warner and his associates upon the Marxian concept of classes and the class struggle. For an effort to remove the ideological implications from the Warner concept of "status systems," see the article "Instabilities in Status," by G. P. Stone and W. H. Form (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 18, pp. 149-162, 1953). With their attention upon what has been here termed "generic" status, the authors of this article argue that such status is so unstable that it had best be designated "status aggregates" rather than "systems." The term "status group" as used in the present work will invariably refer to specific, rather than generic, status-granting groups.

different kinds of groups into which the individual members of society coalesce.² Although some terms, such as "primary group," have gained general usage, there is as yet little agreement concerning the meaning to be attached to such terms; and no two systems of group classification have very much in common.

The confusion regarding the classification of groups into which men enter simply reflects the fact that groupings of men are infinitely varied and that they vary one from another in many dimensions. The simplest of these dimensions is size; for certain purposes, two people can constitute a group; for other and still more limited purposes, so can a million or a hundred million. Between such extremes of size, groups numerically fall along a continuum. Groups also vary in respect to duration; some are perennial—the members come together over and over, and the forms of their association persist through successive generations of members. Thus the system of relationships of a family or village community may outlive the people of which the group is composed at any given moment, because new members are brought in from time to time as older members die out. At the opposite extreme is the group, whether of two or millions of members, that assembles briefly never to reassemble again; and between these two extremes groups range along a continuum. Groups further differ in terms of function—what the members hope to accomplish or do accomplish—and in terms of organization—the means and methods by which the members relate themselves to one another. Thus a group may be organized on the basis of tradition to achieve a predetermined cultural end; or, as another extreme, a group may form as the consequence of the individual interests of the several members and work out a program of joint action by trial and error. Groups also vary in terms of interaction; the members of one group may interact rapidly and directly, as do the people around a dinner table, while those of another may interact slowly and indirectly through the agency of books and periodicals, as do the chemists of the world at large (as distinct from those working in a given laboratory).

In view of the fact that social groupings differ from one another in degree rather than in kind and in many dimensions rather than in just one, the determining of what constitutes *the* social group is an abstract procedure too far removed from concrete realities to have any but philosophical and, hence, suprascientific value. For scientific purposes, the problem is to determine what constitutes *a* social group in terms of some particular concern.³

² For a summary of some of these efforts and an attempt to set up a new classification of groups, see R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society* (Rinehart, New York, 1949), Chap. 10, "Types of Social Groups."

³ The major attempt to develop a general theory of small, or, as they are here termed, "status" group organization and function is that of G. C. Homans (*The Human Group*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1950). The present author has drawn heavily on Homans's work; and although his approach is different from that of Homans, the concepts presented here do not significantly conflict with his.

The rapidly growing body of sociological and sociopsychological data and thinking on

From the point of view of the student of social control, the problem of what is a status group reduces itself to the question "Where along the various continuums that enter into the making of groupness does significant control over the individual's behavior cease?" "Significant" is, of course, itself a relative; operationally, however, it may be defined as that point at which the control exercised by the group under consideration is overshadowed by the control exercised over the same individual by some other group. The point of significance will differ somewhat for each individual member, depending in part upon the other groups to which he belongs and by which he is controlled.

The Factor of Numbers. *All other factors remaining equal, the control that is exercised by a group over an individual member is inverse to the size of the group.* This fact has been totally ignored by those who hold to the view that modern societies are different in kind from premodern. They have assumed that, since certain aspects of the material welfare of the modern individual are determined by such vast groupings as the state, the corporation, and the nation, the behavior of the modern individual is for the most part controlled thereby. Actually, however, those groupings which have status significance for the individual are composed of relatively small numbers of members. To the individual, modern or premodern, it is mainly those people who are known to him personally and who know him personally who count in his behavioral calculations.

Generally speaking, a group of ten can exercise ten times as much effective control over an individual as can a group of one hundred, a hundred times as much as a group of one thousand, and a thousand times as much as a group of ten thousand. Thus, as will be demonstrated later, a small boy's neighborhood friends—his gang—are characteristically much more important to him than is the neighborhood as a whole, while the city at large, as represented by schoolteachers, police, and social-welfare agencies, counts hardly at all in the shaping of his behavior. Similarly, the adult may verbally recognize that his welfare is somehow bound up with that of the nation at large,

status groups is represented by the following: R. F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups* (Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1950); R. F. Bales *et al.*, "Channels of Communication in Small Groups" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 461-468, 1951); H. Becker and R. H. Useem, "Sociological Analysis of the Dyad" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 7, pp. 13-26, 1942); T. Caplow and R. Forman, "Neighborhood Interaction in a Homogeneous Community" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 15, pp. 357-366, 1950); D. Cartwright and A. Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Row, Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1953); A. P. Hare, "A Study of Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 261-267, 1952); L. Festinger *et al.*, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (Harper, New York, 1950); J. James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinants in Small Group Interaction" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 474-477, 1951); H. A. Simon, "A Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 202-211, 1952); F. F. Stephan and E. G. Mishler, "The Distribution of Participation in Small Groups" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 598-608, 1952); and F. L. Strodbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 468-473, 1951).

but he normally behaves in terms of his fellow workers and other people whom he knows personally.

With some exceptions, to be noted later, the maximum effective size of a status group is that number of persons who can know one another as persons (as distinct from knowing one another simply as members of a group). Perhaps the outer limit of effective status-group size is fixed by the ability of people to remember names and faces and thereby to recognize the group status of individuals. At any event, people who are but symbolic constructs (*e.g.*, those who make up the "American people") can grant the individual generic status only and seem to play relatively little part in the determination of the behavior of most individuals. A few individuals—the public figure (politician, entertainer, or whatnot), the individual who is swayed by consideration of what future generations will think of him, and those who have regard for their status in some hypothecated future life—would seem to be somewhat more than normally concerned with their status with people in the abstract. As will be discussed later, the ideas that an individual has about his status with people distant in place or time are, however, actually but projections of his status in status groups to which he belongs; thus what the politician thinks is his status with the thousands or millions who comprise his constituents is, until the votes are in, simply what persons whom he knows tell him, and what they tell him reflects his status with them rather than his status as a political candidate with voters as a whole. Were it otherwise, only winning candidates would run for office; as things are, most who seek election to office fail. The same holds true for the entertainer and his amorphous publics and for the good Christian who seeks favor in the eyes of God.

Status within the membership of a social group is meaningful to the individual only to the extent that he is treated in a way which differentiates him from people in general; he can be given differential treatment only by those who are capable of identifying him as a person occupying a particular status role; and he can perceive such differential treatment only if he is in fairly direct contact with those who accord it to him. In a vague way, the author of a book may gain some satisfaction—in addition to monetary return—from the fact that people bought his book and possibly even read it with pleasure; he can imagine people here and there saying "Did you read such and such? Very fine, you know." But such satisfaction is very vague indeed; the real nonmonetary satisfactions come through the new specific status that he acquires as an author (or as the author of still another book) in the company of friends, relatives, and fellow authors.

Although modern people do contribute to the workings of such vast organizations as the nation, a corporation, or an educational system, and although every individual depends in some respect or in many respects for his food, his habitation, his transportation, his recreation, etc., upon membership in such organizations, it is not as an individual that he belongs to such organizations but as the member of some small group of persons, more or less inti-

mately known to one another; and it is these persons, not the abstract organization, who exercise major control over his behavior. The economic welfare of a worker in modern industry may depend in the last analysis on the economic health of the nation as a whole; but the work that he does and the way he does that work are not determined (although, of course, the work may be terminated, as during economic crisis) by the nation but rather by his fellow workers. Likewise the political fate of a President is dependent in the long run on the state of the nation; but what he does in his role as President is dependent upon the traditions and laws that govern anyone who occupies the office and, within these limits, by the various groups of people with whom he works on a more or less intimate basis and whose good opinion he more or less respects.

The Factor of Duration. *All other factors remaining equal, the control that is exercised by a group over an individual is directly related to the length of time that the members may be expected to maintain relations.* Such expectation is a function in part of past experience, in part of current definition. Past experience indicates, for example, that the members of a family remain members as long as they live; that nations are rarely broken up and dispersed—thus citizenship is usually a lifelong attachment; and that the friendship coteries that develop among the passengers of an ocean liner seldom survive the voyage itself. Current definition is a consequence of the relevant hopes and desires of the members of the group: out of the experience of their first evening together, a boy and girl may come to hope that they will “go together” for a long time, or one may so hope while the other determines to make the first date the last; as they enter marriage, a young man and a young woman usually hope that their association will endure through life; men who are comfortably settled into their jobs may hope that they stay together for years, while those who are discontented may hope that the association will be brief and that each can soon go on to a better job elsewhere.

Much of any individual's conduct is predicted, whether by actual calculation or simple assumption, on future consequences. Just as the farmer plants his seed in the expectation of a desired harvest months later, so the individual commonly enters marriage, takes a job, etc., with some consideration of the future. Involved in any such consideration is his definition of how long the particular association can be expected to endure, and what he does in that association from moment to moment is in part dependent upon his definition of its life span.

On the whole, then, the importance that the individual will attach to his status within any group depends, among other things, upon how long he expects the group to endure; the greater that expectation, the greater the importance to him of status in the group and the greater the control that the group can exercise over him. The man on a one-day job is normally much less concerned with the opinions of his fellow workers than is the one who hopes to hold his job indefinitely. The sailor on shore leave is usually rather indiffer-

ent to the impression he makes upon the townspeople, while the same sailor home on leave is usually greatly concerned with what people think of him, especially what his friends, his relatives, and the neighbors think of him. The professor who addresses a public gathering composed of people whom he does not know may do his best, for, as he might say, he has his pride; but failure to deliver a good address is likely to bring only momentary discomfort to him. A bad lecture to one of his classes, on the other hand, may trouble him for days; for he must meet his classes again and again, and the students know him as a person, and he more or less knows them as persons.

The direct relation between expected duration and susceptibility to control is most clearly seen, perhaps, in business operations. The integrity of so-called fly-by-night enterprises is everywhere and quite rightly suspect; for a merchant who has no enduring stake in the community and does not intend to stay in business there for long (*e.g.*, the itinerant peddler and the circus or street-fair manager) has little if any concern for what his customers will think of him after they have spent their money. An established enterprise with an established clientele and expectations of remaining in business, on the other hand, is highly sensitive to its regular-customer complaints and to other indications of dissatisfaction, although it may treat transient customers with something of the calloused disregard for their feelings that the transient business exhibits. In a similar but more complex way, a temporary neighborhood, such as that which develops around a military camp in times of war, seldom is able to exercise as much control over individual family units as does a permanent one, partly because they may have few jointly agreed-upon standards of neighborhood conduct and partly because the members of each family unit have only short-run interests in the community. On the other hand, in a new residential area where people who buy their homes do so with some expectation of staying there for years, there quickly develops some sort of neighborhood consensus regarding the rights and obligations of each household and strong, and often quite effective, control over the family that insists on violating these standards. For the expectation of continued residence in the area gives each family a stake in the maintenance of orderly relations within the neighborhood and, at the same time, a desire for good reputation among the neighbors. As will be shown later, this desire is fortified by a considerable dependence upon neighborly aid and assistance (the "rights" of a good neighbor) in a variety of practical matters.

When a considerable proportion of the members of a group of long standing lose faith in the ability of that group to endure, they become demoralized and the susceptibility of each one to control by the group as a whole diminishes. This is what happens when an established business enterprise shows signs of failing, when an old neighborhood deteriorates, and when a construction or other work project approaches completion. It is also one of the things that makes the maintaining of military morale so difficult when the war is over, won or lost as the case may be. In a later chapter the various factors

that make for demoralization and those that make for the antithesis, high group morale, will be analyzed in detail.

The Factor of Frequency. *All other factors remaining equal, the ability of a group to control the behavior of the individual is directly related to the frequency with which the members of the group enter into actual association.* No group engages in continuous, uninterrupted association. Even cellmates in a prison remove themselves from active interaction one with the other during sleep and, no doubt, upon those occasions when each is engaged in his own thoughts. The members of normal groups come together and separate as interests and circumstances indicate, and both the frequency of their meetings and the time that they spend together at each encounter vary widely. The members of a family may come together a number of times each day (e.g., at mealtimes) and spend a considerable number of hours together during each day. The members of a club may meet each fortnight or once a month and then for no more than two or three hours. The various members of a neighborhood may never actually gather into a meeting of the whole; each may know all the others only because he encounters them upon fairly rare occasions one by one or two by two.

There does not appear to be a constant relation between the duration of a group and the frequency with which its members meet. A lifelong friendship can be maintained at considerable distance and with only very occasional meetings. Conversely, people who are brought into almost constant association, as are the passengers on a small ship, do not as a consequence develop durable relations. Other things being equal, however, frequency of meeting generally affects the character of the relationship of the members of the group; the more frequent their association, the more intimate their relationship will tend to be. Under some conditions it is no doubt true that familiarity breeds contempt—or violent antagonisms, suspicions, distrusts, etc. More commonly, however, frequent association generates in the participants a degree of sympathetic identification each for the others and that order of tolerance of the conduct of the others that stems from comprehension, limited though it may be, of the motives, emotions, and values of those others. To the extent that the members of a group have become intimates, each feels able to “be himself,” i.e., to behave without restraint. The relations of intimates are informal, unstrained, and largely uncalculated. Membership in an intimate group is for this very reason ordinarily held in high value; as a result, the intimate group usually has great potential power to exercise social control over its individual members. That such groups seldom need to exercise social control seems to result from the fact that (1) the standards of conduct that they impose are relatively few and are loosely applied and (2) the individual member is so sensitive to the sentiments and opinions of his fellow members that in “being himself” he is usually careful not to be in any way obnoxious.

The Factor of Structuration. *All other things being equal, the more fully structured the relationships of the members of a group, the more control*

that group will have over the individual member. In a highly structured group the membership is rigorously defined, the distinction of members from non-members is clear and meaningful, the occasions for and the procedures involved in coming into association are established and are acceptable to all members, and the roles of the various members are functionally coordinated. Such a group is operationally more efficient than a group that is undeveloped structurally; in the latter, the relations of member to member will involve considerable trial and error and consequently much error—*i.e.*, misunderstanding, opposition of interests, etc.

Although there are individual exceptions, men for the most part seem to enjoy most and hence to value most highly those forms of association in which they can participate complacently without the need to strive, competitively or otherwise, to anticipate the conduct of the other members. A group with a highly developed structure may, in a sense, be unstimulating; it is, on the other hand, comforting and reassuring to the individual member. The priest in the monastery may have few stimulating interpersonal adventures; but the prevalence of monastic and other highly structured groupings and, moreover, the rapidity with which groups usually evolve structures suggest that there is a general human preference for peaceful or at least predictable companionship.

The degree to which the group is structured may be a consequence of the length of time that the group has been in existence and the frequency of association that has occurred. The ultimate in structuration is the institutionalized group, a group of people who are organized in accordance with a culturally designated system that has been worked out and perfected functionally over many generations. The structural aspects of such a group are formalized, embodied in specific and stated rules and regulations. A high degree of structuration can, however, be developed informally, especially in small groups that have frequent association, in terms of common interests and of mutual sympathy and understanding rather than specified rules. The dinner-table banter of a harmonious family group may be anything but formal, yet it will probably be highly structured in the sense that each member knows and respects the sensitivities of all the others and that the conversational interchange follows a familiar pattern in which each can participate and which all can enjoy. In any such group the individual who inadvertently transgresses the bounds of unstated but mutually recognized good taste can be and usually is promptly brought under control.

THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE STATUS GROUP

Since the ability of groups to grant significant specific status depends upon a number of factors, each of which is subject to infinite variation, the status group cannot be defined in categorical terms. The ideal status group is small, durable, in nearly continuous association, and highly structured. Actual groups have these characteristics in widely varying and often changing proportions.

Thus the larger of two groups may, in an actual instance, provide its members with more valued status than the smaller because it has greater expected duration, meets more frequently, or is more highly structured than the smaller.

Although the status group cannot be defined in categorical terms, and although it cannot be clearly distinguished from other status-granting forms of association, it is possible to distinguish and to remove from further consideration a number of kinds of groupings that have so little, if any, specific status significance that they can be ignored in the study of social control.

Categories of the Population. All those members of a society (or of mankind, for that matter) who share some common characteristic but are otherwise unrelated constitute a category of the population. Census reports enumerate persons in categories of residence, age, sex, income, occupation, etc. Useful as such data may be for research purposes, they are of no interest to the student of social control, for a category of the population has no specific status significance.

Any population can be broken up into a great many categories—male and female; blond and brunet; ten-year-olds, fifty-year-olds; country-born, city-born; automobile owners, automobile nonowners; etc. But the fact that ten or ten thousand people fall, in terms of some objective criterion such as sex or age, into a common category does not make them in any sense a status group. The mere fact that a girl has blond hair and blue eyes does not make her seek status among all the blue-eyed blondes in her native city, state or country or the world at large. She might conceivably strive to be the most popular blonde in her “set”; but it is far more likely that she will strive to be the most popular girl—irrespective of coloration—in that set.

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, even categories of subcultural identity, such as Negro or Jew, have only generic and no specific status significance. The Negro, for example, operates as one of that category only in his less-happy direct relations with whites; among Negroes he is not a Negro but a member in good or bad standing of various status groups. Likewise the white is a white only in his relations to Negroes and other nonwhites and is, for the rest, Mr. So-and-So, who belongs to certain status groups and would like to achieve membership in certain others. Much the same can be said for categories such as American, French, English, etc. Only outside the United States does the fact of being an American become significant, even as only within America (or some other foreign land) does the fact of being a Frenchman or an Englishman have status significance in itself.

Social Aggregations. In the modern world, where large numbers of people congregate in small areas and where there is much individual spatial movement, temporary aggregations of people are constantly forming and re-forming. Bent on their various individual ends, thousands of people swarm through New York's Grand Central Station every hour of every weekday; with the common goal of getting downtown in the morning and uptown in the evening, tens of thousands of New Yorkers jam the subway system; throughout the day the

streets of Manhattan are crowded with countless people going to different places or just going; from time to time, tens or even hundreds of people with nothing more pressing to do congregate about a shopwindow or the excavation for a new building; and through the evening hours many thousands mill along the sidewalks of Broadway. In every city of the modern world, and upon occasion in the towns, villages, and countryside, comparable aggregations of human beings occur.

A social aggregation is not, however, a status group. And any control that is exercised over the individual in an aggregation—aside, perhaps, from the physical limitations imposed upon him by the presence of other human beings—is exercised not by the aggregation but by an individual member of the aggregation who acts on his own behalf. Thus a person who rudely shoulders others aside may be brought under restraint by some resentful individual, and the pedestrian who has forgotten to watch the traffic lights may be saved from harm by the action of some considerate person. Occasionally an aggregation is converted by an unusual circumstance into a highly, if temporarily, organized group—a mob. But for the most part those who form an aggregation are strangers to one another and indifferent to one another; each acts in so far as possible as though he were alone in the street, the bus, the elevator, the public building, etc. The relations of the members of an aggregation one to another are both momentary and minimal; and only in the most limited and fleeting way (as when an individual decides, because a given car or bus is crowded, to wait for the next one) are they ever that of individual to group.

It is true that the mere presence of other people imposes some restraint upon any individual; there are some things that may be done in private that cannot be done in public. But the individual who is, for example, prevented by the presence of people from relieving himself in the street is *situationally*, not *socially*, controlled. It is not a consideration of his status among the particular people there present that restrains him; it is, rather, the fact that he is so restrained whenever people are present, a fact that might become most painfully evident to him were he to attempt to relieve himself in the streets of a French village, where the action is often socially permissible. Situational compulsions as well as tabus have developed around the phenomenon of social aggregation; and there are a great many conventions, some restrictive and some compulsive, that operate to give a semblance of order and efficiency to modern forms of aggregation. These conventions operate for the most part in the tenuous and impersonal individual-to-individual relations that arise within an aggregation, and they do not provide an over-all organization of members or give the aggregation durability; in fact, they operate mainly to expedite the dispersal of those who constitute an aggregation, as does, for example, the practice of queuing up for buses, subways, etc.

It is true, furthermore, that some individuals are much concerned with matters of dress and deportment when they enter into certain kinds of aggregations; thus the *boulevardier* will put on his promenade outfit before he goes

out to stroll among the crowd, and the suburbanite who wears simple clothes in the suburbs may dress elaborately for her infrequent trips to the city. Generally, the wearing of certain garb (and manner) in the city streets or wherever aggregations occur is no more than a situational compulsion; the individual would, as he might say, feel conspicuous if he did not do so, even as he would feel embarrassed were he to relieve himself against the nearest wall. Occasionally, however, an individual does seem to seek status in the eyes of the strangers in the street; he preens himself, as it were, in public places, "putting on airs" and otherwise trying to secure the favorable attention of the passers-by. Presumably such an individual is one who finds his true status insufficient and is trying to make up for the lack by acquiring a kind of pseudo status—status in his own eyes. Certainly he does not secure any enduring rights from the constantly changing personnel of the aggregations through which he moves. Possibly his impressive garb and manner secure for him better than average service from such functionaries as taxicab drivers and headwaiters, but only if he is thereby adjudged a better than average tipper.

Assemblages. An aggregation is unorganized; it consists of a number of individuals each going his own way and relating himself to others only to the extent that is necessary for him to get along his way. In some contrast is an assemblage of a number of people for a common purpose, such as hearing an opera or seeing a baseball game. In the first place, they have a common desire—to hear or see the performance—a desire that of itself imposes on the individual member certain relevant conventions, such as staying in his seat and keeping still during the singing or, at the ball game, joining in on the catcalls and other antics of baseball fans. Moreover, the various members tend to polarize on the performers and to respond more or less similarly to the performance as it progresses. To this extent an assemblage is organized.

Assemblages, usually described as audiences, do not, however, exercise much control over the individual member, although there may be somewhat more of the individual restraining individual (as when one member shushes down a talkative person) than there is in aggregations. An assemblage is, of course, more durable than an aggregation; but it is for the members a situation rather than a status group, for it disbands at the end of the performance, never to reassemble again. Only for the performers does an assemblage have any long-run significance. For them, the status that they achieve in a given assemblage may somewhat affect the size and temper of subsequent assemblages through which they earn their livelihood, political prestige, or whatnot.

Publics. Although the term "public" is often applied indiscriminately to all sorts of social phenomena, technically it refers to an assemblage (or audience) that is dispersed in space or in time or both. Whereas the people who are gathered at a ball park to see a game are an assemblage, the many scattered individuals who watch the game via television in their own homes, in other people's homes, and in bars constitute a public; so, too, do the many

people who throughout a given day individually read a newspaper item and the many people who over the centuries have read the Bible. The essential difference between an assemblage and a public is that the behavior of the individual member of the former is somewhat conditioned by the behavior of others, as it is when he applauds the performers more because others are clapping their hands than because of what the performers have done. Stemming from the essential difference are many secondary differences. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that the status that the leader of a public—performer, speaker, or whatever—secures with his public is in no way clearly evidenced. As a result, the control that a public exercises over him is fragmentary and delayed. Conversely, the fact that the members of a public are dispersed in space or in time or both makes the effectiveness of his leadership extremely difficult to assess. There is, however, a pronounced tendency to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that public leaders exercise great and enduring influence over the members of publics. This assumption and the slight and dubious evidences that are used to support it will be examined in a later chapter. For the present, it is sufficient to point out that, whatever it may be for its leaders, a public is not a status group for its members and therefore does not exercise significant direct control over their conduct.

Institutional Organizations. Aggregations, assemblages, and publics have so little if any power to grant specific status to those who compose them that they may be ruled out of the general category of status group. They are either far too large, too transitory, too unstructured, or all of these to provide the individual member with significant social status. They may, and often do, constitute situational factors in the determination of the behavior of the individual; but they do not exercise social control over him.

There are, however, many forms of association which in all dimensions except that of size cannot be categorically distinguished from status groups. These are the formal organizations, such as primitive tribes, peasant villages, and modern corporations, that are usually designated by sociologists as "institutions." Institutional forms of organization are many and varied, but they all have in common durability, frequency of association, elaborate structure, and relatively large size. In the first three dimensions they are status group in character; but their relatively large size means that the kind of status accorded the individual member is more generic than specific. To belong to X tribe, to be employed by X corporation, or to serve on the faculty of X university is, however, to enjoy some presumably valued rights and to be subject to some specified obligations; to this extent the organization as such is able to grant specific status and is therefore capable of exercising control over the individual member.

In any large organization the enforcement of rules and regulations is formally accomplished by functionaries—*e.g.*, the tribal witch doctor, the police and other enforcement agencies of a modern political unit, and the

production supervisors of a corporation—who are specifically charged with this responsibility. Nevertheless, there invariably mediates between the individual member and the organization as a whole one or more small, informal groups of members to which he belongs and which represent him in most of his relations with the organization as a whole. It is, in the main, such small groups rather than the formal agencies and functionaries of the organization that effectively interpret and enforce, or fail to enforce, the rules and regulations as they apply to individual members. Furthermore, it is generally through one or more such groups that many of the formal rights of membership in an organization are secured. The worker in a modern industrial corporation receives his wage through the formal mechanism, but the satisfactions and dissatisfactions that he experiences on the job are a function of the small, informal work group to which he belongs.

Institutional organizations are in many significant respects status groups; but since the individual's participation in any such organization presupposes and is contingent upon his membership in one or more subgroups which operate to grant him more specific status than can the organization as a whole, the former type of association will hereafter be conceived as a system of status groups rather than as one over-all group. In subsequent chapters the varied and complex relationships between the organization and its numerous constituent status groups will be subjected to detailed analysis; meanwhile, institutional organizations will be excluded for reasons of convenience from the category of status group.

VARIETIES OF STATUS GROUPS

From the point of view of social control, the essential distinction between modern and premodern forms of society is that in the latter the number of status groups to which the individual can aspire are few and rather similar. In modern society, on the other hand, the individual has a large number of highly varied and constantly changing status groups from which to choose. Thus whereas the individual in a small, "simple" community, such as the primitive village and the peasant village of Europe or Asia, must conform to the local methods of tilling the soil, whatever his own ideas on the subject, the modern worker who dislikes one or many of the obligations of his job can often change to some other job or even occupation where "they do things in a more sensible way."

In the European or Asiatic peasant village the individual who does not get along equably with his fellow workers will find available to him within the village few if any alternative work groups. If he does not get along well with his family—parents, siblings, etc.—he cannot escape them by joining, as can the modern urban dweller, clubs and other organizations of like-minded individuals or by living in a hotel or boardinghouse. If he does not enjoy the company of the other villagers of his own age and sex, he will be lonely indeed; for they are usually so few in number and so bound by common experiences

that to associate with one is to associate with all. In the end, then, if the individual is to enjoy even a moderate amount of social status, he must subscribe to the standards of a considerable proportion of all the village status groups that are open to him; his only alternative is to go elsewhere, seeking perhaps in the nearest large city status groups with standards more compatible with his personal tastes and preferences.

The resident of an American hamlet or rural town is to some extent similarly circumscribed, the distinction being that it is considerably easier for the American to pull up his roots and move into the city than for the European or Asiatic peasant to do so. And in the modern city there are such a great number and wide variety of status groups that the individual is almost certain to find one or more to his liking. It is the availability of a multitude of varied status groups and the opportunity to choose to some extent among them that constitutes the freedom of the individual in modern society. In terms of their function, these groups may be roughly classified into work, residential, and recreational categories.

Work Groups.⁴ However a man may earn his livelihood, his work almost invariably brings him into association with others who do the same or a related kind of work. His status among his coworkers is often a major determinant of his economic welfare and invariably influences the satisfaction which he derives from his job. Even the farmer and the free-lance writer, who may cherish the illusion that they enjoy occupational freedom, are in fact economically dependent upon their status with others; the farmer because, among other things, he must sell his produce and buy his tools and supplies from agents serving a community of farmers, and the writer because the demand for his manuscripts will depend fully as much upon his reputation with editors and others of the craft as upon the character of the manuscripts themselves.

The importance to the individual of his status in a work group is perhaps most clearly evident with skilled and semiskilled workers in business, industry, politics, and government. But such status is actually just as vital to professional men and administrators—lawyers, physicians, academicians, politicians, business executives, etc.—who may not work side by side with fellow professionals or administrators but who are nonetheless dependent upon their good opinion. In many instances modern machine production techniques have made possible an elaborate subdivision of work tasks and comparative isolation of the individual worker; and industrial management has often favored such isolation of the worker on the theory that he is thereby freed from the restraints

⁴ For a summary and analysis of much of the existing data on industrial work groups see G. C. Homans (*The Human Group*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1950, pp. 48-155). For discussions of contrasting work groups see H. S. Becker, "The Professional Dance Musician and His Audience" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 136-144, 1951); W. F. Cottrell, *The Railroad* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1940); M. W. Nichols, *The Gaucho* (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1942); and, for historical contrast, S. M. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948).

on productivity that are otherwise imposed by his fellow workers. However, experience and some detailed studies of workers in action have shown that (1) even under the most unfavorable of circumstances industrial workers form some sort of status group among themselves, and (2) membership in a work group is necessary for the psychological welfare (morale) of the worker.

What is true of industrial workers would seem to be true of workers in any enterprise. While the opportunity to do so varies somewhat from case to case, they generally form into one or many status groups, usually on the basis either of similarity of tasks or of place of work. They may not see one another outside working hours, as is often the case with stenographers, bookkeepers, hotel maids and bellboys, etc.; and they may not even work together in the sense that tasks are subdivided among a number of them. Nevertheless they know one another personally, evaluate one another as fellow workers, and jointly affect one another's welfare on the job. In both crude and subtle ways they punish the one who violates their standards; and if he does not come toward conformity, they may as a last resort maneuver him out of his job. As a worker, he must in the long run fulfill his obligations as they define them, or he will suffer a loss of rights both psychological and economic.

Even such solitary workers as house-to-house peddlers (*e.g.*, the Fuller Brush man) seem to be much affected by their status among their fellows. At any event, the local sales manager usually assembles them for group "pep talks," stages regular competitions for the status of "top man of the week," and provides them with other somewhat forced and definitely contrived substitutes for the informal status-group operations which are precluded by the nature of their work. Conventions and other meetings of traveling salesmen, of branch-office managers, of research scientists and scholars, and of others who do their work in comparative isolation from their fellows who labor in the same field function mainly to give a semblance of groupness to them and to enable the individual to acquire status of a sort in the eyes of his fellow workers.

Very often the individual's work-group status extends beyond the actual work situation as a consequence of the fact that his work associates are also members of some of his residential and recreational groups. Miners, for example, usually live as they work, together. This is especially characteristic of the small, isolated mining village, where workers are relatives or neighbors and where drinking and other forms of leisure-time activity are something of a community affair. In such instances, and they are many—*e.g.*, construction workers on an isolated project, fishermen who go out from a small home village, academicians in the smaller colleges, and migratory agricultural laborers of the California type—the control of the work group over the individual is augmented by the fact that his entire life is bound up with his work-group status.

Businessmen and professional men may work in comparative isolation, and they do not often segregate themselves residentially, at least in the larger cities. But each is usually at the very least quite dependent economically upon

his status with his fellow businessmen or professionals and is commonly much concerned with the personal esteem in which they hold him. A banker, whether he is owner of a smallish bank in a small town or official of a large banking enterprise, needs the respect of merchants and other patrons and usually wants their approval; a practicing physician who is not personally acceptable to the local medical clique suffers many disabilities, and even the lone practitioner in a rural community must have his contacts with city specialists and hospital authorities.

Modern urban women who do not work in business, industry, or volunteer organizations of one sort or another may have no work-group affiliations. On the other hand, rural and small-town women, and to a lesser degree those of suburban communities, usually form a sort of work group of housewives and ordinarily find some personal satisfaction and at times even economic advantage in being known among their friends and acquaintances as good housewives. The work group of housewives tends, however, to be blended and confused with residential and recreational status groups composed of the same women; it is difficult, for example, to distinguish between the work-group status of a local housewife and her status as resident in the community, as a participant in church and other social activities, and as a hostess.

Community Groups.⁵ As a status group the community is that number of persons who know and have interest in one another because of residential propinquity. The very fact that people live in the same small town, in the same section of a small city, in the same suburban development, or on the same street in a large city means that they may repeatedly meet in streets and shops and in time become acquainted with one another. Their children may go to school together, play together, and frequently occasion problems requiring joint parental consultation. The residents of adjacent houses may be further brought together by the fact that what one does may directly affect the others—*e.g.*, a late and noisy party may disturb a number of households.

It is possible for those who occupy a house or flat to ignore the people who live around them, never letting matters progress beyond the nodding-acquaint-

⁵ The term "community" is used in a variety of ways by sociologists, sometimes even to refer to the total population of a great city, *e.g.*, "the urban community." The following articles and books provide varied descriptive materials on status groups of the type here termed "community" in large cities and small towns: F. A. Bushee, "Social Organization in a Small City" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 217-226, 1945); F. Dotson, "Patterns of Voluntary Association among Urban Working-class Families" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 687-693, 1951); St. C. Drake and H. R. Clayton, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1945); E. T. Hiller, "The Community as a Social Group" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 6, pp. 189-202, 1941); F. K. Hsu and J. H. Hu, "Guild and Kinship among the Butchers in West Town" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 10, pp. 357-364, 1945); M. Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 11, pp. 686-698, 1946); and J. West, *Plainville, U.S.A.* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1945).

ance stage; and it may be the comparative ease with which this can be accomplished in large apartment houses that makes this type of housing attractive to some people. But residential isolation is in fact comparatively rare; unless they move frequently and always maintain a frosty independence, even those who live in vast apartment-type housing projects will in time become acquainted with some of the other occupants. And ordinarily such acquaintanceships tend to evolve into important status groups, either because of common recreational interests (bridge, television, etc.) or because of an interchange of services (taking turns at baby-sitting for example) or both.

It is frequently assumed, even by sociologists, that the larger the town or city, the less important the residential community becomes to the individual; *i.e.*, that while in a small town neighbors are important to and control one another, in a city there is little neighborliness and slight control over the individual by his neighbors. As a matter of fact, the significant difference between small town and great city in this respect is that in the small town the residential community is interwoven with work and recreational status groups, whereas in the city, work, residential, and recreational associations tend to be segmental and may impose different and at times conflicting standards of conduct on the individual. Except where there is high individual and family mobility, as in some apartment-house districts, city dwellers do form into a multitude of small status groups on the basis of residential propinquity. The tendency to do so is perhaps more pronounced among the lower classes living in Brooklyn walk-ups than among the rich living in expensive and exclusive residential suburbs. At any event, the man who has lived in a Brooklyn flat all his adult life is quite likely to be as jealous of his status in the local community as is the one who lives in a small New England town; but whereas neighbor and fellow worker are often the same person in a small New England town, they are usually different people for the Brooklynite, with the result that social control over him is at least to this extent divided and segmental.

The tendency of the urban residential community to be distinct from work groups not only lessens the degree of control that the residential community exercises over the urban dweller but permits him to evade the controls exercised by a given community. Usually he can move elsewhere without, as would be true of the small-town or rural resident, disturbing his work-group status. Conversely, he may be able to shift from a job in which he has lost status with his fellow workers (or a job which he has lost for some reason or other) into another without disturbing his community position. Such status-group mobility is perhaps the major respect in which the urban dweller is freer than his small-town or country cousin. For children and young people who have not yet been partially detached from the residential community by outside work-group dependence, the status in community groups is fully as important in the city as in a small town, and the degree of control exercised by the residential community just as great.

Recreational Coteries and Clubs.⁶ Solitary and spectator forms of recreation—e.g., reading and going to motion pictures—take up a considerable proportion of the leisure time of the modern individual. The folk forms of recreation, such as festivals, community religious and other kinds of ceremonials, and participant sports, have historically declined in importance. Nonetheless, most modern people spend considerable time in and attach considerable importance to recreational-group membership of one sort or another.

The simplest kind of recreational grouping, and for some the most significant, is the friendship coterie—the two or more individuals who have discovered common interests and free time for idle conversation, for playing games, for going to dinners, for viewing TV, or even for just companionable silence. Among adults, friendship coteries are likely to assemble for dinner or cocktails in one another's houses, to gather occasionally for bridge, etc. Women's coteries may gather for luncheon or merely assemble at the corner market to gossip while shopping. Men's coteries often form around the use of some commercially provided facility—the English pub, the American bar, the pool hall, or the bowling alley.

At the opposite pole are the formal clubs, mainly but not exclusively a middle- and upper-class phenomenon, with a rigidly selected membership, various ceremonials, considerable stress on the prestige of belonging, and the provision of some more or less satisfactory recreational facilities—clubhouse, golf course, or whatnot. For some persons status as member of a given club may have, or seem to them to have, bearing upon their success in business or professional life. But whether it does or not, many individuals attach tremendous importance to belonging to the right club or clubs. In fact, for many an adult in modern society club membership and status within that membership is as eagerly sought and as vital to happiness as belonging to the right clique in high school is to the adolescent and belonging to the right fraternity is to the college student.

Peer Groups.⁷ The importance that is commonly attached to coterie and club status probably stems from the fact that such groupings tend to consist of people of roughly equivalent age and class positions. There is much evidence to suggest that as a rule the individual attaches the greatest importance to status among his peers, the general exception being that of the one who is ambitious to move into the company of his superiors, *i.e.*, the man who wants to improve his economic or other status. The extraordinary im-

⁶ For the prevalence and functions of clubs in American society see H. Goldhamer, "Social Clubs" (in *Development of Collective Enterprise*, by S. Eldridge *et al.*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1943). By way of contrast see L. C. Jones, *The Clubs of the Georgian Rakes* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1942).

⁷ The major study of peer groups is that by W. F. Whyte (*Street Corner Society*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943). He found that the peer group—or street gang—of the youths he studied was a primary influence on individual conduct, a finding supported by a subsequent study reported by W. W. Wattenberg and J. J. Balistrieri in "Gang Membership and Juvenile Misconduct" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 15, pp. 744-752, 1950).

portance attached to status among peers is most evident in the preference that children and young people show for the company of their age-equals and the priority that they give to the values and sentiments of their age-equals over the values and sentiments of their parents and other adults. Adolescents are especially noted for their clannishness (the groups they form tend to have the exclusiveness and arrogance of the clique) and for the dim view they take of all childish things on the one hand and of the opinions and counsel of their elders on the other. To the adolescent, status among fellow adolescents is usually an imperative; unless one can be a member of "the gang" in good standing, life is hardly worth living. To secure such standing, status in family and other groups may be willingly sacrificed.

The strivings of the adolescent for peer-group status are self-evident—to adults—because they are awkward and unconcealed and because they usually bring the adolescent into conflict with the standards of conduct set by parents and other adults. But the importance that the adolescent attaches to peer-group status is probably no greater than that which most adults attach to theirs. The major difference is that an adult usually has achieved status in one or more well-structured peer groups and need only maintain it, whereas the adolescent is striving to gain status in peer groups which are relatively unstructured and constitute more a field of battle for status than a system of status relationships.

Residential, as well as recreational, groups may be wholly or in part groups of class, sex, occupational, or age peers. Although there may be a fair representation of all ages among the people living in a given area, the effective community groups that are formed within that population tend to be age-based; *i.e.*, the small children tend to be a community of small children, little affected as a group by older children or by adults, the youths to run as a pack, the young matrons and their husbands to have a unity of their own, and so on. Each of these age-peer groups will, of course, overlap at many points with some or all of the others and with peer groups based on sex, on similarity of interests in spare-time activities such as gardening, and the like. Work groups are often composed of age peers, in part because those in a given age may have comparable positions within the work organization and in part because those in each age category tend to have comparable interests, values, etc. Thus, while the whole of an office force may for some purposes operate as a status group, in other respects it may be fragmented into a number of such groups, the office boys and younger clerks forming a group of their own, the stenographers and mature but unmarried men another, and the sedate old hands still another. Usually such structuring on the basis of age and related characteristics is quite informal; but under union regulations or wherever old craft traditions persist, workers may be more or less formally divided into groups of apprentices, journeymen, and master craftsmen, each with something of its own standards and special interests. Almost universal with workers is some sort of differentiation between the old-timers and the Johnny-come-latelys, a distinction that

may also cut across residential communities and club and other recreational-group memberships.

STATUS-GROUP NORMS

From the point of view of the individual member, a status group supplies satisfactions that he cannot otherwise secure, provided that he does what is required of him by the group as a whole; *i.e.*, the group grants him rights and exacts in return fulfillment of role obligations. Each member of a status group may more or less clearly perceive his own position in these terms. At the same time, however, he tends to view the position of each of the other members in terms of their adherence to the norms—*i.e.*, the standards of conduct that are held to be right and proper for members of the group. The latter point of view stems from the former; for the status of the individual depends upon the maintenance of the group itself, and the group can exist only if and as long as the members conform more or less exactly to the norms. Aside from whatever distinctive physical similarities they may happen to possess (*e.g.*, age and sex), what makes the members a group is their adherence to standards of conduct which at once distinguish them from nonmembers and identify them, in their own eyes and in the eyes of nonmembers, as participants in a common activity.

The Law of the Group. The norms, or standards, of a status group comprise the law that governs the conduct of the members, individually and collectively. Like other forms of law—political, religious, corporate, etc.—status-group law may have originated in times past and been passed on to the present members of the group by their predecessors; it may be the product of deliberation in which most or all of the members have participated; or it may have originated in the decision of one of the members and been accepted by all. Even in the relatively unstructured activities of a children's play group, all three sources of the laws governing the group may sometimes be perceived. For example, children may play a game in accordance with rules known to many generations of small children; they may also apply to the game some special rules that they have devised jointly to meet the special circumstances in which they play it; and they may observe still other rules for the game that were laid down on the spot and probably only for the day by the leader of the day. In the usually much more structured activities of adult status groups, the diverse sources of group law are even clearer. As they sit down to dinner, friends may follow a custom that is centuries old (that of alternating the sexes); they may carefully avoid topics of conversation that they have jointly come to realize lead only to controversy; and they may repeat a toast that was initially proposed by one of their number but that has become traditional with them.

Status-group law differs from the law of political, religious, and other kinds of organizations, however, in that it is mainly implicit rather than explicit, and specific rather than general. An organization operates, in its formal aspects at least, in terms of explicit and more or less codified rules. Whether these

rules are recorded, as in modern societies, or are simply preserved in the memory of the village or tribal elders, to be recalled when occasion requires, they consist of definite statements of what must and what must not be done by members of that organization: *e.g.*, thou shalt not take unto thyself a bride from another tribe; thou shalt get to work at 8 A.M. and record thy presence by punching the time clock.

Status-group law, on the other hand, is more a matter of sentiment, taste, and values than of explicitly stated rules and regulations. The members of a status group can readily distinguish between what is and what is not lawful, although they may find it exceedingly difficult to express in words the rules that govern permissible conduct or even what rule a recognizably unlawful act violates. As a matter of fact, the members of a status group do not ordinarily think of their norms as constituting a body of definite rules and regulations. They will, of course, recognize explicitly such things as that they follow the rules of a game, *e.g.*, bridge, that they play together; that they individually take turns having the gang in for a game; etc. And the members of highly structured groups will know and usually be able to designate some of the group criteria by which members and nonmembers are distinguished, such as, for example, that ability to play golf is the minimal requirement for membership in a golf club.

For the most part, however, the rules and regulations of a status group deal with such complex and subtle aspects of conduct that they are difficult, if not impossible, to express in definitive terms. Anthropologists working in the field through native informants have often come up hard against this fact. The native informant may be able to describe to the anthropologist the formal aspects of the tribal or kinship system, to express as rules and regulations the tribal law, and to explain the various customs and traditions of his people. But when asked by the anthropologist how it happens that this or that is done although no rule or custom seems to apply, the informant is likely to make some vague reply to the effect that "We just do this," "It would be senseless not to do this," or "With us, all good little boys (or men, or whatever) do this."⁸

The distinction between the explicit law of an organization and the implicit law of a status group is illustrated by what often happens to a young man who joins the faculty of a college or university. He can easily and quickly ascertain the institution's rules governing the conduct of courses, the number of courses he is expected to give each semester, when and how his stipend will be paid to him, etc. He will find it far more difficult, however, to ascertain the norms of any one of the various status groups to which his position on the faculty makes him eligible and in terms of which his conduct will be evaluated. If he is aware of the problem but not of its subtlety and complexity, he might openly inquire of a member of a peer group in which he finds himself to be a member-on-trial what is expected of him. His very question might serve to

⁸ As a consequence anthropologists often distinguish between what they term the "overt" and the "covert" culture of a people.

demonstrate to his peers that he is not going to prove to be an acceptable member of the group. At any event, the answer he will receive is likely to be an unhelpful generalization to the effect that he is expected to "play ball" with the gang, when what he wants to know is just how one plays acceptable ball in this particular league.

The fact that most status-group norms are implicit and difficult to convey by definite verbal statement stems in part at least from their multiplicity and specificity. The law of organizations is not only explicit but also general in that it applies mechanically to all instances of a whole category of circumstances. Rules and regulations of this order are evolved and applied in terms of what might be called the "principle of averages." Thus an employer may have found or may think that he has found that on the average the worker who gets to work at the specified time produces more than the one who occasionally arrives late; on this basis he may establish an organizational rule to the effect that any worker who has been late to work such and such a number of times in any one month shall be discharged. A few hundred rules of this general sort may suffice to govern the conduct of the many members of a political, religious, business, or other organization. The law of a status group, on the other hand, consists of a multitude of rules that apply for the most part to highly specific items of conduct—*e.g.*, that the individual shall punch the time clock in such and such a manner (not subject to descriptive statement) and not in this, that, or some other possible manner; or that he shall greet his work associates in this particular undescribable way rather than any one of the many other possible but also undescribable ways.

Since the relations of the members of a status group are characterized by a relatively high degree of intimacy, they involve many personal attributes that either do not become manifest in more formal relationships, such as those of a transitory situational character, or else do not gain significance except through time. The fact that a man has a throat-clearing tic is unlikely to be noticed or, if noticed, to be more than an item of passing interest to clerks, streetcar conductors, nooing acquaintances, and others who encounter him rarely and then briefly. But to his work associates, the members of his family, and others who see him frequently and over considerable periods, the recurrent throat-clearing sound may become a source of exasperation which makes an otherwise pleasant companion an intolerable nuisance. Conversely, the one who seems to strangers and passing acquaintances to be rude or gauche may be known to his intimates as a considerate and charming man; for in their relations with him details of conduct not evident to the passing acquaintance are of far more importance than the fact that he sometimes acts rudely.

Some status-group norms do, of course, apply to such gross and obvious matters of conduct as wearing the proper kind of clothing, arriving on time, staying for the full period, repaying one's debts, etc. The vast majority, however, have to do with exceedingly small and subtle matters of conduct, no one of which is, perhaps, of itself significant, but which in the mass distinguish, for the

members of the group, the good companion from the unsatisfactory one, the Good Joe from the one who is suspect, the Proper Bostonian from the man who just happens to be living in Boston.

NORMS AND CONFORMING BEHAVIOR

In toto the norms of a status group provide a multidimensional scale against which the members measure the actual performance of each individual. That scale is, in a sense, a composite ideal of how the perfect member of the group would behave. If all the members conformed to this ideal, the relations of the group would, by assumption, be completely harmonious and each member would secure the maximum possible gratification from participation in the group.

The actual life of status groups, like all actualities, falls somewhat short of the ideal. No member ever conforms perfectly to all the norms; their very multiplicity and subtlety preclude it. And no group, however idealistic and unworldly its member may be, actually requires the individual to live up to all the norms. What is required of him, rather, is that he conform more rather than less to most of them. The norms may be fixed and categorical. Thus according to local custom, the dinner-party hour may be fixed at seven; according to long-standing tradition, the men of the community may need to tip their hats to women of their acquaintance; according to the codes of the craft, the bricklayer may be restricted to working only so many hours a day and laying only so many bricks during that time; and according to the rules of good sportsmanship, the bridge player may need to stick with the game until his companions show signs of being ready to quit. But no matter how fixed and categorical the norm, the behavior of the individual in any instance tends to be but a rough approximation of it. Thus he is more or less on time for dinner; he appears dressed more or less appropriately for that occasion; and he behaves in ways that in some respects exceed and in other respects fall short of what is deemed right and proper for him as a dinner guest (*e.g.*, he may be somewhat overattentive toward his hostess and underattentive toward his host, and he may eat his meat with a slightly greedy air and his vegetables with some show of reluctance). All studies of actual conduct indicate individual variability of this sort from the designated, or ideal, standards.

While it is possible to establish hypothetical standards of conduct from which the individual can deviate in one direction—*i.e.*, by conforming either more than or else less than is required—group norms are actually of such a character that deviation can take either direction. If the standard of conduct were invariable attendance at the regular Sunday church service, it would be possible to deviate from it only in a “less” direction—*i.e.*, to fail to attend on a given Sunday. But even in a highly religious community the actual church-attendance norm to which the individual is supposed to conform will be regular rather than invariable attendance. And so it is with all customs, folkways, local practices, etc., and with the undescribable but multitudinous

implicit rules of a status group. The individual can live up to, fall below, or exceed the standard set for him by the group. As a result, the variable individual conformity of each of the several members of the group tends to balance out; the underachievement of one member tends to be offset by equivalent overachievement of another. When, therefore, the conduct of the members of a status group in any specific regard is measured and plotted on a graph, the resulting distribution tends to assume the familiar bell-shaped, or normal, curve that would be obtained from plotting their various heights, weights, or other physical characteristics.⁹

Group Tolerance. Legislators attempt to formulate laws and the courts profess to interpret them in absolutistic terms; and the determination of individual conformity to the requirements of law are supposed to be categorical: *i.e.*, the individual has or has not broken a law or alternatively has or has not lived up to the specifications of a law. As a result, a man may be adjudged guilty of murder and executed for it when he is, in the values and standards of judge and jury, one-half or two-thirds guilty of murder. But although men continually think and occasionally act in such absolutistic terms, the members of a status group judge the conduct of their fellow members in relative terms, in terms of more or less rather than "he did" or "he did not"; *i.e.*, they temper their judgments. The tempering of judgments is often described as the result of personal, class, racial, or other bias and prejudice (bias if favorable, prejudice if unfavorable); and it has long been the fashion among the less earth-bound social scientists to decry such tempering as contrary to this or that abstract principle of justice. In recent years many writers have gone so far as to consider prejudice—most commonly, racial prejudice—as a symptom of individual and social abnormality. But the hard fact is that the members of every status group are "biased" toward fellow members and to that extent, if no more, "prejudiced" against all nonmembers. The bias of status-group members toward one another is expressed as a tolerance—and to this extent a sanction—of individual variation from the norms of the group.

The tolerance by the group of individual variation in conformity depends in part upon the particular norm involved and in part upon the role and personal status of the individual within the group. Nevertheless, every individual member is always permitted some degree of deviation from each of the many group norms. Such tolerance does not stem from the altruistic or charitable nature of men; it is, rather, the result of very practical considerations. In the first place, the ability of the group to evaluate the degree of individual conformity is limited; this fact is commonly recognized and taken into account in all status-group operations. If the guest is late, the host may question the correctness of his own watch; if the bricklayer appears to have exceeded the standard for

⁹ A detailed study of conformity in a primitive tribe is provided by J. S. Slotkin and D. P. McAllester in *Menominee Peyotism: A Study of Individual Variation in a Primary Group with a Homogeneous Culture* (Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc., vol. 42, Pt. 4, December, 1952).

a day's work, his fellow workers may question the validity of their estimate (and who will bother actually to count the bricks that he has laid?); if it be claimed that so-and-so has not been attending church regularly, his friends may wonder if, perhaps, he may not have been sitting in other than his accustomed pew; etc. And when matters of multiple and very complex conformity are involved, such as the question of whether a husband is or is not mistreating his wife, the possibilities of error in judgment are great and many and will be so recognized by the individual's friends and acquaintances.

Although men may complacently pass stereotyped judgments on the conduct of strangers and of people they definitely dislike, they are normally quite cautious in evaluating the conduct of fellow members of their status groups, giving them the benefit of every possible occasion for doubt. People everywhere devote a great amount of time to talking about one another. Much of such "behind-the-back" discussion is, of course, aimless gossip; but, as will be shown later, a good deal of it is a part of the complex process by which individual conduct is measured and assessed against the normative requirements. Whenever the conduct of an individual is seriously questioned by members of one of his status groups, they invariably explore the evidence that is available, often in infinite and repetitious detail, debate the relevance of this or that, contrast this with that, and perhaps in the end decide, informally, of course, either to give him the benefit of the doubt or to suspend judgment until the next time. Perhaps, for example, two neighbors did hear shrill screams that seemed to come from a certain house; and unquestionably the housewife did have a black eye the next morning. But cats scream sometimes in a humanlike manner, and besides, a woman who bumped into a door in the dark might scream and bruise her eye at the same time. To conclude, from the evidence, that her husband beat her would not be reasonable, let alone just.

Tolerance of the conduct of the individual by the members of his status groups is also encouraged by the fact that the members know from their own experience that it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to live up to this or that group norm. They are what is commonly termed "sympathetic" with one another; they recognize the fallibility of the others, if only because they wish their own failures to be excused. There is among all people a tendency to conspire against their norms, to find excuses for individual deviation from the norms in specific instances.

Tabu Circumvention. The idea, prevalent among social reformers and other idealists, that men are characteristically slaves to tradition and custom ignores the fact that they commonly tolerate wide deviation from customs and traditional practices and at times even sanction actual violation—as distinct from permissible deviation—of the more sacred of their group norms. There are few if any norms that cannot be violated upon occasion, that occasion being any circumstance which in the opinion of the members of the group makes adherence to the norm inexpedient. The definition of expediency is, of

course, variable; but the point is that status groups everywhere operate on the assumption—whatever the ideological pretensions—that the function of group norms is to aid in the achievement of individual and group values. When circumstances seem to distort the functioning of a norm, then it may be violated in the achievement of a value. Every rule of conduct, has, in effect, an “escape clause.”

In some instances the act or acts which constitute violation of a norm are embodied in negative norms—tabus; presumably these are the acts which social experience has demonstrated are most likely to occur as violations. A positive norm invariably implies one or more tabus; for extreme deviation in either direction from the norm is a violation of it. Thus if the norm requires that the individual attend church regularly, not to attend church at all is by implication prohibited; if it be required that the members of the congregation pay reasonable attention to the sermon, either to go to sleep or actively to express enthusiasm for the sermon is by implication prohibited.

In primitive societies a tabu can in many instances be violated with impunity—*i.e.*, with group sanction—provided that the individual proceeds in accordance with a specified ritual. Anthropologists are well acquainted with this phenomenon. The ritual is ideologically supposed to blind the eyes of the god or gods to the violation and thus save the individual from punishment for his infraction of the rule. Actually the ritual is usually a procedure whereby the individual secures community sanction for the evasion, justified by expediency, of the tabu.

Although they do not think of the procedure as comparable to a primitive tabu-circumventing ritual, modern people do upon occasion sanction individual violation of a tabu and in some instances utilize rituals that differ only in form from those of primitives. All our rules of sex segregation, for example, can be violated upon occasion, provided that proper procedures are followed. Thus the cleaning woman can enter the “men’s room,” which is tabu to women, because her cleaning mop and pail desex her. Our Puritan forefathers are reputed to have sanctioned courtship in bed (presumably a concession to expediency, as homes were poorly heated in winter) when it was divested of sin by the presence of a pole down the center of the bed. The Catholic Church, which has persistently made the use of contraceptive devices tabu, has sanctioned avoidance of conception by the dubious “safe period” procedure.¹⁰ One

¹⁰ The confessional of the Catholic Church is a highly institutionalized system of tabu circumvention. Whenever it becomes locally expedient to violate a law of the Church, the individual may do so with considerable assurance that his priest, who tends to reflect local sentiments, will assure forgiveness in the eyes of God for a reasonable penance. An informal tabu-circumventing ritual whereby respectable girls can engage in premarital sex relations without losing their respectability (the ritual makes the boy seem entirely responsible, and in theory the girl is seduced) is described by W. F. Whyte in “A Slum Sex Code” (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 49, pp. 24–31, 1943). B. Siegel has reported (unpublished research materials) what is perhaps the most curious of sex-tabu-circumventing rituals. In Brazil, where Catholic sex codes are nominally in force but commonly violated, a surgical

of our more widespread and traditional tabu-circumventing rituals is the so-called shotgun marriage. Almost everyone forgives and forgets the premarital conception that is subsequently sanctified by marriage.

Even the tabu against taking the life of another, probably the most widespread and most sacred of our prohibitions, is sometimes circumvented by formal court procedure in which the jury "defines" the taking of life as less than murder (as manslaughter or perhaps euthanasia); and both in law and in common understanding, it is permissible to kill in defense of property or life. In not a few instances, a murder committed by one of the members of a status group has been regarded as justifiable by the others, who, having arrived at this interpretation of the act, have then done everything possible to protect that member from the legal consequences of his act. What constitutes extenuating circumstances may range from provocation which, in the minds of those who pass judgment, would lead them so to act, down to personal irresponsibility induced by anything from worry to alcohol. Thus a man's friends may excuse him for murdering his wife on the grounds that, in view of her character, they would have been impelled to do likewise; and adultery may be condoned by almost everyone concerned because it occurred at the height of a party where hardly anyone was responsible for what he or she did.

Sins of Commission and Omission. On the whole, a status group is less tolerant of sins of commission than of sins of omission. The man who fails to come to church will be more readily excused than the one who comes and makes himself objectionable; the man who ignores his wife will be considered less in error than the one who beats his wife; the man who lays less than the normal number of bricks a day will be more readily excused than the one who exceeds the norm. This tendency to be more tolerant of failure to live up to a norm than of action which violates a norm probably stems from vague recognition of the fact that the welfare of the group as a whole is more acutely jeopardized by contranormative action than by subnormative performance. It is to be noted that among all peoples evil is dramatized in story and myth as an active force, never as a passive circumstance. Whatever the reason, most status groups are more tolerant of the indolent man who lets his children die through malnutrition than of the one who kills his children with an ax, of the man who just never gets around to paying his bills than of the one who pays them with bad checks, etc.

Personal Status and Tolerance. A status group tends, furthermore, to be more tolerant with the well-established member in good standing than with either the member in poor standing or the neophyte. One of the more important, but always unspecified, rights that is conferred upon the member who achieves

procedure which purports to reestablish the virginity of a girl has been developed and is widely advertised by qualified medical men. Presumably the middle-class Brazilian youth, or at least his parents, demands that his bride be a virgin, and in order that this requirement for marriageability shall not interfere with premarital sex relations, the surgical ritual—for it can be no more than that—has evolved.

good standing is the right to be somewhat casual about the fulfillment of his status obligations. Thus the highly respected member of a community who, as such, is expected to set a good example for others is usually excused from and protected from the consequences of his misdeeds; even the police, who are supposed to act impartially, are usually disinclined to reveal the fact that he was found in a brothel or gambling house during a raid on it. Preferential treatment of people of means and position is often thought to be a consequence of bribery or political intimidation, and no doubt it sometimes is. But police and other officials tend in their official acts to reflect local sentiment; and they would be acting in an unrepresentative way should they fail to recognize that the local banker has earned the right to a bit of sinful or illegal relaxation now and then and deserves reasonable protection from discovery, whereas the local drunkard has earned nothing, will lose nothing if his latest sin is recorded on the police blotter, and at any event does not himself care much one way or the other. In all this there is a tendency to view conformity to group norms as an irksome chore (is not sin usually pictured as more enjoyable than virtue?) from which the individual should be granted occasional release for good behavior. It may shock and will certainly surprise friends and neighbors to learn that the very responsible and respectable man has begun to play around with his secretary; but they may be inclined to excuse him on various grounds, all of which add up to the idea that he deserves a vacation from the wife and family, to whom he has heretofore been so dutiful.

An excellent illustration of the fact that high personal status can confer the right to some transgression is the way in which a well-established and respected scholar is usually excused intellectual indiscretions (*e.g.*, ill-considered conclusions drawn from inadequate data) that would wreck the career of a less mature man. His colleagues may say of him that a good man has a perfect right to be wrong once in a while, they may remark that he has made an "interesting if unsound speculation," or they may perhaps refer vaguely to the fact that he has been working so hard that he is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. And in academic as in all other kinds of status groups there is a tendency to let an old member ("the grand old man") live on his past performance. Almost every long-standing club has, for example, at least one beloved member who has fallen on evil days but is maintained in his membership by generous fellows; someone pays his dues, perhaps, everyone takes turns at buying him drinks, etc.

The member of a status group who has doubtful standing as a consequence of persistent failure to live up to the norms and the neophyte who has not yet earned personal standing within the group are treated far less tolerantly. Both are, in a sense, on trial, the one because he has erred in the past and the other because he has not yet proved his worth. Both are held, therefore, to much more rigid conformity. Within status groups, as in the eyes of the society at large, ignorance is no excuse for violation of the law; the craft apprentice may sometimes be excused for ineptitude on the grounds that he

did not know better, but as a rule the status-group neophyte is required to adhere quite rigorously to the group norms and will not be excused on the grounds that he did not know, or else misunderstood, local customs. It is for this reason that the individual who is entering into a new community of persons must proceed cautiously and feel his way along; the norms of the group are never conveyed to him directly, yet at the same time he will be held strictly to them.

NORMS FOR DEVIANT ROLES

Most status groups not only tolerate some deviation from the norms, but they also tolerate one or more members who persistently violate those norms.¹¹ The village may express contempt for its drunkard, pity for its idiot, and disdain for its "widow of easy virtue"; yet at the same time the villagers may cherish these local characters, or, as the French say, *types*. A respectable family may lament its wayward son, yet welcome him upon his infrequent visits home and speak somewhat boastfully of its "black sheep." The club members may dodge the notorious bore, but upon his death or resignation someone else will soon be taking his place.

Most status groups—probably all that have developed a fixed structure—have, in addition to their general or standard norms, one or more sets of norms for deviant roles. The individual who has been assigned a deviant role—always a complex and informal process—must live up to the standards of conduct set for that role. Possibly because he will be the only one playing this particular role, with the result that any deviation from the norms thereof will not be canceled out by deviation in the other direction by another, he is expected to conform absolutely; *i.e.*, play his role with complete fidelity. If the role is that of village drunkard, he must never act sober; if his role is that of the fool, he must never act wise—or, if he does, he must act wise in a very foolish manner. It is interesting to observe how intolerant most groups are toward the member whose deviation from the standard norms they have come to tolerate; that intolerance suggests that the person who occupies a deviant role in a group serves an important and valued group function.

While deviant roles are infinitely varied, they would seem most commonly to fall into one or another of three or four general categories: that of the buffoon or fool, who violates all the local canons of good sense and somehow survives; that of the sinner, who violates many of the sacred norms and is

¹¹ The hero, as one who deviates in the direction of superfulfillment of the norms, appears in all societies and has been much studied. See G. Johnson, *American Heroes and Hero Worship* (Harper, New York, 1943); O. E. Klapp, "The Folk Hero" (*J. Amer. Folklore*, January, 1949, pp. 17-25) and "Hero Worship in America" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 14, pp. 53-62, 1949), M. M. Tumin, "The Hero and the Scapegoat in a Peasant Community" (*J. Pers.*, vol. 19, pp. 197-211, 1950). For analyses of some other deviant group roles see O. E. Klapp, "The Fool as a Social Type" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 55, pp. 157-162, 1949); and S. M. Strong, "Social Types in a Minority Group" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 563-573, 1943).

not punished by God or the devil for his sins; that of the adventurer or innovator, who wanders afield spatially or otherwise and is always ready to attempt the untried; and that of the man of knowledge, savant or magic man, as the case may be. In some instances two or more of these deviant roles have been intertwined and filled by one individual; thus the European bohemian of the early modern period and the Lao-tse of old China were scholarly (or artistic) sinners who upon occasion engaged in wild adventures of one sort or another. In most instances, however, the sanctioned deviant specializes in some one of the foregoing roles.

The jolly fat person, the invariable life-of-the-party, the perpetually blundering workman, the village idiot, and in the modern world such characters as the irresponsible newspaper columnist and the word-mangling politician are but versions of the role of buffoon. The drunkard, the "loose woman," the roué, and the trickster who stays just within the law (the shrewd trader, the dishonest peddler, the poacher, etc.) are versions of the role of sinner. The rolling stone who gathers no moss, the gambler who pours his earnings into the pockets of others, the farmer who is always trying some new crop or some new way to grow an old one, and the man who courts all the girls as they reach maturity but settles down with no one of them are versions of the role of adventurer. And the old hag who can work black magic, the scholarly man who knows all there is to know about butterflies or Latin verbs, the hobbyist who can make something that no one else can make and that no one wants, and the village scribe are versions of the role of man-of-knowledge.

Whatever the deviant role, it is sanctioned by the status group because performance of that role contributes in some way or other to the welfare of the group. The function of the buffoon is almost self-evident; he or she provides an object for practical jokes that might otherwise be played on ordinary members of the group, serves as a sort of semiprofessional entertainer, and offers a flattering contrast for all the others; thus, however foolish a man may have been, he can always console himself that by contrast with the local fool he is wise indeed. The sinner seems to provide a source of vicarious satisfaction to those who cannot or dare not violate the standard sacred norms but who imagine that they would like to do so. The sinner probably serves also as a reassuring contrast for the individual who has erred and is conscience-stricken. In somewhat similar ways the adventurer and the man-of-knowledge may provide vicarious satisfactions or reassurance to the ordinary members of the group. The man-of-knowledge is, for example, usually known for his impracticability; the man who has little esoteric knowledge can therefore comfort himself with the thought that "knowledge isn't everything" and that, although the world may be pretty much a mystery to him, he can after all grow good crops, earn an honest dollar, or father a brood of fine children—things that the man-of-knowledge may be, for all his knowledge, unable to do.

In modern society amusement is provided in large part by professional, nationally known people on a commercial basis; sin is organized and offered

in a variety of forms for a price; scientists equipped with temples and forums have become a class apart; and so on. Nonetheless, these functionaries quite obviously do not satisfy in full the needs for entertainment, reassurance, vicarious sin and adventure, etc. For every highly structured status group maintains one or more members in a deviant role or roles, and even such transitory groups as the friendship cliques that form among children and youths tend to acquire at least a buffoon and sometimes even a member who has brains and information but can do almost nothing at all.

Chapter 6

STATUS-GROUP NORMS AND VALUES

A status group is a number of people who know one another with some degree of intimacy, who come into association with one another recurrently, and who grant one another certain specified role rights in return for fulfillment of certain specified role obligations. From the point of view of the individual member of such a group, the group is a provider of social status and in return demands conformity to its customs, traditions, etc., which have here been termed "norms."

A status group is, however, considerably more than a "number of people . . . etc." It is a number of people formed into and operating as a group; and "groupness," as it may momentarily be termed, is a product of the association of individuals which cannot be explained in terms of the qualities of the individual members. Thus a group is something more than the sum of its individual members.

Just how to conceptualize, to say nothing of describe, the "something more" that arises when numbers of individuals associate as members of a group is still a matter of sociological concern. Analogous comparisons have frequently been drawn between the life processes of an organism and those of a group in the attempt to indicate that a social group, like a living organism, is more than the sum of its constituent parts. But this organic analogy has serious limitations and defects, the most marked being that no part of an organism can live independent of the whole, whereas an individual human being can live, for a time at least, removed from any particular group context. On the other hand, when, as is often done, the structure—the patterns of association—is totally abstracted from the behaving individuals, the resulting analysis of institutions and other forms of group organization gives them a lifeless quality as far removed from the realities as the anatomist's description of a cadaver is from the living human organism. And when, as has also been done, an attempt is made to capture the essence of the living group without reference to the individuals who compose it, the result is usually an even higher level of abstraction, in which such metaphysical terms as "ethos," "collective representations," and even "group mind" are used.

Some of the difficulties of conceptualizing the something more than the sum of its individual members that is produced by their association in groups can perhaps be overcome by piecemeal analysis. Even as the biologist may analyze organic life in terms of such specific, if also interdependent, criteria as body temperature, respiration, and digestion, the something more that constitutes

groupness, as distinct from the sum of the individuals composing a group, may be analyzed in terms of four fairly distinct, however interrelated, qualities: norms, values, structure, and morale. The first two will be considered jointly in the present chapter; and each of the latter will be treated in a successive chapter.

Norms and Values. The norms of status groups, which have already been discussed from one point of view, vary widely; and the norms of a given group change considerably through time. There is, clearly, nothing of universal and permanent value in any specific norm. To the individual member of a status group, each of its many norms is, however, both a "given" and a means to status. If, then, the group as a whole were nothing more than the sum of its individual members, status-group norms could only be described as a random, or irrational, assortment of antics required of those who desire the status that can be secured by participation in a group.

Actually, status-group norms are, with some exceptions, group-devised means of achieving group ends, ways of securing what the group—as distinct from the individual member—values. Means and ends, or norms and values, must be clearly distinguished for a number of reasons. In the first place, a given value may be satisfied in any one of a number of possible ways, a fact that is often recognized by the members of status groups. In the second place, while a norm can be tested empirically for its effectiveness in achieving a value, a value is and must always remain a "given." For example, it can be proved by empirical test whether a train, an automobile, or an airplane will get a person from point A to point B in the shortest time; but that there is good reason to get from A to B and that to do so in the shortest possible time is desirable cannot be tested and must either be assumed or rejected.

Although norms must be distinguished from values, they can never be considered separately from them. The effectiveness of any norm can be assessed only in terms of the value it serves or is supposed to serve; and no status-group norm (or, for that matter, any social form of whatever order) can be meaningfully analyzed apart from the context in which it operates and the value or values of those who conform to it. Without ink, paper, and a written language, a fountain pen cannot be an instrument for writing; and unless the possessor of the pen has not only these other elements but also the desire to write, the pen is at best an ornament and most likely no more than a piece of worthless metal and plastic. In a similar but more complex and subtle way, a status-group norm is meaningless when examined in terms of itself. Consideration of norms apart from the context in which they operate and the values which they serve almost certainly leads to the conclusion that they are "irrational" and that those who adhere to such norms do so without rhyme or reason.

For example, thousands of Americans devote tens of thousands of hours and dollars each year to casting artificial flies out onto the waters of lakes and rivers. Casting is itself a complex skill requiring, in addition to considerable and costly equipment, a good deal of practice. The flies, or lures, are made in

great variety; and although devotees to the activity may differ in their beliefs, all operate on the assumption that there is one specific kind of fly that will prove irresistible to a specific kind of fish on a given day in a given place and with the light and wind as specified. The practitioners of what is usually termed "fly-fishing" have, furthermore, relatively fixed ideas concerning how heavy a line it is permissible to use, etc. Equipped in accordance with the standards to which he subscribes and using the special fly that is dictated by his beliefs and the circumstances, a fly-fisherman will wade for hours through icy water casting here and there to locate the fish for which that fly was designed.

Taken from their general context—vacationing, the fishing lodge, etc.—and without regard for the actual values they serve, the activities of a fly-fisherman appear to be completely irrational, a system of elaborate and fruitless rituals. Clearly, fishing in this complicated manner is not conducive to the catching of fish. A ten-year-old child could work out a more efficient means, and the fishing methods of "simple" primitives are far more effective; if they were not, primitive fishing peoples would never have survived. In terms of its context and the values of the fly-fisherman, however, fly-fishing is actually an effective procedure—as effective in its way, no doubt, as the fishing procedures of the primitive are in theirs. For one thing, fly-fishing makes the catching of fish so very difficult that few fish are caught, with the result that a number of values held by fly-fishermen are served: (1) streams and lakes will not be fished out, and there will be fish to not-catch in subsequent years; (2) there will not be so many fish to eat that the very idea of fish becomes repugnant; and (3) the man who does catch a fish in this difficult manner will be acclaimed by his fellows for his exceptional skill.

Almost every form of human activity becomes, as does fly-fishing, a meaningless ritual when it is considered apart from its context and the particular value or values that it serves. Even primitive fishermen who presumably "value" fish may do many things during the course of a fishing expedition that do not directly aid in the catching of fish. In accordance with an ancient practice, they may make a small offering to the sea as they embark upon it, throwing in a small fish in order that, as they might explain, the hunger of the sea will be appeased and a large catch thus forthcoming. Such a practice might appear to be a meaningless ritual; but closer inspection may reveal that, in terms of other practices and the various beliefs to which they subscribe, the offering strengthens the morale of the little group and thereby indirectly serves to help them achieve their dominant value—the fish which they need.

The term "value" is here used in its psychological rather than economic sense. Economic values—those valued goods and services which, within the particular society, are exchanged in the market place—encompass only a small proportion of the values held by the members of a society; and only a few of the values which, as rights and obligations, are exchanged between the members of a status group are ever economic in character. Thus the monetary dues that the individual may be required to pay to maintain his membership

in a club are usually only one of many obligations to that group; and although the wages that the worker secures may be his dominant concern, his status in the work group provides him with a great many values that are not and cannot be included in his pay envelope.

In the inclusive, psychological sense, values are the obverse of motives. "Motive" refers to the driving force which leads to action; "value" to the object, quality, or condition that satisfies the motivation. Like motives, values are inferred from behavior; but at least in the English language, it is somewhat simpler to discuss some specific forms of conduct in terms of values than in terms of motives, for our language does not facilitate ready discrimination of the various motives of men. Thus one may say of a man that he goes to a restaurant because he is hungry (hunger being the generalized motivation for the act); but one can more effectively describe in terms of his food preferences (*i.e.*, in terms of the various values which he attaches to the various foods available to him) the choices of foods that he then makes.

What is said in the following pages concerning status-group values could be conveyed, although less directly, in motivational terms—or, for that matter, in terms of interests, desires, or even wishes. No special significance should, therefore, be attached to the use of valuational terms; they are used as the most convenient way of analyzing the distinction between norms and the ends they serve and of demonstrating that the effectiveness of a norm cannot be ascertained except in terms of some designated end.

STATUS-GROUP VALUES

The particular values of a given individual will depend upon the culture and various subcultures into which he was socialized and upon incidents and accidents of his personal experience. Similarly, the values of a status group, which are more than the sum of the values of the individual members, will depend upon the historical experience of that group as a group and thus in considerable part upon the particular social context in which the group evolved and acquired its structure. All other things being equal, a boys' gang that has grown up in an urban slum area will value many things unknown to or at least not valued by a gang that has grown up in a middle-class suburban residential community.

Real and Spurious Values. It is very often difficult to distinguish group values from group norms. In some instances, as will be indicated later, the members of a status group seem to have a clear and valid understanding of the value served by a norm or set of norms and to be able to verbalize this value. Thus the members of a work group may maintain certain unofficial rights, such as that of taking a break for coffee, simply and avowedly because they enjoy the time taken off from work;¹ and the local physicians may pro-

¹ The rise of a new and nationwide workers' norm—the "coffee break"—is described in the following news report: "Some employers flung themselves hopelessly against the moving horde. Others, already defeated, just watched the tide, making mental notes. But

tect one another from adverse criticism (a common norm among professional groups of all sorts) for the clearly recognized reason that the welfare of the group, and hence of the individual practitioner, depends upon maintenance of the myth of infallibility.

In many instances, however, what the members of a status group profess, perhaps sincerely, to be a value may actually be a verbal norm to which they conform. It is the professed goal of many fly-fishermen to catch as many fish as possible; but their actual conduct indicates that what they value is not the catching of fish per se but the attempt to catch fish in a difficult and narrowly defined manner. It is one of the norms of American professional military men to promote military preparedness on the grounds that it serves to preserve peace; the evidence of history is quite otherwise, and it is at least doubtful that men can devote a lifetime to preparing for war without valuing militant action.

When, as is often the case, there is a clear contrast between what is professed as a group value and what is actually done, the professed value can be adjudged spurious, and the real value can be inferred from the conduct of the group. The medieval Church, for example, held life to be sacred but at the same time took countless lives for the glory of God. Governments are almost always dedicated to the task of serving in the public good and almost always serve the interests of special groups. Governmental bureaus and other agencies of government officially profess to be engaged in furthering the general welfare and almost invariably are engrossed in the preservation—at whatever cost to society at large—of their own organizational rights and privileges. And even a modern business enterprise may profess to be operating in terms of social service, although it is obviously engaged in the endeavor to earn a monetary profit for its stockholders.

Some of the contrast or at least confusion between professed values and values as demonstrated by actual conduct arises from the fact that people often hold mutually exclusive values or systems of values and operate in terms of them. The professional military man may value war; but he no doubt also

there was nothing to be done about it. Every morning, in every city in the U.S., the bosses watched glumly as the last stenographer disappeared down the hall with a departing flirt of her skirt, purse clutched firmly in one hand, cigarettes and matches in the other.

"The morning coffee break had become as deeply entrenched in U.S. custom as the seventh-inning stretch and the banana split. Clerks, secretaries, junior executives and sales-girls had come to consider it an inalienable right of the American office worker. In the face of that terrible, soft insistence, the fuming employer could only take his finger off the unanswered buzzer, jam on his hat, and follow along after the crowd to the coffee shop . . .

"In the drum-tight labor market of World War II, when trained workers were hard to find and hard to keep, the wise boss had indulged such little liberties. Later, the men came back from wardrooms and mess halls of the armed forces, where the percolators chuckled day and night, and gave the custom new impetus. . . These days, no time clock daunts the coffee-breakers, and no office manager's frown . . . the coffee break has been written into union contracts and authorized by state labor laws. No truly modern office building is designed without its grid of coffee dispensaries." (*Time*, Mar. 5, 1951, p. 25.)

values his life and even that of the men whom, in time of war, he sends to their death. He may also value highly the physical and other comforts of peace, which may be for him the rewards of the war during which he earned promotion and honor. To that extent, war was for him a means to a value rather than a value per se.

On the whole, however, contrast between professed values and values as demonstrated by actual conduct stems from the fact that the professed values are verbal norms used to justify the group's (or the organization's) existence and conduct, means to an end rather than a statement of that end. Spurious values of this sort are characteristically altruistic. There are occasional individuals who, as will be noted later, do seem rather consistently to operate as though they really place a high value on the welfare of others—although they usually insist on defining the welfare of others in their own terms. But the real values of most people and of all organizations and status groups are egoistic.

Individuals or groups that profess spurious values of an altruistic sort may do so for one or another of two reasons. In the first place, people are not always able and willing to symbolize their real values accurately. Most people can express their simple tastes, such as their food preferences, rather effectively and are quite willing, if not anxious, to do so. Perhaps they cannot actually explain why they like or dislike a given food, but they can ordinarily communicate the more marked of their food tastes and even convey some idea of the relative intensity of their various likes and dislikes. But their ability, to say nothing of their willingness, to verbalize more complex and subtle values—such as, for example, those that enter into their marital relations—is decidedly limited. The partners to a compatible marriage presumably are quite aware of the fact that they have many values in common and certainly become aware in times of disagreement that in some respects they have different and perhaps mutually exclusive values. But it is one thing to sense a similarity or dissimilarity in values and quite another to define in words the nature of those values. A great many values are matters of sentiment, of emotion, and of moral predilection, rather than of reasoned choice, and are not readily susceptible to symbolization. A man may order his dinner in a deliberate manner, using in the process symbolic representations of his food preferences. He cannot enter into and conduct his marriage in an equally reasoned manner, if only because most of the values that can be gratified through marriage are matters of feeling rather than of thought, matters that can be experienced but not easily put into words.

When an individual or group of individuals is called upon to define in words values which, in fact, they only sense, the tendency is to profess adherence to one or more of the stock, stereotyped values of the society at large. In our own society, and apparently in most societies past and present, the generally approved values are altruistic in nature. Thus the man who enjoys family life because it satisfies egoistic values which he feels but cannot reduce to words may upon occasion explain his being a husband and father by reference to

the stock idea that "the family is the foundation of society." The altruistic implication, and it may be no more than that, is that he is raising a family for the good of society rather than to satisfy his own real values.

The second reason why people frequently profess spurious values of an altruistic order which they do not in fact act upon stems from their dependence upon the good will—or at least the toleration—of the larger society. Only those individuals, groups, or organizations that are by their own and by general social definition antisocial—*e.g.*, criminal gangs—can enjoy the luxury of professing that they live to live; all others must at least make a pretense of living for service to the society that makes their continued existence possible. This is, as will be shown later, an ideological requirement in all social systems.

Norms as Ends in Themselves. The problem of distinguishing between norms and values is further complicated by the fact that in some instances the normative conduct (as well as other modes of conduct) is valued for itself. When the intercollegiate football coach talks about the value of football playing as "training in good sportsmanship," he is advancing an altruistic value that has slight relation to the value that he places on football playing; for him football playing has value mainly because it provides him with a livelihood and secondarily because as a successful coach he is accorded social esteem. When the youngsters playing football in a vacant lot say "Gee, that was fun," they are probably expressing the value to them of football playing—that it is an enjoyable activity in itself.

Many things that people do are done for their own sake, for the direct satisfaction that the doing provides. Games, both passive and active, are the obvious illustration. The vulgar arts—motion picture, novel, radio, television, comic books, etc.—are usually valued for their own sake and without any pretensions to the contrary. Such spare-time activities as gardening, handicraft, and the collecting of this or that may also be undertaken for the enjoyment of the doing. When any such game, hobby, etc., is a group endeavor, it may then be a norm which is an end in itself.

The analytical difficulty arises from the fact that, on the one hand, what is normally an end in itself may in specific instances be a means to such an end as prestige or exclusiveness, and on the other hand, norms that are actually ends in themselves are sometimes professed to be means to values. The former instance is illustrated by the individual or group that goes in for some game, sport, or related activity mainly, if not entirely, because it is locally considered the thing to do—as distinct from the thing that is simply enjoyable. The latter instance is encountered frequently among "high-brow" or self-styled "intellectual" circles in which novels are, purportedly, read for anything but the enjoyment of reading a good story, motion pictures are viewed if at all for their "cultural" value, music is something to discuss rather than listen to, and so on. In either instance it is often difficult to ascertain whether the activity of the status group is an end in itself or a means to some end. Often, no

doubt, there is an inseparable intermixture of the two; thus the coterie of "high-brows" who make so much of the "higher values" served by the plays they put on at the little theater may gain therefrom a sense of self-importance and at the same time considerable fun in the doing.

Individual versus Group Values. In so far as the real values of most individuals and of all status groups are, to the extent that they can be distinguished from the conduct that serves them, egoistic, the question arises how numbers of individuals, each seeking to satisfy egoistic values, can work together for a common if egoistic good. Or, as the problem was described at the opening of this chapter, how the association of individuals with one another can involve values that are in excess of the sum of their individual values. A commonly proffered explanation is that group life is made possible by the willing subservience on the part of each individual to the welfare of the group; *i.e.*, that group values take precedence over individual values, just as group norms necessarily take precedence over the individual's personal preference in conduct.

On the whole, however, it would seem that the individual member of a group does not willingly subordinate his own values to those of the group. He seeks, rather, to satisfy his values, or some of them, through participation in the group. Those values are served by his rights as a member of the group. Thus the individual member of any group most values his rights in that group, while his associates value his obligations, which are to him a disutility or un-value. Since this is more or less true of each individual member, there is a normal and continuing opposition between the individual and the group. The opposition between individual and group values does not ordinarily interfere with the maintenance and effective operation of the group; but it does mean that each individual member is constantly subject to social control. In simple terms, the individual ordinarily takes his rights gladly but often gives his services grudgingly,² which would not be the case if group and individual values were identical or if, these values being different, the individual members willingly subordinated their values to the group values.

Except, perhaps, in the very intimate relations of parent to child, of siblings,

² The major exception is the willing contribution to the welfare of the group as a consequence of sympathetic identification with the members. Through sympathy, an individual may be led to exceed his group obligations or even to take over the obligations of another member, particularly in times of crisis. On the whole, however, conduct based upon sympathy is more common in interpersonal than intragroup relationships; thus where strong bonds of sympathy exist between two members of a group (*e.g.*, a mother and one of her children), they may in some instances operate within the group as one member rather than two—the status of one of them may be protected by the other, one may assume obligations for the other, or one may extend some of his status rights to the other. Cooley and others since his time have, it seems to the present author, tended to exaggerate the functional role of sympathy in group life and to ignore the possibly greater role of antipathy. Even the most casual observation indicates that the prolonged association and interdependence of status-group members often leads not to sympathy of member for member but rather to intense antagonism of one to another.

and of husband and wife, there is little more altruism in the relations of the members of social groups than there is between such groups and society at large. Within groups, as between groups and their context, each member gives in order to get. If each member of a group is to get from his membership more in his value terms than he gives in return, a condition that is essential to the existence of the group, the values of the various individual members must be of such a character and order that the total of their individual contributions to group activity produces in their value terms a net gain in value satisfactions in which each shares. This net gain constitutes much of the "something more" that was referred to earlier.

The net gain in value satisfactions which may arise from group activity is basically a function of the fact that several people operating together can often do more than they can operating independently. If each values what is thereby accomplished, if each contributes equally to the endeavor, and if each shares equally in the results, each will gain by his contribution more than he could secure by independent action. The boat that is difficult for one man to row may be easy for each of four men pulling together; if they have in common a desire to get via boat from here to there and each pulls his share, all will gain. Somewhat more complex, but similar in principle, is the net gain in value satisfactions that may come through such a joint activity as going together on a picnic. One person may go alone into the woods or to the beach with a picnic lunch; if he does so, he will be more or less free to decide for himself when to start, just where to go, where to eat, etc. If, on the other hand, he joins forces with a number of others, he will be required to conform to the will of the group in these respects. By so doing he can, however, share in the companionship that is provided by a number of persons; and if he and each of the others values his share of the companionship above the disutility of conforming to the group requirements, there is a net gain in value satisfactions. In still more complex group activities, such as those of a durable play group, a neighborhood, or a bridge or other club, the same principle operates; but the individual member may give such varied things to the group and secure in return such subtle shared values that the nature of the exchange and the character of the net gain is often difficult to ascertain.

From the foregoing it is evident that in order to constitute and operate as a group a number of persons must have at least one value in common—whatever will be produced as a net gain of their association. A number of persons may form a group and, by conforming to norms of silence, produce and individually share a companionable silence only if each under the circumstances values silence; a number of persons may form a group and, by conforming to norms of taking turns at talking and listening, share, by turns, the opportunity of telling others just what they think about this or that only if each values doing so. Only when shared status is part or the whole of the net gain in value satisfactions that will be produced by their association do a number of persons form and operate as a status group. The specific attentions by others

that will constitute or be defined as acceptable status may vary widely from individual to individual. One individual may value highly, defining it as status, simple inclusion as a member of a group; another may feel that anything short of the full and active attention of the other group members is beneath his dignity. Actual status, as was indicated earlier, is a flow of varied and mainly subtle symbolic behaviors which may be described as ranging from acceptance through approval to admiration. Whatever the specific definitions, there must, however, be a common understanding and evaluation by the several members of the particular kinds and forms of status which will be produced through the particular association and which will then constitute or be included in the net gain in value satisfactions.

It is often assumed that harmony in group relations depends upon homogeneity in the membership, and that unless people have the same values they will necessarily come into opposition. If this were true, only completely like-minded people could form into and maintain status groups; and there could never be a really compatible marriage, since the subcultures of men and women everywhere provide sex-differentiated values. Harmonious association on any level does presuppose a common valuing of the net gain in which each individual shares; but it does not require that the members hold in common all, or even most, of the other values that are relevant to their joint activities.

A complete sharing of values by the members of a group is seldom if ever realized. While the children brought up in a family will certainly share many values, they will also inevitably differ about others; while the compatible husband and wife must, to be compatible, share a good many values, they will frequently find their values in conflict; and while good neighbors may agree about the value of lawns and hedges and returning borrowed garden tools, there may be considerable disagreement concerning the value of dogs, cats, radios, television, etc.

There is no doubt some tendency for the individual who enters and retains membership in a given status group to adopt those values of the group that he does not already have. This tendency is especially marked with children and adolescents, who are likely to absorb the current values of their peers with great rapidity—in part, perhaps, because their own values are somewhat unstructured and in part because they lack values relevant to peer-group association; and it is not without reason that parents frequently fear that their good children will fall into bad company. The personality attributes of the adult, values included, are usually more stable than those of the child; nevertheless, the adult often takes over some, if not all, of the values of the company he keeps. The tendency to do so is clearly illustrated in the fact that a man's idea of what constitutes a full day's work depends almost entirely upon the particular work group (or, as is sometimes the case, the particular profession) to which he belongs. On the whole, governmental bureaucracies maintain the fiction—which is to the members a fact—that no man can be an efficient worker for more than an hour or two at a stretch, and that an eight-hour day

and a five-day week are the maximum consistent with the physical and mental well-being of the worker. On the other hand, practicing physicians seem generally to take for granted almost uninterrupted work for twelve hours a day and six, if not seven, days a week. It might be said of physicians, in contrast to bureaucrats, that they place a higher value on doing their work—or, at least, on the money they receive therefrom—than upon rest, relaxation, and—if the bureaucrats are correct—long life. At any event, the man who enters medicine either already has accepted or soon comes to accept the medical rather than the bureaucratic concept of the workday.

Even so, the multiplicity and complexity of values preclude more than a rough or approximate sharing of them by the various members of a group. Values are, among other things, always relative to other values. Although all the members of a given group may value playing golf on the club course, they may differ considerably in regard to when, under what conditions, and for how long to play golf. Of two members who value playing golf, one may perhaps prefer playing the game to eating, another may prefer to eat if he has a choice.

The Value Scale. No doubt most small boys, and most adults as well, would like to eat their cake and have it too. It is, however, one of the truisms of social life that what one eats one cannot also have. A recreational club cannot, for example, hope to grow ever larger and at the same time maintain a quality of exclusiveness. A residential community cannot enjoy freedom from restrictions on the giving of noisy parties and also freedom from the noise of such parties. The workers in a factory cannot, under typical conditions, have both the satisfaction of maintaining a high level of productivity (working with zest, in other words) and the right to work at a leisurely pace. The members of a Rotary Club cannot really work for the betterment of the whole community and at the same time work with one another for mutual economic gain.

It is because many values are mutually exclusive that the values held by both individuals and status groups tend to be scaled, ranging in a priority series from the highest to the lowest or least important. On the value scale of a young man just leaving college, for example, priority may be given to securing employment. How selective he will be in his search for employment will depend upon many things, including the particular scale of values that he has relative to the various kinds of occupations that are or might become open to him. If on that scale financial considerations take priority over such other factors as the kind of work (manual or mental; in industry, trade, or agriculture; etc.), the social prestige of the occupation, the physical location of the work, and the like, he will be inclined to take the first well-paying job that comes his way. But he may be more concerned with the kind of work than with the initial income from it, with long-run prospects than with immediate returns, or with where the job is located than with what it has to offer (e.g., he may value living in New York City more than the prospect of rapid

promotion in a job in Chicago). Moreover, irrespective of his scale of occupational values, he may be inclined to take the first job available because the income prospects and kind and place of work are less important to him than getting married; in this instance, then, getting married would, on his general value scale, yield priority only to the value of getting a job. Such being the case, once he has a job and is married, some other value will have top priority, possibly such a previously unimportant one as that of owning his own home. And should he then get down to the task of buying a home, he will be faced with a great variety of alternatives. The choices that he makes as he selects from these alternatives—often, no doubt, without much conscious deliberation—will depend upon his values; in many instances, in fact, he may have to acquire a set of values (or perhaps accept those of his wife or some adviser) before he is equipped to make a given choice between a number of mutually exclusive alternatives. He will, for example, have to decide whether to him and his wife the advantages of living in a suburban community more than offset such disadvantages as his having to commute to work and having to devote his week ends to such suburban chores as mowing lawns and, in the winter, shoveling snow. He will have to decide, perhaps, whether it is more important to him to have a house with a spare bedroom that can be made into a nursery when and if a child comes along or to do without the spare room and have an automobile for week-end jaunts into the country. When he gets down to the actual selection of the house, assuming that a number of houses in the same general category are available to him, he will have to decide whether the tiled bath in one is more desirable than the automatic washer that comes with another, and tileless, home. In all such decisions, few of which will be easy for him to make, some scale of personal values becomes operative.

It should be evident from the foregoing that reference to "the scale of values" of an individual or a social group is a gross oversimplification of reality. In the first place, individuals and groups have not one, but a great number, of scales of values, a more or less separate scale for each of the many kinds of circumstances in which choices are possible; *e.g.*, an individual may have one scale of food preferences for party dinners at a restaurant, another scale applicable to party dinners at home, still another for run-of-the-mill meals at home, another for restaurant meals while traveling, etc. Moreover, the items of a given scale do not have a fixed relationship but rise and fall in the scale as a consequence of experience. Although various scales differ considerably in this respect—*e.g.*, an individual's food preferences are ordinarily subject to rapid, if temporary, shifts, while his concepts of the relative importance of various duties change very slowly—there is certainly nothing static about any value scale. Food and other tastes become quickly surfeited; as a result a food, color, or other preference is frequently replaced by another. A somewhat comparable change occurs when a value is achieved; such is the case when the "pressing need" for a new automobile is fulfilled, whereupon the "pressing need" may become a new rug for the living room, an additional in-

surance policy, or a vacation at the seashore. Even such relatively stable value scales as those which have to do with the individual's sense of personal obligations are subject to change as the result of surfeiting (*e.g.*, when repeated experience demonstrates the futility of acting dutifully in some respect or toward some person) or of value achievement (*e.g.*, when a financial obligation is repaid or death ends the responsibility).

Value scales are, furthermore, affected by physical and social maturation. Both individuals and status groups grow up and old; with the advancing years the roles of the former always change, and the activities of the latter often do. Thus the child becomes the youth, the youth the man. In somewhat similar fashion, the simple recreational club may change its activities as its members grow older; *e.g.*, there may be fewer active games and more bridge, or, as a consequence of such things as accumulating club properties, less concern with recreational and more with economic and political activities. Some of the values of a residential neighborhood will change as the children of the neighborhood families grow older or as the neighborhood itself matures. Thus the neighborhood public park, valued highly by parents and children alike, may fall into disuse as the children grow old enough to wander off on their own; the same thing may happen even though maturing children are replaced by a new generation of youngsters, as would be the case if growing street traffic were to make the little park a hazard to small children or if a substitute were provided in the form of a planned recreational area.

Finally, some values are inherently fugitive. These are the values that are temporarily imputed to a given act or object—the newest game, a certain kind of ornament, the latest style in clothing, etc.—with the result that it becomes “faddy” or fashionable. Values of this kind come and go in a whimsical, unpredictable way. To the individual the value of the “faddy” or fashionable act or object is mainly secondary, a consequence of the fact that for the moment the act or the object attracts the favorable attention of others.

All status groups include within their value systems some fugitive values. Even the characteristically conservative academicians may value, for the moment, the latest scientific or educational vogue. Some kinds of status groups, moreover, are greatly if not mainly concerned with values of the fugitive order. The direct and more evident of the values of an adolescent clique, for example, are typically superficial and transitory; to be a member in good standing, the individual must know and use the latest wisecracks and the latest slang, enjoy or seem to enjoy the currently popular game, and so forth. Adult “smart sets” seem often to be preoccupied with the latest thing—whatever it may be—which is always something different from what it was a week or a month before.

The Value Motif. The probability of a complete sharing of values inevitably diminishes as the number of individuals involved increases; and in view of the multiplicity, the relativity, and the variability of human values, the chance that the members of a status group will share all, or even most,

values is certainly close to zero. They must, however, as was indicated earlier, have one value in common—regard for the status that is produced as a net gain of their association. In terms of specific values, the sharing of this common value would seem to depend upon the existence of a patterning of the qualitatively and quantitatively varied specific values of the different members around some motif. Anthropologists usually refer to such patternings of values as “themes” in the culture of a given people. The phenomenon is a complex parallel to the vague general similarity that may be perceived in the physique of men who do in fact vary considerably one from another in a great many respects.

It is to the existence of a motif, or theme, in the various and often contradictory value scales of a given individual that reference is made when it is said of him that he is “a highly domesticated animal.” By this is meant that he places a consistently higher value on the pleasures of home life than do most men of his age and general social status, that there is a patterning of values around the motif of home life. It does not suggest that all, or even most, of his values are domestic or that he at any moment will value domestic life above all else. Likewise, the phrase “a woman of fashion” is a somewhat stereotyped—and to that extent oversimplified—reference to the fact that this particular woman is more than normally, but by no means exclusively, concerned with stylish clothing, with being seen, properly clothed, in the “right” places and with the “right” people, and so on. Similarly, an “artistic” person is, with the same qualifications, one who habitually places a higher value on the visual appeal of things—food, houses, clothing, landscapes, etc.—than on their utility. Status-group values, even more than those of individuals, tend to form a pattern or configuration around some value motif. This fact is quite apparent in the case of those men’s clubs and associations which are dedicated to sports of one sort or another. Among the members of such a group the value motif is usually something called good sportsmanship. The values of a residential neighborhood quite commonly pattern themselves around the motif of children, the highest value often being the physical safety of children, when even the value of a given householder’s picket fence may be affected by its possible advantage or disadvantage to the children of the neighborhood. By contrast, a neighborhood composed largely of elderly retired couples may have as its motif economy—*e.g.*, finding bargains in the markets and protecting all physical properties from damage. In some residential neighborhoods the dominant value motif will be domestic tranquillity; in others, ostentatious display; in still others, the maintenance of neighborly—pleasant and mutually helpful interfamily—relations. Probably the value motif for most work groups is job security; but certainly in some few it is the maintenance of craft skills or the preservation of a reputation for exceptionally high productivity. Whatever the value motif, the other values will be more or less dependent in character, related to and valued largely because they minister to the value motif.

SURVIVAL AS A VALUE

Although the particular values and scales of values and the particular value motifs of status groups are infinitely varied and subject to change, all status groups, once established, place considerable and usually very high value on sheer group survival. This value is roughly comparable, both in kind and in universality, to the high individual value commonly placed upon continued life.

It has often been observed that most human beings, even those trained into a firm acceptance of belief in a better life after death, display considerable reluctance to die. There are, of course, exceptions: individuals, and occasionally whole groups of individuals, do at times "choose death"—*i.e.*, commit suicide; and men everywhere act in ways that are conducive to a foreshortening of their lives—*e.g.*, they overeat, they expose themselves unnecessarily to communicable diseases, and they undertake hazardous ventures such as war and voyages of discovery. But these are in the nature of exceptions; the suicide is, perhaps quite rightly, considered psychologically abnormal; the man who overeats ignores the effects on his life span, even as the worker in a dangerous trade ignores (either because of ignorance or by the psychological process of dissociation) the dangers; the warrior enters battle, but with, it now seems, the greatest reluctance and only because the alternative, loss of his generic and specific status, is more painful than the prospect of death.

There are, however, many occasions when the detached observer may wonder why an individual or a group of individuals struggles to keep alive. For every person who destroys himself there are thousands who are, by current definition, hopelessly ill and destined to die but who do everything within their power to delay death. Occasionally a dying elder will speed the death process; but most old people seem to cling to the last vestige of life although so nearly dead that death would seem—again, to the detached observer—to be a welcome relief from the misery of living. Occasionally numbers of men will in desperation destroy themselves; but under the greatest adversity, such as acute and widespread famine and plague, there is usually little if any resort to suicide and, on the contrary, the wildest struggles to escape from impending death. In fact, the detached observer might conclude from wide study of the matter that those who have the least to live for—the impoverished, the aged, the ill, and the maimed—are the most eager to continue living.

Whether the will to live is a biological imperative, as is sometimes deduced from the fact that the subsocial animals also seem to die with great reluctance, or a cultural one is undecided. The question need not concern us here; for the value that status groups place on survival is clearly of social rather than biological origin.

Survival as a Group. All highly institutionalized groups, *i.e.*, those that are culturally indicated, place a high value on group survival. Wherever the family has been culturally fixed in structure, as it was in the premodern West

and has been for centuries in China, the survival of the individual family (as distinct from the family as a system) has been a central concern of family life. To maintain the family line has been institutionally incumbent upon every son; and many of the mechanisms, such as concubinage and child adoption, served this basic end. Even in modern American society there is a strong tendency, persisting against the greatest of odds, to consider the perpetuation of the family name a sacred duty. Under feudalism, both in premodern Europe and elsewhere, a similar stress was placed on the survival of the feudal group; the persistence into modern society of such remnants of feudalism as hereditary titles indicates the tenacity of this value; and the way in which antiquated social elites, such as the postfeudal aristocrats of the Middle Ages and the plantation owners of our Southern states, struggled to preserve their class identity and the forms of their organization further suggests the high value that whole classes of people may place upon sheer survival as a class. Finally, the value that is placed on group survival is reflected in the persistence in an otherwise changing world of such institutionally organized religious systems as the Catholic Church and, until very recently, the outmoded monarchical form of government in Western Europe.

The valuing of sheer survival is usually exhibited by all groups that have had a considerable life history, whether those groups are culturally indicated or not. Many of our own residential communities are perhaps partial exceptions, since there may be little inclination on the part of the various families in a neighborhood to preserve the community from the loss of a given family, and since family, and hence neighborhood, mobility is a significant aspect of American life. On the other hand, the towns and villages of Europe and Asia display an amazing ability to survive; although stripped of all economic reason for existence, the town or village may continue to exist for no more important reason than that it has always been and, to those who stay on, always must be.³ We have in America a few ghost towns, places that grew up on the basis of an economic function that subsequently withered away, leaving a few residents to continue a halfhearted existence. Our ghost towns are, however, both few and torpid in comparison with the very lively ghost towns and villages of older countries. Scattered over the face of England, for example, are villages that grew up hundreds of years ago around fishing, mining, or some local industry that has long since died out.⁴

Residential neighborhoods within towns and villages often evidence the same persistence in the face of external forces of change. London, Paris, and even New York, to say nothing of Boston, have many residential islands, old neighborhoods which have been surrounded by business or industrial estab-

³ For a brief description of the intense, but ultimately ineffective, resistance of a French village to displacement in order that a river could be dammed and a power plant built, see "Wave of the Future" (*Time*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 30).

⁴ An amusing but quite convincing parody of this phenomenon is provided in *There'll Always be a Drayneflete*, by O. Lancaster (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1950).

lishments but which persist as a consequence of the fact that the residents continue to value the place and the kind of life that once was led there. Sometimes these islands survive only as long as there remain alive representatives of the old families who founded the residential community; but often the once-fashionable neighborhood—and this is equally true of antiquated villages and towns—is preserved by successive generations of newcomers, people who are recruited from outside and inducted into the community group, in the same way that many an ancient club carries on its ancient ways although old members are always dying out and being replaced by new. Many of the old New England villages, for example, have been preserved in part at least by recruits from New York and other large cities.

Clubs, associations, and intellectual and artistic cliques, in fact all types of status groups can and often do develop an extraordinary ability to survive. The number of such groups that currently exist even in our own relatively young and dynamic society is considerable, and many of them continue in existence for no very tangible reason. The Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, show no signs of disbanding. Evidently the American Legion, like many comparable organizations that preceded it, will survive the death of the last World War I veteran; and in every town and city in America there is at least one society devoted to the preservation of something that no longer exists.

Informal friendship groups, such as those that develop among children and youths, have less ability to survive; but such groups do usually make some effort to preserve themselves against the forces which normally, and usually inevitably, dissolve them. Thus friends who have scattered to various colleges, gone off at marriage, etc., will often for a time try to retain a semblance of continued groupness through correspondence, occasional reunions, and the like. At the end of a war, military comrades characteristically lament their dispersal—much as they welcome escape from the military life—and they often make individual and collective efforts to keep up the associations which were occasioned by war and which are *de facto* dissolved by the coming of peace.

Because clubs and associations of whatever sort show a decided tendency to persist far beyond what might be termed their normal—i.e., functional—life span, it has been said that “anyone can establish an organization but only the good Lord can dissolve one.”⁵ Even that presumably most utilitarian of all current forms of human association, the business enterprise, seems to generate a will to live beyond its time. In Europe and Britain there are many firms, and in the United States some, that have continued in business for generations;

⁵ The survival, or more properly revival, of the traditional German dueling societies is a striking case in point. These societies were prohibited by law under the Weimar Republic; the Nazi Party made every effort to stamp them out during its long years of power; and after the war, Allied occupation authorities ruled them illegal and endeavored to suppress them. Nevertheless, the traditional dueling society was gaining new popularity among German youth in 1952. For a news report of this revival of what had been prohibited by law for over thirty years see *Time*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 51.

and not infrequently such old establishments carry on in the fine old way of the founder until capital accumulated in early and organizationally vigorous days has been consumed by decades of increasingly large deficits. In fact, the tendency for business establishments to persist from what might be called organizational habit is so great that bankruptcy is the normal method by which business enterprises are terminated, while voluntary dissolution is the atypical one.

As will be shown later, all status groups within industrial organizations—work gangs, office coteries, and administrative cliques—place a high value on survival of the group. While each such group maintains a somewhat independent life and carries on its own struggle for existence, groups often work together for joint survival when the establishment as a whole is in jeopardy. The same is true of governmental and other bureaucracies, which, once established, are practically indestructible; of military organizations; and of colleges and other educational agencies. The tremendous struggle for independent survival which the United States Navy put up when Congress undertook unification of our armed forces is one case in point. The way in which the majority of the small, mainly denominational, colleges in the United States survived the great depression is another. For a number of years these colleges lived on hope and little else; they had few students, few of whom could afford to pay tuition; and their endowments, such as they had, paid little or nothing during the early depression years. How faculty and operating staffs of these colleges kept themselves—and thereby the institution—alive is difficult to understand. Why they struggled to survive is, however, easy to comprehend.

Self-interest Basis of Group Survival. The origins of the individual will to live are still obscure. But the origins of status-group will to live are found in the fact, discussed in an earlier chapter, that most human beings place a very high value on the status that such a group provides. To each individual member of an established status group the maintenance of that group is essential to the maintenance of the status he derives from it; thus each of the several members has a vested interest in preserving the group, and each is willing to suffer considerable loss of group rights and considerable increase in group obligations before membership ceases to be a value to him. In other words, the status that the individual preserves through continuing the life of the group is more important to him than the status of the group itself in the larger society. To the aging spinster it may seem vitally important to keep the tradition of a dying family alive, since it is mainly through membership in that group that she herself is accorded a specific status role—*i.e.*, the role of daughter in an important family; if the family disperses, never to meet again, she loses her specific status and becomes just Miss So-and-So.

The stake that an individual has in the perpetuation of a particular status group depends upon many things: for one, his alternatives, which may be few or many; for another, his faith in the long-run future of the group. As a rule, the fewer the individual's alternatives, the greater his stake in the maintenance

of any group to which he belongs. It is for this reason that economically submarginal villages and business enterprises, decrepit and functionless clubs and associations, and pathetically incompetent families and decadent aristocracies hang on generation after generation. The members of such groups are, by and large, people with few alternatives; they are, characteristically, the survivors of the group—those left behind after more energetic and socially competent individuals have gone off to more fertile fields. It is seldom the boom town—the town built up to accommodate temporary construction workers, etc.—that lives on to any extent after its economic base has disappeared; rather it is the old trade center, the once-thriving agricultural village that has become devaluated by sterility of the land or new techniques of cultivation or the like that lives on precariously. A boom town has been populated mainly by men of enterprise; their enterprise brought them there, and their enterprise will usually take them away when the boom is past. Lack of acceptable alternatives is often a major factor in the perpetuation of an old business firm after the time of profitable operation has passed; those of the personnel who have grown old in service will be incapable of finding new employment, and the newer recruits to the firm are likely to have been selected for their passive acceptance of the traditions of the establishment rather than for competitive value in the labor market, with the result that they, too, may have few employment alternatives.

The survival of the little denominational colleges through the hard years of the great depression well illustrates the importance of available alternatives. The faculties of all colleges and universities experienced salary cuts; but for the most part these cuts brought no decline in real income because of the equivalent increase in the value of the dollar. Excessive cuts were precluded by the fact that many of the men on the faculties of the larger colleges and universities had or could obtain alternative employment in government or in other academic institutions; *i.e.*, they had some national prestige in their particular fields as well as status in the local organization. But the teachers in the small denominational colleges have for long been, in terms of the academic profession at large, marginal at best; it is to such low-prestige places, for example, that the inferior graduate students are sent for placement. For such men, known only locally, there were during the depression years no alternatives. Should the little college have closed its doors, the man who at least had a position in society while it remained open would simply have sunk into the mass ranks of the unemployed. He was, therefore, willing to sacrifice a great deal—even to the point of foregoing his salary and living on savings or even earning his keep by odd jobs—in order to save the college and thereby keep some vestige of occupational status and, with it, his status in residential and other groupings.

In some instances the major stake in the survival of the group will be held by one or a small number of the members. The paid secretary of a club or association, its unpaid but proud president, or the member without office

who has made a career of that membership⁶ may be the driving force in preserving a group that would otherwise dissipate. Such a person may make something of a full-time job of keeping the group alive, trying to convince dissident members that the group has a glorious future and to induce outsiders to join whenever possible. Occasionally such a person actually brings a group through a period of decline into better days; more often the effort succeeds only in prolonging the death struggles of the group.

In some instances a status group is kept alive solely because a small clique within the membership finds the maintenance of the group politically, economically, or in some other respect valuable to it. The majority of the members are then simply dupes or unwitting victims. Such was the case with the many "front" organizations of the Communist Party that grew up in America during the 1930s and 1940s. Such may be the case with the American Legion, in which most of the members play only a passive part; *i.e.*, they are inactive except for paying their dues but are counted by the leadership clique as part of the organization's political strength. No one actually knows whether the leaders of the American Legion represent in their various dealings with politicians any considerable proportion of the membership; but no politician has so far been willing to put the matter to the test by ignoring the Legion's lobbyists.

Satellite Values. The fact that different individuals and the members of different societies have widely varied food, artistic, musical, and other tastes and equally contrasting concepts of what constitutes the good life, etc., has led some to conclude that there is simply no accounting for values. Social scientists have sometimes expressed the view that human values originate in accident and cannot be explained in any scientific sense. Values are, in this view, "givens," the origins of which need not be sought because they can never be found.

A good case can be made for the view that values are inexplicable, that they are human attributes which the scientist must take into account but which he can never account for. Quite striking and "unreasonable" contrasts can be found between the various value systems of many different peoples. Even feminine pulchritude is not uniformly defined; some primitive tribes like their women with scarified faces, whereas modern men generally prefer theirs painted

⁶ In any society and every segment thereof there will be certain individuals who gain much satisfaction from what may be termed "derived status." These are people who achieve local status of a sort on the basis of their claimed or actual status elsewhere or in society at large. To some extent the status of the priest and of the primitive magic man is of this character—he claims to have high status (*i.e.*, rights or powers) in the world of the spirits. In modern society the bids for derived status range from simple claims of knowing persons of note to insistent meddling in the affairs of organizations and groups of high general prestige by individuals who belong thereto nominally if at all. Every college and university numbers among its alumni some men and women who seek derived local status in the latter manner. Of these, the self-appointed guardian of the football squad is perhaps the most common, most persistent, and—to the duly appointed officials of the institution—the most obnoxious.

and otherwise camouflaged; some primitives go to great length to elongate the necks or the lips or the ears or the heads of their females; modern men currently prefer their women to have what is euphemistically termed the "uplifted breast line." There is certainly no accounting for such differences in taste.

Some food and other preferences can perhaps be related to natural resources, as affected by technology and other cultural factors. Island and coastal people may prefer fish to meat simply because fish are more readily available than meat; rice eaters may prefer rice to wheat or potatoes because in the area in which they live rice is the most productive crop; no doubt the Negroes of Africa prefer dark-skinned women for their wives and the Caucasians of Europe light-skinned ones because these are available to them; and there are, no doubt, utilitarian considerations underlying the fact that a neighborhood in which there are many small children values a playground, while one composed of elders does not. Some values are, in effect, an aspect of cultural adaptation to physical, biological, and other circumstances.

A great many of the values of any society or any status group are not, however, susceptible to this explanation. There is no practical reason—*i.e.*, biological basis or advantage—why one people should prefer women with elongated heads and another women with exaggerated breasts; there is no practical basis for differing musical tastes,⁷ color preferences, or any esthetic values; there is, moreover, no practical reason why the members of a country club set should place great store on the fact that they can "hold their liquor," while those of the temperance league value equally the fact that they have never tasted anything stronger than tea.

It does not follow, however, that values of this latter sort are as random and inexplicable as the breezes of June or the falling of leaves in September. For underlying the widely different "unaccountable" values of status groups (and, in a somewhat vaguer way, of societies as such) is the common and accountable necessity for the group's being distinctive in order to survive. Unless the members of a group are in some way categorically differentiated from nonmembers, the group fades or blends into the society at large and so vanishes as a group. Some kinds of status groups are inherently distinctive; thus the members of a given family are differentiated from all other people by the fact that they live together, share the same family name, etc. But many kinds of status groups must strive to achieve and maintain a distinctive character, especially forms of distinction which will put them not only apart from but above the level of ordinary men.⁸

⁷ There is no evidence whatever for the almost universal assumption that the musical tastes of one's own society or group therein are inherently superior to the tastes of others. Musical taste is not in any way natural; and all that can be said with confidence is that one man's music is certain to be another man's noise. See P. R. Farnsworth, *Musical Taste: Its Measurement and Cultural Nature* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1950).

⁸ The use of very scarce and hence esoteric foods, such as the Chinese bird's-nest soup, Russian caviar, and French truffle, is mainly a matter of what Veblen termed "conspicuous

The otherwise unaccountable values of status groups are actually satellites to the value of group survival, dependent values which give the status group the distinctive qualities that are essential for its survival as a status group. The group that goes in strongly for heavy drinking, for temperance reform, for a bigger and better clubhouse, for canasta rather than bridge, or for high-brow talk rather than bowling may do so, not because the members place a high value on the thing or activity itself, but because under the circumstances locally and currently obtaining, this thing or activity gives the group a distinctive quality. Similarly, many individual values are derived from participation in status groups and are simply individual manifestations of satellite values. Thus the Chinese gentleman who drinks costly bird's-nest soup, the American who turns in last year's car for next year's, the woman who buys the latest thing in hats, or the man who passes over the fifty-cent drink of bourbon for the dollar drink of Scotch may do so, not because the doing is valued in itself, but because doing so seems to bring, or at least prevent the loss of, status.

The nature of any given satellite value is beyond accounting; but the existence of such values is susceptible to scientific explanation. Everywhere and always individuals seek to obtain and preserve status, which leads them to subscribe more or less willingly to the norms—and hence operate in terms of the values—of status groups. What this means, it should now be clear, is that many human values are secondary in character; they are not the true ends but are, rather, value means to an end. A man may thus value a new automobile because it reinforces his status in his community, while the community as a status group may approve of the purchase of new automobiles by its members because the presence of new automobiles reinforces the distinction between that community and the larger society.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF NORMS AND VALUES

Analytically there is a clear and vital distinction between norms and values, between what is being done and what the doing accomplishes, between the tool and the product of the tool. The distinction is, it will be recalled, a vital one because most ends, *i.e.*, values, can be achieved by a variety of means, the comparative effectiveness of each of which is testable. Thus the end, getting from A to B, may perhaps be achieved by walking, riding a horse, driving an automobile, taking a train, or flying by airplane. Likewise, the end, doing or being something distinctive, may be achieved, depending upon the social context, by wearing old clothes on Sunday, staying up all night and sleeping by day, or countless other things. A residential neighborhood may achieve distinction by such varied means as letting the roads fall into extreme disrepair, putting on wild Saturday-night brawls, keeping the houses of which

consumption"—*i.e.*, consumption based upon status striving or maintaining. Such usage seems to occur in all societies. See, for example, J. W. Bennett, "Food and Social Status in a Rural Society" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 8, pp. 561-569, 1943).

it is composed newly painted, keeping out all but a certain limited category of people, and so on. A work group may strive to assure continued profitable employment by such varied means as holding to a low daily production rate (so as not to "work themselves out of a job"), maintaining a monopoly over the work done, or producing with utmost efficiency.

It is the distinction between means and ends, or norms and values, that sociologists have in mind when they draw a contrast between the form of a cultural device (a technique, a social practice, or a mode of social organization) and its function. Sociologists are generally, and perhaps quite rightly, of the opinion that the members of any society are more aware of and to that extent concerned with their social forms than with the functions that those forms fulfill, a preoccupation that becomes particularly significant when external changes modify the function of an old social form. Social lag, the historical tendency in Western society for political, familial, and other forms of organization to change more slowly than technology, is usually taken as evidence of this preoccupation with means. There are certainly many cultural forms in modern society that persist although they have long since outlived their original functions. It is not so certain, however, that such forms are functionless; whether they are or are not depends upon the point of view taken, upon the definition of function.

Sociological versus Sociopsychological Functions. The sociologist, whose attention is on the total pattern of society, may consider that an old technique, an old mode of social organization, or an old form of individual action has lost its function and persists only because people are predisposed to overlook ends—functional consequences—in their preoccupation with means—forms. But to the people who use it, that technique, that mode of social organization, or that pattern of individual action may have a vital although obscured function. The horse, for example, is a decidedly antiquated means of transportation in most of America. But many people still ride horses, going nowhere, just as little boys often tote around little guns that shoot nothing, and, in fact, for much the same reasons. Riding a horse on a park bridle path or up a trail from a Western dude ranch is not a means of transportation; but it is often a means whereby people enjoy themselves or seek to gain status. It is something to do, to be seen doing, to tell about having done, or, for the less sociable person, something that gives a bit of substance to daydream participation in a dream world. In the latter case, the rider may gain the illusion of status—as a knight on a white charger or a cowboy home on the range—in the eyes of imaginary persons.

The function of many social forms is, in sum, sociopsychological rather than sociological. The horse is generally antiquated as a means of transportation, but it may serve the sociopsychological function of providing enjoyment or bringing prestige to the rider. The old political form may actually hamper the achievement of many widely desired political ends, as the township and county government unit has retarded the development of an integrated and

rational road system. But those who live by the old political form—*e.g.*, the county clerk—may find it an entirely satisfactory means to status, economic and otherwise. The development of science may have made rain making via prayers, incantations, or the shooting of cannon technologically antiquated. But country preachers may still be able to gain status by offering prayers for rain, and the members of their congregations may still find it advisable, whatever their personal opinions, to subscribe outwardly to the idea that God wills the rain to fall and that His will can be influenced by the pleas of His subjects.

It does not, however, follow from the foregoing that those who use a given form are necessarily aware of its function to them. Complex cultural devices, such as a religious institution or a political system, function to so many ends, most of which are long-run rather than immediate, that the functional consequences of any such device to the members of the society are beyond their comprehension; and even the highly sophisticated and diligent social scientist still does not completely understand the functions of a given social institution as it operates in a given social context. At any event, every complex cultural device is provided with a designated function to justify its use and perpetuation; that is, an ideology, a system of beliefs which is taken by the initiated to be the explanation of the value of the device. The practices of Christianity are ideologically supposed, among other things, to please God, to the advantage of the living, and to assure the good Christian a welcome in heaven upon his death. The real functions of Christianity, as of any religion, are many and complex; they consist of such psychological services as furnishing the individual with consolation in times of personal adversity and reassuring him as death approaches and such sociopsychological services as giving distinctive status to Christians in general and the members of a particular sect and congregation in particular. Moreover, Christianity, like many other religions, has served, and to some extent still serves, as a means of social control.

The ideologies of social institutions, of classes, castes, races, and sexes, often have slight relation to the actual functions of the cultural devices that they purport to explain. And, as was indicated earlier, the professed values of organizations such as political parties, governmental bureaus, business establishments, etc., often differ markedly from their real values. Men are, to this extent, continually fooling themselves; they devise methods of achieving some end or ends and at the same time invent fictitious justifications for the use of those devices. On the level of the status group, however, there is often a close relationship between the professed, or generally agreed upon, ends and the real shared values served by the group's norms. There are many and various exceptions, as will be noted shortly; but on the whole the status group has much more integrity, is much less pretentious—at least within the confines of its membership—and is less encumbered with nonfunctional beliefs and ideologies than are any of the larger and more complex forms of social organization.

Where a status-group norm, or complex of norms, is simply a local version

of some widespread institutional or other practice, the local reason for adhering to the norm may be entirely ideological. A devout congregation may not know in detail the official dogma of the Church, but the theology of the layman and the Church leaders will probably be in general agreement; to both, the Church represents the one, true God, etc. Likewise, the reasons given by the local sages around the cracker barrel or over their cocktails for the belief that the American form of government is preferable to any other may be less profound than but will probably be in general accord with those of the framers of the American Constitution and the generations of Supreme Court justices who have shaped that Constitution by interpretation. The status-group norm that requires attendance at church, voting in national elections, or other things that have to do with the larger society may thus be ideologically explained. So, too, may the norms that have to do with interracial, international, and intersex relations. Thus the reasons given by the poor white Georgia farmer for keeping Negroes out of white homes, stores, and places of amusement are probably no more realistic than those advanced to justify similar actions by the ideologists (the self-styled spokesmen) of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

Nevertheless, many of the norms of most status groups are held to with a pragmatic if inarticulate regard for the actual ends that they achieve. The individual member may not realize that he likes to ride a horse, have a new car every year, or get drunk with the gang on Saturday night mainly because such action is a means of gaining or holding status, although it is possible that he does do so with this devious end clearly in view, especially if he is tempted to do otherwise and conforms only in response to status-group controls. But the status group itself—that is, the members jointly—are quite likely to be aware of the fact that the horseback riding (or whatever it is) is one of the things that distinguishes them as a group from other people. Upon occasion they may, for example, agree among themselves that the keeping of horses is costly and time-consuming, that one must keep in practice or riding will be a bone-shattering and muscle-tearing experience, and that wind, rain, or heat and dust usually make a ride unpleasant. Nonetheless, they may add, it is just these disadvantages which prevent most people from owning and riding horses. The members of such a group may even recognize the true function of some of the specific norms surrounding the riding of horses. Suppose they subscribe to the idea that English saddle and bridle are correct and that only a fool or a cowboy—in their minds much the same thing—would use Western-type equipment. They may have many detailed explanations for this preference, none of them relevant; but they may also recognize and possibly even admit that the English saddle is historically associated with a social elite—with riding to hounds in the manor-house fashion of the English landed gentry—while the Western saddle is associated with working cowmen, and thus that riding in the English fashion gives them prestige in the eyes of others, or at least in their own eyes.

Where the real function of a norm is something less intangible than gaining prestige, the explanation is likely to be even more definite. The residents of a respectable middle-class neighborhood may not be too clear as to why they object to the fact that one home is unkempt; they may feel, variously, that it is a disgrace to the neighborhood, that the weeds in the untended garden seed the gardens of more responsible householders, that it detracts from the value (financial or prestige) of the well-kept houses, or that it sets a bad example for the other householders. But such neighborhood norms as those which require each resident to rake up his own leaves, pull down his window shades before taking off his clothes, or get his adolescent daughter to bed by 10 P.M. weeknights and such neighborhood tabus as those that prohibit noisy parties except on Saturday, the blowing of automobile horns late at night or early in the morning, etc., usually have clear and clearly recognized functions. And a considerable proportion of the norms of all status groups are of just this character.⁹

Production Norms, an Illustration. The most detailed studies of group norms available are those that have been made in industrial plants.¹⁰ The

⁹ This fact is very interestingly illustrated by the opening portions of an article on prison life by a professional thief. He says, in part, "The basic necessity [for informal organization] is . . . the pressing desire, present in us all, for acceptance, approval, admiration; the need to belong somewhere; the desire for social status . . . The first time I became aware of the prison world in anything resembling these terms was when a fellow called Little Mack put a convincer to me. A convincer, in underworld parlance, is an irrefutable argument. Mack was a friend who asked me for a dangerous favor for someone I disliked. 'Ah, go ahead, kid,' he said. Then he added, as you might say that someone is a superior citizen of impeccable character: 'After all, the guy's a thief.'

"What he really was saying, I realized with a species of shock, was that thieves are superior people, and that I owed an allegiance to my peers which in some respects transcended my own feelings and even my welfare. . . . The shock . . . was by no means an unpleasant one, for the idea that other thieves owed me a similar obligation was implicit in the remark." (L. Dent, "The Social Structure of the Underworld," *Harper's Mag*, May, 1953, p. 22. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.)

An equal awareness of the functional values of their group norms is reflected in a fictionalized description of life in two German wartime prison camps by E. Williams (*The Tunnel*, Coward-McCann, New York, 1952). The author describes, in a reasonably realistic fashion, how a group of men forced to live together under most adverse circumstances develop their own appropriate system of norms, enforce them upon the individual member, and evolve such agencies of group survival as a special jargon unknown to their captors, a spy system, a court to administer punishment—including death—to any detected traitor in their midst, and procedures for the provision of medical care, religious services, etc. The net result was a complex if limited "society within a society."

¹⁰ The basic document on the Hawthorne study, which was mentioned earlier, is *Management and the Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago* (by F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939). Illustrative of the many studies of worker norms that have since been made are D. Roy, "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 427-442, 1952); S. K. Weinberg and H. Arond, "The Occupational Culture of a Boxer" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 460-469, 1952).

The findings of J. S. Ellsworth, Jr. (*Factory Folkways: A Study of Institutional Struc-*

findings of these studies will be referred to frequently in subsequent chapters. Relevant to the present concern is the fact that every work group has a rather clearly defined norm of productivity. In the highly unionized building trades production norms are often codified; elsewhere the norm is an informal sort of agreement among those who do the same sort of task in office, shop, or on the production line as to what constitutes a reasonable day's output. It is exceedingly difficult for industrial management to increase the worker's production above this norm. Even when a given task is made simpler and quicker by the introduction of new machinery or rearrangement of the work process, the production rate is likely to remain unchanged—the worker just slows down and, if necessary, may so mishandle the machinery that time is lost.

Whatever means the worker uses, he usually sees to it that there are good, or at least face-saving, excuses for the fixed rate of production. Yet by and large workers are not reticent concerning the existence of production norms or the real reasons why they aid in maintaining those norms. Individually, the reason usually given by the worker is that should he overproduce, his fellow workers will be resentful, which means that they will bring various sanctions—*i.e.*, social-control devices—to bear on him, and that unless he come into conformity with the norm, he will soon be out of a job. Collectively, the workers generally agree that worker-set production norms are necessary if the worker is to earn a decent livelihood and live a decent life. Their reasoning runs somewhat as follows: In our competitive system management is under continual pressure to lower production costs. The largest cost in the production of most goods is labor; it is here that the greatest savings could be made, provided only that workers could be forced into competition with one another. One form of labor competition is the "incentive system," in which the man who produces the most gets paid the most. But under this system—which has usually taken the form of piecework—the fastest producers ultimately set the rate of pay per unit of work. In effect, where the workers do not set and hold to their own norm of production, management sets the norm, which is a high and ever-rising one. Under this system there inevitably occurs a general reduction in the demand for labor; and the survivors—the best and most intensive workers—will be paid only a subsistence wage.

All but the Marxian economic theorists consider the above view unsound and contend that over the long run the laboring class as a whole gains from increased labor productivity. But from the point of view of a specific work group, concerned with the short-run consequence to it of increased productivity per worker, the argument is reasonably valid. The laboring class as a whole may not be able to "work itself out of a job" or become subject to the hated speed-up. But any given group of workers is, under our industrial sys-

ture and Change, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952) encompass much more than production norms and lend considerable support to the thesis that group norms of all sorts tend to have empirically based functions.

tem, faced with the alternative of setting and holding to its own production norms or submitting in ever-diminishing number to an ever-increasing production tempo. (This statement does not, however, apply to workers in such non-competitive organizations as government bureaus or military forces.)

The pragmatism with which production workers view their production norms is found, in almost the same degree, in their view of many other worker norms. Most workers in and out of industry jealously guard various informal privileges, such as their right to go out for a smoke at stated intervals and their right to refuse, without prejudice, to do any task beyond that to which they are regularly assigned, on the general grounds that, if they give in to their superiors at any point, they will soon have no rights at all. In this they take a position that is similar to the academician's stand on freedom of speech, the difference being that the workers frankly value their little personal rights, while academicians purport to value their freedom of speech not for themselves but for the welfare of mankind.

Combat Norms, an Illustration. The idea that a nation's soldiers go out to battle in the spirit of self-sacrifice and face death bravely in loyal adherence to the nation's traditions is one of the more persistent myths of our age. It is a myth derived in part from the romantic Age of Chivalry version of the later Middle Ages (when, in point of fact, soldiers were invariably crass mercenaries) and in part from the postwar romancing of successive generations of ex-soldiers. The fact, now for the first time capable of unimpeachable documentation,¹¹ is that most nonprofessional soldiers fight reluctantly and are motivated (1) by status-group considerations (to be discussed later) and (2) by fear that, unless they kill the enemy, they will not live to return home.

Relevant to the present concern is the fact that informal status groups form within the official military structure and that each such group of soldiers quickly develops a variety of norms. These norms are all oriented around the value of group survival; thus it is often tabu to volunteer for any task or to exceed the letter of an order, and it is always incumbent upon the individual to support his fellows in the preservation of the various unofficial rights which they have carved out for themselves at the expense of the organization as a whole. Some such "rights" will be petty matters of privilege maintained by theft and deceit; but others, such as the right to withhold fire and thus avoid retaliation by the enemy, will be group efforts to lessen the normal hazards of war. In actual and prolonged combat there is even a tendency for groups to develop a norm regarding how long a man should stick it out before giving in to "battle fatigue"—the World War II term for breaking down under the stress of warfare. The only order of self-sacrifice demanded of the individual by his peers is that of sticking with the group in defection from duty and under some circumstances taking exceptional personal risk to aid a comrade.

¹¹ S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (2 vols., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1949).

Almost all the combat norms uncovered by the studies reported in what has come to be called *The American Soldier* are in sharp contrast to the romantic myth of the military man. Yet there was little attempt on the part of American soldiers to gloss over the fact that they were not heroes fighting loyally on behalf of the nation; they frankly revealed the existence of "disloyal" and unheroic standards of conduct. And, as any one of them might have said, they knew quite well why they had these standards—they were the best possible means under the circumstances of minimizing both the discomfort and the dangers of participating in a war. In sum, the American soldier in World War II, and there is ample historical evidence to think that he was no exception, valued above all else his life and the prospect of returning home a whole man and did everything he could, individually and collectively, to realize this goal; and he knew what he was doing. A decade or two after his return home, his reasons for having done what he did or what he imagines or pretends that he did during the war may be quite otherwise. But at the time he acted in a very earthy and pragmatic fashion.

Empirical Nature of Norms. There are many specific and some general exceptions, but the rule seems to be that those status-group norms which have to do with local and immediate concerns are empirically and quite consciously developed by the group to satisfy recognized values. Such norms are held to, not with any idealistic illusions regarding their sacred or inevitable nature, but with a reasonably clear understanding of how they serve the ends in view; and although they are held to tenaciously for their proved values, they are nevertheless subject to modification when changing circumstances repeatedly demonstrate that the same values can be satisfied more easily or more surely by some other means.

Industrial workers have learned over the years that they must determine and hold to production norms in self-defense. The explanation for their refusal to exceed the established production norm lies not in the inherent laziness of the worker, not in his stupid inability to comprehend the "laws" of economic life, and not in stubborn opposition to his employers. It lies in his or his predecessors' experience with an industrial order that does actually penalize workers who labor with zest for the job and strive to complete the assigned task as quickly and efficiently as possible.

The explanation for such crass and unidealistic military norms as that which sanctions minimal adherence to the letter of orders from above and that which makes tabu volunteering for any sort of extra duty likewise lies in the military system itself rather than in the stupidity or ignorance of the individual soldier. The "stupidity," if so it may be called, lies in the military system, a system that consistently penalizes initiative and discourages any effort to adhere to the professed—*i.e.*, official—values of that system. Under it, the individual quickly learns that those who willingly do the most are simply required to do more and that those who do nothing willingly are the most likely to succeed—in effect, that the apathetic soldier has the greatest life expectancy. What the

individual learns by empirical experience is soon incorporated into group norms, so that what has been learned is shared and, through an exchange of rights and obligations, each member of the group is enabled to enjoy the greatest possible freedom from the discomforts and hazards of what is at best an uncomfortable and dangerous trade. Under a system of military organization that rewarded the man of enterprise and of valor in the long run as well as the short run, combat norms would be quite different from what they are. It is conceivable, although quite improbable in view of the established military culture, that a system of military organization might be devised in which the norms of informal status groups would actually foster efficiency and the winning of wars.

Most large, impersonal organizations, political and otherwise, seem to have the inherent inefficiency that is so clearly evident in modern military organization, which might be characterized as accomplishing the least with the maximum possible effort. But as will be shown in detail later, the behavior of the individual member of any such organization is only indirectly related to the rules and regulations of that organization. His conduct is far more profoundly affected by the norms of some status group that operates within the larger system; and those norms, unlike the organizational rules and regulations, are comparatively effective means of satisfying group-held values. The status group, unlike the organization of which it may be a part, proceeds empirically and with considerable awareness on the part of the individual members to adjust its norms and the satellite values which they may serve to the dominant value of social life—group survival.

STATUS-GROUP STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS

The norms of a status group are abstractions derived from the conduct of the members of the group; they have, therefore, no existence apart from the human beings who are behaving in the normative ways. In the analysis of status-group behavior the concept of norms occupies a place comparable to the concept of personality attributes—motives, sentiments, etc.—as it is currently used in the analysis of individual behavior. The many norms of a group may be described as a system or structure. At this level of analysis the stress is on the interdependence of the various norms, and the use of the term “structure” is roughly comparable to the use in psychology of the term “personality organization” or “structuring” to emphasize the fact that the various attributes of an individual's personality do not operate independently of one another.

By the structure of a group is thus meant the pattern of preexisting relationships among the members of a group (the system of norms) through which certain functions (values) can be accomplished when action of the group as a group is called for. Structure invariably implies some division of labor (or of functions) among the members of the group and, hence, some differentiation of them. Structure is preexistent to the individual member and to the circumstance in which it appears, in the sense that it has been evolved out of prior experience and has become for the members of the group the established way of dealing with that particular kind of circumstance. Structure is, therefore, a part of that “something more” than the sum of the individual members that distinguishes a social group from a mere collection or aggregation of human beings.

The extent to which a group is structured, *i.e.*, has developed a structure, depends upon the number of norms that it maintains and the degree to which these norms are interwoven and hence interdependent. Structuration is, it will be recalled, one of the significant dimensions of a status group; other things being equal, the more highly structured a group, the greater the value the individual will attach to membership therein. Generally there is a relationship between the age of the group and the degree to which it has developed and fixed its structure. A mature structure includes, among other things, a system of norms whereby new members are selected and inducted into the group, procedures by which the conduct of the individual member is evaluated and social controls are exerted when necessary, devices for the maintenance of group morale, etc. The more mature the structure, the more efficient, on the whole, will be the internal operations of the group and the more resistant the

group will be to modifications of that structure under conditions of external change. To this extent the mature status group is comparable to the mature individual; the older it grows, the less adaptable it becomes. But as will be shown shortly, most status groups value survival of the group above the preservation of its structure and under duress may modify the structure in order to survive.

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

For the most part structure is latent; it becomes manifest only at those times and upon those occasions when internal or external circumstances arise which call for decisive action of the group that cannot be provided by simple member adherence to group norms. Any violation by a member of the norms of his role, the death or resignation of a member, the appearance of a new candidate for membership, or a change in some significant aspect of the social context constitutes such action-demanding circumstances. Thus the fact that a member has fallen far behind in the payment of his dues will require some sort of action by the club or its officials, a new rule or demand on the part of management will require action by the work group that will be affected by it, and the appearance of a new boy in the neighborhood will require action by the local boys' play group as a group rather than just as individual members of that group.

A simple example of latent structure, involving a rudimentary division of labor, is the accepted arrangement by which an adolescent friendship clique may solve the recurrent problem of getting from their various homes to a high-school dance. Perhaps past experience in this matter has demonstrated that of the three or four boys whose parents have automobiles, the father of a certain one is the most lenient, that he imposes the fewest restrictions (such as time of return home with the car), and that he provides the largest car and usually supplies it with ample gasoline. Out of such experience there would normally arise the practice of assuming that when transportation is needed for the group this boy will provide it. In the casual planning of the group to attend the dance jointly, this boy will thus be called upon to ask his father for the car; and, if he gets it, the evening's procedure for getting to and from the dance will more or less follow the pattern that has developed on previous occasions. That pattern may include such items as the route the boy takes in picking up the other members, who sits in the front seat with him and who sits in back, etc. As provider of the car, the boy will have a special role, at least for the duration of the trip to and from the dance; *e.g.*, the girls may shower him with compliments on the car and his driving; or, perversely, his "reward" for providing the transportation may be exclusion from the sex play enjoyed by the others—his rôle may require that he keep his eyes on the road and his hands on the wheel. Once the dance is over and the group has returned home, the entire system of member relationships by which they got to and fro again becomes latent; in fact, it could be temporarily set aside

on the way home if the group were to stop off—in accordance with custom—at the home of one of the girls for something to eat. Then another and perhaps quite different structure might come into operation; the girl whose home it is would play the role of hostess to the group, one of the boys might play up to her mother with an eye to future occasions when the group will want food late at night, and so on.

Group structure is obviously not a tangible construct, as is the structure of a bridge or a building. It is composed not of things but of forms of interpersonal relationships, each one more or less effectively tied in with all the others to make a patterned series, or system of relationships, within the group and between the group and others. Many of the norms of a group, especially the norms of the various status roles within the group, have the direct function of contributing to structure; and the structure in turn functions to satisfy some group end—either an immediate one, as with the foregoing illustration, or such a crucial and long-range one as that of group survival.

Rank. The structure of a status group invariably ranks the members into a hierarchy of at least two status positions. Even in small, relatively unstructured groups the members are never in all respects equal. The various families in a residential neighborhood will by general consensus rank differently in terms of such matters as affluence, respectability, domestic harmony, charitability, and the like. The various members of a work group will be informally ranked each one by the others in terms of work skill, generosity toward fellow workers, reliability, etc. The members of a recreational group will be ranked in terms, perhaps, of skill at cards or golf, capacity to hold liquor, and other matters important to the members of the group. Although informal ranking of this sort usually reflects performance and is in this sense simply a matter of repute, the resulting ranks tend to become structured and then to be maintained by the group as status roles with special rights. Thus the man who has earned the reputation with his associates of being an excellent bridge player may be granted the right of picking from among them those with whom he wishes to play; the workman who has earned the reputation of being the most skilled of his group may, perhaps, be granted thereby the right to pick his helper, to choose from the available work tasks, etc. Conversely, the man who has earned the reputation of being the worst bridge player may have few rights in the matter of bridge playing; and the worker of low competence may have the obligation of doing undesirable tasks rather than the right to choose the preferable ones.

In highly structured groups the ranks and the rights associated with each rank are more or less predetermined, and individuals are assigned to or gain entrance to each given rank in accordance with some fixed criteria. Club membership, for example, may be ranked as senior and junior. Within family groups some sort of kinship ranking is always followed. In primitive tribes there are usually such ranks as elders, married adults, unmarried adults, youths, and children. Seniority, age, sex, and achievement in some specified

activity and in accordance with certain criteria are the usual bases for the assignment of ranks.

To the outsider the system of ranks in a group may seem to be quite irrational, to be a matter of special privilege for the few, of pretentious assumption of superiority by the few, or of something equally nonfunctional. Comparison has, in fact, been made between the pecking order of chickens in a hennerly and the rank order of members in groups of various kinds. In some instances, no doubt, a given rank is a functionless survival from an earlier period in the life of the group; in some instances an entire system of ranks may be artificially maintained by those few members of the group who profit most thereby. But on the whole, the system of ranks serves one or more important group functions.

The most obvious of these functions, though not necessarily the most important, is that of providing a workable and acceptable (since generally understood or agreed upon) division of labor—the term “labor” here meaning all forms of action in which a number of the group engage jointly. Thus it is usually in terms of the assigned ranks of the members vis-à-vis each other that such recurrent problems of group life are settled as who shall wash and who wipe the dishes in a household, who shall hold the stake and who shall wield the sledge in a work group, and who shall pitch and who shall catch in a play gang. There are few forms of human activity in which a number of individuals can participate equilaterally. Even in so simple a matter as that of playing a game of cards, one may have the right to deal the first hand and another the second. Division of labor by predetermined ranking tends to assure both efficiency and harmony in group activities. If each member of the group were permitted to take that part in a common task that he personally preferred (either because he liked it or because it seemed to him the least irksome of the various aspects of the task), two or more members might compete for a given part, and some parts might go unfilled. This is just what happens in the relatively unstructured children’s play group when the children quarrel over who has to get shot and pretend to be dead or when they fight to determine who is to be pilot of the interplanetary space ship that they have constructed.

Less obvious, perhaps, but often more important is settlement of matters of precedence by predetermined ranking. In the daily life of any group a great number of recurrent situations arise which by their very nature preclude all the participants from acting at once or acting alike. In some of these situations, such as that of a casual conversation, the determination of precedence can be left to trial and error; *i.e.*, to the outcome of the strivings of the individual participants. But in most instances competition of individuals for precedence in group situations would rapidly degenerate into conflict; and at best the solution would involve bickering and ill feeling. Should a mother permit her children to decide, each day, among themselves which one was to sit in which chair at the dinner table and which one was to have first choice of the various items served them, the result would almost certainly be a good deal of quar-

reling, probably some resort to force, and the generation of considerable ill will. To avoid such consequences of individual competition for the preferred place and the larger piece of cake, she may rank her children at the dinner table; each has his assigned place, and each has his turn to be served.

Ranking is often, in fact, no more than the ordering of the members of the group in series of individuals or of classes of individuals for some defined circumstance. In a modern household the father of the family may, perhaps, have first call on the bathroom in the morning in view of the fact that he has to get to work on time and shaven; the children may have first call on the bathroom in the evening in view of the fact that they are to be the first to bed; etc. As a rule, rank order is basically as simple and functional as who gets to use the bathroom first, although the functional basis is often disguised by verbal, and even ritualistic, embellishment.

Rank gives to the person who holds it authority to do one task rather than another, to sit in this chair rather than that, to go through the door first or last rather than second or next-to-last, and so on. It defines, in some way or other, his position and relations relative to other members of the group. Rank does not, however, authorize the person to determine the actions of any other member of the group. Rank may, for example, give the person who holds it the right to sit at the head of the table; but rank as such would not enable him to assign the other places at the table to those he might wish. The rank of village elder may enable an old man to sit in the village council and debate village affairs with his peers: it may require of his rank inferiors that they address him respectfully, give him precedence in such matters as going through doorways, and the like. His rank may, perhaps, entitle him to reprimand a rank inferior who fails to accord him these rights; but his rank as elder would not empower him to determine the conduct of his rank inferiors—*e.g.*, to decide for them that, since he wants fish for dinner, they should go out fishing. The right to determine to some extent or other the conduct of members of the group is vested in office. Rank and office are sometimes combined or at least held jointly by a single person. Operationally, however, the rights of rank and those of office are distinct and different in kind.

Office. To the extent that a group is structured, the various recurrent circumstances in the life of the group which call for decisive, as distinct from routine, action are provided for by one or more designated offices. A relatively unstructured group accomplishes the same end by casual but often rather consistent consensus as to which of their members is best qualified to make decisions in this or that circumstance—*e.g.*, who knows the best picnic spots or restaurants, who can make purchases for the group most advantageously, or who can be trusted to work out the arrangements for a party.

The kinds of problems calling for decisive action vary from group to group; but every group, no matter how few its members or how restricted its activities, encounters some kind of problem that can be solved only under the direction of some one of the members. Although the life of a family may be

highly routinized (the mother of the family always cooks the dinner, the father always washes the dishes, the daughter always wipes them, etc.), someone must decide from day to day what is to be cooked for dinner; if, when, and how the house is to be painted; whether the small son of the family has been naughty (violated a norm) and, if so, how he should be punished, and the like. No matter how much mechanized and controlled from above, any work task in shop, field, or factory entails constantly arising problems that must be settled by one or another of the workers. No matter how peaceful and ordered the life of the little village, things continually happen and problems thereby arise; a tree blows down, a child falls ill, an old man dies, the paint wears off the church, a man and his wife grow intolerably quarrelsome, a stranger comes among them, the king's tax collector exceeds his traditional rights, etc.

All status groups have one or more offices, but it is only in highly structured groups that office is formally designated. Father, Mother, Mayor, Captain (of the ship or of the team), Secretary, Treasurer, Scribe, Professor, Doctor, and Chief are just a few of the titles of traditional offices maintained by some of the more common highly structured groups. By social definition an office, whether formally designated or not, is a position bearing responsibility and providing the one who occupies it with power over others and respect from them. Every status group so defines its grants of office. As a consequence most members of a status group (and, by extension, most members of the society at large) tend to look upon office as a desirable position. To gain office is a common member ambition; and, as will be indicated later, the prospect of elevation to office is frequently used by status groups as a means of social control, *i.e.*, as an inducement to each member to conform to the norms of his role.

In some instances the structure of a group includes one or more offices that are in fact merely honorary, *i.e.*, that provide some special prerogatives, such as that of title and respect, but no real authority over the conduct of the group. Even a relatively small club, especially a women's club, may have, in addition to a president, a vice-president, a secretary, a treasurer, and perhaps even a chairman or two. The governmental structure of a small village may include almost as many official positions as that of a large city; and a little college may include within its administrative staff so many deans and department heads that most of the faculty are assured at least one such office.

Although offices of this sort may be empty ones and carry no real powers over other members and no real responsibilities for the welfare of the group, it does not follow that the provision of such offices within the group structure is a functionless bit of group whimsey. On the contrary, the provision of honorary offices is usually, but not, of course, invariably, a pragmatic solution to some problem of group life. The problem may be that of maintaining morale, a subject to be considered later. It may be that of rewarding one member at minimal sacrifice to the group as a whole for outstanding service to the group (nothing so highly valued is quite so cheap to provide as an

empty title). Or the problem may be how to remove from an important office a member who has outlived his usefulness, the usual device being what is euphemistically known as "promoting him upstairs"—granting him an office which is nominally superior to the one he occupies but is *de facto* without powers.

Limits on the Authority of Office. The responsibilities and powers that attach to all but honorary offices may adhere from tradition—as did those of the tribal chieftain and the patriarch of the old family; they may adhere from established formal regulations; or they may adhere from the current consent of the members of the group—as when the group appoints one of their number to be chairman of a newly established committee or assigns to an established office responsibility for some new matter. The responsibilities and powers of any office are, however, always limited. Office never confers *carte blanche* to rule over or look after the group. The group specifies more or less clearly that such and such is the function of this office, so-and-so of that—"the president shall have the deciding vote when the members are deadlocked on a given issue," etc.

Moreover, the authority of office is further limited in that the specified function must always be accomplished by some specified procedure. That procedure may be anything from prayer to consultation with the members assembled; but whatever it is, the designated procedure—presumably an outgrowth of empirical experience and more or less effective for the conditions under which it developed—prevents the officeholder from exceeding his designated powers and precludes his resorting to unusual methods when unique circumstances are encountered. Just as the mayor of a city cannot lawfully circumvent the sealed-bid procedure of letting contracts for city construction, although in a given instance it might actually save the city money to do so, so the official of a status group cannot officially transgress the procedures designated for his office. The procedural rules of a status group—like those of large organizations—have developed to meet typical circumstances. Thus over the years the members of a club may have found that when an individual is delinquent in his dues so many consecutive months, he seldom pays up and reestablishes himself in the club. On the basis of such experience the rule laid down for the treasurer may be that "after so many months, the treasurer shall cancel the membership of the delinquent." Every office, even those of small and relatively unstructured groups, is bounded by procedural rules of this sort. Consequently the office is limited in its effectiveness to the typical, the normal, or the average case or circumstance.

Finally, the authority of office is often limited by the kind of person who, in accordance with the group structure, is likely to be elected, appointed, or elevated by seniority to occupy such office. Offices with real authority as well as those with none are commonly used to reward members for exceptional conduct; and exceptional conduct usually means meticulous fulfillment of member obligations and excellence in the performance of those group norms

that can be exceeded (*e.g.*, giving a neighbor more aid than is usually required of the good neighbor). In highly structured groups, therefore, the members who gain office tend to be those who are most cautious and conservative about group affairs. As individuals they are prone to adhere with unimaginative reverence to the limits imposed by office and to be personally incapable of breaking from those limits when unique problems arise or when they encounter atypical circumstances.

There is a universal tendency to place narrow restraints on the authority of an office and then to elevate to the office individuals with little personal initiative. Status groups of all kinds (and large-scale organizations as well) display this tendency; it is most clearly seen, perhaps, in such institutional groupings as the primitive tribe and the premodern family and feudal systems, but it is equally strong in both the national and the local aspects of such established modern voluntary associations as business clubs, the Masonic order, scientific societies, and professional and other occupational groupings. The tendency is so all-pervading that groups and organizations of professed radicals quickly come to think and act by rules and to be led by "orthodox" thinkers.

As will be indicated shortly, there is a characteristic conservatism of groups which stems in considerable part from the fact that time-tested rules are safe, whereas experimentation is always hazardous. The tendency to stabilize group offices, to the end that officeholders cannot direct the group into untried channels, may be simply a reflection of the general conservatism of groups. But it is more likely that this tendency arises rather mechanically as a consequence of the fact that every loyal member of a social group values his status rights and guards them more or less jealously. Any proposed modification of the *status quo* can be and, it seems, usually is interpreted by most members as a potential threat to their own rights (or, alternatively, as resulting in an increase in their obligations). The officeholder who avoids suggesting changes in group practices is, therefore, the one who is most widely approved; and it is to assure that their officeholders will not initiate changes that the members of the group evolve offices with restricted authority and then put in them those individuals who are most likely to serve in a passive way.

From the member point of view, the value of rigidly structured offices is that they prevent those who occupy the offices from using their powers for purposes of self-aggrandizement. The individual member need not fear the person who occupies an office, for the office reduces the person to a functionary of the group whose actions will be relatively predictable and will generally operate to perpetuate the rights of the member. At any event, the framers of the American Constitution were not the first to fear and make provision against rule by persons. In some way or other, and usually quite effectively, every established status group—whether it be a gang of thieves, a dictatorial political clique, or a country club—assures that it will be governed by offices rather than by persons.

THE FUNCTIONS OF OFFICE

The kind of direction that is necessary for the maintenance of a status group depends upon the nature of the group and the context in which it operates. Small, short-lived groups of the sort that arise among children and young people require only a crude division of labor and the kind of direction that emerges through the competitive give-and-take of play. In the complex and relatively durable associations and group activities of a village community or a modern country club, on the other hand, the administration of the group's affairs may be sufficiently complex so that it is broken down into a number of offices, each with its specialized administrative function. Three more or less distinct functions can be discerned.

Juridical Function. In small, relatively unstructured groups the maintenance of the group norms is a joint endeavor in which all members tend to participate; for in such a group the number of norms, most of which are implicit, is not so great but that each member can share in the knowledge of them. The norms of a large or highly structured group, on the other hand, are often so many in number and the decisions of the group concerning individual conformity to them often accumulate so rapidly that the task of knowing and interpreting the law of the group is entrusted to a special office. The existence of such a juridical office no doubt promotes rule by precedent and is an important factor in maintaining the continuity and stability of the group. In its simplest form, the juridical office is more or less automatically the role of that member of the group who most clearly remembers what was decided in such and such a case and what the practice is in regard to this or that matter. Any member with a mind for details and a tenacious memory can and usually is encouraged to serve in this capacity; and there are always some individuals who have the kind of bookkeeping or legalistic interest required. Most people, however, seem unable or perhaps only unwilling to remember in any detail what the group's customary practice has been in a given regard and what was decided about something the last time that something was up for discussion. It is for this reason, no doubt, that in contemporary society most formal groups have written constitutions or charters, keep minutes of their meetings, and put any decisions that have been reached in meeting on record as regulations. In such groups, recording secretary or executive secretary is the title usually given to the office charged with the juridical function; to the person holding that office are referred the many questions that normally arise concerning precedent and preexisting practice. In such complex informal groups as the village community, there is usually at least one person—in the typical European village, the priest or the schoolmaster—who makes it his business to note and remember what has been done and what, therefore, should again be done when similar circumstances arise. In premodern China, and no doubt elsewhere, the village scribe (often the only literate person in the community) served also as local historian, and his records constituted the au-

thority to which the village elders turned for guidance when some problem arose that could not be settled on the basis of remembered precedent. Among preliterate the law of the tribe or village is necessarily a matter of memory; and in many instances the group structure has included an office with the special function of preserving the law, giving the law when occasion arises, and transmitting the body of laws to a successor in office. In some cases the tribal or village chief has been entrusted with this function; in others, the juridical function has been performed by a priest or magic man; and in still other instances a council of tribal elders has jointly preserved and decided upon matters of tribal law.

The person who occupies a juridical office simply provides safekeeping for the group rules and procedures. He does not, except perhaps through lapses in memory and an occasional choice of which of several rules might be applied to a given case, make the rules which he keeps in storage for the group to use. He is, thus, a functionary, representing for the group the wisdom of the past, and as a person is typically conservative and an advocate of adherence to precedent and of avoidance of experimentation.

Arbitrative Function. In any group innumerable incidents arise in which one member or faction of members inadvertently or deliberately infringes or seems to infringe upon the rights of some other member or faction of members. Such infringement is or appears to be an attempt of the member either to extend his rights or to shirk his obligations; in either case it is a violation of status-group norms and is punishable as such by the imposition of group sanctions. In relatively unstructured groups the detection of such a violation and the administering of punishment is usually accomplished through casual discussion and action by the members as a whole or by some one of them who assumes, usually with the tacit consent of other members, the responsibility for doing so. In highly structured groups, especially large highly structured groups, the person or persons who hold juridical office will often determine what rule was violated and then apply the punishment that is indicated by precedent.

Many instances will, however, arise in which a charge of violation of a norm or norms made by one member against another cannot be substantiated by the evidence of other members. The result is a conflict between two members or factions that cannot be resolved by routine application of the rules. Conflicts of this sort are evidently a normal part of the life of any status group; for there would seem to be no group in which two or more of the members do not from time to time become involved in arguments, in bickering over who did what and when, in charges and countercharges. Such conflict appears perhaps in its simplest form in the squabbles that recurrently arise among the members of children's play groups ("He hit me!" "I did not!" "You did!") and that are normally mediated or otherwise resolved by parents. Among the members of adult groups the conflict may be subtle, covert, and of long standing, as would be the case if a member of a club thought but could not be

quite certain that another had been making slightly improper advances to his wife, or if one member of a work group suspected that one of his fellows was currying favor with their superior. Whatever the nature of such conflict and however covert it is, it constitutes a hazard to the welfare of the group and calls for some sort of decisive action on the part of the group or of some member acting for the group. Characteristically action, when taken, tends to be arbitrativ, since it is to the interest of the group as a whole that the membership be preserved by reestablishing harmony between the conflicting individuals or factions.

The arbitrativ function is often fulfilled informally by a member of the group who is respected for his impartiality and his regard for the rights (and, most especially, the feelings) of his fellow members. Effective service in this capacity demands unusual patience, skill in persuasion, sensitivity to the petty prides and prejudices of people, and an even temper. The task of arbitration is generally both demanding and unrewarding in tangible terms. But the group that does not have at least one member who is able and willing to listen to the claims and counterclaims of members and smooth their ruffled feelings will ordinarily be torn by increasingly severe internal strife.

In some kinds of highly structured groups the arbitrativ function is assigned to a more or less specialized formal office. The modern club, for example, may have a rules committee. In the peasant village the most respected elder, or perhaps the local landlord or the priest, is likely to be the recognized arbitrator of disputes. Sometimes the primitive sorcerer or magic man appears to have fulfilled this function—with the aid, of course, of supernatural powers—in the tribal or village community. In most kinds of family groups it is one of the traditional functions of the mother or the matriarch; the father may interpret the law and administer justice, but most often the mother reconciles her quarreling sons or other relatives.

Managerial Function. The person who knows the law may also be responsible for and empowered to carry out the requirements of the law. Such is the case when the father of a family interprets the law and administers justice. Often, however, the function of carrying out the requirements of the law, or more commonly of directing others in doing so, is embodied in a special managerial office. A relatively unstructured group may informally establish such an office for some specific occasion. Thus if the members of a club or the women in a residential neighborhood have decided to undertake a picnic, some one of their number may be given responsibility for managing the affair; in accordance with the norms of the group she may plan the menu, divide up the various tasks and distribute them among the members, and otherwise see to it that there is assembled at the picnic grounds on the day and at about the hour agreed upon a satisfactory variety of foods and the necessary variety of equipment. Unless someone assumes such responsibility, the joint efforts of the various members will be uncoordinated and will be satisfactory to no one.

In most work groups the managerial function is usually limited to such relatively minor matters as taking up collections to buy one of the members a retirement or wedding present; for here the coordination of work effort is usually imposed upon the group rather than determined by it. There are, however, exceptions. Volunteer workers in a charitable or other project usually provide through one of their number their own management, as do, of course, primitive and other self-employed groups. Moreover, even modern industrial workers are sometimes given considerable latitude in working out among themselves the division of labor, and this requires coordination of the work of the various members.¹ In the village and residential neighborhood, management of this sort is necessary only on those occasions when numbers engage in some joint activity, such as cleaning up a vacant lot, building some desired facility or collecting funds for the purpose, or salvaging furniture from a burning home.

In the more highly structured kinds of groups the managerial function may be fulfilled by a special and permanent office to which a succession of members are elected, as with the typical American club presidency, or which is occupied for life on a hereditary or other basis, as is frequently the case with the chieftainship of a primitive tribe. It is, for example, the usual function of a club president or, where the presidency is an honorary office, of the club secretary, to arrange programs, dances, games, etc., at times and places most convenient for the members, to call meetings and guide those meetings in a way which will minimize confusion (*Robert's Rules of Order* has long been the standard for this), to appoint committees to do this or that designated task, and so on. Whatever the specific responsibilities of a managerial office, they consist of putting into effect established practices of the group or the current will of the members of the group. The person who occupies that office is not empowered or expected to initiate new, and certainly not deviant, programs of group action.

STRUCTURE AND STABILITY

All the aspects of the structure of a group operate to preserve the *status quo*. The established system of rank aids in the maintenance of the traditional division of labor among the members; the various offices, whether formal or informal in nature, function to conserve, enforce, and guard the established standards; and the structure of offices is such that the individuals occupying

¹ There is considerable experimental evidence to indicate that under some conditions the work (and play) group which is given the greatest freedom to work out its own division of labor performs most efficiently. See K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates'" (*J. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 10, pp. 271-299, 1939) and A. Bavelas and K. Lewin, "Training in Democratic Leadership" (*J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 37, pp. 115-119, 1942). But as was noted earlier there is no certainty that what holds true in this respect in our society is necessarily true in all societies.

them are either disinclined to initiate modifications of the standards or are precluded from doing so.

Although a status group always applies its norms with some tolerance and for the most part views them pragmatically, every status group is in most respects inherently conservative—even those groups which are dedicated to bringing about political revolution. Even external crisis, such as destruction by fire of a club's facilities, encroachment by some other group, or adverse governmental action, is normally met by simple resistance. Each member of the threatened group struggles—verbally at least—to preserve his role rights and avoid any extension of his obligations; and the group structure, represented by those members who occupy established offices, endeavors to mobilize group action in terms of precedent. The point of view is that threat to the welfare of the group should be fought on principle; that no concessions should be made; and that in the end right—the group's standards—will prevail. Even when the group rebels actively, as is now the traditional way with groups of organized labor, against a threat to its established ways, such as the introduction of some new technique, the effort is to hold the line, to resist.

Resistance "on principle" no doubt often serves the group ends, especially that order of resistance which is inherent in the very existence of groups, a matter which will be of very great concern in later chapters. But simple resistance, although it is the normal response of groups to external crisis, seldom resolves the crisis; at most it postpones for a time the necessity for working out a functionally effective adaptation to the new conditions in which the group must operate if it is to survive. The passive resistance of blacksmiths, carriage makers, stable proprietors, and many others who were economically and sentimentally bound to the horse and buggy no doubt delayed somewhat the full flowering of the motor age. During the early part of this century that resistance (sometimes not entirely passive, as a matter of fact) unquestionably led many who were interested in purchasing an automobile to think twice; but in the end the automobile displaced the horse, and the unconverted blacksmiths and carriage makers were put out to pasture along with the horses.

In the long run, then, the survival of a group may depend upon its modifying its standards and thus its structure to accord with changes external to it. To the extent that it is a structured group, it will, however, resist doing so; the structure is designed to preserve things as they are; it is a stabilizing system.² And in the short run, if not the long, stability is the means to survival,

² A very considerable part of the recorded history of human society attests to the stability of groups, group forms, and group practices in the face of strong external pressures from without. The following books and articles deal specifically with this matter in terms of some special group or group practice: S. W. Baron, *The Jewish Community: Its History and Structure to the American Revolution* (3 vols., Jewish Publications Society of America, Philadelphia, 1942); M. Benney, *Charity Main: A Coalfield Chronicle* (G. Allen, London,

for a status group can survive only to the extent that it is able to secure conformity to its norms by its members. In the short run, any marked deviation by its members from established norms is a threat to the maintenance of the group, since after all, the group exists only in and through member conformity to a common set of norms. If norm A is abandoned as inexpedient, the group is, as it were, proved to have been in error in previous enforcement of that norm; such being the case, there is no assurance that norm B is worthy of enforcement; etc. The initial resistance to the changing of any norm is thus really a group defensive reaction. Initial resistance does not preclude the group's eventually abandoning or modifying an established norm. It may do so as and if continued experience demonstrates the advisability of doing so.

The function of initial resistance to change in the norms of a group is to force a demonstration of the advisability of change. There is, of course, nothing reasoned about such resistance; it simply follows from the habitual acceptance by the members of the group norms and the stabilizing operation of the group's structure. But it serves to prevent, or at least discourage, ill-considered changes. A work group, for example, almost always insists that a proposed modification of technique or of work procedure is bad—*i.e.*, that it will not work. In fact, should the proposed change be forced upon the group, the members will do their best to prevent it from working. As a result, only those changes that are strongly and persistently advocated and that prove to be inherently so superior that worker antagonism does not cancel out their advantage over the old will survive the test of work-group resistance and become incorporated into the norms.

Conservatism of this sort no doubt discourages in technology and elsewhere the testing of many possibilities that would prove to be successful; thus the very knowledge that he would at best have a hard and uphill fight to gain worker acceptance of a new tool, material, or procedure may discourage an employer from making the attempt to introduce something new. On the other hand, this conservatism certainly prevents the costly putting to the test of many ill-considered proposals for change. For example, university and college administrators are perpetually coming up with plans for the reorganization of the curriculum (for reasons inherent in their official roles, incidentally), and invariably the faculty opposes each proposal as it is made. Persistent pressure on the part of the interested administrator may lead to prolonged and critical discussion among the various status groups within the faculty, from which

1946); E. H. Bernert and F. C. Ikle, "Evacuation and the Cohesion of Urban Groups" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 133-138, 1951); H. H. Kelley and E. H. Volkart, "The Resistance to Change of Group-anchored Attitudes" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 453-465, 1952); R. H. Murray, *Science and Scientists in the Nineteenth Century* (T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1925); T. H. Noss, "Resistance to Social Innovation as Found in the Literature Regarding Innovations Which have Proved Successful" (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944); V. H. Whitney, "Resistance to Innovations: The Case of Atomic Power" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 56, pp. 247-254, 1950); and L. Wirth, "Education for Survival: The Jews" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 682-691, 1943).

at least nine times out of ten historical or other evidence emerges to indicate—to the satisfaction at least of the majority of the faculty—that the proposal is not worth putting to the test.

In a general way, then, status-group conservatism operates to sift out the most probable errors in the trial-and-error process by which new techniques and forms of human relationship are developed. That this conservatism also discourages some trials that might have turned out to be successes is simply the cost of caution.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE STATUS GROUP

A new, developing group—such as a family just getting under way, a neighborhood in a frontier settlement or modern housing project, a club in its early years, or a business enterprise struggling to establish itself—must be highly dynamic if it is to survive. Its life is markedly eventful, and every event poses a new problem for solution. Under these conditions, all the activities of the group partake of the quality of an experiment; and in the absence of precedent, of established norms, each qualified member assumes from time to time the direction of the group experimentation. In time, group norms evolve, a structure of ranks and offices becomes established, and the life of the group tends to become increasingly routine and less eventful. Early in the emergence of a structure of authority the responsibilities and powers of the various offices, formal or informal, are loosely defined. The group at this period in its development is inclined to respect and give power to those members who have initiative in settling dissensions within the group and in solving its collective problems.

In the normal course of events, all groups, most markedly those which are both large and formal in character, arrive in time at a sort of organizational maturity. The time required to reach maturity will depend upon many factors, the most important of which is perhaps the degree to which the social context remains stable. At any event, the condition of maturity (a relative matter, at best) involves a fully developed system of norms, which in turn means, as was mentioned earlier, a traditional procedure for the induction of new members, ritualization of all important and many trivial group activities, and a fixed structure of ranks and offices. The latter will be rigidly defined; both the scope and the powers of office will be specified; and a procedure will be followed whereby only those individuals who are disinclined to exceed the authority of office can gain access to office. All this means that as the group matures, its formal characteristics become increasingly stable and rigid. Mature group structure can make for efficient accomplishment of routine operations under relatively stable conditions. The local post-office personnel, for example, is ordinarily a highly structured group and ordinarily collects and delivers the mail in a most dependable manner; the personnel of the local library is usually equally efficient, for the same reasons; and the president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of the local country club usually follow

a fixed procedure and thereby succeed in keeping the members happy. When, as is quite often the case, the activities of the group are very much limited (as, for example, are the activities of the local chapters of Phi Beta Kappa, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and most other prestige groups and of many bureaucratic work groups) the primary function of the structure is to make motions with a maximum of energy and a minimum of result. In this, too, the mature structure is often very efficient.

The Power Structure. But all groups (and organizations) ultimately and most groups recurrently encounter exceptional circumstances that cannot be solved by rule and rote. Exceptional circumstances can be met expediently only by taking exception to the established rules. A mature, highly structured and rigid group may for a time let the problems posed by some exceptional circumstance go unsolved; *e.g.*, the group as a whole may ignore the fact that there is sharp and intensifying conflict between certain members or factions of members, or it may refuse to recognize that changing technology (or some other external factor) is jeopardizing its existence or rendering it obsolete. Such a group may live for a while on its reputation. Occasionally such a group is preserved by the larger society as a sort of museum piece. But ordinarily unless it eventually adapts to internal dissensions or external changes, a group disintegrates in time.

A mature group with a well-developed and rigid structure is always conservative; but such a group is not necessarily unadaptable. For even as the structure of the group evolves and becomes increasingly rigid, a secondary and informal structure may be devised to meet those comparatively rare occasions when rule and rote must be abandoned in favor of trial and error—*i.e.*, when the members of the group, or a significant proportion of them, feel impelled by circumstances to say in effect, "To hell with the rules! The question is, What do we do now?"

The rigid structure of a mature group protects its members not only from costly group experimentation but also, and even more importantly, from exploitation by those who hold office. To protect themselves from the discomforts that unresolved internal dissensions occasion and the disaster that unsolved external problems may bring, the members frequently—but not, of course, invariably—evolve what might be called an emergency structure of group leadership. This structure may not be explicitly recognized by the members of the group; and unlike the formal structure, it is not static; it is, in effect, a lightly structured structure. For reasons that will shortly be evident, this kind of informal leadership system is usually designated by social scientists as a "power structure."³

³ The term "power structure" was apparently derived from Max Weber (*From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. and trans., Oxford, New York, 1946, Chap. VI, "Structures of Power"), but it has come to mean something quite different than it did to him. He did not distinguish between the formal structure of political and other organizations and the informal one; he did not recognize the existence of the latter.

For some recent descriptions and analyses of what is here termed the "power structure"

Boss Rule. The existence of power structures was long overlooked by social scientists, particularly those concerned with the organization and operation of government. Most students of government, and until very recently most of those interested in business and industrial organization, have considered the formal structure—as embodied in constitutions, regulations, laws, etc.—the whole means by which the organization operates. As a result, they have had only the most superficial understanding of the actual working of such organizations and of the status groups of which such organizations are invariably composed; and their proposals for reform—via changes in formal (or paper) structure—have been quite justly laughed off by practicing and practical politicians as of no moment. For the fact is that practical politicians can and do make the most improbable charter or constitutional paper structures work; which is to say that the actual power structure of a government bureau, political subdivision (city, county, etc.), or business enterprise is largely independent of the formal structure and can, when necessary to keep the organization operating, entirely nullify the formal structure.

Perhaps Steffens was the first to call the attention of political scientists to the fact that American city government is never what it seems.⁴ A muckraking journalist of the early part of the century, he ignored city charters, "organizational plans" of city administration, and other formal aspects to ascertain, largely through interviews with local political "bosses," how municipal government really worked. He found, among other things, that there was always a hidden system of personalized government operating along with, and at times counter to, the formal system. The latter, headed by the elected mayor or appointed city manager, would take care of routine operations and usually would serve as a front for the hidden system. Should anyone want to get something done—*e.g.*, should a crook want to "beat the rap" or a businessman want to build a building—he would go for action to the boss (hence the term "boss rule").

The boss of a political or other organization is characteristically a man of drive, ingenuity, and wile, who normally shuns public recognition, avoids public office, and has no official status in or income from the organization that he covertly rules. In politics he lives by graft of various sorts. Nevertheless,

see S. Forthal, *Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain* (William Frederick Press, New York, 1946); A. H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1945); D. D. McKean, *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1940); E. H. Vaughan, *Community under Stress: An Internment Camp Culture* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1949); W. F. Whyte, "The Social Structure of the Restaurant" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 54, pp. 302-310, 1949).

For recent discussions of power in the highly artificial, formal manner of Weber see R. A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1943), and R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1953).

⁴ L. Steffens, *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1931).

it is the opinion of those who have studied the matter that he and his organization are necessary if the gap between the artificially idealistic paper systems of government (and unenforceable laws) and the crass realities of political life is to be closed. His organization is in most respects the exact opposite of the formal one. Whereas the formal consists of a system of defined offices (mayor, director of the budget, supervisors, etc.), operates in terms of rigid legal and other rules, is subject to the constant scrutiny of the public and conflicting pressures therefrom, and is consequently inherently sluggish and unadaptable, the boss rules entirely in terms of expediency and through men whom he knows personally and who serve him only as long as he in turn serves them.

While political scientists and such students of economic organization as labor economists have been slow to realize that they can learn very little about the actual operations of an organization by analysis of its paper system, sociologists rather early discovered in their studies of penal institutions and the operation of police, courts, and other agencies dealing with crime and the criminal that the paper system—the formal structure of prison, police, etc.—may have little bearing on what actually happens. It has, for example, been repeatedly found that the organizational plan of a prison can be radically changed, new administrative personnel introduced, and the like without the actual life of the prisoners being affected in any important regard. Similarly it has been found that a shake-up in a police force or a reorganization of criminal-court procedure seldom affects the actual operations conducted by the police; for once such a change-over is effected, the undercover power structure reasserts itself, the word goes out that conditions are back to normal, and the crooks and other underworld characters resume their trades. Within the last few decades, students of industrial management have likewise discovered the existence of “boss rule” in certain aspects of business organizations.

Most mature highly structured status groups have, in addition to the formal structure with its designated offices and rules of procedure, a latent power structure that is topped by a member who can provide the dynamic leadership that is necessary when new group problems arise. Leadership via an informal power structure in the small status group does not, however, have any of the implications of corruption that boss rule has in political and some other large-scale organizations.

Rule by Respect. The informal power structure of a mature group is in most respects identical with the informal structure and procedures by which unstructured groups solve their problems. In the first place, leadership is by persons rather than by office. As a result, the leadership provided by a power structure is in all respects the antithesis to that provided by a system of offices. It comes into operation when the group meets any sort of adversity that cannot be resolved by rule—when new problems arise or when an old problem

involves atypical factors. At such times the leadership of a power structure provides more or less ingenious solutions which it is capable of effecting by "realistic" methods, by any procedure that seems for the moment to be expedient.

The powers of those who exercise leadership in a power structure stem from the personal respect in which they are held by the group members.⁵ That respect may be akin to reverence, as it is in the case of the "grand old man" who occupies no office but to whom members turn for counsel when grievous troubles arise. The respect may, however, be fearful, as it is when an individual can, because of superior physical strength, courage, initiative, skill, or external attachments, maintain a reign of terror within the group. Such, no doubt, is often the case with criminals and other groups that live outside the law, with revolutionary cliques, and with many other groups when external circumstances are troubled and survival requires strong men and harsh tactics. But even when obedience to the leader of a power structure is based on fear, the power of the leader rests ultimately upon the respect that those who obey and enforce his will have for his ability to make their supporting him worth their while. In the informal gangs of boys, for example, the power structure is in part worked out by fighting among the members, with the one who can whip, or at least physically intimidate, all the others rising to the apex of the power system. Nevertheless, unless he also makes their continued membership valuable to them, the one who has fought his way to the top will lose his power through dissolution of the gang; to keep them together, he must see to it that interesting programs of gang action are initiated. Since the boy who can slug and bluff his way up to the top is not always the one who can also provide the most intriguing activities, it often happens that the one who rules by respect for his physical prowess rules only on behalf of a boss who commands his respect because of the latter's ability to suggest the adventures that the members crave.

In all peaceable groups, the persons who exercise leadership through a power structure have usually acquired their powers—which are characteristically indirect and undefinable—by having demonstrated their ability to get the group out of predicaments. Occasionally the respect accorded a "grand old man" is quite unwarranted and is founded more on legend than fact. Occasionally respect is inexpediently based upon the fact that the member has demonstrated ability in some other kind of group (*i.e.*, he has halo prestige). Thus the local minister may be informally asked to advise the literary society on what novels to read, and the local banker may be the behind-the-scenes director of the school system. In the main, however, the personal respect upon which rest the powers of those who exercise leadership through a power structure are earned. And the personal qualities—as distinct from the specific actions, which

⁵ The contrast between the personality attributes of officeholders and those of informal bosses has been explored by C. A. Gibb in "The Principles and Traits of Leadership" (*J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 42, pp. 267-273, 1947).

necessarily vary widely from group to group and culture to culture—that normally characterize those who earn such respect are, somewhat in order of importance, initiative, selfless regard for the best interests of the group, and understanding of and consideration for the idiosyncrasies of the various individual members of the group. The initiative of such a person and his concern for the welfare of the group make it possible for him to devise, in a way official leaders cannot, new solutions to new problems and expedient violations of rules and other group precedents.⁶ His awareness of the personal peculiarities of the various members may make it possible for him to do these things without seeming to jeopardize any of their established rights. Hence he can, ideally, lead the group in new directions without seeming to change anything.

The techniques of rule by office are reducible to rules and may even be taught as methods of administration and management. The ways by which an informal boss provides actual and dynamic direction of a group without seeming to do so, or at least without seeming to disturb the rights and increase the obligations of any member of the group, are so many and varied and so dependent upon intangible personal factors that they defy description and remain in the province of the arts. About all that can be said with confidence is that some few people are able to cajole, trick, delude, bribe, and otherwise manipulate others without being discovered. How they acquire such skills, while most do not, is so little known that it is usual to describe them as “born” or “natural” leaders.

Dynamics of the Power Structure. The fact that the power structure of a group is informal, dependent upon member respect for persons rather than offices, and composed of individuals with drive and initiative means that it can and often does provide creative leadership as distinct from routine administration for the group. It also means that the structure is fluid. The boss and his henchmen have gained their informal power positions as a consequence of individual striving for the respect of group members; they can hold that respect and their power positions only as long as they can, in effect, “deliver the goods” better than any other member or number of members. Unlike those

⁶ The perspicacity of informal leaders at times exceeds that of professional students of society. A colleague, sentimentally attached to a small, isolated backwoods community, once took it upon himself to warn against the trickery of a little carnival that was soon to arrive. The villagers shrugged aside his warnings; and at length he took his fears to the local sage, who thereupon explained it all to him. “Of course they are a bunch of crooks,” he said. “We all know that. But think of the fun we have. There isn’t much excitement in a place like this, and small opportunity or excuse for a man to fritter his money away. With this carnival, now, we’ll have lots of excitement. They’ll bring a few whores around for the boys to wrestle with, and some moonshine liquor, and everybody can have a hell of a good time throwing away a dollar or two on games of chance that ain’t no chance at all. The pickpockets will get a few empty old wallets and in return some of our young bucks will beat up a carny fellow or two. We get our money’s worth. Ever hear of a country carnival getting rich?” (As reported to the author by J. Berreman.)

who hold formal office, they are subject to competition from any ambitious and ingenious member of the group.

The intensity of competition for power position varies widely from group to group, depending in part upon the composition of the group and in part upon the rewards, tangible and intangible, that power over the group provides. In some instances, notably in clubs and associations with limited functions, the members are often content to let some one person rule continuously—*i.e.*, to make the group a sort of private preserve for him—because it does not seem worth the while of any other member to challenge his rule. In other instances, competition for power is keen and continuous, and indecision or ineptitude on the part of the leader is promptly challenged by some member or members who are eager to take over his powers. And within an elaborate power structure there may be intense competition, with the result that the boss must not only provide acceptable guidance to the group as a whole but must also pay off and play off his henchmen one against the other to the end that no one of them gains too much respect in the eyes of the others.

In politics and business, in religion and among military forces, and even in primitive tribal and village affairs, the power structure is always elaborate and complicated. The power structure of a small status group, on the other hand, may be comparatively simple and may operate in a very casual, although perhaps quite effective, way. In a work group or residential neighborhood, for example, where there are no formal offices, one member may be held in greater affection and esteem than any other member, and to him the group may turn for guidance when some unfamiliar problem arises. At such times the procedure is neither formal nor direct; the members do not, for example, in meeting assembled agree that "Old John can tell us what to do" and then call for his advice. Rather, what he has to say in the random discussion that is always occasioned in such a group by the appearance of a problem will tend to be taken up and advocated by one or more members (serving, thus, as his henchmen), to the end that he may contribute more than any other single member to the group consensus which slowly emerges from the discussion. Or, when the members have talked themselves into a stalemate, as often happens, he may enter the discussion with a new suggestion. Frequently, in fact, the boss of a status group is simply one who habitually reserves judgment on group matters until all the evidence is in and then swings the balance in the direction that he deems most expedient.

In the formal structure those who occupy office exercise authority or rule by the sanction of tradition, to which the group members give tacit and passive support. In the power structure, on the other hand, rule is by what is usually described as "the consent of the governed." The personal respect on which its power rests is always subject to withdrawal. Unless the boss can provide leadership which will both solve the problem faced by the group and either meet with general support by the members or else be made palatable by some form of indirection ("craft" and "trickery" are the terms of disapproval), he will be ignored. If he is too often ignored, his reputation declines and, or-

dinarily, that of someone else grows, until at length he is displaced. During that process there may exist for a time two competing power structures, or, as the members would probably say, two factions, in the club, neighborhood, work group, or whatnot.

Illustrative of the simpler forms of power structures and the way they work is that which is characteristic of a village, small town, or residential neighborhood. In any such grouping the members will be differentiated in terms of the respect accorded them as persons, irrespective of their rank positions and the weighting given their opinions on matters of general concern. At the bottom of this informal hierarchy will be those who either because of their personal qualities or their limited interest in community matters may give consent to a designated course of action but are otherwise passive. In the American suburban community, for example, commuting husbands usually have little time for community problems. Thus the wife of each household may be the one who takes an active interest in community matters and around whom discussion in that household of any local crisis will revolve. The wives of three or four such households, more intimate and friendly with one another than with the wives of other households in the neighborhood, may in turn constitute something of an interhousehold discussion group, in which one of them is somewhat more respected for her opinions on local matters than any of the others. And that one, in turn, may in a vague and casual way represent this group of households in discussion with representatives of other such groups, who together may constitute a group in which some one member is especially respected and is capable of guiding the discussion toward a solution of the problem that, once reached, is refined (or perhaps torn apart) on its way back down to the individual households.⁷

The actual power structure of any village or other residential community is at once more complex and devious and less fixed than the foregoing description would suggest; for in actuality there is usually considerable and continuous competition between numbers of individuals to gain acceptance for their opinions. Thus the acknowledged "leader" in a given household may not be content simply to discuss some matter with her immediate neighbors, thereby conveying her views upward indirectly, but may trot here and there throughout the community asserting her views and trying to secure acceptance of them. Moreover, the lines of person-to-person communication up and down the power structure are not channelized (as they are supposed to be in large organizations) and are anything but accurate.

It will be observed that the operation crudely described above is what is

⁷ Following a procedure originally devised by Moreno (J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations*, Mental and Nervous Disease Publishing Company, Baltimore, 1934), Lundberg and others (G. A. Lundberg and M. Steele, "Social Attraction-patterns in a Village," *Sociometry*, vol. 1, pp. 375-419, 1938) undertook some objective study of the informal structure of various groups. Their limited data support on the whole the concept both of the power structure and the decision process presented above. Unfortunately for science, however, the sociometric technique, as Moreno termed it, has since been applied almost exclusively to psychotherapeutic ends

conventionally termed "democratic." And the fact is that in a status group the normal process by which decisions to act are reached via the power structure (as distinct from decisions made by those who occupy offices within the formal structure) is the exact antithesis to rule by precedent or rule by law. It is, furthermore, a process which involves the active participation of all those members of the group who are concerned with the problem that faces the group and the passive consent of the entire membership. The resulting decision, if one is reached, comes close to being a product "of, by, and for" those whom it affects; it will be, at any event, the nearest approximation that will be found in social life to the ideal of pure, or true, democracy.

Such formal procedures as that of the New England town meeting and that of parliamentary government are apparently attempts to regularize the process of status-group decision making and to utilize it in the governing of larger forms of association—the town, the nation, and even the "society of nations." That the consequences have been less democratic than the early proponents of representative government had hoped seems to indicate that the operations of a power structure are too complex, too subtle, and too dynamic to be reducible to explicit rules and designated procedures. The consequences suggest, in fact, that the fundamental laws of social life are not subject to legalistic codification, and that as men in association devise fixed standards for their individual and collective guidance, they also evolve informal and dynamic procedures whereby those fixed standards can upon occasion be violated or changed in order that the group, whether large or small, can survive in a universe in which nothing is fixed and certain.

The rise of representative forms of government has not, it is clear, made such agencies sufficiently sensitive to what is vaguely described as the "will of the people" to obviate the development of informal power structures. On the whole, it is such informal structures, rather than the formal operations of a representative government, that most nearly and most effectively give representation to the "will of the people." And, as will be shown in some detail in later chapters, the informal power structures of government and of all large and formal organizations consist of systems of which the operating units are informal status groups, each governed by its own quasi-independent power structure. Perhaps the best formal description of such a system of controls is the Russian Constitution of 1936, in which political representation is theoretically effected through a vast system of occupational hierarchies, beginning at the bottom with the work group as the primary unit. That the actual political, military, and economic control of the Russian people bears not the faintest resemblance to this paper plan is only further illustration of the fact that the laws of social life cannot be reduced to fixed rules of social action and a demonstration of the ability of men in association at once to stabilize their relations in the interest of social efficiency and to adapt dynamically to changing circumstances in the interests of survival.

Chapter 8

MORALE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

There is no doubt a close relationship between the life expectancy of a status group and the degree to which the group is both structured and at the same time capable of adapting to new conditions. There does not, however, appear to be any sort of normal or typical life history for status groups. The origins of such groups are many and varied; the "mature" life of a group may be anything from a few weeks to many decades; and a deteriorating group can, unlike a dying organism, sometimes be born anew. A group can also evolve new forms and new functions, changing through time and with no break in continuity from one kind of status group to another kind.

So many and such highly varied factors, all of which are subject to change through time, enter into the making and maintenance of status groups that it is impossible to predict the future course of any specific group. Nevertheless it is possible to designate, at least in general terms, the conditions under which any status group will thrive and, conversely, the conditions that will weaken and jeopardize its life.

Survival, the most common value of status groups, depends in part upon the ability of the group to maintain member conformity to its norms and in part upon the ability of the group to recruit acceptable replacements for those members who leave the group for any reasons, including death. Inability to satisfy the latter requirement makes some status groups inherently short-lived. Included in this general category are the friendship and other coteries that develop among children and youths and that normally disintegrate as the members grow older. Even in a rather stable community of persons, the young form groupings on the basis of temporary interests and regroup themselves as their interests change. Thus in our society boys and girls commonly play together before puberty; at that time the boys tend to form their own gangs and the girls to pair off or develop their own coteries; and a year or two later all re-sort themselves into mixed groups, which are gradually replaced by courtship cliques. Marriage, in turn, usually detaches both a bride and a groom from whatever sex groups may have survived the preceding reassortment; young married couples tend to form into new coteries; and so on. Each such age-status group usually dissipates as the members outgrow the group; and the next "generation" forms its own group rather than taking over from its predecessors. That is, age groups do not ordinarily live on by recruitment; rather, each successive generation of sixteen-year-olds, twenty-year-olds, etc., develops its own special groups and norms.

Status groups that develop among people who are brought together by some temporary circumstance are for obvious reasons inherently short-lived. Tourists, especially those who are on a long ship cruise or who are taking an organized tour of some foreign country, form groups of this sort; the members of such groups often evidence superficial concern for the survival of the group, but the group actually dissipates with the end of the cruise or tour. The work, recreational, and residential groups that develop among construction workers and their families also terminate when the job is done and the workers scatter to other projects, as do the status groups that evolve among the graduate students working together at a given time in a university, among the officers stationed at a given military post or naval establishment, and the like. The norms of such groupings, however, unlike those of travelers briefly thrown together, have a greater duration than the groups themselves; although the same group of construction workers, soldiers, or graduate students may never come together again, construction workers, military officers, and academicians have their own folkways—common values, sentiments, and codes of conduct—which give a certain uniformity to the group norms that emerge whenever a number of them come together. The same thing is true of harvest hands, migratory laborers, and the personnel of many other occupations. Seamen, for example, are constantly changing ships; but the status groups that form, on an inevitably temporary basis, among the crew for a given voyage utilize many norms that have become, as it were, traditional among sailors.

With inherently short-lived groups, the value placed on survival is usually qualified in the minds of the various participants by a sort of "for the duration" clause. This qualification does not, however, necessarily reduce the power of the group to control the behavior of its individual members; the expected duration of the group is, it will be recalled, only one of the factors that enter into determining the value of membership to the individual. For the sailor on a ship and the construction worker on a job in the wilderness, the fact that there are no alternatives to belonging to a given group may outweigh the certainty that the group will dissolve at the end of the voyage or the completion of the project. And the same thing is true, in one way or another, for many other groups which are recognizably short-lived. As a consequence, temporary groups may actually secure a level of individual conformity to their norms as high as, or even higher than, that achieved by normally long-lived groups. The reputedly rigid code of a "narrow-minded" rural hamlet may be no more rigid than that of the temporary neighborhood groupings that develop among construction workers, and the professional codes enforced upon the physician by the local and enduring company of his peers may be no more severe and demanding than those imposed upon a sailor by the temporary crew of a ship at sea or upon an army officer by those with whom he serves a brief tour of duty.

There is, thus, no constant relationship between the life expectancy of a group and its ability to control individual members. The ability of a group to

control the behavior of its individual members does, however, have profound effect upon the survival prospects of that group. The group in which the social control over individual members is weakening is a group on the way to dissolution; the group that can effectively enforce its norms has, all other things being equal, high survival value. The present concern is not group survival per se but rather, social control; the fact that the two are usually related means, however, that the effectiveness of the social controls of a group—an intangible matter—can often be inferred from the measurable ability of the group to maintain membership. Thus a military unit with an abnormally high desertion rate is most likely poorly disciplined and untrustworthy; the village that is declining in numbers is most likely experiencing difficulty in maintaining its community norms; and the industrial plant with an excessively high rate of labor turnover is most likely one in which the workers do not, for some reason, form into effective work groups.

MORALE: SITUATIONAL AND GROUP

The ability of a group to secure, through social controls, member conformity to the norms is a measure of the cohesion that exists within the group—what was earlier described as the “glue” that holds the members of a group together. When each member of the group is considered individually, the cohesion within the membership appears to be a function of the value of continued membership to each of the several individuals. As an individual, each member can be seen as reluctantly fulfilling his role obligations in order to enjoy his role rights and continuing to do so only as long as the latter outweigh, in his value system, the former. But, as was indicated earlier, a group is something more than the sum of its members. Elements of that something more—norms, values, and structures—have been analyzed in the two preceding chapters. There remains to be considered a most elusive yet significant aspect of groupness—one that stems from the fact that the value the individual places on continued membership in a group, and hence his submission to the controls exercised by the group, is largely a function of the group itself. In effect, the group produces the cohesion that enables it to operate and survive as a group.

The term “morale” is currently used to designate the degree of cohesion that exists within a given group; “high morale” indicates that a condition of strong cohesion exists which enables the group to enforce its norms and to survive great adversity (as generally used, it is the equivalent of the French term *esprit de corps*); “low morale” describes a condition of cohesion inadequate to the maintenance of group norms under duress; and “demoralization” is applied to a condition in which there is so little cohesion within a group that the members not only fail to respond to social controls but will withdraw from the group upon the slightest provocation.¹

¹ Serious scientific study of group morale has only recently been undertaken, and existing definitions of the phenomenon are still both vague and contradictory. For a number of such efforts to define the phenomenon see G. B. Watson, ed., *Civilian Morale* (Houghton

Situational Morale. One kind of morale is that which arises through the momentary interaction of the members of a situation, whether or not the members of the situation are at the same time members of a status group. Such morale is a group parallel to the mood tone of an individual, which seems to influence the zest and effectiveness with which the individual engages in any activity. Mood tone is difficult to define; but that there is something that may be so termed and that it varies both from individual to individual and from time to time for a given individual is easy to demonstrate and is a commonplace of daily experience. Almost everyone, for example, has an occasional off day—a day, or an hour or two, when everything seems to go wrong and he can do nothing right, or a day when he is atypically depressed, inclined to see and find the worst in everything, etc. Conversely, almost everyone experiences occasional periods of euphoria, when everything that he undertakes goes well and every prospect is pleasing.

The collective parallel to individual mood tone, situational morale, consists of the zest and enthusiasm for an activity that are generated among the members of a situation. Such morale may be high or low, and it may change rapidly and radically during the course of the situational interaction. It sometimes happens, for example, that a dinner or dancing party that gets off to what might be described as a slow start generates zest and excitement as it goes along and becomes so pleasurable to the members that they finally depart with the greatest reluctance. Subsequently assembled for another party, the situational members may arrive with high expectations but may fail to generate a similarly high situational morale.

The situational interactions of the members of all kinds of status groups are subject to wide variations in situational morale. Work groups, for example, exhibit fluctuations in productivity which can often be explained only in sociopsychological terms; thus, although the group may have a production norm that it will not for long exceed, on any given day the production may be quantitatively and qualitatively well above that norm and on another day well below. There is some evidence that even such a complex matter as the extent to which workers are accident-prone may rise and fall as a reflection of changes in situational morale.

Whatever its antecedents, and they will not concern us here, situational morale is situationally induced and is highly specific in character; it is the morale of the situational members for the particular activity in which they are at the moment engaged. Although the members of a status group normally experience considerable variation in their situational morale—it may, in fact,

Mifflin, New York, 1942); H. Blumer, "Morale" (in *American Society in Wartime*, W. F. Ogburn, ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943); *Amer. J. Sociol.* (special issue entitled "National Morale," vol. 47, November, 1941); H. Zentner, "Morale: Certain Theoretical Implications of the Data in The American Soldier" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 297-310, 1951); and N. Gross and W. E. Martin, "On Group Cohesiveness" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 546-564, 1952).

rise and fall during the course of a single situational interaction—and although any such change does affect the zest of the members for the activity then in progress, situational morale does not necessarily affect the value each member places upon his membership in the group *per se*.

Group Morale. The kind of morale that has a vital bearing on the ability of the status group to control the conduct of the individual members is what for convenience will here be termed “group morale.”² It is the prevailing state of mind of the members regarding the future of the group. Upon that state of mind depends the willingness of the average member of the group to fulfill his obligations to the group in order to continue to enjoy the rights of membership. High group morale is a prevailing state of mind in which the future of the group is deemed assured, whatever the current state of group affairs; low group morale, or demoralization, is a prevailing state of mind in which the future of the group is deemed likely, or even certain, to be less gratifying to its members than is the current state of affairs. Theoretically the morale of a group may fall anywhere along a continuum between some sort of maximum high to total demoralization; but, as will be shown shortly, the morale-determining process is such that the actual morale of any group tends to swing toward one or the other extreme.

Group morale would seem to be the collective parallel to the state of mind of the individual concerning his personal future. In this use, the term “mind” includes all the many interdependent variables of personality, such as glandular balance, mood tone, beliefs, etc. Differences in individual states of mind toward futures are suggested by such terms as “confident,” “optimistic,” “fearful,” and “pessimistic.” Often the qualities are spoken of as matters of temperament, indicating that there is a certain persistence of the quality in the given individual. Thus one person may be described as temperamentally inclined to view all things with alarm, while another may be characterized as temperamentally disposed to hope for the best in some one or all regards.

Particularly in times of critical physical illness, the individual’s outlook regarding the future plays a considerable, if currently little understood, part in the actual outcome. Medical science cannot explain why; but every medical practitioner is aware of the fact that psychological factors contribute in significant degree to the course of many illnesses—a fact which has been institutionalized as a therapeutic cult in Christian Science. The state of mind of

² In a later chapter political, economic, and other organizations incorporating numbers of varied status groups—*e.g.*, the political organization of a city, an industrial corporation, an army—will be examined in terms of control. Such organizations, like the status groups of which they are composed, vary tremendously in the extent to which the various component parts are working together or working at odds; and the term “morale” is often used in reference to such differences; *e.g.*, the army has low morale. But the morale of an army, of a corporation, of a nation, or of any other vast association of people is far more tenuous and difficult to analyze than is that of status groups. For the present, attention will be restricted to status groups, and unless otherwise noted the term “morale” will be used to refer to qualities of such groupings.

the individual can, indeed, induce all those physical disorders (the list is constantly being added to) that are classed as psychosomatic; and it would seem to influence the progress, for good or ill, of disabilities that are unquestionably of organic origin.

In a somewhat comparable way, high group morale may enable a poorly or adversely structured group to survive, and low morale may more than cancel out the survival value of an effective and relevant group structure. Moreover, other things being equal, a group with high morale can survive external adversity that would destroy a group with low morale. As will be indicated later, there is a normal relation between the structure of a group and its morale; but so many other factors enter into the determination of morale besides the character of the group structure that the two may in any given instance be inversely related.

The prevailing state of mind of the members of a group regarding the future of the group, *i.e.*, group morale as here defined, is not significantly affected by temperamental peculiarities of the individual members; nor is it determined by the accidents and incidents in the personal experiences of any one of the members of the group, however much such events may affect the individual's own state of mind concerning the group. Presumably there will be within the membership of the group more or less of a canceling out of temperamental differences and of factors, such as ill health and misadventure, that affect individual states of mind; a temperamentally pessimistic member may be offset by one who is temperamentally optimistic; and if one member is at the moment unusually depressed and thus disposed to look at all things darkly, including the future of the group, another will probably be unusually hopeful regarding all things, the group included.

Moreover, group morale, like situational morale, is a product of, as well as a factor in, group activity. The individual who shares with other members the prevailing state of mind regarding the future of the group derives that state of mind from group participation; he does not, as it were, bring that state of mind to the group. Rare is the individual who can for long resist being caught up in the prevailing state of mind of a group in which he is a participating member. In this as in other respects the individual tends to conform to the norms of the group—even though conformity may mean, as in the case of a badly demoralized group, discontinuance of membership.

The existence of group morale does not, however, presuppose a uniform state of mind regarding the future of the group among the members, or even constancy in their various states of mind. "Prevailing" is that which is most common most commonly—*i.e.*, common to the majority of members most, but not necessarily all, of the time. Although the morale of a group may be fairly high, some members may be quite discouraged regarding the future of the group, or at least their future in it, and about to drop out; and upon occasion considerable numbers of them may view the future of the group darkly. Conversely, although the morale of a group may be low, some members may

have great hope for its future; and most of the demoralized members may on occasion briefly revive their faith in the group's future. Thus neither the relevant state of mind of a single member of a group nor the general member state of mind at any given moment is necessarily indicative of the group's morale.

What may be called normal morale is a prevailing state of mind in which the future of the group is simply taken for granted, in exactly the same passive way that the reasonably healthy individual usually takes his physical survival for granted. A critical test of group morale comes when the members are, for whatever reason, required to forego some or many of their usual role rights, or to take on new role obligations, or both. Such a test of group morale may come gradually, as would be the case if the membership of a club were slowly declining, with the result that member dues and other obligations were growing heavier; or it may come abruptly, as would be the case if a scandal threatened the reputation of a family, if one member of a country-club set murdered another, or if a group of soldiers were sent into combat. Whatever the test and however it came about, the new demands on the individual members would eventually lead each of them to reevaluate his status in the group. It is under such circumstances that the morale of the group becomes a major determinant in the current conduct of its members; for in the reevaluation of his membership the individual member ordinarily includes in his calculation the group's own estimate (its state of mind) of its future. Thus if the morale of the group is high, most members will willingly forego rights and assume new obligations on the assumption that they will be paid back in full in the future for these personal sacrifices. But if morale is low, they tend to evade the new demands upon them, on the assumption that the loss will be final and perhaps progressive; and if such evasion is impossible, they may then, formally or otherwise, withdraw from membership in the group.

THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALE

Although morale is subject to external influences, as will be shown shortly, it is not something imposed on the group from without. It does not originate in some metaphysical force, such as the Durkheimian "collective representations"; nor can it be conjured up by the practical efforts of political or other leaders, such as the indoctrination rituals on which military leaders rely to convert unwilling conscripts into eager fighting men. Metaphysical concepts of morale simply substitute one verbal abstraction or another for the theological "will of God," and practical attempts to induce morale by appeals to emotion or to reason assume that group morale is simply the sum of the states of mind of the several individuals composing the group.

Group morale is invariably the product of the interaction of a number of interdependent variables. Each of the several factors or circumstances discussed below enters to some degree into the determination of the morale of any group. But each of these factors is subject to wide variation and is im-

portant only in terms of all the other factors involved. Thus the current state of a group's affairs, which is one of these factors, may be adjudged by the group as anything from excellent through normal to disastrous. The country-club set may have been left funds for a new and luxurious clubhouse by a recently deceased member; its affairs may be the usual admixture of troubles and achievements; or it may find itself unable to meet mortgage payments on its aging and antiquated clubhouse. Whatever the particular state of its current affairs, that state of affairs will be important to group morale only in combination with all the other involved factors; any one of the other factors may intensify or nullify the effect of this particular one. Here, as elsewhere, the term "cause" should be used cautiously, if at all; no one factor of itself causes a lowering or raising of morale; it operates always as an interdependent rather than independent variable.

Tradition. All other things being equal, which of course they never are, a long-established group has higher morale than one that has recently come into being. Status groups, like whisky, often improve with age. They acquire what is usually called "tradition," a body of practices and verbal constructs which constitute a group parallel to the wisdom which is supposed to come to the individual with the passage of years and the accumulation of experiences.

Institutional groups, such as a family under the old patriarchal system, may start off with a set of pretested status roles, norms, rituals, and the like. Such a group has, as it were, a heritage of tradition. All noninstitutional groups, on the other hand, necessarily begin as experiments and work out structure and norms on the basis of whatever elements of tradition may be available to them as they go along. Until such a group has worked out an effective structure and a set of adequate norms, its life is precarious. Business failures, of which there are many each year in the United States, occur disproportionately among young enterprises; and, as was remarked earlier, the survival value of old and antiquated business establishments is often greater than their economic efficiency and financial conditions might seem to warrant. Clubs and other recreational groups have a very high mortality rate; but the deaths occur mainly in the early years of life, and the group of this sort that can outlive its founders is likely to live on and on thereafter.

Even when a newly formed group starts off with exceptionally high morale, as did the various utopian colonies of earlier days and as do most of the housing, retail, and other cooperative groups that are formed from time to time in the United States, its life is precarious. It is apparently characteristic of the members of a newly formed group that they have come together in hope and with high expectations but with slight appreciation of the inherent difficulties of solving the many problems that any group is bound to encounter. Perhaps if this were not so, new status groups would not be formed; at any event, the inauguration of a new group endeavor—whether informal, as is the establishment of a casual friendship coterie, or elaborate and formal, as is a proposed cooperative housing or other noncommercial project—seems al-

ways to be more hopeful than realistic.³ Even the founders of a new business enterprise frequently fail to anticipate any considerable proportion of the problems that must be solved before they can make a profit. Those who enter into unplanned associations, such as the various family units that move into a new residential district, are even more likely to ignore at the outset the difficulty of working out effective forms of association. If such were not the case, there would be little market for thin-walled apartments and suburban homes that tread on one another's doorsteps.

The life of a group with slight tradition is always precarious, for the group is always subject to sharp and rapid demoralization. There are two interrelated reasons why this is so. In the first place, the group is inexperienced in the arts of survival. As a developing, unperfected group, it lacks a tested structure, tested norms, and time-tested forms of leadership that would enable it to resolve difficulties with a minimum of trial and error. It must experiment, and every experiment that fails tends to demoralize the group and thereby to make for adversity. What tends to happen is that, as each successive problem arises, a variety of conflicting solutions are proposed, the members take sides, and the various factions—each advocating a different solution—engage in controversy, during which status relations tend to be determined by such irrelevancies as strength of voice, glibness, degree of belligerence, and size of ego. However it may be finally resolved, the controversy is likely to leave many members with hurt feelings; and should the chosen solution prove to be inadequate, these members will place the blame rather than share it. Moreover, each adversity may appear to one or another of the members as an opportunity for him to profit personally, to take advantage in one way or another of the confusion and dissension among the membership. Since the leadership of new groups is tentative and unsettled, it often happens that adversity is the occasion for considerable internal struggle for power, during which ambitious but otherwise unqualified individuals may seize authority and thereby precipitate new forms of crisis. A long-established group, on the other hand, has its tradition to draw on, its prior experience in meeting a new problem, and leadership of proved worth to guide it toward a solution.⁴

In the second place, a group with slight tradition has no history of past successes to lend confidence that current difficulties will be surmounted. A newly formed group may therefore succumb more readily to a given order of group adversity than a long-established group, in much the same way that a child may give way to an illness which an experienced adult might take in

³ The unrealistic, and hence unrealizable, expectations of those who join together in the establishment of new forms of group organization and their characteristically short life span are indicated by the following two studies of utopian communities: H. F. Infield, *Co-operative Communities at Work* (Dryden, New York, 1945), and R. V. Hine, *California's Utopian Colonies* (Huntington Library, Pomona, Calif., 1952).

⁴ The importance to the morale of a military corps of a long and honorable tradition is described by B. Fergusson in *The Black Watch and the King's Enemies* (Crowell, New York, 1950).

his stride. The members of an established group tend to evaluate current adversity in terms of their tradition; thus the old-timers among a business firm that has had a bad year can reflect upon, and communicate to the younger personnel, the fact that in the past the firm has experienced and survived one or more equally bad years. Any established group has codified, as it were, the normal and recurrent adversities of group life in the obligations that are incumbent on the individual members. And every well-established group trains its incoming members, usually but not always informally, in myths and legends about the group as well as in the rights and obligations of membership. Often the training in the traditions of the group is accomplished without much intent through stories told, perhaps boastfully, about the accomplishments of the group's great men. Among seamen, loggers, and other occupational groups, tales and ballads of mythological heroes may help to supplement less dramatic and slightly more realistic stories recounted by elder members.⁵ As a consequence of such training in the traditions of the group, the new as well as the old members of a long-established group are prepared to discount a current adversity.

The members of a newly established group, on the other hand, tend to evaluate the current state of affairs of the group in terms of the unrealistic hopes in which the group was formed. The individual who enters into membership in an established group either knows at the outset or quickly discovers that he must contribute to the group in order to receive anything from it—that membership entails many obligations as well as some rights; whereas, as was suggested above, the people who come together to form a group usually do so with high expectations of the personal advantages to be secured and relatively little anticipation of the disadvantages, the obligations, that are certain to be involved. Under the best of conditions, most of the members of such a group will find membership less gratifying than they had anticipated, and the slightest adversity may discourage them from hanging on, especially since the group has no tradition to lend it confidence. Some of the rather conclusive findings about American soldiers in World War II were that prior to combat experience their faith in their outfit was high, that in initial combat their performance was uncertain and generally poor, and that seasoned troops expected the worst but were far more reliable in combat.⁶ Any time-tested group is thus more reliable than a newly formed one, if only because it evaluates its current circumstances by a realistic scale—the traditional—rather than an idealistic one.

The Trend of Recent Experience. A long tradition makes for high group morale by providing the group with more or less adequate techniques for meet-

⁵ This seems to be true even of the workers in modern industry, where, according to some theorists, the relations of workers are depersonalized and preclude the development of such a group characteristic as a body of occupational folklore. See G. Korson, *Coal Dust on the Fiddle: Songs and Stories of the Bituminous Industry* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1943).

⁶ S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (2 vols., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1949, Vol. II, pp. 141ff.)

ing current circumstances and by giving the members a perspective in which to view those circumstances. Current circumstances are, however, evaluated not only in terms of the past but also in terms of the expected future. In evaluating his membership in the group, each individual member usually takes into account, in addition to the balance between his current rights and obligations, what he estimates to be their balance in the future and, hence, what satisfactions he will subsequently secure from continued membership. The estimate of each individual in the group, together with similar estimates of the other members, contributes to the making of group morale, but it is distinct from it. It is but one small element of the prevailing view (or state of mind) regarding the future of the group as such—specifically, the individual member's estimate of his own future in the group.

When the group is one with a long tradition and when its affairs are normal, *i.e.*, in good order, it is unlikely that many of the members deliberately calculate the future satisfactions which they will derive from membership. Under these conditions each member tends to take his future status more or less for granted. This taking of the future for granted by the individual, his enjoying the satisfactions of membership on a day-to-day basis, makes for and at the same time no doubt reflects a condition of relatively high group morale. When, however, current participation in a group fails generally to provide the members with the satisfactions which they have anticipated, as is commonly the case with newly formed and experimental groups and with established groups experiencing adversity, the members tend individually to estimate whether future satisfactions (as distinct from the future of the group itself) will be such as to compensate for current dissatisfactions.

With newly formed groups, each member's estimate of his future satisfactions is largely a matter of faith. With long-established groups, and increasingly with new groups as they gain experience, his estimate of his future satisfactions is likely to be a simple projection of the trend of his recent experience in the group. To the extent that the trend of recent experience of each of the various group members is comparable, the group itself experiences a trend. The group's trend of recent experiences is, it should be noted, a distinct factor in the determination of group morale and should not be confused with those factors which were discussed above under the rubric "tradition."

Whenever circumstances, external or internal, impose a steadily mounting burden of obligations on most of the members, or a successive reduction in member rights, or both, the trend of recent experience for the group as such is downward. Under such conditions, each individual member tends to project the downward trend into the future, with the result that to his current dissatisfactions with membership will be added those of anticipated further loss of rights and increase of obligations. Conversely, when the recent trend of experience has been in the direction of a general, however slight, rise in member rights, or decline in member obligations, or both, each member will be

inclined to anticipate greater satisfactions in the future than are currently experienced. A downward trend therefore contributes to the lowering of morale, an upward trend to a raising of morale.

The trend of recent experience is usually to some extent, and at times to a very considerable extent, self-perpetuating. As one of the factors that enter into the determination of group morale, it indirectly colors the current activities of the group and thereby may further its own course. This possibility is the complex basis for the old proverb that nothing succeeds like success. A military unit that has won a number of recent engagements will, all other things being equal, have exceptionally high morale; having exceptionally high morale, it will, again all other things remaining equal, fight better than an equivalent unit with medium or low morale and thus increase its chances of being successful in a subsequent engagement. Likewise a country club that is prospering—that has built a new clubhouse and gained in local prestige and hence has many applications for membership, etc.—can usually afford either to give more and better service than it previously has to its members without raising membership dues or to lower the dues and continue to provide the same facilities. On the other hand, a country club that has suffered a series of adversities (critical nonmembers might say that it has gone to seed) will usually begin to lose its membership, marginal members will drop out in discouragement, indifferent members will fail to pay their dues, and so on, with the likely result that the directors will find it necessary to raise dues, reduce club services, and otherwise intensify the crisis.

Even in so informal a status group as that of a residential neighborhood or a rural hamlet, the trend of recent experience, as it has here been defined, may have profound effect on morale and thus on the future of the group. If the residents take great pride in their neighborhood, they will tend to adhere to and require conformity to norms which in their value system justify that pride—*e.g.*, the existence of pleasant relations and an absence of bickering between neighbors, the maintenance of a neat and tidy physical aspect, the exclusion from the neighborhood of “undesirable” families. Thus should one of the houses be put up for sale, the neighbors would in one way or another try to make sure that the purchaser would be one who would contribute to rather than detract from the neighborhood. But should they, for any one of a multitude of possible reasons, fail in this endeavor, with the result that a distinctly “undesirable” family moves in—one belonging to a different class or ethnic group or with a family subculture in marked contrast to neighborhood norms—their morale might decline and a downward trend be inaugurated. As a result of this initial failure to maintain standards, a family that had been debating the advisability of moving elsewhere might now decide to do so, thereby opening the way for another possibly “undesirable” family to enter; or a householder who had intended to have his house painted might be discouraged from making the expenditure. With each successive failure of the neighborhood to maintain its standards, other families would become less

interested in, because less proud of, keeping their lawns and gardens tidy, etc. Each evidence of declining pride in the neighborhood would tend to lower morale and in turn to encourage further delinquencies, until at last everyone who could do so had moved elsewhere and been replaced by what were, from the former residents' point of view, undesirables.

Crisis and Morale. When a status group is subjected to any sudden and sharp adversity, the members may define the circumstance as a crisis which jeopardizes the continued existence of the group. That definition will then constitute a factor entering into the determination of the group's morale.⁷ The definition of crisis by a status group seems most often to strengthen the morale of the group by sharpening the distinction between members and nonmembers, by providing the members with a dramatic and self-evident basis for unity, and by giving to the individual's support of the group an all-or-none quality that it does not normally have. There are, however, many exceptions.

The definition of any given circumstance as a crisis is probably as much a reflection of the characteristics of the group and the condition of its morale as of inherent dangers to the welfare of the group in the circumstance that provoked the crisis definition. A group that is undergoing a gradual downward trend in experience, such as a residential neighborhood that is being encroached upon by undesirable families or a work group that is slowly losing its value to an industrial organization, perhaps through increasing mechanization of the plant, is not likely to define a further item in that decline as a crisis. Such a group tends, rather, to take this new adversity as simply another indication that the future of the group is doubtful; and the already low level of group morale is further lowered. Moreover, a group that has had a steady or a rising trend of recent experience is not likely to define the deflection of a member or two as an indication that it has lost prestige in the eyes of outsiders or even to define a forced reduction of member rights as a threat to the survival of the group itself. Such a group would most likely dismiss any such adversity as a momentary loss that could quickly and easily be made up, in which event the effects of the adversity on morale would be nil.

Only those changes for the worse (*i.e.*, changes that are inimical to the maintenance of group values) which are both sudden and sharp are susceptible to being defined as constituting a crisis. And of such sudden and sharp changes, only those which seem to the members directly to jeopardize the survival of the group or which preclude the maintenance of one of the satellite values of the group and thus indirectly constitute a threat to the survival of the group will actually be defined as crisis. An upper-class residential neighborhood is unlikely to define the encroachment of one inferior family as a crisis (although,

⁷ J. T. MacCurdy (*The Structure of Morale*, Macmillan, New York, 1943) has advanced the thesis that high morale is a function of the fear induced by crisis. If this were so, demoralization should not occur—as it certainly does—in groups exposed to the hazards of war; and the morale of every peaceful and quiet village would be low indeed—which is certainly not the case.

of course, it might do so); but it is almost certain so to define a proposal to convert its quiet street into a superhighway. A country club which provides prestige is not likely to be alarmed should one of its members resign in a huff; but should one of its members murder another, the group might define this event as a crisis, in view of the fact that the scandal could destroy the prestige of the club and thus take from it the main quality that has made membership valuable. On the other hand, a primitive village community that may take a murder in its stride may define as a crisis the fact that one member has thoughtlessly or willfully violated one of the supernaturalistic tabus and thereby subjected the entire group to the wrath of some god.

There is thus wide variation in the kinds of events or changing circumstances that different groups will define as constituting crises. Moreover, the effect upon group morale of a crisis definition is by no means uniform. As a rule, the defining of an event as a crisis solidifies the group and makes the members temporarily willing to take on new obligations or give up old rights, or both, in order that the group may survive. In a given instance, however, a crisis definition may shatter the existing morale of the group and lead to utter demoralization. Just what factors enter into the making of differential response to crisis definition is not at present known. No doubt cultural and subcultural values, sentiments, and attitudes play some part. It has been observed, for example, that in what was defined as the extreme crisis of military conquest during World War II, the French seemed generally to become demoralized and the Dutch to evidence a stiffening of morale. Of the English it has often been said that they are noble in defeat and intolerable in success. The characterization of a nation is, however, a more entertaining than reliable procedure.

The cultural base of a status group may somewhat influence its response to a given definition of crisis. Probably more significant is the state of the group's morale when it encounters the crisis. Other things being equal, a group with low morale will tend to become demoralized and a group with good morale to be strengthened by crisis. To this generalization one important qualification seems necessary. There is apparently some tendency for status groups, as for individuals, to grow soft under markedly favorable conditions, to the end that they are incapable of active adaptation to adversity. Any status group which, because of an unusually favorable social context, can achieve its values, including that of survival, without fairly rigorous enforcement of its norms tends to replace the more irksome of those norms with norms of privilege: the responsibilities of administrative offices tend to diminish and the prerogatives to increase; and various operations of the group, such as the procedure for the selection and indoctrination of new members, tend to become empty rituals. In such a group, the individual members come to expect a continual decline in their obligations and increase in their rights; to them, then, the demands of a crisis mean not only a temporary loss of current rights or increase in current obligations, or both, but also a loss of expected future increments in rights and future decreases in obligations. For a given member of the group,

one such loss in source of satisfactions might be temporarily bearable; all such losses together might make his continued membership not worth the cost to him. When a considerable number of the members of such a group so evaluate the consequences to them of a crisis, group morale is on the decline; and, since withdrawal from the group of such members reduces the ability of the group to surmount the crisis, the process may run toward total demoralization.

The Quality of Leadership. It is conventional to relate the morale of status groups (and of large, impersonal organizations also), or at least their effectiveness, to the personal qualities of those who occupy group offices or exercise informal leadership functions. The general assumption is that unenergetic, ineffectual, or venal leaders are responsible for the deterioration of any group or organization, and that aggressive, progressive, and honest leaders are to be credited with the success of any group or organization.

The actual relation between the morale of a group and the personal qualities of those who occupy group offices or informally fulfill leadership functions is far more complex than the conventional view assumes. As was shown in the preceding chapter, the activities of a group are never in any large measure directly determined by the persons who occupy group offices or serve as informal leaders. And as has just been indicated, the morale of a group is the product of a number of factors, of which the quality of the leadership is only one.

The quality of leadership affects the morale of a group in the long run indirectly, through the extent to which the guidance that it gives is effective in solving the problems of the group. And, other things being equal, there is probably a tendency for the level of group morale and the quality of group leadership to be directly correlated. The effect of leadership on current morale may, however, be quite different from its effect on the long-run welfare of the group; *i.e.*, what constitutes effective leadership in terms of current morale may be ineffective leadership in terms of the survival of the group, and an action of leadership which has the immediate effect of lowering morale may prove in time to be in the interests of group survival.

The characteristic conservatism of those who occupy status-group and other kinds of offices is perhaps in part a consequence of the fact that such leaders are frequently faced with an irresolvable dilemma: good morale is a prerequisite to efficient current group action, most especially in times of crisis; but the long-run interests of the group often dictate the making of demands on the members of the group which will have the immediate consequence of lowering their morale. In long-established groups, the prestige which a leader acquires with his office may enable him to ignore the temporary declines in morale that are occasioned by his requiring current sacrifices from the group in order to achieve long-run goals. The leader of a newly established group, however, has little prestige; and his actions as leader tend to be evaluated by the members on a day-to-day basis. He must therefore either act on a day-to-day basis, disregarding the long-run consequences of his actions; or pro-

vide long-run guidance and risk loss of member support; or attempt to cancel out the demoralizing effect of demands for current sacrifices by holding out the promise of great future returns. In the latter case his leadership takes on a charismatic quality—a quality that will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this work.

One of the factors that make for morale is, as has been shown, the trend of recent experience. Where he has the power to do so, an official or informal leader may therefore foster high morale by artificially, as it were, affecting the trend of recent experience for the better by catering to the members' desire for more status rights and less obligations. Provided that the concessions he makes to current member interest are made in an equable way, morale will, all other factors being equal, rise. When a group is prospering, such a distribution of new satisfactions is the normal expression of group gains. Frequently, however, in a group that is experiencing adversity, a leader may make concessions to current member interests in an attempt to check the decline of morale by borrowing on the group's already dubious future; *e.g.*, the leader may sell out the prestige of the club, often its most valuable asset, to replenish the club's coffers (or lift the mortgage on its clubhouse). The immediate effect of such a maneuver may be salutary—morale may rise for a time, and the group may appear to prosper; but the ultimate effect may be the disintegration that the procedure was intended to prevent. Thus a club that has brought in new members in order to resolve a financial crisis may thereby lose the reputation for exclusiveness which was its major value to the older members. In more subtle but quite similar ways, almost any kind of status group can in times of duress be led to borrow on its future; but whether the momentary improvement in group morale thus obtained will prove to be worth its cost depends upon many complex factors, the accurate assessment of which is in times of group crisis one of the major functions of group leadership.

To the extent that a leader of a group is motivated mainly, as are most group members, by concern for his current status in the group, he will tend to cater to member interests without regard for the long-run consequences to the group. He will, in other words, be primarily concerned with current morale and only incidentally if at all with group survival. Such a person may be for a time highly admired and respected, regarded by the members as an "inspiring" leader; but he may in time prove to be most incompetent. Thus the existence of a high level of morale does not necessarily indicate that the leadership of the group is operating effectively from the long-run point of view. The man in charge of the limited food supply of a group of castaways can usually give a temporary lift to their morale by increasing the daily ration; but doing so may only reduce their chances for survival. In the same way, any reduction in the obligations of the members of a group or increase in their rights usually improves current morale; but whether it improves the group's long-run prospects is another matter.

Some of the complexities of the relation between the quality of leadership

and morale can be illustrated by the fact that an officer who is despised as a tyrant by his subordinates during field training may be respected and admired by them when the survival value of that training becomes evident in battle. The members of a club may likewise be quite incensed by the fact that its directors have decided to levy a special assessment for repairs to the clubhouse or something of the sort. They may feel that no repairs are necessary, that the cost of the proposed repairs is excessive, etc. When, however, the project has been completed, they may be so gratified by the results that their morale is actually higher than it was before the proposal was made; and some among them may then be found loudly complaining that the job was not done long before. Similarly the informal leader of a work group may urge willing and enthusiastic support of some new task or technique that has been imposed by management, feeling that this support will put the group in a position to make effective protest against some subsequent and more vital change that he anticipates. The group may follow his advice distrustfully and in the feeling that he has let them down, although subsequent events may prove that his counsel was wise.

The fact that what is good for current morale may also be bad for group survival and vice versa means that the particular qualities that make for effective leadership in the short run may be quite different from those that make for effective leadership in the long run. There would, however, seem to be some qualities of leadership that normally serve both short-run and long-run purposes. They are probably not so much calculated techniques of leadership as functions of the temperament of the leader; *i.e.*, they are aspects of the art of leadership as distinct from the craft or technique. These qualities are, at any event, extremely difficult to describe and impossible to reduce to rules of procedure. In terms of accomplishment they may be suggested by such phrases as "showing wisdom and integrity" and "having the best interests of the group at heart." Since the judgment of the members of the group in such respects devolves upon their interpretation of motives or intent, it is more *how* the leader does things than *what* he does that is important here. Thus a given leader may, because of his easy and pleasant manner, be able to talk members into making willing sacrifices, whereas a granting of new rights in what is interpreted as an offensive—or officious—manner may adversely affect morale. What manner will be easy and pleasant and what will be offensive depends, of course, upon the values of the particular group; there is nothing inherently offensive in the barked command, nor is there anything inherently pleasing in the wheedling plea.

Equity and Morale.⁸ One quality of leadership that seems everywhere

⁸ Equity is not to be confused with equality, which is a legal concept. Men may in relatively rare instances be "equal before the law," and small children often insist upon strict equality in the division of pie, cake, and other tangibles. But on the whole, equality is seldom desired, infrequently demanded, and almost never found in the social relationships of human beings. Equity, on the other hand, is everywhere and always insisted upon. And

important for the maintenance of morale is what might be described as "justness." Justness is, of course, a matter of local definition; and what is deemed just in one group may be considered unjust in another. In any status group, however, each member tends to evaluate his rights and obligations in relative rather than absolute terms. The worker who has been getting, say, two-thirds as much as another worker tends to evaluate that wage relatively; and should the other worker secure an increase in wages, he will feel that his own wages have in effect been reduced. And so it is with all the rights and obligations, mainly intangibles, that adhere to a given role in a given status group.

In any complex and highly structured group the rights and obligations of various members, or categories of members, do differ absolutely; thus an army sergeant has somewhat different rights and obligations from those of a corporal, and the latter from those of a private; a master craftsman has somewhat different rights and obligations within a work group from those of a journeyman, and the latter from those of an apprentice. The member who enters into a given group role tends to take the specific rights and obligations of that role for granted, especially if the group is highly traditionalized; they are "just," if only because they have long been associated with this particular role. In accepting them the member also accepts the justness of the rights and obligations for the other roles within the group. As a consequence, when the established balance of rights and obligations of one role is changed, the members in other roles reevaluate the rights and obligations of their own roles—probably for the first time making a calculated assessment of how much they contribute to the group in return for what they secure from it; and their standard will tend to be the relative profit originally accruing to their roles as compared with the relative profit that now obtains.

To the members of any established status group, justness usually means the maintenance of the normal relationship between the rights and obligations

equity is frequently, if not invariably, achieved. "Justness," as the term will be here used, refers to the achievement or maintenance of equity, which is always relative rather than absolute, and not to that which is simply legal. In the long run, law—the fiat or decision of a tribal chieftain or the enactments of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court—tends to approach equity; but at any given moment and in any given instance there may be no relation whatever between law and equity.

What is here discussed as equity is currently being studied, with attention on equity between different groups rather than between individual members of the same group, under the term "reference group behavior," a term that was introduced by Merton (R. K. Merton and A. S. Kitt, "Reference Group Behavior" in *Continuities in Social Research*, R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld, eds., Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1950).

For other discussions that bear on the subject of morale and equity see C. A. Anderson, "Food Rationing and Morale" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 8, pp. 23-33, 1943); H. H. Hyman, "The Relation of the Reference Group to Judgments of Status" (in *Class, Status and Power*, R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1953); A. Rose, "The Social Psychology of Desertion" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 617-618, 1951); and A. Rose, *The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949).

of the various roles. A general and proportionate decline in role rights and increase in role obligations may be resented by the members; but since it does not violate their sense of what is just, it may have far less adverse effects on morale than an unequable distribution of declines in rights and increases in obligations. Equally shared hardships may even be less demoralizing than an increase in the role rights of a few favored members. Most damaging to morale is that circumstance in which the many who are least able to shoulder new obligations are required to do so and the few members who are least in need of new rights are granted them. It may be true that in some times and places the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer; within status groups, if not within society at large, this is the ultimate inequity and the condition most certain to bring about demoralization and dissolution of the group.⁹

To the extent that leadership is able to determine the distribution of new obligations or rights within a group, the justness of leadership directly affects group morale. A leader who can make an equable distribution, or can make his distribution appear to be equable whether it is or not, will be adjudged just and will thereby contribute to high morale. The one who favors or seems to favor one member or category of members thereby lowers the group's morale; for unjust leadership is certain to arouse jealousies, controversies, and discontent—often in those who are favored as well as those who are not.

Earlier it was observed that a prospering group may suffer a decline in morale, *i.e.*, that soft times sometimes make for discontent. And it is possible that in a prospering group it is the justness of leadership that plays the vital part in determining whether the group experiences an increase or a decrease of morale. A leader who sees to it that the various members prosper (*i.e.*, secure more rights with no increase or with a decrease in obligations) equably may thereby assure the maintenance of group morale, while a leader who permits or shows favoritism in the distribution of group gains may thereby contribute to a decline in morale. The demoralizing effects of nepotism have long been recognized; demoralization is the normal consequence of leadership that has by action or inadvertence gained the reputation of showing any kind of favoritism. Even in business and industry, where rights include such quantitative symbols as money income, this principle holds true. The raising of the salary or wage of one employee may jeopardize the morale of a group fully as much as, if not more than, would an equable group-wide reduction in wages.

Generally the reduction of the rights (or an increase in the obligations) of one role is less disturbing to morale than the reverse. People are less inclined to cry "Unfair!" when one of their number is hurt than to cry "Favoritism!" when one of their number is given special privilege. But in any given instance

⁹ Probably there is no single change so demoralizing to the members of a modern society as rapid monetary inflation or deflation. Aside from the direct disturbances such changes occasion to the normal economic operations, they make for increasingly inequable distribution of goods and services and seem to induce a general loss of faith in the social system and in the integrity of its political and other leaders.

the unfair treatment of one may be almost as demoralizing to the group as the granting of some special privilege. The members may take the action as a sign of injustice which can in turn adversely affect them. If their morale has been very high and they have had great pride in the integrity of the group, an unfair act of leadership may injure that pride simply because it violates their idea of what is permissible in the best of all possible groups.

Particularly in times of general social disturbance, such as that occasioned by the advent of war or economic disaster, the morale of a status group may depend in part upon what happens to it relative to other status groups. The position of a status group relative to other status groups is often not unlike, although it is more complex than, the position of one role in a status group relative to the other roles. A small boys' coterie in a residential neighborhood, for example, has its more or less clearly defined rights and obligations within the neighborhood; *e.g.*, the group may play in the streets but must not leave its play equipment behind to clutter up the streets. Likewise, each of the several work groups (and, on the formal level, departments and other subdivisions) of a business or industrial enterprise has its special role in the organization as a whole. The rights and obligations of a status group as a group tend to become structured and more or less taken for granted by its members, as do those of the other status groups which make up the total system or constellation. These established rights and obligations are, in the view of the members, equitable.

As will be shown in detail later, in most instances the various status groups in a constellation are competitive; each strives somewhat to enlarge its rights and reduce its obligations. Gains in this competition by one group ordinarily contribute to the morale of that group, provided that the gains are equably distributed among the members. Losses, on the other hand, tend to lower morale; and since the group evaluates its position relative to the other groups, a gain by another group is more or less the equivalent in its effects on morale to an absolute loss of rights. Thus should a certain class of workers in a business be given a raise in pay, new washroom or other facilities, or some other valued right, the other classes of workers are likely to feel injured; and should the small girls in a neighborhood be given a new right—such as, for example, freedom to play in the garden of a vacated house—the small boys may be disgruntled, although they have actually lost none of their established rights.

Studies made of army morale during World War II revealed that some, but certainly not all, of the typically low morale of troops in the field stemmed from their feeling that they were being asked to make greater sacrifices than other troops (*e.g.*, headquarters units, men held in reserve, and those who had not been sent into foreign service) and than the civilian population, most especially those industrial workers who were earning high wages as a consequence of the war boom. Rumors about war profiteering on the home front, about the black market, and about the easy treatment accorded conscientious

objectors seem to have contributed to and reflected the sharp sense of inequity felt by combat soldiers. The evidence of these studies led to the conclusion that soldier morale was considerably affected by relative deprivation—that the soldier measured his plight largely in terms of the status of other classes of war-affected persons. And so, no doubt, he did; he made that evaluation, however, as the member of a status group rather than as an autonomous individual.

Intergroup equity is for the most part so subtle and complex that it often eludes the attention of all but those who are directly involved. The importance to group morale of equity among groups is usually self-evident only within the framework of formal organizations, such as industrial establishments or governmental bureaus, where inequitable favoring of one group usually results in a prompt and manifest decline in the morale of any of the other groups that feels itself to have suffered a relative loss in position.

The effect on group conduct of a sense of relative loss in position depends, however, upon many factors and is not, therefore, constant. When for other reasons the group has low morale, a loss of relative group position will ordinarily further the decline in morale; such was evidently the case with the American soldier in World War II, who had many reasons for disliking his status. But when for other reasons the group has a relatively high morale, a sense of inequitable treatment may actually strengthen the morale of a group as a consequence of the fact that it defines the circumstance as a crisis in its affairs. In terms of the crisis definition, the members of the group may see themselves as pitted against all others, or against some certain person if the inequity seems to stem from the action of authority, and thereby be bound together in a greater than normal unity; they may be activated by the injustice rather than demoralized. This is what often happens when the police "crack down" on a gang of youthful rowdies, when the local politicians seem through taxation and other means to be discriminating against the local country-club set, when a military officer makes what appears to be inequitable demands on one of the units under his command, or when management increases the pay of all but one class of workers. In defining an inequity as an intolerable violation of their group rights and hence as a crisis, the members of a group with relatively high morale thus may develop even higher morale and take such action to recover their lost rights (or gain new rights to bring the group into its former position relative to other groups) as seems likely to be effective.

The Compulsive Factor in Morale. It is often assumed that a group which exists as a consequence of external compulsions and operates under external constraints will have lower morale than a group that has a voluntary membership and is not subject to externally imposed regulation—*e.g.*, that conscripted or impressed soldiers normally have lower morale than those who have willingly enlisted in the army; that slave or indentured workers have low morale and are therefore less efficient than those who have voluntarily

sought employment; and that any sort of captive population, such as that of a prison, inevitably has low morale.¹⁰

Undoubtedly people who have enjoyed a certain freedom of choice because of the character of their culture and the social circumstances under which they have lived will resent the loss thereof; but it does not follow that compulsion per se is detrimental to morale. Only when and to the extent that compulsion violates established sentiments, attitudes, and values does it affect morale adversely. Thus the fact that minor children in our society are under cultural and legal compulsions to remain members of the family into which they were born does not predispose the family to low morale; the fact that American children are forced by law to attend school does not of itself make them unusually resistant to learning; and to a people, such as those of contemporary Russia, who have never known freedom of occupational choice, the fact that they may be required by government to work in a given industry does not necessarily mean that they will be less efficient as workers than the "free" employee of American industry. Compulsion, like freedom, is a matter of personal-social definition; and as a consequence, what is compulsion for one may be freedom for another, and vice versa.

Moreover, there is one order of compulsion which is generally favorable to the maintenance of status-group morale. This is the compulsion to secure status through membership in a given group simply because there exist no alternative opportunities. Just as some food, however poor and inadequate, is better than no food at all, so any status role is generally preferable to no status role. And it often happens, even in modern democratic societies, that the individual has few if any alternatives against which to assess his status in a given group. As a member of the sole local country club, whatever dissatisfactions the individual feels will of necessity be equated against the dissatisfac-

¹⁰ This assumption underlies the perennial false hope on the part of democratic peoples that they can win wars and other kinds of conflict with nondemocratic peoples by default. It was widely believed in the United States during the early years of World War II that both the Japanese and German peoples were inherently weak, since they worked and fought only under strong political compulsions. Subsequently it was believed that however efficient they might be in the conduct of war, they had for the same reasons inherently low morale and would crack under the strain of adversity; *i.e.*, that as a people the regimented Japanese and Germans were good winners but would prove to be poor losers. During the early years of the so-called cold war with Russia, American political and military leaders—and, presumably, the lay citizen—took considerable comfort from the belief that since under the Soviet system workers both in industry and agriculture are under strong legal compulsions to stay by their assigned tasks, their morale and consequently their productivity were low. Neglected in all these and similar hopeful assumptions are two relevant facts: that the right to choose one's work, residence, etc., is a cultural rather than universal or natural value; and that the compulsion which stems from a lack of alternative sources of status reinforces rather than lowers group morale.

S. Lens (*The Counterfeit Revolution*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1952) has used the "no alternative" concept in an interesting effort to explain the successful maintenance and extension of power by the Russian Communists.

tions of belonging to no club of this particular kind; as a conscripted soldier, the irksome obligations and paucity of rights can be evaluated only against the status which will be accorded him as a conscientious objector or as a deserter; etc.

On the whole, it would seem that the more status-group alternatives there are and the more varied these alternatives are, the less is the incentive for the members of any given group to make the best of the satisfactions provided by that group. Where there are many alternatives available, the individual tends to shop around among them, in his mind's eye, if not by direct experience; and if he finds his status in a given group at all irksome, he will be far more inclined to shirk his group obligations or even to drop his membership than he would be if he had few alternatives available to him. Thus during times of economic prosperity industrial and other workers are far more prone to quit their jobs at small provocation—an indication of low group morale—than they are when business is slack and jobs are relatively scarce; likewise, when there is plenty of rental property available, a family that is dissatisfied with one or another of the neighboring families may simply change residence rather than attempt, as it would if housing were scarce, to get along with the less-than-perfect neighbors.

In modern American society compulsion is less often perhaps a factor in the maintenance of group morale than it is elsewhere. No doubt the recent concern of industrial management over the morale of workers stems in considerable part from the fact that the American worker, who is relatively mobile and who has, at least during periods of prosperity, numerous job alternatives, is under little compulsion to put up with inequities of any sort; as a consequence, the morale of American workers is perhaps somewhat more tenuous than is that of workers who are under greater compulsions, legal or otherwise, to stay on the job. No doubt, too, the morale of formal clubs, of residential neighborhoods, of villages and small towns, and of other kinds of groupings in modern America is for similar reasons somewhat less stable than it is in societies where the available alternatives are few. Thus it is, perhaps, that the English and French villager will put up with inadequate and even to him distressing physical facilities without doing anything more vigorous than grumbling, whereas under similar conditions the American villager would probably demand an improvement and, if such improvement were not forthcoming, move somewhere else. The complacency, as it may seem to Americans, with which people in other lands put up with a variety of inconveniences and even hardships is in large part a reflection of their different values; but in some instances what may seem to be complacency is in reality resignation bred of the fact that those involved have no alternative. No doubt the English industrial worker would prefer to work in a comfortable, heated, well-lighted and well-ventilated shop; but since he has no opportunity to do so, he and his fellow workers endure their physical discomforts as one of the normal

penalties for being an industrial worker. Because they must put up with such discomforts, those discomforts do not, as they might with the American worker, make for a lowering of morale.

MORALE-MAINTAINING DEVICES

Every established status group utilizes in some form or other one or more of a number of devices that serve the core group value, survival, by functioning to maintain group morale; and every developing status group, formal or informal, tends to acquire some of these devices along with its other structural attributes. In one sense these devices are not group norms but are supplements to group norms, for they function as indirect controls to encourage individual conformity to the norms of the group. But in another sense they are themselves norms, since the individual is induced to adhere to them in the same ways that he is induced to conform to the regular norms of his role. They may perhaps be described as norms for the maintenance of other norms.

The distinctions involved here can be simply illustrated by the conventional wedding ceremony. Whatever the society and whatever its particular nature, the ceremony serves primarily to impress upon the participants—bride and groom, relatives, friends, and all other concerned persons—the fact that a new marital unit is being established and that thereafter the social roles of bride and groom relative to each other, each to all others, and all others to each will be somewhat different from what they were in the past. In our society, for example, the bride's mother has impressed upon her the fact that she is "losing" her daughter and becoming a mother-in-law; the eligible girls in the community are in effect being told that thereafter the groom is no longer fair game; the bride and groom are being impressed with the fact that their commitment is a serious and, in the Roman Catholic Church, an irrevocable one; etc. Furthermore, the couple entering marriage is being assured by all the attentions of the ceremony that their union is sanctioned and that it is important not only to them but to all the others who are participating in the ceremony. Thus they are in theory, and perhaps often in actuality, set off on the inevitably troublesome course of marriage with great expectations, *i.e.*, with high morale. They each have considerable conviction that the relationship is and will subsequently continue to be personally satisfying; hence they each are more anxious than they might otherwise be to preserve the marriage; and this desire in turn means that they are willing to conform to the norms of their respective new roles—in the modern world, the wishes of each other and the compromise arrangements that they jointly work out.

But while the marriage ceremony is primarily a device for the inauguration of high morale, it is also a complex of norms more or less effectively enforced upon those who enter into marriage. When the family was highly institutionalized in the West, as it still is among the masses of Asia, conformity to the norms of the complex roles required by the marriage ceremony was requisite to being married. Even with us, going through a simple civil ceremony is

usually the minimum condition upon which two people can become married; and for a great many—including all devout Catholics—a church service is the minimum, and the normal includes formal engagement, formal announcement, the receipt and acknowledgment of presents, a more or less elaborate reception after the church ceremony, etc. While the traditional procedures are no longer a cultural compulsion, it is nevertheless still true that if the bride-to-be or her mother desires an elaborate and drawn-out ceremony, the groom-to-be must conform or risk loss of status in the eyes of his future wife and, perhaps, many others.

In effect, then, a marriage ceremony, like the other devices to be discussed shortly, is a means of fostering conformity to the norms of marriage; at the same time the ceremony itself is a pattern of norms that the individual is required to conform to. On the whole, morale-maintaining devices are sufficiently rewarding to those involved so that adherence to these norms does not need to be encouraged by social controls; and such devices tend to be self-maintaining, which is one of the reasons why they often continue in use after their morale-maintaining function has disappeared.

Ceremonies, Ceremonials, Rites, and Rituals. In both common and sociological usage the terms "ceremony" and "ritual" are interchangeable; and for some specific kinds of ceremonies sociologists and anthropologists usually prefer the term "rite," *e.g.*, a puberty rite or marriage rite. Occasionally the term "ritual" is used in a derogatory sense to indicate a ceremony that has lost its original function and is followed only because it pleases the performer to follow it; and by extension the term is also used to indicate an individual's own peculiar and fixed way of doing some commonplace thing, such as setting the table for dinner.

The common element of meaning in all such usages is a traditional form of action that is valued for itself. As was indicated above, ceremonies are usually enjoyed by all, or at least most, of the participants. Whether or not the ceremony serves any further function depends upon the context in which it occurs; if it does, the participants are quite likely to be unaware of that function—in fact, the functions of institutional ceremonies are usually obscured by ideological mumbo jumbo.

Some of the ceremonies and ceremonials (minor forms of action) observed in modern society—and the same is to some extent true of any society—are survivals from an earlier time which have lost much if not all of their original morale-maintaining and other functions. They are like the whatnot, the old spinning wheel, or the Early American whisky bottle that is preserved for its sentimental or artistic value; they serve no useful purpose but are enjoyed, as was mentioned in the preceding chapter, for themselves alone. On the other hand, many of our ceremonies and ceremonials, while equally enjoyable for themselves alone, are definitely functional devices.

The simplest of these devices is the fixed ceremonial by which the members of a group greet one another. All groups have some such special form. It may

be, as it usually is with adolescent cliques, crude and obvious—a simple gesture, an unconventional term, or an unusual inflection of the voice; and whatever it is it may be changed from time to time. It may be and often is but a slight variant on the conventional handshake, recognizable to the initiated as a special sign. It may be, on the other hand, a rather complex form of the sort that the members of a number of so-called secret societies affect. Whatever the form is—and the particular form is important only to the members of the particular group who use it—the greeting ceremonial is a symbol signifying recognition as a member, whether it is the password necessary to gain entrance to the secret conclave of a secret society or, as is more commonly the case, simply a sign by which one member of a group recognizes the presence of and thereby accords status to another. Being recognized by one's kind is the minimum sign of group acceptance by which members of the group signal the difference between fellow members and nonmembers. Just as to be granted admission to the "exclusive" Stork Club is a gratifying experience to those who place a high value on mingling with New York's café society, so being recognized as one of the gang is gratifying to the adolescent, and being given the sign of acceptance by a coworker is pleasing to the physician, the lawyer, the stenographer, or the machinist.

The greeting ceremonial tends to maintain the value of group membership to the individual by recurrently reminding him of the distinction that exists between belonging and not belonging. It is one of the many devices by which groups endeavor to keep clear and to stress the contrast between themselves and all others. In the more highly structured status groups the greeting ceremonial is often a recognition of the rank or office of the individual. The military salute, by which one of subordinate rank recognizes the presence of a superior, is a simple and very widespread example of ceremonial recognition of rank differences; so, too, is the deference with which men in polite society once recognized the presence of women. Status-group ceremonials of the same order may include special terms of address, such little rites as rising when the elder (or president or other officer) approaches, preferential treatment in seating at table or elsewhere, etc.¹¹ As signs or indications of special respect, of admiration, and even reverence, these ceremonials are often highly valued and jealously guarded. They constitute, as was indicated earlier, rights of rank or office; when rank or office is only honorary, ceremonial recognition may be the only special right that accrues to these special roles. In such instances the only group function that these ceremonials can serve is that of aiding in the maintenance of group morale. They do this by making otherwise empty rank and office roles valuable, thus providing a sort of extra value to membership in the group, both for those who occupy such roles and those who can hope to achieve them in due course.

¹¹ For interesting illustrative materials drawn from contemporary society see J. H. Bos-sard and E. S. Boll, *Ritual in Family Living* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1950).

The establishment of a variety of ranks within the membership and of a wholly irrational number of offices is a favored device of some of the more formal kinds of status groups. In many recreational clubs, and most especially in prestige associations such as local chapters of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and in secret societies such as the Masonic order, the maintenance of purely honorary ranks and offices might seem to be the sole purpose of the group. It is apparently in part at least through the ceremonials surrounding such ranks and offices that the members are led to value their membership and the group as a whole is supplied with satisfaction-providing activities.

Induction and Indoctrination Rites. Actual acceptance into the membership of any established group is always contingent upon the satisfactory fulfillment of some designated form. The form may be either a selection procedure or an induction rite, of which baptism of infants into the Church is a cultural example, or, where selection and induction are interwoven, a combination of the two. The nature of the form varies widely from group to group and may be more or less complex; but its functions are everywhere much the same—that of testing, if only in a ritualistic way, the acceptability of the individual for membership and that of impressing upon him the value of membership and hence the desirability, from his own as well as the group's point of view, of his conforming to the group norms.

Where, as is often the case, a group as a whole is able to select from a number those few whom it will accept into membership, the procedure that is followed has, or is supposed to have, the effect of discriminating between potentially desirable and undesirable members. In some kinds of groups, the sponsoring of the individual by an established member is sufficient to obtain for him initial acceptance, a procedure that must work fairly well in very small and intimate groups such as a friendship coterie, since the sponsor stakes his status in the group upon his judgment of the one whom he sponsors. At the opposite extreme are the formal and relatively mechanical procedures by which such organizations as colleges and universities select students for admission and those by which governmental bureaus and corporations select their personnel. Somewhere between are the methods used by college fraternities in determining to which few of the many students they will offer membership.

With such small and intimate groups as friendship coteries, informal clubs, and business partnerships, selection usually involves considerable pretesting; the sponsored candidate may be given careful scrutiny by all members and, perhaps, invited to participate in the group on a guest basis; or else election to membership is a reward for good performance in some other and subsidiary group. Moreover, candidates for admission are usually drawn from a population (*e.g.*, sons of members) that is long and well known to most of the members. Highly institutionalized groups, such as the Chinese family and the Western family of a century or two ago, invariably included within their structure complex procedures whereby new members were selected from outside the group and then ceremonially inducted into membership. This was, for

example, the function of the elaborate and traditional procedures through which Chinese parents secured brides for their sons—and in the process, servant girls for the household. In Western societies the courtship procedure, like the wedding ceremony which marked its successful completion, was until recently both traditional and, on the whole, a means of assuring parents that their sons-in-law and daughters-in-law would be persons acceptable in these family roles. Among primitives even more elaborate procedures, such as those surrounding both exogamy and endogamy, are often followed in the selection and induction of wives into the family and tribal or other institutional groupings.

Groups that are unable to determine who shall come up for admission, such as work groups in a factory, bureaucracy, military establishment, or other large organization and such as residential communities, usually have some rather fixed and quite elaborate procedure by which the person thrust upon them by higher authority or by circumstance is tested for worthiness. Whatever the nature of the particular test, it partakes of the qualities of trial by ordeal; *i.e.*, the person is subjected to duress of some sort and must come through in satisfactory fashion.¹²

There is probably an empirical basis for the kinds of tests used by various kinds of groups, the particular test being one that gives a rough measurement of the individual's fitness for membership in the particular group. One of the standard and highly traditionalized tests applied to the novice by work groups of all sorts is that of subjecting him to a series of practical jokes; and one of the standard jokes is sending him for some nonexistent tool, a tiring, embarrassing, and fruitless endeavor during which he is passed from place to place. These jokes are played for the fun that the members of the group get out of them; nevertheless, they serve as a trial by ordeal, since the spirit and fortitude with which the new worker takes the razzing determines in considerable part his acceptability into the group. If he behaves in what is deemed a too-smart manner, if he rebels, or if he breaks down under the strain, he will probably be adjudged respectively too independent, too ill-tempered, or too much of a weakling to be taken into the inner circle.

Most of the test procedures used by groups subject the novice to some sort of indignity or pain or else put him on his mettle under conditions that set his personal concerns—such as his pride—in conflict with his desire to gain good standing in the group. For example, the public hazing of the pledge by a college fraternity requires the pledge to make a fool of himself in public to make himself acceptable to the group. Such devices are, in effect, loyalty tests; and

¹² For an analysis of the primitive *rite de passage* by which the boys of a tribe are inducted, with considerable ordeal on their part, into the status of manhood see M. H. Watkins, "The West African 'Bush' School" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 49, pp. 666-675, 1943). For other materials on ritual as a control mechanism in a primitive society see C. Kluckhohn, *Navaho Witchcraft* (Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, Mass., 1944).

they are given on the implicit assumption that the addition of a loyal person to membership will contribute to group morale, while a disloyal person will have adverse effects on group morale.

Among those work groups subjected to constant hazard, such as construction workers and lumbering crews of a generation ago, there is a tendency to test out the new worker (whether he be a beginner or an experienced hand) through trial by combat, *i.e.*, by requiring him, quite informally of course, to fight it out with one or more of the members. Fighting among the younger men may be simply a revelous outlet for their physical energies or psychological tensions; and fighting is sometimes the route to leadership within a group. But it can also be a test of the individual's physical courage, such courage being highly important for the members of any group that is subject to danger and that is, from time to time, dependent for its safety upon the willingness of a fellow worker to risk his life on behalf of the others. Among such groups the label "coward" or, more commonly, "yellow-bellied bastard" is a feared stigma.

Among academic status groups, on the other hand, the physical courage of a neophyte is of no concern. He is tested in more or less standardized ways, all of which are extremely devious, for his intellectual fitness, for his ability to teach—or at least to avoid arousing criticism of his teaching—for his personal acceptability to the other members of the department, and, most especially, for what is usually called his "promise," a judgment of how well he will wear over the years and decades. For since the expectation in this profession is that the man given final acceptance will stay on in the group until he retires, an effort is made to anticipate what he will be like as a person and coworker years hence. That such evaluations are far from reliable is attested by the presence in many academic work groups of unproductive and disagreeable members who are tolerated, because they must be, but are otherwise disregarded.

Such residential groupings as rural hamlets, villages, and established neighborhoods in cities apply devious tests to those who move into their midst. Such groups commonly make a categorical distinction between visitors, such as tourists and summer dwellers, and newcomers to the community. To the latter they characteristically apply tests of quality, the outcome of which will determine the warmth of the welcome given the newcomers and the rank within the community which will initially be accorded them. The character of a family's household goods, their clothing, the way they treat one another—and little escapes the watchful eyes and attentive ears of the old-timers—and their conduct in public may be used as tests by which the quality of the newcomers is judged. Meanwhile, the children of the family will be put by their own peers to more forthright tests; small boys, for example, may be required to demonstrate their physical skill and courage by fighting with a succession of playmates.

In a long-established village or neighborhood the criteria of acceptability are invariably local, detailed, and rigid. To one community the possession

among their household goods of a goodly supply of wineglasses (or perhaps beer glasses) may be a strong point in favor of the newcomers; to another community the same thing may be forever damning. Middle-class housewives almost everywhere are inclined to judge the newly arrived housewife in terms of her housekeeping techniques and standards; if it is the local consensus that she is a poor housekeeper, they may consider her an undesirable neighbor in all respects.¹³ Male suburbanites likewise tend to judge a new householder by the skill and care with which he tends his lawn, how he treats his car (and, possibly, what kind of car he owns), and the like. In some instances a future neighbor will be prejudged by the very kind of house that he has built for himself; in an area of conservative homes, for example, the ultramodern house under construction may be taken as an indication that the owner and his wife are either the naïve victims of architect and contractor or people of pretension and superficiality.

Generalizations drawn from this sort or any other kind of test are, of course, simple and untrustworthy stereotypes; but they provide the members of a group with something to go on in deciding how rapidly and fully to extend the rights of membership to new neighbors, fellow workers, etc. As will be shown later, acceptance into full membership does not always assure tenure in the group; nor does hesitance to accept always preclude ultimate granting of membership. On the other hand, cautious acceptance of new members aids in the maintenance of group morale in at least two ways: by reducing the chances of admitting to membership people who will not sufficiently value membership and who will, therefore, be reluctant to conform to the group norms; and by impressing on both the selected and the members who do the selecting and testing the exclusive character and hence desirability of membership in the group.

Incoming members of a group not only are tested in some way or other but are often put through some process of training for the obligations of their roles. Since the means by which the group presses the established individual member into conformity with its norms will be discussed in the following chapter, it need only be remarked here that formal indoctrination rites, such as those by which one gains admission and progresses up the various ranks of the Masonic order, are always more impressive than educational. Indoctrination rites of this kind serve mainly as an opportunity for the group to convey in subtle and covert ways the obligations of membership. What the individual is "taught" is some meaningless rigmarole; what he meanwhile acquires through association with his teachers is some appreciation of the values and sentiments of the group.

Ceremonial Occasions. Many status groups, especially those with a

¹³ Hence the use in soap and detergent advertising of appeal to the fear of the housewife that the neighbors will observe that the wash hanging on her line is less than clean (e.g., "tattle-tale grey"), as it will be if she does not use the advertised product.

formal structure and long tradition, have stated occasions upon which the entire membership gathers to eat, to listen to speeches, or whatnot. Such occasions are true ceremonies, for the forms are fixed and followed mainly because they are traditional. They are always supposed to be enjoyable in themselves, and no doubt they sometimes are. All have, however, the long-run significance of maintaining morale. The mere act of eating together gives a sense of intimacy and belonging; for the world around, the act of eating together implies good will and friendliness, probably because it is normal to eat in the company of friends and in an atmosphere of relaxation (the major exception being the hasty consumption of food at a modern American lunch counter). Ceremonial eating adds to this sense; it is typified by extravagance—or, as Veblen termed it, “conspicuous consumption”—and the participants usually appear in their best clothing and wearing their best manners, both of which are conducive to a feeling of self-importance. As he glances around the heavily laden table at his fellow members, the individual may, in effect, remark to himself on what a fine group of people they are and how fortunate he is to be numbered among them.

Speeches, usually taking the form of testimonials on behalf of the group, probably have slight value in themselves; but the giving of speeches by officeholders, by members about to become officeholders, or by members who have for the moment some special claim to fame—*e.g.*, who have returned after adventures elsewhere—serves at once as a reward to the speaker for good conduct and as a promise to envious members that someday they, too, may be asked to say a few words to the group as a whole.¹⁴ Presumably, it is in much the same way that the elaborate rites of elevation in rank and to office that are followed by the Masonic order and many other formal groups operate to sustain member morale. It is, in fact, largely through the device of ceremonial occasions that the formal group gives recognition to the individual member. In small and intimate groups the same end is often accomplished by more

¹⁴ In large organizations, such as an army or an industrial corporation, where it is impossible to honor individuals by any such ceremonial observance, attempts are often made to achieve the same ends by the routine granting of tangible symbols of distinction—*e.g.*, the service stripes of the soldier and the railroad conductor or the ribbons and medals given by military organizations to those who have participated in various wartime actions, served in various areas, or won special honors by conduct “beyond the call of duty.”

The value within the organization of any symbol of rank or office and of any badge, medal, or ribbon indicative of special achievement is evidently in inverse relation to the proportion of the membership qualified to wear that symbol. The ability to “buy” morale by the granting of such symbols is very limited. During World War I, for example, the French gave out so many *Croix de guerre* to their own and Allied troops that the man who wore the ribbon was more an object of derision than of admiration. In an experiment conducted by the American Army during World War II, it was found that lavish granting of medals to combat troops quickly devaluated those medals. See H. Zentner, “Morale: Certain Theoretical Implications of the Data in The American Soldier” (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 301–302, 1951).

casual and subtle means, as it is when fellow workers express admiration for some accomplishment of one of their number or chip in to buy some small present for one starting off on a vacation.

Even the august meetings of scientific societies involve activities that can only be described as morale-maintaining ceremonial occasions. Thus the traditional presidential dinner, which is the high point of most scientific meetings, is little more than an excuse for eating and drinking expensively and possibly to excess and for a ritualistic exchange of honors. The latter consists, according to custom, of lavishly introducing to the assembled members their elected president, who presents a paper which compliments the members on the great progress that they have made in their science, and of the members in turn listening respectfully and at appropriate points applauding vigorously. All this is supposed to, and possibly does, contribute to the morale of the group as a whole.

Procedural Rites. Many status groups, especially those which lead a noncompetitive existence within the protective custody of a bureaucratic organization, tend to acquire with the passage of time a traditionalized reverence for procedure and a stock of procedural rites. Various designated in the lay language as busywork and red tape, procedural rites are usually survivals from a time when they had a utilitarian function. Thus in a government office it may be the practice to type all letters in triplicate, carefully filing one of the copies in one set of files and the other copy in another set of files for reasons long since forgotten. Most long-established groups adhere to one or more antiquated procedures; and it sometimes comes as a shock to the members when one among them discovers that they have been doing this thing simply through force of habit.

Although some procedural rites are antiquated norms that are completely pointless, many of them serve a morale-maintaining function by giving a meaning to participation in the group. This is particularly apparent in work groups that have little work to do or work that no longer needs to be done and in prestige groups. There is, for example, practically nothing for the local members of the Daughters of the American Revolution and, to be impartial about this, Phi Beta Kappa, to do; the principal value of membership stems from the fact that it gives prestige elsewhere. But to justify its existence the group must at least make motions; so it elects officers who write reports that no one reads and occasionally holds meetings which few attend and at which nothing happens. The fact that they go through motions and that members take turns at serving as officers places just sufficient demands on the time and energies of the members to justify the group's existence.

The Claim to Social Significance. The group that is largely dedicated to the preservation and fulfillment of a body of procedural rites is likely also to claim that it has special social significance. High morale invariably involves member acceptance of the idea that they—the group—are in some respects superior as well as distinctive. But with many groups, being superior simply

means being better able to provide satisfactions to the members than are other groups of the same kind, as when the members of a country club say of themselves that, while their clubhouse is nothing special, the Saturday night parties held there are delightfully informal and, after all, it is the spirit of a club rather than its clubhouse that makes all the difference. Rationalizations of this sort stress the value of the group to the members rather than to society at large.

The claim to social significance, on the other hand, involves the assertion that what the group does and what it represents is valuable to, if not always valued by, society at large. Such a claim may aid in the maintenance of group morale by sharpening the distinction between members and nonmembers; and it seems to be especially important in this respect when the activities of the group and what it represents are held in disdain or outright contempt by the society at large. On the whole, therefore, it is usually groups with a low or a declining position in the larger society that resort to this particular morale-maintaining device.

The claim to social significance takes many forms. Local historical societies, the smug elites of old towns, and many other kinds of groups often pose as defenders of fine old traditions against the inroads of new, superficial, and transitory peoples and forces.¹⁵ Hobbyists of one sort and another often speak rather mystically of the value of preserving the fine old craft that it is their pleasure to play at. The gradual professionalization of social-welfare services has somewhat dampened the social-welfare claim which was a favorite of women's clubs and associations a half century ago; but there are still some groups which take a dilettante interest in welfare work and profess that as their excuse for existence. Closely related are the many groups that dabble in some form of social reform—including those groups of men and women to be found in almost every locality who run to the support of the latest organization to prevent or make war, to save or spend taxes, to spread or check socialism, to preserve liberty or to avoid one of the inevitable consequences of liberty, etc.

By far the most frequent and least meaningful claim to social significance is that raised by modern art and literary cliques. In many societies, and not long ago in our own cultural history, workers in the arts and men of letters

¹⁵ The posing and posturing of those who considered themselves the social elite of America toward the close of the last century and the early part of this have been amusingly recorded by C. Amory in *The Proper Bostonians* (Dutton, New York, 1947) and *The Last Resorts: A Portrait of American Society at Play* (Dutton, New York, 1952).

The following anecdote, which was widely circulated in Europe in 1952, reflects something of the European view of the British and illustrates what might be termed the ultimate in national morale. An English diplomat proposed to a Czech girl, who said that she loved him but feared that her mother would object to her marrying a foreigner. The outraged diplomat explained that he was an Englishman, she was the foreigner. The girl smiled and replied, "But you forget—we are in Prague, not London." To which he answered, "My dear, truth does not depend on geography!"

have had a social status both high and assured, a status comparable to that which is currently accorded scientists and technicians. There was then no need to defend themselves either individually or as an occupational class. Even today, those artists and writers who work in an accepted medium—*i.e.*, painters who paint pictures of something recognizable by the layman, musicians who compose playable music, and authors who write readable fiction—seem generally to be little concerned with the social significance of their products. But the *avant garde* is forever insisting upon the significance to society at large of its latest artistic forms. When made by working craftsmen such claims differ not at all in principle from those made by the producers of any unpopular commodity. When made by nonproductive arty cliques, however, the same claims serve only to justify group values and activities—which consist in good part of talk about the value of this or that art form—that are for some reason unjustifiable in themselves.

Argot, Jargon, and Bureaucratic Jabberwocky. Just as most status groups have a special sign by which the members welcome or recognize one another, many such groups have special words and word usages known only, or at least mainly, to members of the group.¹⁶ The argot of thieves, the Latin of priests, and the circumlocution of lawyers represent markedly deviant and fully developed status-group languages; at the other extreme are the few special word meanings and the secret term or two that may be used by the members of a simple friendship clique.

In some instances the special language may aid the group in achieving its recognized functions; the jargon of scientists is in part necessitated by the fact that the knowledge of scientists transcends the lay language, and the argot of criminals may at times permit them to communicate secretly. No doubt the well-nigh secret language of the professional bureaucrat also has its practical uses. It at least serves as a form of protective coloration. Bureaucracies, both public and private, are dependent upon and therefore sensitive to their status in the society at large. Every bureaucracy soon learns that any announced policy will offend some special-interest groups and that any action it may take will run counter to some, usually vocal, interests. Out of such experiences a bureaucracy acquires what might be called a passion for anonymity and,

¹⁶ The following example, an account of his misadventures by a gunman sentenced to ten years in San Quentin for shooting, will give some idea of how deviant a group language can be: "Th' nex' mornin' they try t' hang th' torpedoin' on me, but the [crooked] beak gets th' office, an' comes down. He goes f'r me, puts me on th' bricks, an' hands me two grand an' tells me t' breeze th' burg; which I does. Well, when I hits Frisco th' bulls know me. They frisk me an' pipes the case dough. I tries t' tell 'em it's square jack, but they don't fall, an' th' next thing I knows I'm doing a spot in college." (Quoted by *Time*, July 31, 1950, p. 68.)

For compilations and analyses of three different kinds of argot see E. Partridge, *A Dictionary of the Underworld* (Macmillan, New York, 1950); F. Elkin, "The Soldier's Language" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 414-422, 1946); and W. Granville, *Sea Slang of the Twentieth Century* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1950).

along with all the other standard paraphernalia of bureaucratic organization, a system of double talk whereby rulings and policy announcements may be more or less accurately communicated to members of the bureau without providing a clear and therefore assailable statement for the public at large.¹⁷ Bureaucratic and other political double talk operates on the principle that "a vague word engenders no wrath." On a limited scale, the small boys' play gang learns the same lesson and develops its secret terms for activities that are frowned upon by adults.

But the major function of the argot of criminals, the jargon of scientists, and the jabberwocky of bureaucrats is the maintenance of morale. And such would seem to be the sole function of the esoteric language affected by every arty clique, the special terms and grammatical forms used by sport and other cultists, and the secret terms invented by the adolescent gang. The special language of a group aids somewhat in keeping the distinction between member and nonmember clear; it often lends a bit of magic to otherwise commonplace group activities; and it may gain prestige for the group in the eyes of nonmembers. Together with shared special "knowledge," group myths and legends, and ritualistic jokes, the special language of a status group fosters an in-group quality. Especially when the value of the group to its individual members is dubious and transitory, the quality of in-groupness thus obtained, spurious though it may be, is often a significant factor in the maintenance of group morale.

¹⁷ In the following news report, the quoted statement of a government official who quite obviously either had nothing to say or did not want to say anything is hardly more comprehensible than the example of criminal argot cited earlier.

"In Washington, the up-to-date word for gobbledygook is 'bafflegab' Last week a speech by an NPA official on materials allocations furnished a prime example:

"We are peaking our program philosophically, but it is naïve to assume the allotment program is an equity program unless the allotments are so abysmally low that they permit the agency to relax and allow market determination as a percentage of base period, side-tracking military return with adjustments.

"This is based on use levels proportionately and is in the market test sense. We now have a quantitative framework with marginal qualitative allocations to formalize the procedure for further refining and implementing of our objectives." (*Time*, Mar. 24, 1950, p. 89.)

That bureaucratic jargon is not a peculiarly American phenomenon is illustrated by the examples of British bureaucratic language provided by E. Partridge in *Chamber of Horrors* (British Book Center, New York, 1953).

Chapter 9

THE TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL CONTROL:

I. BASIC PROCESSES

A high level of group morale is essential to effective social control, but it is in no way a substitute for it. A high level of morale simply assures that most of the members of the group will more or less willingly conform most of the time to most of the group norms and that they will be inclined to make some current sacrifices in order that the group as such may endure. It does not mean that all the members will conscientiously and consistently fulfill their status obligations, that they will be wholly satisfied with their status rights, and that they will willingly make current sacrifices for the good of the group when required to do so. Unanimity of this sort is an ideal never actually encountered in social life.

His Brother's Keeper. In any status group there is always some variation among the members in degree of conformity to the norms. Although morale may be high, some member or members are certain to place less value on membership than do most; some member or members will be less well trained in status obligations than the majority; some member or members will be more tempted by external circumstances to shirk an obligation or exceed a right than the rest. When the tendency of any member to deviate from the norms of the group and the norms for his special role within the group exceeds or threatens to exceed the group tolerances, the survival of the group is jeopardized and a current sacrifice is required of the other members. This current sacrifice, which will be forthcoming if group morale is high, is assumption of responsibility for the conduct of the deviant member.

There are, no doubt, some people who relish holding others up to ridicule or worse for failure to live up to group standards of conduct, who enjoy spying on their fellow men, who gain much personal satisfaction from the sense of superiority that calling others to task may provide, etc. The "holier than thou" attitude is occasionally found among all peoples and in all places. Every primitive tribe has its parallels to our stereotypes of the sadistic reformer, the scandalmonger, and the malicious gossip. Those who enjoy playing unofficial and exceedingly stern policeman for a status group are, however, the exceptions. They are certainly not well and adequately adjusted to their group status; their hypercritical set toward the other members reveals personal dissatisfaction and jealousy. Nonetheless they may inadvertently serve the group well. The carping critic, the local gossip, and the self-designated guardian of

public morals constantly and eagerly do what every good member may on occasion feel himself called upon to do, *i.e.*, participate in the exercising of social control.

The assumption of responsibility for the conduct of fellow members is not a normal obligation of status-group membership; group norms do not ordinarily include the command "watch over thy brother's behavior." But to the extent that the individual values his membership in the group, he has, and usually recognizes, a personal interest in the conduct of the other members. That interest is obvious in the case of those member obligations through which his own status rights are fulfilled. If the member whom he greets pleasantly fails to return his greeting in kind, the failure is to his personal disadvantage; if one mother in a neighborhood fails to take her turn at minding the neighborhood children, all the other mothers lose and are aware of the loss. Where the norm is one that involves cooperation—as distinct from simple exchange—the disadvantage of one individual's nonconformity is not always self-evident. If one of a number fails to bring to a picnic the food or equipment that has been assigned to him, each of the others is certain to perceive the loss to him that this omission has caused. Not so evident, however, is the loss to each member wrought by the failure of one member of a club to pay his dues or by the destruction of club property by another member. Still less evident is the hazard to a group's prestige in the larger society, and hence indirectly to the interests of each of the members, of conduct unbecoming to a member of the group, *i.e.*, violation of a norm which has as its major function protection of the group from external criticism. A case in point would be unethical conduct on the part of a physician; another would be drunken and disorderly conduct on the part of a member of the local Baptist Church.

Nevertheless, the members of a status group usually perceive, however dimly, or at least can be made to perceive by leadership, that the welfare of the group as a whole requires reasonable conformity to its norms on the part of all members. That established, each member will generally observe that his individual interest as a member demands conformity on the part of all others, just as his interest in maintaining status within the group necessitates his conforming to the norms. It may be doubted that many people participate in enforcing social conformity upon others from a sense of righteousness; they do so, rather, from a sense of self-interest, supplemented at times by a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the members of the groups to which they belong. The idea that deviant conduct in others offends sensibilities—ethical, esthetic, economic, or whatever—and thereby arouses protest and efforts at correction would seem to have very limited validity. In the main, people would seem to be less inclined to hold out for adherence to moral and other codes of conduct on principle than for selfish and practical reasons of calculated self-interest. The rigid moralist may insist that others adhere to his code for their own good or even for the good of some abstract principle. The ordinary man would seem to insist on adherence reluctantly and only to the extent that he

feels that deviation from that code is a threat to his own status—*e.g.*, that his brother's excesses may rebound to his own discredit or expense.

To be upon occasion his brother's keeper is not, therefore, so much a duty that the individual feels toward the group of which both are members as it is a means of self-protection. Ordinarily, what he protects is his own status rights within the given group; and ordinarily, the necessity of protecting those rights comes as an irksome addition to the normal obligations of membership. With the exception of the occasional busybody and scandalmonger, men do not as a rule enjoy being one another's keepers.

The Techniques of Social Control. The methods by which the members of a status group may endeavor, each in protection of his individual interests, to bring a deviant member into conformity to the group norms are many and various but seem to operate on a few universal principles, or more properly, techniques. The description in subsequent pages of the specific methods used in specific kinds of groups are intended only to illustrate the principle or technique under discussion. So far as can be ascertained, the techniques of social control in use today differ neither qualitatively nor quantitatively from the techniques used in primitive societies, both past and present, and in many and various civilizations of the past. The "truth serum" which the Russians are currently reputed to be using to obtain spurious confessions of deviation from political criminals is presumably a method devised by biochemists; but the technique of forcing the individual to incriminate himself is apparently as old as human society. The medieval Inquisitors used the rack and the burning iron for the same purpose, the Chinese sometimes drove splinters of bamboo under the accused's fingernails, and many primitives have used magic rites (trial by ordeal) to extract confessions of guilt. As will be demonstrated, methods of social control may have changed; but apparently the techniques of social control were perfected once and for all in antiquity.

PHYSICAL SANCTIONS

By far the simplest and most direct, but at the same time least frequently employed, method of social control is that of physically punishing the individual for violation of group norms. Physical punishment takes various forms and is variously administered; its effectiveness is, however, limited, since it usually alienates the individual who is so punished and tends to make him less, rather than more, sensitive to other methods of control. The threat of physical punishment, on the other hand, may be subtle and indirect and at times highly effective. While in practice there are infinite graduations from the faintest threat to brutal extermination, all depend upon the individual's abhorrence of physical pain or injury and are effective only to the extent that he fears being physically hurt. They may therefore be considered together as constituting a single technique—physical sanctions.

A Negative Control. A distinguishing characteristic of physical sanctions is the fact that they can be applied only to penalize or punish, never to re-

ward. They are therefore negative in character. All the other techniques have positive as well as negative control possibilities; *i.e.*, the sanction may be applied so as to encourage exceptional loyalty and service to the group. Thus the economic powers of a group may be used not only to penalize the individual who falls short of conformity to a norm, but to reward the individual who does more than conform—a matter to be discussed later—and thereby to encourage exceptional performance on the part of others.

Physical sanctions are always used to discourage substandard performance; no comparable reward can be given for good conduct. The reason is simple: while it is possible to hurt, injure, and destroy an individual, it is not possible to add directly and immediately to his physical status. The dead cannot be returned to life, and the broken bone cannot be restored by group endeavor, and the normal, whole and healthy person cannot be rewarded by the gift of a new arm, another head, or six inches additional height. Social groups do reward good members with physical properties, ranging from sickroom soup to a new roof on the barn; and they can minister to the ill and take care of the wife of a member who died in the service of his group. But such properties and attentions are not the obverse of physical punishment and inflicted death; they are the obverse of economic and psychological punishment.

Even as a horse cannot be made to drink, a man cannot by the threat of physical punishment be made to put his heart and soul into the doing of any task. As a consequence of this limitation, the use of physical sanctions is at once the least important of status-group controls and the least effective, for all but a few purposes, of the devices of leadership. In later chapters consideration will be given to the problems and limitations of such large-scale efforts at control as political enslavement, ancient and modern, and military conquest and to the potentials and disabilities of government as an agency of control. In each instance the analysis will turn upon the negative nature of the physical sanctions by which enslavement, government regulations, etc., are mainly enforced. What follows is therefore not only an analysis of control operations within status groups but is at the same time a demonstration that even on the most intimate and hence favorable level, that of the status group, physical sanctions are limited to the discouragement of malperformance and cannot be so applied as to secure exceptional performance.

Expulsion. Not all status groups can or will subject the incorrigible member to direct physical punishment or even the threat thereof. Fishwives may upon occasion take to their fists, and in every class of every society there are some few women who are capable of physical belligerence. But group-sanctioned use of fists, feet, teeth, and nails is rare among groups of women and the exception rather than the rule among groups of men. All status groups do, however, have the power of physically rejecting intolerable members and upon occasion exercise it. Ultimately physical ejection, as distinct from psychological rebuffing, rests upon the ability of a number of individuals physically to overpower one individual should the necessity to do so arise. Thus a women's club

—or a men's club—that drops a member could, if necessary, as a simple consequence of superior numbers, keep that member out of club gatherings by force. The club will, as a rule, never be called upon to do so; formal notice of discontinuance of membership will discourage almost anyone from turning up at club affairs, and the rare individual who is not discouraged by this means could probably be excluded by someone's slamming the door in his face. But should he persist, trying by physical force to gain entree into the group, the members can and will eject him forcibly. In our society, this would ordinarily be accomplished by calling the police to act for the club members. But police or no, ability to overpower and physically eject is the ultimate defense of any group against an unwanted but persistent ex-member.

Expulsion of a member from a group is grounded on the ability of the group bodily to remove him by physical force; it is, however, usually accomplished through psychological means. Expulsion takes numerous forms, the most complex and subtle of which is perhaps that of exclusion through failure to include. The failure of a friend of the family to be invited to the wedding of its daughter may signify that he has been dropped as a friend of the family; should he fail to get the point, he may then discover that no one is at home to him when he telephones or calls at the house. Failure to include implies, of course, failure to include in affairs in which the individual would normally participate or normally expect to participate. And since membership in any sort of group involves a variety of such expectations, there is always wide opportunity for meaningful failure to include. Neighbors, friendship and other coteries, and work and professional groups can effectively exclude a former member by simply failing to include him in casual conversations, in parties, or in other joint activities.

Formal groups usually have some specified method of arriving at a decision to expel a member and of then making the decision effective. Club membership, for example, may require annual renewal; failure to receive notice of dues, or something of the sort, may be tacitly recognized by all members as tantamount to dismissal from the group. In some instances the decision to expel is ritualized, and the dismissal is effected in the presence of the group, with the result that insult is added to injury in the form of public humiliation. Some highly traditionalized military units, for example, have special court-martial procedures—as distinct from the recognized legal procedures of the army as a whole—by which an officer who is accused of disloyal or degrading conduct is tried. In the former British East India Police it was the practice to drum out those adjudged guilty. In fact, it was for long a standing tradition of Western military life for fellow officers to hold the threat of total disgrace over the individual officer. The consequences to the individual of the modern American "dishonorable discharge" are but a pale suggestion of the disaster which being cashiered from the army once meant.

Among many primitives, expulsion from tribe, clan, or other basic group has been the major form of physical sanction. Typically the tribal elders or

other leadership group have applied this sanction when all else has failed to bring an individual into conformity with group customs and institutional practices or when an individual has violated one of the more sacred tabus—*e.g.*, that against murder. Very often expulsion from a primitive group has been tantamount to a death sentence, since the individual has had no alternative grouping to which he could attach himself. Under the patriarchal family system the patriarch usually had the power to disown a wayward son or daughter, making the disowned an outcast. A remnant of this old practice remains in the legal right of a parent to disinherit a son or daughter grown to maturity; as a means of control the threat of disinheritance is effective only when the parent has considerable economic wealth and the son or daughter is lazy or incompetent.

Historically, many kinds of groups and organizations have used some form of expulsion as a control device.¹ In old China the clan, or "large family," would through its ruling elders remove from the clan records the name of an individual who had persistently dishonored the family name; and he was thereafter denied all the rights of membership. In the Middle Ages the guildsman could be shorn of his guild membership for cause, which meant not only loss of employment but also of many other valued guild rights. The medieval towns and principalities also resorted to expulsion on occasion, with results to the individual not unlike that of loss of citizenship in a modern nation. So common and so disastrous to the individual was expulsion from his town or principality that outcasts often banded together to prey on productive communities (as pirates on the sea or as thieves in the towns) in groups from which they were, in turn, subject to expulsion for violation of the group norms.

In more recent times, expulsion has been used by American towns as a form of extralegal justice, as when alarmed and aroused townsmen rode the object of their wrath out of town tied on a rail. Extralegal, but accomplished by legal representatives of the town or city, has been the long-standing practice of transporting vagrants to the city limits and threatening them with arrest should they be found within the police jurisdiction again and the practice of declaring the jurisdiction "out of bounds" to known, but difficult to convict, criminals and gangsters. The Chinese fighting tongs of early San Francisco for long were able effectively to expel members and others who had seriously offended them; later the police "solved" the fighting-tong problem in the same way; as a consequence the Chinatowns of Eastern cities were in some instances developed mainly by refugees from San Francisco's tongsters or, subsequently, by tongsters driven out by the police.

¹ In some few instances the stigma of the outcast has been stressed and extended to the larger society by branding the person with some visible sign. In Puritan New England the "scarlet letter"—made famous by Hawthorne—was a mark applied to women guilty of adultery. An extensive use of branding was made by the German Nazi Party, who, having ostracized the Jews to the extent of depriving them of most of their legal rights as German citizens, tattooed "J" on the wrists of many of them so that "good" Germans could easily identify those who had been disqualified.

In modern society most professional groups, including doctors, lawyers, and academicians, utilize forms of economic intimidation (to be discussed shortly) that at least border on physical expulsion. By informal decision and through the mechanism of their formal organization, the lawyers of a locality may secure the disbarment of one of their number. His loss is mainly occupational and hence economic, but he is kept from practicing his profession by force—*i.e.*, he has no legal status as a lawyer; and should he attempt to practice, he becomes subject to ultimate physical punishment. Much the same is true of physicians; the local physicians do not throw a member out of practice bodily; but the disqualified physician becomes subject to legal restraints should he persist in the practice of medicine. Among academic groups expulsion is an uncertain and always roundabout procedure; but the philosopher, chemist, historian, etc., can upon occasion be effectively excluded from academic employment, participation in professional meetings, and the like. And again, should the excluded individual persist in trying to secure his former rights, he would be subject to physical restraint.

Status groups that have limited legal jurisdiction over the determination of their membership, such as many work groups and residential neighborhoods, sometimes achieve the expulsion of an intolerable member by trickery of one sort or another. Workers can usually get an undesirable fellow employee discharged; through their union organization workers sometimes effectively black-ball an individual; and the residents of a small town may upon occasion informally conspire to use the local legal machinery to remove from their midst a persistent irritant.

Extermination. In some kinds of groups, rejection of a member by the group takes the form of extermination. The threat or the actuality of death is the most extreme form that physical sanctions can take; yet it exists in every society, and nowhere does the individual have unprovisional assurance of the right to continued life. The rationale—the ideological justification for inflicting death—has varied considerably from society to society and from status group to status group, and it has sometimes changed through time. During one period of the Middle Ages, death was the fate of the unrepentant heretic “because God so decreed”; later the death sentence was justified on the grounds that it was the reasonable punishment for certain crimes against society; currently we justify the death sentence on the grounds that it is a deterrent to others who might be tempted to commit similar crimes, professing that the death sentence is not passed in a spirit of vengeance.

Whatever the rationale and however death is inflicted, the extermination of a member of a social group constitutes permanent, irrevocable rejection. There are many exceptions, but by and large status groups resort to extermination only when an individual, if expelled, might work serious damage on the group. Criminals, revolutionary bands, and others who operate within an antagonistic social context tend to exterminate rather than expel a disloyal individual; for if driven from the group, he would ordinarily be able to go over

to the other side and aid in the capture and punishment of his former friends. It is for the same reason that warlike primitive tribes have usually killed traitors, that at least during times of war modern nations have sentenced disloyal citizens to death, and that at certain times the patriarch of the family has had the institutionalized right to execute as well as disown his sons.² The reasons why modern civil governments on occasion use the death penalty are, however, by no means so clear; at any event there would seem to be nothing consistent about executing a husband convicted of killing his wife and sentencing a gangster-murderer to a term of imprisonment on charges of income-tax fraud.

In contemporary society few status groups, as distinct from governmental units, resort to extermination; in modern law the private group—the family, the neighborhood, etc.—does not hold the power of death over its individual members. Criminals are perhaps the one kind of modern group that consistently and effectively uses extermination as a method of social control. In some instances, however, other kinds of groups sanction the killing of a member. Occasionally, for example, a merchant sailor will “fall overboard,” a construction worker will be “accidentally” killed by a falling tool or a faulty piece of equipment, and a soldier will “happen” to get in the way of his comrade’s bullets. Informal execution of this sort is usually accomplished by one member of the group with the tacit approval of the others. It is invariably the culmination of long and futile efforts by the group to bring the individual into conformity by other means. A rather traditionalized parallel was the old American frontier practice of letting it become known, through responsible members of the community, that so-and-so was now fair game. Anyone who wished to take the risk could then engage to outdraw the sentenced individual. If he won, he was something of a local hero; if he lost, he was buried with honor. Informal and extralegal trial and hanging, particularly of horse thieves and cattle rustlers, by an aroused community was even more common in the frontier West. During the California gold rush a claim jumper was frequently driven out at the point of guns by neighbors who feared that their own claims might be next; if such expulsion failed, he might be unceremoniously shot.³ Extralegal “justice” of these sorts has not, however, always been limited to rough, frontier communities. Until rather recently it was not uncommon for the citizens of settled and normally peaceable towns to take the law into their own hands; sometimes that meant merely driving the victim out of town; sometimes, however, the victim was first coated with tar and chicken feathers to mark him

² A fictionalized, but anthropologically valid, portrayal of the use of extermination by an African tribe to rid itself of an intolerable member is given in the short story “Assassin’s Fee” by W. MacArthur (*Saturday Evening Post*, Dec. 1, 1951). The story suggests the devious means by which the tribe, through the person of its chief, secures the assassination of the intolerable member in spite of the fact that such action is contrary to the law of the British, who exercise political jurisdiction over the tribe.

³ For historical data on these and related practices see R. W. Paul, *California Gold* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1947).

as an outcast—a procedure that usually resulted in death. And if our mystery-story writers are to be believed, it is not uncommon for the members of even the best of modern families to plot, or at least to sanction, the murder of one of their number in order to inherit his wealth or to gain relief from his intolerable nagging.

Physical Punishment. Since the relations of the members of all groups are normally peaceable, any use or threat of force is to that extent a denial of normal membership rights in the group. In many instances, however, physical punishment for violation of group norms is antecedent to expulsion from the group, the latter being the final and desperate measure.

The use of physical punishment as a means of social control must be distinguished from simple interpersonal resort to force. Unless an individual represents some status group and his threat or action is group-sanctioned, the effort is personal and is not a phenomenon of social control. Even though the punisher and the person punished are both members of the same status group, as is often the case, the fighting is person to person; and while it may provoke the group to exercise social control over the belligerents, it is not such control itself. The exception is the use of force in status groups, such as those which form among small boys, in which physical threats and fighting are one of the normal means of achieving rank within the group.

Physical punishment, like expulsion, is for all status groups a latent device of social control; when all else fails, an intolerable member can be threatened and then, if necessary, subjected to physical attack. Even the sedate and middle-aged members of a literary society can be provoked to violence; but they rarely are. And in contemporary society most status groups conduct their affairs through peaceful and symbolic means; when all else fails and physical punishment seems called for, they then usually call upon the police to do their fighting for them—*i.e.*, they invoke the law to protect them from the belligerence of one of their number.

There are, however, many conditions under which status groups themselves resort to physical punishment.⁴ Small boys everywhere are prone to rely on

⁴ Some few uses of physical punishment, such as the spanking and temporary isolation of small children by parents or other responsible adults, seem to be universal. Generally, if not invariably, the use of physical torture is restricted in application to the members of out-groups and to those of large, impersonal organizations, as is any considerable use of imprisonment as a means of punishment; possibly because both torture and imprisonment tend to alienate the individual so treated, status groups tend to avoid these means of physical punishment.

The desire of a status group—if not that of a government or other large organization—is to bring the deviant individual into conformity with its standards, and, up to the point where the group despairs of doing so and resorts to expulsion or extermination, it tends to use methods of physical punishment which hurt but do not at the same time psychologically alienate the individual from the group. Historically, torture seems to have been used mainly in the effort to extract information (or, as during the medieval Inquisition and currently under Communist governments, to extract a confession of guilt). The dismembering or disfigurement of a person as punishment, a common practice in early modern

threats and actual physical assault to restrain or subordinate one of their number. Ganging up on a playmate is normally an effort to bring him into conformity with the group's norms; a boy who refuses to share play equipment with his fellows, one who spoils a gang enterprise by dropping out, or most particularly one who disloyally reveals group secrets to adults is often subjected to a beating either by the group leader or by a number of the members. In the play and work relations of youths, as distinct from children, there would generally seem to be less reliance on physical measures; and in every society there is probably a crude relation between the age of the members of a group and the disinclination of that group to use physical punishment as a means of control.

The character of a people's base culture seems also to play a considerable part in the tendency of groups to resort to force. Among nomadic peoples physical punishment has apparently been more common than among settled agricultural peoples. Possibly the ruggedness and the physical insecurity of certain ways of life are conducive to the use of physical coercion. In our own society, hill and mountain peoples are reputed to be quicker to fight than those who dwell in fertile valley lands; and it is traditional that pirates, brigands, modern gangsters, and all others who live dangerously are quick to resort to force among themselves. At any event, those whose occupational life imposes exceptional physical demands and risks seem to be unusually prone to rely on physical measures. Merchant seamen, longshoremen, construction workers, lumberjacks, miners, and the like are far more likely than doctors, lawyers, teachers, and bookkeepers to engage in physical combat, and much of that combat is group-approved. Probably it is in those groups whose way of life makes physical courage and prowess functionally desirable (a matter that was discussed earlier in connection with induction rites) that physical punishment is culturally most relevant. Just as the hunter is technically prepared to trail and kill his fellow man, so the man who battles nature in one form or another is psychologically qualified to engage in battle with other men.

Physical punishment is seldom, however, an announced policy of status groups. When the elders or the chieftain of a primitive tribe decide that a given individual should be punished and someone is assigned to administer that punishment, the procedure is comparable to punishment under the law in a modern society. When, however, the young men of the tribe turn on one of their number, the process is informal and group-sanctioned, rather than institutionally sanctioned. The same is true of the beatings that criminals may today administer to the criminal who has cheated or otherwise violated the limited but rigid code of criminals.

As a rule, the decision of a status group to apply physical punishment—like most of the important decisions of such groups, whatever their formal structure—is arrived at informally and indirectly through discussions between mem-

Europe, in China, and in some primitive societies, seems to be an alternative to imprisonment and has rarely occurred within status groups.

bers. When some consensus is reached to the effect that the only way to teach the incorrigible member a lesson is to batter him into insensibility, a number of the more youthful and belligerent members may take it upon themselves to waylay that individual and administer the punishment in the privacy of a dark road or clump of trees. Alternatively, the group consensus may be carried out by one informally appointed or self-appointed member, possibly one with a personal as well as group grievance to settle.⁵

Even the most peaceable and responsible of modern communities can indirectly and through due legal process punish its individual members physically. The device, developed in English common law, of subjecting those accused of certain crimes to trial by a jury of their peers has introduced a considerable element of social control into legal control; *i.e.*, it permits local variations in the application of general laws. Such local variations tend to reflect, on the one hand, regional and other differences in values and standards of conduct and, on the other, the social status of an accused person. The consequences of the former will be considered later; the latter basis for variable application of laws is relevant at this point.

Historically, the jury system grew up to provide traveling magistrates with local, "inside" information on the character of an accused person and on the circumstances surrounding the crime. The assumption was that a number of persons drawn from the community in which the crime was committed and in which the accused resided would be better able to determine the true facts of the case than would a magistrate strange to the locality and unacquainted with the details of local life. By such a procedure, moreover, prejudiced, biased, and corrupt magistrates would be restrained, and just decisions would be assured.

In actual practice, trial by jury has operated in widely different ways. At some times and in some places jurors have been less informed and more corrupt than the worst of magistrates, and at other times and places juries have generally rendered almost mechanically objective decisions on the basis of the evidence presented in court. On the whole, however, jury decisions have been and continue to be neither consciously corrupt nor truly objective. Like the primitive trial by ordeal,⁶ jury decisions seem mainly to reflect the established

⁵ An odd variation on the normal process was the practice, rather common apparently in eighteenth-century plantation families in the Old South, of punishing not the son of the household for misbehavior but a Negro alternate—the "whipping boy." How this worked to restrain the son is not clear; nevertheless the somewhat comparable practice of employing an alternate to serve out a prison sentence was common in England for centuries.

⁶ Among many primitive peoples, especially those of Africa, and during certain periods of the Middle Ages in Europe, an accused person was subjected to trial by ordeal. The ordeal, one form of which was to plunge the hand into boiling oil, was supposed to prove the guilt or innocence of the person accused of a crime; *e.g.*, if his hand burned, he was guilty, if it did not, he was innocent. Since the ordeal, whatever it consisted of, was administered by a priest or magic man or other social functionary who could determine the

status of the accused in the community of persons from which the jury is drawn. This is particularly true of small-town juries, with whom the accused ordinarily has a fairly well-defined status; but even in the large city, where the accused is personally unknown to members of the jury, his status with them as a person—a product of their observation of him during the trial, etc.—usually has at least as much bearing upon their decision as the formal evidence presented for their consideration. The tendency of large-city juries to be influenced by the person of the accused is well known to trial lawyers and is embodied in the half-joking idea that it is impossible to get a young and beautiful woman convicted of first-degree murder.

Probably few people ever reflect upon the fact that, should they be accused, justly or not, of a major crime, their standing in the community would count heavily for or against them; few people, it may be assumed, cultivate a good reputation in the hope that a jury will someday find them not guilty of a crime. But through jury decisions communities can and no doubt often do punish a person who has acquired a bad local reputation, not so much for the crime of which he is accused as for his long-standing bad behavior. Moreover, the officials responsible for the conduct of a criminal investigation, the making of criminal charges, and the prosecution of a criminal case are probably as much influenced by factors of status as are the members of juries; that this is so is commonly recognized and must at times serve as a threat to those of bad repute. The man who believes, perhaps quite rightly, that the police "have it in for him" may be encouraged thereby to mend his ways. The frequent assertion that in law as elsewhere "money talks" has a certain validity; but by and large, reputation and symbols thereof speak louder still. It is often difficult in our system to convict a man reputed to be a professional criminal; it is even more difficult to convict one who has over the years earned the respect and admiration of his fellows.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

In every society, primitive or modern, capitalistic or communalistic, the right of the individual to live is sustained by a continuous flow of goods and services—food, clothing, protection from violence, etc. The nature and quantity of those goods and services will depend first upon the particular society and second upon the status which the individual enjoys within that society. Every person, however—rich man, poor man, beggarman, or thief—is, as was indicated earlier, dependent for his maintenance upon the good will of others. As

outcome, it is probable that on the whole, trial by ordeal has been a means by which the local community or the primitive tribe justified the punishment of that member who was in bad repute, whether or not he had committed the particular crime of which he was accused.

For sociopsychological analysis of the ways in which legal agencies in our society may serve as social-control agencies see E. M. Lemert, "The Grand Jury as an Agency of Social Control" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 10, pp. 751-758, 1945); and L. T. Merrill, "The Puritan Policeman" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 10, pp. 766-776, 1945).

a result, changes in the good will of others may and usually do affect the flow of goods and services which the individual enjoys and upon which he is dependent. By a more or less deliberate reduction in those goods and services the individual may be punished for bad conduct; by an increase of his normal flow of goods and services he may be rewarded for exceptionally good conduct. The threat and promise and the actual meting out of such rewards and punishments constitute a fairly well-defined technique of social control which may be designated as economic sanctions. The fact that in our society these sanctions are administered largely through monetary symbols should not obscure their use in societies where no wages are earned, profits made, or goods bought in the market place. In every society status groups rely in considerable measure on economic sanctions to maintain member conformity to the group norms.

Economic Penalization. Not all status groups have the power to reduce the flow of goods and services to an individual member and thereby to penalize him economically. A women's club, an adolescent clique, and other mainly recreational groups neither supply the individual member with goods and services nor have any significant control over them. On the other hand, the ability to administer economic sanctions is not limited to work and other economic groupings. Although a man does not earn his livelihood in the community in which he resides, and although he purchases his goods and services outside that community, his community status may significantly affect his economic welfare. In the first place, and most commonly, the residential community ordinarily renders the individual family a variety of minor services and sometimes even goods as status-role rights. Gardening and other tools that might otherwise have to be purchased may be borrowed from a friendly neighbor; urgently needed household supplies (including the traditional cup of sugar) may be borrowed from nextdoor, saving a special trip to market; surplus garden products may be distributed among the households; a man—or housewife—in need of advice may be able to consult the lawyer or the experienced cook nearby; and so on. In the second place, the residential reputation of an individual may have some bearing on his work status; thus through a chain of friends and acquaintances his reputation with his neighbors may reach his employer or a potential employer.

The loss of the goods and services which are normally provided by neighbors in an urban residential community is likely to be more injurious to a family's pride than its pocketbook, although in a time of crisis, such as illness, neighborly services can be of great material as well as psychological value. It is, however, in the rural community and small village that economic penalization by the residential group is most effective; for there each family not only depends in significant measure upon a neighborly exchange of goods and services but also purchases, and indeed may earn, them from merchants and others who are neighbors. Such functionaries will seldom refuse to serve an unpopular member of the community, but they can do a great deal to annoy and even hamper a householder in poor repute. Even in these days of highly standardized

commodities and fixed prices, the attitude of a merchant toward his customer—to say nothing of that of the local plumber, electrician, or garageman—has a considerable influence on what that customer gets for his money. And although a man's dollar income may be entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the community in which he lives, as it is in the case of one who lives on income from invested capital or who works in a distant city, his real income will depend in some measure upon his local status. If he is thoroughly disliked by neighbors or if he fails to gain their acceptance as one of the community (as often happens with city people who reside in rural areas), his money will buy less than it would were he an accepted and respected member of the community. It is not so much that the local merchants and service people set out to cheat him as that, whenever alternatives arise, they will be disinclined to give him the benefit of the doubt; *e.g.*, the grocer will feel that wilting lettuce is good enough for those Joneses, the plumber will be sure that it serves the Joneses right to be charged for the time he takes off on his way to their place to do a bit of work for those fine people, the Browns, etc.

When, as in the peasant villages of Europe and Asia, the resident is almost wholly dependent for his goods and services on local sources, economic penalization is a powerful weapon of social control. Both what he gets for his labor and what he secures for his money are very largely determined by his community status; he can, in fact, be effectively starved out by his fellow villagers.

Although the growth of large-scale corporate enterprise has depersonalized the production and distribution of many kinds of goods and services, merchants and others who deal directly with consumers are subject to economic penalization. There would seem to be an inverse relationship between the size of a business enterprise and its dependence upon the good will of those it serves;⁷ to the extent that the owners or managers of an enterprise are known personally to its customers, their status as persons determines the status of the business. The vast majority of those who buy and use steel products are no doubt uninterested in the men who manage the corporation that produces them; but they may very well choose the merchant from whom to buy a garden rake, a washing machine, or other product made of steel in terms of his local reputation.

In towns and small cities, merchants, bankers, and other functionaries are highly vulnerable to economic penalization. The local merchant may think of himself as an "independent" merchant or plumber or whatnot, but he is in fact dependent upon the good will of those to whom he offers goods or services. Even the large chain banks and stores (*e.g.*, J. C. Penney's) have found it

⁷ No enterprise ever entirely and for long frees itself from dependence on the good will of the society at large, as the great American corporations ("trusts") of the 1890s discovered to their dismay. The recent growth of public regulation of business, the rise of profit and other business taxation, etc., has made large business enterprises increasingly sensitive to public opinion. To the extent that government regulation and taxation of business reflects general social sentiment, it is, like much other law, grounded in social control.

necessary to cultivate the reputation of being locally managed, if not locally owned; and the local managers are often trained in methods of gaining personal acceptance in the community, such as joining and participating in local businessmen's organizations and in the most popular churches, making appropriate contributions to local charities, serving on various civic committees, etc. While most people, certainly most Americans, may do their buying on a comparative price basis, thus favoring the efficient merchant, noneconomic considerations frequently enter into their decisions. Of two equally efficient merchants in a given community, the one who is personally popular has a considerable advantage; and the higher efficiency (*i.e.*, lower prices) of one merchant may be entirely canceled out by marked personal unpopularity or, as is sometimes the case, the unpopularity of the establishment, which is operated in some way that is offensive or unsatisfactory from the local point of view. The personal popularity of a merchant or other economic functionary is in part a consequence of his personal status as a merchant; but in the long run and in all but the larger cities it usually reflects his general status in the community. If he persistently or flagrantly violates the local norms, his popularity as a merchant tends to decline and his business to suffer. Knowing this, most businessmen are at least somewhat jealous of their reputations as husbands, fathers, and citizens; and much of what is known as community service—*e.g.*, serving in charitable organizations and participating in church activities—really is undertaken because it is good business.

Although the local merchant, as well as the local handy man, is especially vulnerable to economic penalization by the community in which he lives and from which he earns his livelihood, he may not be as dependent economically upon his personal status among fellow merchants as the professional man and the wage earner are upon their fellow workers. The extent to which a man is economically dependent upon his status as a person varies considerably between occupations, but there are few, if any, ways in which a man can earn a livelihood free from the influence of status-group controls, even when his occupation and residence are unrelated, as they commonly are in contemporary society. A trial lawyer may succeed in spite of the fact that he is personally disliked by most other lawyers; and a novelist may prosper although he is personally disagreeable and despised by neighbors, literary agents, and publishers. But even such relatively independent workers are subject to some economic penalization; they must at least overcome by exceptional skill and industry the handicap of being personally disliked by colleagues, agents, publishers, etc. At the other extreme are those who are entirely dependent upon the good will of fellow workers for the very right to work. Nowhere, for example, can a physician practice medicine without the consent of other physicians, and no building-craft worker can hold down a job unless he is acceptable to his fellow workers. Whereas construction workers or seamen might resort to physical sanctions to rid themselves of an undesirable coworker or to bring him into conformity with their norms, bookkeepers, stenographers, mechanics,

junior executives, and others unviolent by inclination would be inclined to jeopardize his job or at least make his work difficult.

Methods of Worker Penalization. The simplest way in which a work group can injure a fellow worker is to withdraw the support that they normally give him—the work they do for him on occasion, the protection they give him from shop supervisors, and the like. Active tactics take such forms, depending on the work tasks, as being careless with work for which he is responsible, slyly shifting extra duties to him, feeding him substandard parts (on the assembly line, for example), or making him shoulder an excessive load of difficult cases (salesmen, for example, can shift to one of their number whom they dislike all the customers they judge to be potentially troublesome, file clerks can selectively misplace records, etc.). There is an almost inexhaustible variety of ways, each petty in itself, by which fellow workers can make life miserable for the one who refuses to conform to their norms. As a result, it is fully as important in most work situations for the worker to conform to work-group norms as to have the technical or other skills required by the job and to be diligent at his work. An excellent and industrious worker can usually be reduced to ineffectuality by the persistent efforts of his work associates; and however insensitive he may be to the opinion of others, he can hardly fail to be frustrated in his work and may, in time, be discharged “for the good of the organization.”

Those professional workers, such as physicians and academicians, who do their work in comparative isolation from fellow professionals—*e.g.*, in surgery and sickroom or in classroom and study—are nevertheless vulnerable to economic penalization. A physician who has fallen into disfavor with his colleagues may, for example, find it increasingly difficult to secure hospital beds for his patients, and he may have access to surgical and other facilities only at those times and hours when no other physician happens to want them. He may have difficulty in arranging with local specialists to examine or treat his patients, and he may be unable to get a competent man to take over his practice temporarily so that he can go on vacation. Certainly he will have few patients referred to him, and those few will most likely be charity or other unprofitable cases.

In the academic profession, a man's reputation as a teacher and scholar is largely a function of his status as a person, rather than the other way around;⁸

⁸ Mainly because the criteria on which he is judged are limited and always subject to variable, hence prejudiced or biased, interpretation. Thus student reports on the teaching ability of a man are always suspect, since they may reflect, not how well he teaches, but how harshly or easily he grades his students. Moreover, only a very few of those who take his courses will indicate to his superiors their opinion of him; *i.e.*, the evidence is too fragmentary to be considered representative. For an account of the complex and devious procedures that are followed when academicians attempt to make a formal evaluation of one of their number—an account that indicates the tendency to judge him as a person—see “Academic Freedom and Tenure: Smith College” (*Bull. Amer. Ass. Univ. Professors*, vol. 32, pp. 105–148, 1946). The article is a report of an investigation by a committee of the

and his reputation as a teacher and scholar influences his rate of promotion through the ranks and the number and character of offers he receives from other institutions. As a consequence, a man who seriously violates academic norms can be punished economically by his associates in a multitude of ways. Through devaluation of his professional abilities they may delay his promotion, through casual but slighting comments they may prevent him from obtaining offers of positions elsewhere, through their advisory role with students they may discourage enrollment in his courses, etc. They can also hamper his teaching and scholarly work in a variety of petty ways; his departmental colleagues may, for example, gang up on him to the end that he is assigned the more distasteful courses, the more disagreeable class hours, and the less adequate classrooms. A junior executive in a business organization can, when occasion arises, be subjected by his associates to similar penalties.

The Frame-up. When tactics of the foregoing sort fail to bring a worker into conformity with the group norms, the work group usually proceeds to more drastic measures. If a worker—mechanic, stenographer, physician, or whatever—falls below the general level of competence, all that may be necessary is to let his incompetence become evident where it will do him the most harm—*i.e.*, to remove the protection which most work groups give to the individual worker. If, however, a recalcitrant individual is industrious and competent, or if he is under the protection of a superior, he may become the object of what is popularly known as a “frame-up.” The frame-up is in principle simply an artificial or forced arrangement of circumstances to the end that a given individual appears to outsiders—employers, the general public, etc.—in the most unfavorable light. It is not, as tradition would have it, the exclusive property of police and criminals. But with work groups—if not with the police⁹—the frame-up is a method of bringing an individual’s economic value to his employer (or to the public) into accord with his value to the work group. To the members of that group the procedure is entirely justifiable; he is a “bad” worker, and his incompetence should be brought to the attention of authority. Such, in brief, is the rationale behind the frame-up.

As a rule, an organized conspiracy is not necessary for the members of a work group to “frame” an undesirable coworker. In actual practice, the frame-up is usually compounded of a great number of minor distortions of the truth, each one made independently of the others. The various workers develop, through experience with the nonconforming individual and casual discussion among themselves, an adverse set toward him and everything that he does. He becomes, for each of them, the shop or office scapegoat. Everything that

Association of University Professors that was appointed to decide whether the discharge of a member of the Smith College faculty had been for adequate cause (*i.e.*, incompetence).

⁹ Actually the police frame-up is often an expression of the fact that the police feel that the law they are employed to uphold favors one who by their definition is a criminal; by the frame-up, the man who would be absolved from the crime he actually committed is convicted for one he did not commit.

he does well is either promptly forgotten or, if remembered, comes to be associated with some other worker; everything that he or anyone else does badly is remembered, and he is blamed for it. In considerable measure, therefore, the frame-up is a function of selective and faulty memory; only the more belligerent of his associates will actually plant evidence against him or tell outright lies about him to his superior. Most work groups will, however, enter into deliberate and calculated conspiracy against one of their number if the group's survival is actually jeopardized by his continued presence.

In office and factory work groups, the frame-up usually involves casting the undesired individual into an unfavorable light as a worker. Among professionals, where the integrity of the worker as an individual is often as important as his technical proficiency, the frame-up may also take the form of ruining his personal reputation. It takes only the breath of scandal to destroy the occupational status of a minister; while a gentle breeze, arising from the mouths of numbers of work associates, can often kill a physician's practice, turn a business executive's employer against him, or lead to the discharge of a professor of ethics. Again, an organized conspiracy among associates is seldom necessary for such a frame-up. There is always much talk among physicians, businessmen, professors, etc., about one another, including discussion of such matters as how they seem to be getting along with their wives, how someone saved on his income tax, how another failed to pay a long-overdue bill, and so on. A man who is in bad occupationally will tend, through the selective process already mentioned, to become the butt of an increasing store of degrading story items. Moreover, his own actions will be interpreted in the most unfavorable way—i.e., unfavorable to him and favorable to the occupational group. No man's reputation can for long withstand this sort of insidious disparagement. But if it should withstand it too long, almost any group of professional workers will deliberately and without reference to the truth set out to ruin it; better that, they will argue, than that the profession itself should suffer.¹⁰

Economic Intimidation. The fact that coworkers and fellow professionals can injure one economically is one of the things the novice learns as he is inducted into occupational life. He hears threats made and older workers recount stories—part of the lore of the occupation—of incidents in which workers

¹⁰ An ingenious frame-up, but probably not exceptionally so, was one resorted to in desperation by the staff of a business concern. The owner had made his son-in-law active manager; he was both incompetent and arrogant but proved to be untouchable by ordinary methods. His father-in-law persistently discounted employee evidence of the manager's incompetence, even when it was cooked up to make a good case stronger. Eventually the son-in-law gave his subordinates a lead—he became enamored of one of the stenographers in the office. She was encouraged by her coworkers and immediate superiors—who promised her job protection—to encourage the manager in his amorous advances; and she shortly became Exhibit A to prove to the owner of the enterprise that his son-in-law was unfaithful to his daughter if not inefficient in the management of the business. (From an unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author.)

have been penalized for deviant behavior, and in time he himself may participate in the punishment of some unpopular individual. An important part of his training in the occupational way of life is such sensitization to the power that the group has over his economic welfare. For almost every worker, therefore, the ability of the work group to penalize him economically for nonconformity to its norms is a consideration in many of the calculations he makes. Whenever he is tempted to violate a norm—*e.g.*, the tabu against informing on a coworker—the anticipation of economic penalization may deter him, *i.e.*, he may be economically intimidated.

The prospect of economic penalization is usually sufficient to keep all but the most willful worker conforming to the norms. As a result, economic intimidation is a more characteristic mode of social control than is economic penalization, just as the threat of spanking is a more common parental method of discipline than is actual spanking. However, the threat of economic penalization—unlike that of a spanking—is normally implied rather than explicit. The community does not tell the merchant that his business will suffer if he beats his wife or fails to go to church; the workers do not tell one of their number that they will see to it that he is fired if he does not play the game their way. But since worker and merchant are at least vaguely aware of these possibilities, they will hesitate when tempted to violate known group norms. Only when temptation—considerations which run counter to the norms—is stronger than the intimidating prospects of economic reprisal does it become necessary for the group to apply economic penalties. At such times the act of economic penalization serves two group ends: it punishes the deviant individual and possibly brings him back into conformity; and it provides a demonstration—a sort of refresher course—to all members that they, too, are subject to economic sanctions.

Economic Rewards. The obverse of economic penalization and intimidation is the promise and provision through group action of economic reward for exceptional performance, for conduct beyond the demands of loyalty to the group. What will be deemed rewardable conduct depends upon the particular group and its particular norms. Most group norms, it will be recalled, provide both minimum and maximum levels of action; *e.g.*, a worker must neither too far exceed nor fall too much below the group's production norms, and he should neither quarrel with nor be servile toward his superiors. On those norms which are conducive to pleasant and harmonious relations between the members of the group there is, however, no upper limit. Almost any group will approve exceptional thoughtfulness by one member toward other members; in effect, the individual may oversatisfy his obligations to the group but not exceed his rights in the group. For example, a worker who is obliged to give protection to fellow workers by covering up for them might exceed this obligation by accepting responsibility for the delinquency of a fellow worker who is in disfavor with superiors; a neighbor who is expected to offer the sick housewife sympathy and some token help—*e.g.*, chicken broth—might laudably

exceed her obligation by taking over the operation of the sick woman's household until she recovers.

The economic rewards that a group can promise and give for exceptional conduct are simply the counterpart of the penalties it can exact. A merchant with an unusually fine reputation in a community may be given more patronage than he would otherwise secure; when a beloved housewife falls ill, her neighbors may energetically pitch in to see that she does not want for aid and consolation; an admired member of the local medical fraternity may have his way smoothed for him by fellow physicians, nurses, and hospital authorities; etc.

Perhaps the most significant way in which many groups can economically reward the individual for exceptional conduct is through speeding his promotion up the occupational ranks.¹¹ The advancement of almost every professional and of any employed worker is partially determined by his coworkers; they can usually do much to retard the advancement of a nonconforming individual and a good deal to accelerate that of an exceptionally popular one. This aspect of group control is one of the reasons why occupationally ambitious individuals are especially vulnerable to social controls, a matter that was discussed earlier in another connection. One way for an ambitious individual to get ahead is to excel in the fulfillment of his obligations to his work group, gaining their support for his advancement. The check on this method of getting ahead is that many of the ways by which an ambitious individual might gain the support of his peers will tend to make him *persona non grata* with those who actually decide if and when he is to be granted advancement, *i.e.*, his superiors in industry, business, government, etc., or the public from whom he draws his clientele in medicine, law, and some other semi-independent professions. A further difficulty arises from the fact that the line between exceptional performance of group obligations and what the group considers aggressive behavior is always a narrow one. An individual who deliberately sets out to win group rewards may succeed only in earning the group's contempt; for the unusually charming manner blends into the obnoxiously oily one, and an effort to extend exceptional aid to fellow workers is easily construed as an attempt to curry favor.

Nevertheless, it is generally true that the individual's occupational advancement depends fully as much upon group approval of him as a person and coworker as upon his work skills and industry. The sensitivity of an individual to economic sanctions depends in considerable part, therefore, upon the intensity of his economic ambitions. An apathetic worker will be less interested in the prospect of economic rewards and less intimidated by the threat of eco-

¹¹ Whether they will actually do so depends, however, in part upon how calculating and ambitious he is. If the unusually cooperative and helpful worker is also passive concerning his own status, he may be "rewarded" for his exceptional conduct by being exploited by his fellow workers, in much the same way as the kind and generous mother will be exploited by her children.

nomic punishments than an ambitious one; in the extreme instance an apathetic worker drifts from job to job and, in time, slips down the job hierarchy toward the status of common laborer. An unusually ambitious worker, on the other hand, actively seeks the rewards that the group can provide and is highly sensitive to social control.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SANCTIONS

In most instances a status group will not invoke either economic or physical sanctions until it has exhausted the possibilities of securing member conformity by psychological sanctions. The latter constitute the third, and by far the most important, technique of social control, a technique which is the chief reliance of status groups the world around and the one to which every human being is continually subject and, for the most part, submissive.¹² Relatively few people are physically ejected from the status groups to which they belong,

¹² The tremendous powers that psychological sanctions may exercise over an individual have on a number of occasions been dramatically demonstrated by the ability of the Supreme Court of the United States to reform, in accordance with its own standards, a new member with exceedingly dubious antecedents. The court constitutes a small status group with high status in American society and a high level of morale. The members do not ordinarily associate much with one another except when the court is in session; nevertheless there has always been maintained a remarkable individual conformity to the court's dominant standard—personal integrity. Agreement with the majority is not a requirement; but the tradition of impeccable personal conduct and unquestionable intellectual honesty is demanded by the group as a whole of each individual member.

It has occasionally happened that a professional politician, who has demonstrated his complete freedom from principles by his success, or a proved rascal has been appointed to this highest bench of the land. In every case, however, such men have come into rapid conformity with the traditions of the court; in some instances an irresponsible demagogue has been made over by the appointment into a jurist of reactionary leanings.

Reformation by induction into a respectable group is not uncommon. Many a crooked trial lawyer has become honest and impartial as a judge, many a prostitute has "reformed" when a fortunate marriage gave her entree into respectable society; in fact, it is a tenet of folklore that no woman is as belligerently moral as the prostitute gone respectable.

From the fact that adoption into a group may bring about profound changes in the conduct of an individual it does not follow that criminals, drunkards, or other sociopaths can be readily normalized by being put into a normal life context; in the first place, the individual must want to have membership in a group before he will strive to maintain his position there, and criminals, homosexuals, and many other kinds of deviants have their own status groups and are contemptuous, by and large, of "respectable" people and their groupings; in the second place, the group must be favorably disposed toward the individual before it will adopt him. Even the foster home for the delinquent child has qualities of artificiality that somewhat negate its ability to control the child; and the acceptance of an adult criminal or other deviant by a status group as a good deed on its part would be so atypical as to encourage the individual to be atypical in conduct rather than conforming.

For some interesting materials on the operations of psychological sanctions in a primitive society see G. W. Harley, *Masks as Agents of Social Control in Northwest Liberia* (Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, Mass., 1950, Vol. 32).

and comparatively few people are subjected to strong economic penalization by their friends, neighbors, or coworkers; but from early infancy onward throughout life every human being experiences, and in the main submits to, psychological sanctions. As an infant he is alternately scolded and smiled upon; as a child he is alternately laughed with and at by his peers; as an adult he is hedged in on every side by a watchful host eager and even anxious to administer psychological punishments should he transgress their ideas of how he should behave and willing to reward him in the same coin for conduct they deem honorable.

Psychological sanctions are administered entirely through symbolic means, and their effectiveness depends upon the value the individual places on the symbols of his status in the group. The rights of every status role include, it will be recalled, some more or less clearly defined and specific signs of recognition and acceptance by the other members of the group; *e.g.*, it is his right upon joining them to receive a warm welcome, to secure from them friendly attention to his presence, to be permitted to participate in their activities, to be listened to with some degree of respect, etc. As a member in good standing of a group, the individual is accustomed to some level of symbolic treatment—to a flow of symbols, verbal and gestural, from the other members. This flow of symbols constitutes a major source of the satisfactions he secures from membership in the group, satisfactions which stem from the value to him of the symbols themselves.

The value which men place on symbols of status cannot be exaggerated. Although it may be said that "sticks and stones may break one's bones, but names will never hurt one," men everywhere impute value to "names"—more properly, to symbols; the process is both universal and psychologically meaningful. In the first place, the symbols are an accurate, if at times unreadable, barometer of the individual's general status in the group; any change in the level of symbolic treatment is indicative of "things to come." In the second place, many of the activities of all groups and all the activities of some groups—*e.g.*, conversation, games—are symbolic; and the pleasure that is derived from participation depends in considerable measure upon the quality of symbolic treatment accorded the individual. The pleasantly attentive ear can upon occasion turn deaf; the laughing response to a joke can shade into a contemptuous sneer; the expression of respectful admiration can through small adjustment become a disrespectful leer; and a nuance of manner can turn dancing into a painful ordeal.

Finally, the individual's concept of himself is, as was indicated earlier, in considerable measure a function of his group status. Any perceived change in the level of his symbolic treatment by a group will tend to change in the same direction his self-judgment. Thus the cool reception accorded him by the members of a status group may hurt in part because it reduces his own confidence in himself; and the unusually friendly greeting may, conversely, give pleasure because it elevates his ego.

The significance of any symbol—a greeting, a smile, a frown—to the individual depends, of course, upon the value that he imputes to it, which in turn depends upon the kind of symbol to which he has become accustomed. For some a pat on the back is the most disrespectful, most degrading, sign of recognition; for others a pat on the back may be a symbol of high esteem and a source of keen pleasure. The administering of psychological sanctions is accomplished by variation, in one direction or another, from the established symbols of status, whatever they may be, rather than in the meting out of this or that kind of symbol. The relativity of symbol values should be kept in mind throughout the following discussion, in which for convenience the common lay terms, which imply an absolute symbol value, will be used.

Psychological Punishment. Each status group has a stock of signs of disapproval, derived from the culture and subcultures of the members, with which it can psychologically punish an individual for misconduct. Such signs are many and various, crude and subtle, and can be used to indicate different degrees of disapproval. The nature and range of such signs can be suggested by such terms, presumably designative of different kinds of symbols, as "reproach," "disdain," "derision," "taunt," "jeer," "shame," and "slight."

The individual who has been discovered violating a group norm or a norm of his role in the group may be promptly and almost automatically reprovved by some appropriate symbolic means. His joke in bad taste may, for example, invoke frowns and compressed lips rather than the anticipated smiles; his too-casual manner with a superior may meet with marked reserve; his disloyal remark may be angrily challenged; his improper clothes may be the object of cutting comments; and his failure to fulfill a stated obligation may provoke anything from critical glances to outright charges of malfeasance.¹³ Should his error be slight and just outside the group tolerance, as is often the case, the reproof is likely to take the form of a withdrawal of symbols of approval rather than a subjection to symbols of disapproval. Thus should he be definitely late in arriving at some group affair, he may be taken to task; but should he just "slip in under the wire," his delinquency may be noted by a lack of welcome—e.g., by the nod which says "So you're here, are you?" rather than the smile which says "Glad to see you!"

Every status group is continually subjecting its various individual members to reproofs of the foregoing sort; for it is rare that an individual can consistently avoid falling at some points and to some degree below the stand-

¹³ An extreme form of reproof was the old practice, particularly significant in villages and small towns, of putting a lawbreaker in stocks in the public square. The punishment was not so much that of physical restraint as of being publicly declared a misdoer and becoming the object of taunts and jibes. The old schoolroom "dunce cap" treatment of misbehaving students has something of the same quality. Branding—such as the head shaving of French girls who had too readily fraternized with the German conquerors—has been at times a popular and possibly effective device of punishing by subjecting to public shame. For further analysis of this method of social control see K. Riezler, "Comment on the Social Psychology of Shame" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 457-465, 1943).

ards of conduct demanded by the group. Often reproof of one member by another member simply indicates that the latter has been irritated or annoyed by the other's conduct; but when there is some consensus among group members and the reproof represents group sentiment—as would be the case when an individual unduly delayed a group activity—it is a mode of social control. Control by this means is in fact the group's major and first-line defense against individual nonconformity, for it nips deviation in the bud.

Reproof indicates a momentary decline in the individual's status, but a decline that is ordinarily without prejudice; *i.e.*, the individual's misconduct is not held against him. As was mentioned earlier, every group seems to have a vague scale applicable to each of its several norms by which the group adjudges the extent to which nonconformity is dangerous in an individual. A man may, for example, be only mildly reproofed for failure to pay his club dues on time; he may be forgiven for failing to remember that it is his turn to treat the gang at the bar; and he may possibly be permitted to ignore his wife and dance with others at a club dance; but should he get drunk and maudlin, he may be judged a hazard to the welfare of the club and penalized accordingly. At the next gathering of the club he may, for example, be teased or taunted with being unable to hold his liquor; and, if reproof of this sort fails to bring him into conformity, he may then actually lose status in the eyes of his fellow members.

Where and when the administering of reproof will give way to outright taking away of status will depend upon the nature of the group and the individual's position within it, the norm or norms involved, and other factors. Any persistent violation of norms, however, always leads in time to loss of status, since the individual acquires a reputation for being something or other that is contrary to the group idea of what is acceptable in a member. He may, for example, come to be known as a drunkard, as distinct from his having become a bit drunk on a given occasion, as disloyal, as aggressive, or as dishonest. Such adverse repute must be earned just as fully as the good repute that makes for good standing with the group. With some exceptions, no single act will lead to a loss of status; ordinarily a violation of a norm must be repeated numbers of times or many norms must be violated for the majority of the group to be convinced that the individual is unworthy of good standing.

Loss of status, or, as the Chinese term it, "face," results in partial—never total until he is expelled—and continual reduction in the individual's right to symbolic recognition as a member in good standing and, at the same time, in more or less continual punishment by signs of disapproval. The individual is in effect being reluctantly tolerated by his fellow members. If he places a high value on membership and continues to participate in group activities, he subjects himself to a kind of trial by ordeal; for participation will be painful to him. Individuals vary considerably in their sensitivity to symbolic treatment, and occasionally an individual will cling to his group membership quite oblivious of the fact that he is a member in poor standing. The stereotype of the

club bore suggests such a person. On the whole, however, an individual who has lost status in a group and has become thereby subject to psychological penalization either finds membership a negative value and drops out or else tries to reinstate himself in the eyes of the group. Living down loss of status is usually a drawn-out and discouraging process, for status groups are characteristically slow to condemn and slower to relent. An individual who has lost status in a group in which he values membership sufficiently to have struggled back into the members' good graces is usually scarified by the experience and thereafter hypersensitive to signs of disapproval.

As a Traumatic Experience. In some instances many attributes of an individual's personality can be traced to the shock of loss of status in some group in his past life. One would suspect that an individual who has been expelled from a group would be little affected in permanent ways by that experience, since ordinarily the fact that the group resorted to expulsion shows that it failed to secure conformity by more subtle ways, *i.e.*, that the individual was insensitive to either economic or psychological sanctions. But an individual who loses status in a group and either withdraws voluntarily from it or wins his way back into good standing is presumably sensitive to psychological sanctions; and for such a person loss of status can, especially in childhood and youth, constitute a traumatic experience. The personality consequences of the experience may vary, depending upon a great variety of other but related factors, in both kind and degree. Probably every adult has in his stock of remembered past events at least one occasion on which he made a complete fool of himself and at which he cringes inwardly every time he recalls it. The event is often situational; but it may precipitate a belated discovery on the part of the individual that he is not liked and approved of by the members of the group, as he has presumed, but is rather considered with disfavor. That discovery and its aftermath may make him more or less shy, humble, timid, belligerent, aggressive, or otherwise atypical in regard to groups of the kind in which he has had the traumatic experience. As a result he may be a submissive and highly conforming member of groups of this kind; or, conversely, he may as a person be incompatible with members of this kind of group.

The general term "feeling of insecurity" is currently applied to the presumed covert antecedents of any sort of behavior that makes the member of a group stand out in adverse contrast to his fellows, that makes him an exhibitionist, a sycophant, a braggart, or an arrogant and belligerent person from the point of view of the members of a situation or a status group. As it is used, the term "feeling of insecurity" often covers so much that it does not refer to anything specific. There can be no doubt, however, that a sense of personal insecurity—probably more specific than general—that has stemmed from a traumatic experience in some status group underlies some kinds of atypical behavior. Displaced persons, *i.e.*, people who have lost all status through political upheaval, seem seldom to feel entirely certain of themselves although they may

have reestablished themselves in a new system of status groupings. They may, for example, be excessively suspicious and critical of the motives of their associates, unable, as it were, to believe that the status accorded them is real and, to that extent, durable.

Psychological Rewards. The promotion of an individual up the ranks or offices of a formalized status group is a reward, mainly perhaps of psychological value to the individual, for exceptional performance of status obligations, for duration of membership (seniority), or for both. With each advance in rank or office the individual acquires a new complex of rights, most of which are symbolic in nature. Within any given rank or office his position is, moreover, subject to considerable subtle variation; if he excels in the performance of an obligation, he may be rewarded by being accorded symbolic recognition superior to that normal for his position; *e.g.*, he may be addressed, for the moment, as almost an equal by members of a higher position. Such terms as "unusually warm welcome," "marked approval," and "exceptionally high praise" crudely suggest the nature of the symbolic rewards a group may mete out to the individual for exceptional performance. In practice, the symbols of approval are mainly slight accents on or additions to those which are the normal rights of membership.

In informal, unstructured status groups, such as residential neighborhoods and friendship coteries, individual position within the group is entirely a matter of such differential symbolic treatment. Thus the respected leader of a neighborhood, who has no designated formal office as leader, may be accorded a variety of special considerations; what he has to say may, for example, be listened to more attentively than the words of ordinary members. Except, perhaps, among youthful peer groups, in which status relations are both dynamic and marked out by rather obvious symbols, the signs of respect and admiration are characteristically slight and subtle. On the whole, people do not openly exhibit their admiration for one of their number; nor do they often reward an individual for his admirable conduct by such crass means as the pat on the back and a "Well done, John!" Such devices are usually reserved for children, who normally become accustomed and indifferent to the patronizing air of their elders.

Status Testing. Since the signs of special approval are usually no more than slight accents on the symbols of acceptance as a member of the group, the individual who strives to achieve special repute within a given group has considerable difficulty in measuring his progress. Most members of most groups are presumably content with a membership in good standing and the prospect of such advance in position as normally comes with time. Some individuals, however, more than normally ambitious and, perhaps, precluded from climbing from group to group, strive for special status within the membership of a certain group; thus a man may want to be known as the best-liked man in the club, a craftsman may want to be known among his kind as the "best damned carpenter" or whatnot in the town, and a woman may not be content with

the reputation of being a good housekeeper but may seek to be recognized locally as the best cook and homemaker. Such a person tends to channelize his efforts, concentrating on achievement in one field of endeavor in order to gain special position in one kind of status group to the partial exclusion of other concerns. Thus a woman who highly values repute as a housewife may be more or less indifferent to her status as a clubwoman or churchgoer, while one who wants to be the acknowledged leader of a club may more or less ignore her household duties and disregard the fact that her neighbors consider her a poor housekeeper. Concentration upon status in one group is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the typical adolescent, who almost invariably values position among his peers above all else.

To the individual who is striving to gain special recognition in a given group, status evaluation is a major concern. Ordinarily the psychological punishments by which a member is promptly notified if he falls from the group's grace are obvious to him. The signs of special approval, on the other hand, are less evident and may be overlooked or misread. As a consequence an individual who is ambitious to gain special approval frequently resorts to testing his status in some way or other. The nature of the testing varies in accordance with the group and the ingenuity of the individual; but in principle, status testing consists of precipitating a crisis in which numbers of the group members will be forced openly to declare themselves on the side of or against the one who is making a test of his status. Perhaps the simplest way in which the individual does this is by the deliberate criticizing of another member. If others side with him, he takes it as an indication that his position is at least better than that of the one whom he criticized. Among themselves at least, women currently seem much inclined to use this testing device, as is evidenced by the common practice of backbiting. Men are a little more subtle, perhaps, in this procedure, for they would seem to be more prone to do their backbiting in a backhanded manner; thus a man may comment favorably about another in the hope that the comment will provoke indications that he himself is considered more competent, or whatever, than that other. This sort of test by comparison reaches its ultimate when the criticism is of the recognized leader of the group; it is then a small-scale parallel to radicalism in political or other aspects of the society at large.

Among the many other means that are used to test special status within a group are the threat to withdraw from membership (a means that is especially favored by those who have some sort of office in the group) and the imposition of special demands on the group members. Particularly in family and other very intimate groupings, faked or psychosomatic illness is commonly used to impose special demands on the group; the procedure is perhaps less a test of status per se than a test of the outer limits of group tolerance. But whatever the character of the crisis precipitated by an individual to test his status within a group, the results depend upon his ability to interpret correctly the signs made by the members, and in this interpretation there is considerable possi-

bility of error. It may be suspected that the individual who frequently resorts to status testing is not only ambitious for special approval but is too self-centered (or, alternatively, too hypersensitive) to be a competent judge of his true position in the group.

ANTICIPATED SANCTIONS

There are many reasons why an individual may conform to the norms of a status group. He may be habituated to doing so and may have no temptation to do otherwise; he may find, in some instances, that conforming is enjoyable in itself; he may be guided into conformity by group-administered sanctions of one sort or another. A further and often major reason why he conforms is that he may anticipate being subjected to group sanctions. To the extent that he values his membership and is sensitized to social controls, he endeavors so to conduct himself that he avoids becoming subject to psychological (to say nothing of physical and economic) punishments; and he may at the same time endeavor so to conduct himself that he becomes subject to the rewards, psychological and otherwise, that the group can mete out. In either endeavor, the individual is being controlled by what may be termed "anticipated sanctions."

Anticipated sanctions are grounded in the individual's experiences in the group. But in operation, anticipated sanctions stem wholly from the individual's self. In his mind's eye he sees the members of a group make gestures of disapproval (or approval), and in his mind's ear he hears their adverse comments (or approving remarks) should he do thus and so; and such anticipation may discourage him from doing that thing (or, alternatively, encourage him to do it).

Various terms have been used to indicate control through anticipated group approval and disapproval—"social conscience," "reflected self," "self-other roles," etc.¹⁴ The phenomenon is complex and elusive and so far has remained largely the province of poets rather than social psychologists. Yet the importance of anticipated psychological rewards and punishments as a means of social control cannot be questioned. The difficulty is to measure objectively this entirely subjective process.

The concept of a group which a member thereof carries with him and upon occasion adjusts to in an anticipatory way is, of course, a symbolic construct. Through words and visual images, supplemented in some instances by auditory

¹⁴ The terms "reflected self" and "looking-glass self" seem to have come into social psychology by way of C. H. Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* (p. 184). The term "self-other role" is derived from G. H. Mead's *Mind, Self, and Society* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934, pp. 138ff). Both Cooley and Mead were primarily interested in the development of personality—"self"—and neither explored the way in which current and often temporary aspects of self are derived from membership in specific status groups. Sherif and Cantril (M. Sherif and H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-involvements*, Wiley, New York, 1947) occasionally use the term "ego involvements" to mean approximately what is above discussed as anticipated group sanctions.

symbols, the individual represents for himself each of the several groups of which he is a member. The representation is an abstraction rather than a composite of symbols representing the various individuals who actually compose the group; *i.e.*, when the individual thinks about a group it is as "they" rather than as Joe, Mary, Sam, George, *et al.*, who are the constituent elements of that group. In calculating the various consequences of a possible act, he considers, as it were, what "the gang" would say if he did it, what "the boys in the office" would think, and so on.

The process of abstract representation is itself entirely valid, for, as has been demonstrated, a group is more than the simple sum of its individual members. Individually, Joe, Mary, Sam, *et al.* might concede that a given act is entirely permissible; but as members of a group their personal calculations often take on an entirely different character, hence the evaluation of an action by the group as a whole might be quite different from the sum of the individual and personal judgments of the members. "As far as I am concerned," the individual may say, "you can get drunk every night in the week; but after all. . . ." The "as far as I am concerned" reflects personal values and the calculated personal consequences of the other's action. The "but after all. . ." reflects the norms of the group to which they both belong and the anticipated consequences to the group as a whole, and hence indirectly to the member, of the action under consideration.

As members of status groups people may be more critical of the actions of another and apply a much more rigid code of conduct than they do as individuals. Thus the one who is anticipating the consequences to his group status of a given act must and usually does think of the group as a whole rather than as a sum of discrete individuals. But the fact that his mode of thinking of the group is valid does not necessarily mean that his concept of the group is also valid. On the contrary, he may grossly overestimate or underestimate the group's tolerance for a given act, its interest in and definition of a given act, and the likelihood of the group's learning that he has committed a given act. As a consequence, various members may have quite different ideas about the group to which they belong. One member of the group may apprehensively carry as a guilty secret the memory of an action which he thinks may become known at any moment and will then bring ruin to his reputation; another may be only amused by the fact that he "got away with" the same act; and still a third may be confident that, should his act become known, it would be considered more amusing than scandalous.

It is in part because the various members of a group do have rather different concepts of the group that group resort to negative sanctions is necessary to secure individual conformity to the norms. If every member held membership in high esteem and also had an accurate concept of the group, anticipatory sanctions would keep him conforming to its norms.

What factors enter into the determination of a given individual's concept of a group is not entirely clear. Probably the most important single factor is

prior experience in that group. There is some reason to think that, all other factors being equal, the member who has at some time lost status and then regained it will have a more realistic concept of the group, as well as be more highly sensitized to its controls, than will the member who has never been tempted to deviate from the group norms and hence has not yet learned by direct experience the actual tolerances of the group and how painful loss of status can be. Under equal temptation to violate a group norm, the former may be more restrained by anticipated psychological sanctions than the latter; he has been disciplined, and like the burnt child, he dreads the very thought of being disciplined again.¹⁵

Other factors that may enter into the individual's concept of the group include his temperament—*i.e.*, his general view of matters social, ranging from optimistic expectation of the best to pessimistic expectation of the worst—and the particular value that he places on membership in that group. Almost every individual seems to value his membership in some one group above all others, a phenomenon that has been referred to elsewhere in another connection; and he may conceptualize that one group as much more strict than any of the others to which he belongs.

Closely related to the individual's concept of the group, but operationally distinct from it, is his concept of his personal role in that group. When he thinks of the group it is mainly in reference to himself; and his concept of himself, specifically of his role in the group, is quite as important to his calculations as is his concept of the group itself. At the one extreme he may, for example, think of himself as always putting his worst foot forward in connection with a given group. Irrespective of how he conceives the group itself, he will then be more constrained by anticipation than he would otherwise be. At the other extreme he may conceive himself as occupying a special and invincible role in the group; "they'll let me get away with anything," he tells himself, which may be true or not—true, perhaps, if he is the favored son, untrue if he is one who overestimates his prestige, personal charm, or worth to the group.

Group Omnipresence. All status groups are somewhat concerned and most of them much concerned with the behavior of individual members when

¹⁵ All sorts of status groups display a strong predisposition to forgive (somewhat in the manner of the Biblical story of the prodigal son) and welcome back into their midst the individual who has sinned, been punished, and confessed his guilt. Often, in fact, the recovered member seems thereafter for a time to be given a favored position in the group. There may well be in such instances some recognition of the fact that the erstwhile prodigal member is likely to be more sensitive to anticipated sanctions—having experienced the anguish induced by actual sanctions—than others and hence generally more reliable as a member. The Chinese Communists and, possibly, the Russian Communists also have shown rather amazing willingness to take back into the fold "deviationists" who have recanted, professed their loyalty to the Party, and pleaded for reacceptance. Whether this tendency to forgive, if not forget, is also predicated upon the assumption that once a man has experienced the disadvantages of being a non-Communist, he will ever thereafter appreciate the joys of Communism is not known.

those members are away from the field of group activity. If nothing else, the conduct of a member elsewhere may reflect on the reputation, for good or ill, of the group itself; for the member may be recognized as a member of the group wherever he goes. Usually, however, group concern with individual conduct outside the field of the group itself has a more utilitarian basis. Often some of the obligations of membership are fulfilled away from the group; the head of a family may earn support for it in places and among people unknown to his wife and children, and the soldier on outpost duty may serve his comrades in complete isolation from them. Often, too, the performance of the individual in the group is affected by what he does elsewhere. The members of the crew of a transport plane are almost as much interested in one another's conduct off duty as on; for the man who is having trouble with his wife, the one who did not get to bed until dawn the day before, or the one who broke regulations to take a few drinks is a danger to them. Even in nonhazardous occupations, work groups have some stake, as distinct from personal concern or interest, in the nonwork activities of the individual member. The one who turns up with a hangover may secure their protection from superiors, but he does make things difficult for them; and the one who has taken to playing the horses is a nuisance around the shop or office if only because he may or does want to borrow money all the time.

It is because the welfare, and often the very survival, of a group is bound up in some measure with its ability to control the conduct of the individual member beyond the purview of other members that every durable group includes within its structure a complex of beliefs which supplement the basic means of control upon which the group relies. These beliefs invoke on behalf of the group the forces of nature, of some supernaturalistic power, or both; and they give to the group a quality of omnipresence. They constitute, as will be shown in the following chapter, the group's universe of action, or idea of the world in which it operates, as distinct from the individual member's personal idea of the group, which constitutes his personal universe of action. And they operate in ways far more complex than, but comparable to, anticipated group sanctions to keep the individual conforming to group norms wherever he may go.

THE TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL CONTROL: II. IDEOLOGICAL

Every individual, whatever his society, carries in his mind's eye concepts of the groups to which he belongs, has belonged, or aspires to belong, ideas that commonly influence his situational conduct. People frequently strive to live up to the standards of a group that has actually ceased to exist, as does, for example, the person who tries to maintain the proud traditions of a family that is only a memory. Everyone is at times intimidated or encouraged by the thought of how his conduct would be regarded by the members of groups not actually present. Thus while some travelers in a foreign land may poorly represent the society from which they come, behaving among strangers as they would not among friends and acquaintances, the conduct of most travelers, like that of all individuals in most circumstances, is conditioned by considerations of group status. This is, in fact, one of the reasons why the stranger may fail to endear himself to his momentary hosts. In attempting to live up to his idea of the standards imposed on him by the Chamber of Commerce back in Podunk, Iowa, he may violate the standards of the citizens of Podunk, France. And everyone at times strives to adhere to the norms of some group or other to which he does not yet belong but to which he hopes to gain membership. A small boy playing soldier may do this in a fragmentary, inept way; an adult may be doing this when, in the judgment of his peers, he is "putting on airs." In some instances the individual endeavors to model his behavior on that of some specific person; often, however, what he endeavors to live up to is his concept of how a member of a group behaves—*i.e.*, he models his behavior on that of an abstract, symbolic person rather than an actual one.

The individual's ideas of the groups to which he belongs, has belonged, or aspires to belong, of their normative standards and values, and of the possible effect on his status in those groups of any action are the embodiment in symbolic form of his prior experiences with group life. The individual's ideas may be unrealistic in the sense that they symbolize nonexistent groups or nonexistent norms of actual groups or fail to include symbolizations of relevant norms of actual groups. In group participation, as in other aspects of life, experience is not always the best teacher; atypical experiences may be taken as representative, a given experience may be misinterpreted, and all experiences are subject to misrepresentation as a consequence of the fact that the individual sees the events around him and his relation to them largely in terms

of his preconceptions. The embodiment of experience in symbolic form is thus inherently inexact.

However inexact, experience embodied in symbolic form is nonetheless very real to the individual and in many ways affects his conduct. Thus a man may purchase a suit thinking that it will win the approval of his wife and children, be the envy of his neighbors, and earn the acclaim of his associates in the office, whereas, as subsequent experience will indicate, the contrary is true. To a vastly greater degree than any of the other animals, man uses and acts in terms of symbols of things as distinct from the things themselves. It may be debated whether the dog, most socialized of the lower animals, carries in its mind's eye an image of its master and strives to earn the approval of that idea in somewhat the same way as it does in its master's actual presence. But there can be no doubt that every human being carries with him ideas of the groups to which he belongs and aspires to belong that are quite as real for him as are the actual groups. Their control over his conduct is secondary only to the control exerted by a group in which he is actually present.

The embodiment in symbolic form of experience with group life is one of the normal consequences of socialization. Not all that the individual learns through direct experience is symbolically contained; much of it consists of manual and other kinesthetic skills, such as those that make possible the act of walking or of playing a musical instrument; much of it consists of sub-symbolic food and other tastes and of mood tone, emotional and motivational responses. All such nonsymbolic attributes of the human personality have, however, some symbolic correlates (one can, for example, hardly feel excited by the presence of a beautiful girl without at the same time reflecting symbolically on the fact that she is beautiful and exciting); and most of them can be aroused to action by symbols of things and events as well as by actual things and events. Moreover, much that the individual experiences can be embodied in his personality only, or at least largely, in symbolic form. The "mood tone" associated with a given incident is nonsymbolic—*i.e.*, it is a feeling rather than a thought about a feeling; but the incident itself can be remembered, and thus the mood tone invoked, only in visual, verbal, and other symbols.

THE GROUP'S UNIVERSE OF ACTION

The individual's concept of the group, which serves to extend the influence of the group over his conduct beyond the confines of the group itself, is only one of many ways in which symbols enter into the determination of behavior. As was indicated earlier, the norms of group conduct are symbolically represented and often symbolic in nature, membership status is marked by various kinds of symbols, and so on. And in some instances the activities of a group may consist mainly of symbolic actions, as is the case with a bridge club, with office workers, and with the faculty of a college.

For the most part the symbols used in group operations, like those used by

the individual in his personal bookkeeping and private thinking, are tools, means to ends, that facilitate action but do not themselves determine the nature of the action.¹ One of the major exceptions is those symbols and symbolic constructs by which the group defines its universe of action—the people, places, things, ideas, beliefs, etc., in respect to which it, as a group, operates. The definitions that it makes of the external world enter into all calculations of the group and hence into the determination of the behavior of the individual member. By what it defines, the group delimits its sphere of action, for in effect what is not defined does not exist; and by how it defines what it defines, it limits the range of permissible action within the group universe.

Every group evolves out of experience something of its own special universe. For a given family the world about it may, for example, include bill collectors because it has had experience with bill collectors; whereas the family nextdoor,

¹ The fact that man uses and relies on symbols of things—words, gestures, mental and graphic representations—to a vastly greater extent than any of the lower animals has been remarked upon by social thinkers of all times and places. The role of language and other systems of symbols has been explored by many; and during the past century a number of social philosophies have been founded on the assumption that symbols are the major determinants of social life, a concept that can be reduced to the simple statement that “as men think, so shall things be.” This philosophical principle has been corrupted—or “popularized”—by a number of cultists to provide the key to personal health, wealth, and prosperity; e.g., Mary Baker Eddy’s doctrine of body health through good thinking and, one of the latest, the “general semantics” of Alfred Korzybski

Philologists and others who specialize in the study of language forms are occupationally inclined to consider language, the use of which is the major kind of symbolic behavior, the determinant of nonlinguistic conduct; semanticists have raised this view into a philosophical doctrine; and psychotherapists, including the Freudian variety, place great reliance on the magic of words. All such views are based upon the fact that there is some relationship between language and other kinds of conduct; they do not, however, provide an acceptable explanation of the nature of that relationship. The fact, for example, that most men who talk in the argot of pimps are pimps does not necessarily mean that as a group they live the life of the pimp because they speak the argot or that any one of them learned to be a pimp because he learned that argot.

On the whole, it would appear that language is a tool, a means to an end, which develops and is modified to serve the needs of cultural and subcultural groups, and that the forms of a given language *reflect*, far more than determine, the nonlinguistic aspects of the culture. In the development of science, symbols have often served as exploratory tools, making possible the prediction from what is known of things still to be verified; in astronomy, for example, mathematical analysis of observed phenomena has led to the prediction and subsequent discovery of new planets. But the forms of lay languages seem to have had little bearing on the exploratory or inventive abilities of their users. In technology, for example, English-, French-, and German-speaking peoples have all at one time or another been outstandingly inventive; in the exploration of the world, the Italians, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English each took their turn.

For the most part, then, the function of any language is to communicate, and what is thereby communicated depends upon the nonlinguistic content of the culture. If people have words for and talk about ghosts, it is because their culture provides them with ghosts; if their language includes such words as “automobile,” “radio,” and “airplane,” it is because they have these devices; they do not have the devices simply because they invented or otherwise obtained the words representing them.

having had no such experience, may not make this particular definition and hence may not include bill collectors in its universe. The primitive village may have a universe limited in scope to a few square miles and inhabited by, among other things, a variety of evil spirits; the universe of a modern residential community, on the other hand, may include ideas of a number of distant places that some member has visited and talks about and will probably be inhabited with, among other things, microscopic organisms, such as the virus of poliomyelitis, rather than evil spirits.

Wide differences exist in the definitions that various groups make of what is to be included in their universe, and equally wide differences exist in how various aspects of the world around them are defined. Office workers, for example, may define as the ideal writing instrument anything from a quill pen to an electric typewriter. Whereas one group of bank clerks may consider computing and recording machines such as those used in most American banking establishments to be instruments of Satan, another group may think that pen, ledger, and mental computations such as are used in most English banking establishments are devices out of the Dark Ages. Whereas one group of warriors may deem the blowgun and poisoned dart the ultimate in death-dealing devices, another may prefer the tommy gun, and still another the rocket with shaped explosive. The slum kids may define a dirty, dingy alley as an ideal playground; the local society for the prevention of delinquency will, no doubt, define the same alley in contrary terms. The adults in a neighborhood may define the policeman on the beat as an efficient guardian of the peace, but the small-fry toughs may define him as the preventer of all things worth doing.

The individual does, of course, acquire out of his personal experiences definitions of the world about him. But these are supplemented and often supplanted by the definitions he acquires through participation in group life. The universe of the small boy is, for example, often redefined for him when he leaves the protection of his parents and enters into play with his peers. The place which was only a weed-grown vacant lot by parental definition may perhaps become a region of mystery and vague dangers because his play group so defines it; the policeman who had been something of a hero may by gang redefinition become a person to circumvent and an object of scorn; the unthinkable act may become a desirable one; the nasty, unspeakable word may become the badge of sophistication; etc. Likewise, the adult who enters into membership in any new group will be more or less effectively trained to accept that group's definitions of its universe of action. Often, but not of course always, the new definitions are different from those he has acquired in previous group membership. Frequently they are in sharp conflict with some or many of his prior understandings. The soldier up from the ranks who is given a commission finds, for example, that officers define soldiers and their relations thereto quite differently from the way soldiers define themselves, officers, and their relations thereto. Comparable acceptance of a redefined universe of action is required of the student who is appointed to a teaching position, of the

man who marries and settles down in a residential neighborhood, and of the person who moves from one occupation or community to another.

Dynamics of the Group Universe. Like the idea of the group that the individual member carries in his mind, the definitions of their universe that the members of a group hold are products of experience. But whereas the individual's idea of the group is derived mainly from his personal experience, the group's definitions of its universe may in large part be derived from experience which antedates that of any one of the current members. Definitions of this sort represent the history—or, more properly, the mythology—of the group, rather than its current experiences. They may nonetheless become an important factor in the determination of member conduct.

The boy who goes out into the neighborhood to join his peers gains his idea of the group through direct, personal experience. But the definitions of the group into which he is inducted, although subject to change, are ready-made for him, a product of events in which he himself did not participate. He adopts these definitions and later conveys them, more or less intact, to subsequent newcomers to the group, along with the group norms and other organizational attributes. As the personnel of group membership changes, rapidly or slowly as the case may be, the definitions that are so passed along become more and more remote from the actual experiences from which they were derived. Every group soon acquires a body of secondhand definitions, definitions that represent experience, not with things—with events, circumstances, people, etc.—but with symbols of those things. The symbols, unlike the things they represent, are relatively pliant and susceptible to modification to meet the functional needs of the group, for what is known only second-, third-, or umpteenth-hand is characteristically adaptable. For the individual member, group definitions are more or less fixed; but for the group as a whole its definitions are, or over time become, agents of its norms, values, and other essential attributes. In effect, the universe as the group defines it is the universe as the group wants, or needs, it to be.

The distinction between definitions which represent direct experience and those which have been acquired secondhand (usually designated as myths, legends, and beliefs) is basically as simple as it is significant. Should a group of small boys come upon a badly mangled body in a vacant lot, that experience—presumably it would be rather traumatic—might, through subsequent discussion among themselves, result in their defining the vacant lot as a place to be avoided. Time would no doubt dull their horror of the event itself, but the definition of the place as one to be avoided would continue to be meaningful. New members joining in their play would, no doubt, be inducted into that definition; the stories told them about the finding of the body might even exaggerate the horror occasioned by the event itself. But to these new members of the group the experience of finding the body would be only secondhand; it would be experience with a story, exciting and deliciously gruesome, rather than with actual blood, torn flesh, and death. Should, therefore, the second or

third generation of boys in the neighborhood find occasion to use the vacant lot as a playground, they would be able to redefine the place in a way and to an extent that their predecessors—those who had actually experienced the body finding—could not. They might, for example, convince themselves that the original story was not true; that, while a bloody body was found in the place, it was that of a dog rather than a man; or, if such would fit in with the group's existing norms and values, that the place was especially appropriate as a playground, since what had happened there on some distant day was that a policeman shot and killed a gangster.

At any event, all those secondhand definitions of the universe of a status group which have originally evolved out of group experience to complement and justify the norms, values, and other attributes of the group will ordinarily be modified in the face of contradictory experience to preserve those norms, values, etc. For example, a work group that has for historic reasons established a low production norm will have defined its universe accordingly: the employer (or management) may have been defined as an enemy; and such physical circumstances as poor shop lighting, inconvenient and unsanitary toilet facilities, awkward work arrangements, and the like may have been taken as evidence that the employer has been endeavoring to exploit them to the utmost. Should the employer then begin to install better lighting, modern washrooms, improved work arrangements, etc., the group as a whole must make some sort of readjustment. Management has historically assumed that such improvement in working conditions would improve worker morale and increase productive efficiency. Actually, however, the characteristic adjustment to changes of this order is a redefinition of its universe by the work group to make "logical" the maintenance of the old production norms. The group might, for example, define the new facilities as new evidence that the employer is exploitative, *e.g.*, that the new lighting is intended to speed up production, not to ease the eyestrain of doing the work, and that the new washrooms are intended to make the workers think the employer is interested in their welfare and thus encourage them to work harder, whereas his only interest is in increased production. It is by such redefinition of its universe that the status group preserves its valued norms in the face of changing external circumstances.

Redefinition of the group universe is at once a reflection of high group morale and a requirement for the maintenance of high morale under the impact of new experiences. The process is comparable to the rationalizing of the individual who is confident of his abilities but fails in some effort; he justifies the failure in terms of some external factor. To the well-established group any change, internal or external, that lessens the functional efficiency of one or more of its established group procedures jeopardizes the maintenance of those procedures. By redefining aspects of its universe, the group shifts the blame for the inadequacy of those procedures away from the group to the universe.

The Myth of Distinctiveness. The functional nature and adaptability

under changing circumstances of group definitions of its universe is well illustrated by those definitions of its universe through which a group maintains its belief in its distinctiveness.² *In toto* these definitions, whatever their particular form, constitute a categorical description of how the members of the group are distinguished from all other people and a mythological explanation of how they came to be so distinguished, supported by a variety of associated beliefs. For convenience, the whole will here be termed simply the "myth of distinctiveness."

Definitive membership and effective control over the selection of new members are, it will be recalled, vital aspects of all status groups. (In large commercial, military, political, or other organizations the selection of new personnel is not, of course, under the direct control of the work or other groups to which new personnel may be formally assigned; but, as was indicated earlier, any newly assigned member must prove himself acceptable or he will be more or less subtly excluded from the group.) The group's selectivity and exclusiveness are invariably justified by the myth of distinctiveness, by some version of the claim that they, the members of the group, differ in kind from and are in some way superior in quality to the members of all other groups, including groups functioning to the same ends. The forms that the myth of distinctiveness takes are, of course, infinitely varied. The members of a family may think of themselves as distinguished because of their noble ancestry (royal blood, descendants of a *Mayflower* Pilgrim, founder of the town), because they have always—or never—paid their bills, because of what the living members have accomplished (whether in the field of crime, business, religion, science, politics, or just philandering), or possibly because they have produced the highest proportion of shiftless incompetents of any family in the region. A work group may consider itself distinguished because of its unbroken record of low or of high productivity or, more commonly, because its work is of a different nature from that of the other work groups with which it is associated. A friendship coterie may achieve its "distinctiveness" through smug self-deception that "everyone" would like to belong and the pretense that it alone engages in worthwhile, or at least enjoyable, activities. The tightly knit village or neighborhood community may proffer as its claim to distinctiveness anything (and often everything) from monopoly of the best climate on the globe to a reserved seat in the kingdom of heaven.³ The myth of distinctiveness is "validated," when necessity for validation arises, by the group's reference to the demonstrable fact that only they and they alone have experienced the particular activities of the group, activities which are, by assumption, of value in themselves. Should this assumption be challenged, the value of the activities is then demonstrated by the fact that the group has engaged in them. Of

² See N. P. Gist, "Secret Societies: A Cultural Study of Fraternalism in the United States" (*Univ. Mo. Stud.*, vol. XV, no. 4, 1940).

³ For a sardonic treatment of some of the more fatuous of current American claims to distinctiveness see R. Lynes, *Snobs* (Harper, New York, 1950).

the group, as of the individual, existence is, in effect, justification for existence: "I am; therefore I must be."

An important function of the myth of distinctiveness is its providing the members of the group, where necessary, with symbolic justification for doing unto others what they would not do to their kind—*i.e.*, for behaving toward nonmembers in quite different ways from those in which they behave toward fellow members. The contrast may be as striking as that between ensuring prompt death and aiding to preserve life. The myth is not self-sufficient; unless it is paralleled by the appropriate member feelings of sympathy toward fellow members and antipathy toward nonmembers, it is just empty verbiage.

Essential as it is in maintaining a group's integrity, and categorical though it makes the distinction between members and nonmembers, the myth of distinctiveness is usually subject to redefinition in times of group crisis. Under duress, such as that which may be occasioned by war, various friendship coteries, formal clubs, and other groupings in a community may temporarily shift the basis for their distinctiveness. Faced with the prospect of sharply rising dues, the members of an old and proud club may "discover" new sources of members, men or women who previously would have been deemed unworthy of membership in the company of the best people. Presented with a bastard heir, even the proudest old family can usually find some comforting justification for accepting into its fold as son-in-law the common boy who fathered the child.

There are, however, always exceptions. Groups which have no other function than the provision of prestige to the members, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, cannot for that very reason afford to redefine the basis for their distinctiveness. To do so would be to destroy the sole justification for their existence. It is for this reason that so-called decadent families, whose members live mainly on memory of the past, and dispossessed aristocracies protect their bloodlines so zealously. A rough but fair test of the functional significance of a given group within the social context is its willingness to redefine its myth of distinctiveness under duress and "take in new blood."

THE SYMBOLIC CONTEXT

The definitions that a status group makes of the actual persons, places, things, and symbolic constructs to which the members, as members, must make adjustment are relatively pliant. The group provides the definitions and by them molds its universe to its own ends. At the same time, the larger universe in which the group operates—the society in all its aspects—provides a great body of comparatively stable, stock definitions of that society, of its constituent elements, and of its past, its present, and its future. These are the cultural and subcultural definitions of the social, as distinct from the specific group, universe. Like the group definitions of its universe, the cultural definitions presumably have originated in social experience and are symbolic representations thereof; but the experiences which any cultural definition

represents are usually so remote in time or space that the symbolic representation has little direct relevance for current experience. Moreover, that representation has usually been passed down through so many generations or passed along through so many contemporaneous persons and groups, gaining, like the ordinary rumor story, simplicity through retelling, that it has lost all substance and become an abstraction.

The larger universe as brought to the individual via cultural definitions may be thought of as the symbolic context. It is the larger world as seen through culturally standardized ideas; each member of a given society is provided by his society with much the same set of cultural definitions of what, why, and how things are or should be, definitions that are varied and supplemented by his particular subculture. Thus, whatever the society, each member in learning its base language acquires in the process the multitudinous meanings with which that particular language is fraught. Through that language, supplemented by gestural and other means of communication (pictorial, etc.), he is also indoctrinated into the cultural mythology—*i.e.*, the “history” of the society, into the larger social values, into behavioral principles, and into institutional and other enduring ideologies. Theoretically at least, these symbolic concepts provide each member with working definitions of the universe at large and of his relations to that universe.

Almost all the data of the folklorists, the ethnologists, the social historians, and the students of philosophy, ethics, esthetics, and religion are derived from the symbolic contexts of various peoples. Much of the so-called knowledge stored in symbolic form in our modern libraries is in fact only the recorded cultural definitions of peoples past and present. Much of our current literature, including the newspaper editorial and the essay on modern morals, consists of reiteration, elaboration, or reinterpretation of the cultural definitions of contemporary American society. Much that is taught in grammar school and university about American history and society and the world at large falls into the same category. And, finally, most of the data that are garnered by sociologists and others via attitudinal scales and opinion polls are reflections of the cultural definitions—*i.e.*, of the “conventional thinking”—of the American people about social matters rather than measures of their social conduct.

The Symbolic Context and Conduct. Just how and in what circumstances the symbolic context affects individual behavior is not clear. In general, the individual member of any society uses the language of that society and speaks more or less faithfully in the terms of the symbolic context of that society. He is “loyal” to his tribe or country, he “believes” in its god or gods, he “reverences” the memory of its heroes, he “subscribes” to the society’s primary principles and values, etc. All this he does verbally; to do so is necessary if he is to retain his social membership; for if he does not, he becomes a dissident, a malcontent, or a traitor to the society.

There is always a presumption on the part of society at large that verbal adherence to the cultural definitions is essential to acceptable social perform-

ance and that the individual who verbally adheres is per se a satisfactory member of the society. This presumption is currently illustrated by the procedure through which we grant citizenship to the foreign-born individual (e.g., if he knows the provisions of the Constitution and swears loyalty to the nation he is, other conditions being favorable, acceptable; should he fail on either count, he is not); by the way in which we determine eligibility for a driver's license (e.g., knowledge of the laws governing the operation of a motor vehicle in the particular state is generally a major prerequisite); and by the practice of associating loyalty to the nation with signing a loyalty oath and of membership in the Communist Party with refusal to do so.⁴ On the whole, society tends to be more concerned with the verbal than the nonverbal conduct of the individual. If he verbally subscribes to the proper beliefs, ideas, and values, he is generally assumed to conduct himself accordingly. Should he deny the validity of one of them or advocate a contrary one, he is generally assumed to conduct himself in ways inimical to the welfare of the society. In many instances it is, therefore, more dangerous to speak as a heretic than to act as one; and, conversely, the individual who speaks in the proper and pious vein can often thereby hide the fact that he acts in violation of the cultural standards.

That there is no necessary relation between an individual's professions and his practices is, however, easy to demonstrate and is universally recognized at the level of interpersonal relations. The nation may, through its courts and other formal agencies, judge the loyalty of an individual in terms of his avowed beliefs and expressed values; but his friends and acquaintances know him by what he does. The public may evaluate a political candidate by his speeches and other pronouncements; but his family, his cronies, and his political associates know him through quite other means. In all intimate, interpersonal relations a distinction is constantly made between the overt symbolic and the other behaviors of an individual. This distinction is involved when a man's promise is "taken with a grain of salt"; and it is what underlies all speculation concerning a man's intent, his motives, his sincerity. Such common terms as "braggart," "windbag," and "liar" are used to indicate one whose verbal behavior differs markedly in degree or kind from his nonverbal conduct, thoughts, and feelings. In any society the members of certain occupational groups—entertainers, priests, soothsayers, lawyers, teachers, scholars, or whatever—are recognized as specialists in verbal performance; and none but the naïve expect them to practice what they preach. No one, for example, imagines that the actress who says or sings that her heart is breaking is actually feeling the distress implied; few expect that the politician will even attempt to live up

⁴ For an analysis, bitter in tone but quite authentic, of the rise in America during the years following World War II of political insistence that teachers, government workers, and others in public service "demonstrate" their fitness by taking an oath of loyalty to the American form of government, see C. McWilliams, *Witch Hunt: The Revival of Heresy* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1951).

to his campaign promises; and hardly anyone thinks that the priest or teacher is as impractical in the conduct of his personal affairs as he is idealistic in his sermons or lectures.

Within the larger society individual conformity does, it is true, consist mainly in verbal acceptance of the cultural definitions; and most of the members of the society learn to conform in this way. Most contemporary Americans, for example, are "believers" in Christianity, capitalism, democracy, and the double standard of sexual morality. Lip service to the cultural definitions is, on the whole, the minimum requirement for generic social status. But status in specific groups, without which generic social status is a meaningless abstraction, calls for an entirely different order of conformity. The status group requires not only verbal conformity by the individual member to its own particular definitions, which may or may not be compatible with the cultural definitions, but also nonverbal overt conformity to the norms of conduct prescribed by the group. It is not enough, for example, that a man speak well of and toward his wife or even that he treat her kindly on state occasions. She and his interested friends and acquaintances will judge him a good husband only if he treats her well in all ways over the years. To conform with any consistency on the overt levels of conduct presupposes considerable, if not total, conformity on the covert levels also—*i.e.*, a man must feel and think in the manner of a good husband, or he cannot for long treat his wife overtly as a good husband should.

Principles versus Practices. It frequently happens that one or more of the groups to which an individual belongs or aspires to belong demands conformity to conduct norms which seem logically inconsistent with concurrently held cultural definitions. Thus it may seem logically inconsistent for a man to profess faith in Christianity, attend church regularly, and say his prayers nightly and at the same time belong to a group which requires of him, as do all status groups, such un-Christian conduct as discriminating between members and nonmembers. And it may seem logically inconsistent for the man who, as a citizen, has only good to say of political democracy and bad to say of political autocracy to act, as a businessman and member in good standing of the local Chamber of Commerce, in support of authoritarian methods of local police and political control.

But what may seem to be a contradiction between professed beliefs and actual conduct is a normal and inevitable consequence of the fact that most cultural definitions do not apply to daily conduct. Either they are irrelevant to conduct, or they are so abstract that they cannot serve as fixed guides to conduct. All the symbolic constructs which define the world outside the individual's actual range of activity are of the former sort. Whether the world is flat, round, or square can mean nothing, verbal behavior aside, to the peasant who is bound to his village and his fields; whether or not there is life on Mars can so far have only verbal significance to earth-bound men.

Some discrete beliefs, such as that corn planted in the dark of the moon will

germinate better than corn planted at other times, can serve as direct guides to conduct. But all the larger symbolic constructs, such as democracy, communism, capitalism, Christianity, etc., provide principles rather than precepts, abstract doctrines rather than specific practices to be followed in specific circumstances. For example, the democratic thesis that all men are created equal and endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness does not in any way apply to such commonplace daily problems of conduct as whether to spank the child for disobeying an order, whether to let the neighbor keep the lawnmower he has borrowed and forgotten to return, whether to give the beggar the coins he asks, whether to kiss the pretty girl who seems to invite such action, and so on. Is a child a man? Is disobedience a form of liberty? Does equality require that one share his possessions and his wealth with neighbor and beggar? And does equality, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness mean that a man and a pretty girl have the liberty to kiss at will? These and countless other problems inevitably arise whenever an attempt is made to act in accordance with the multiple abstractions included within the comparatively simple concept "all men are created equal, etc." Comparable and even more complex problems arise in the attempt to act in accordance with the doctrine of Christianity, of capitalism, of communism, or of any other abstract statement of principles.

The Need for Reification. All the larger symbolic constructs of a society are so distantly related to the concrete problems of daily life that they must be reified before they can serve even the true believer as guides to actual conduct—*i.e.*, they must be reduced by interpretation, including definition of the terms of the construct, to the concrete, to specific rules of conduct. The process of reification is subject to wide variation in form and may occur on any one of several levels. On the one hand, it may involve elaborate, official rituals, such as those by which the Catholic Church defines a given act as sinful in the eyes of God and the American courts define a given act as criminal in terms of the laws of the land. On the other hand, reification may involve nothing more complex than the individual's private decision (usually described as a rationalization) that it would be un-Christian to do such and such but not contrary to law to do thus and so. Whatever form the process takes and by whomever accomplished, the reification of cultural definitions is a far more important factor in the determination of conduct than are the definitions themselves. For any act can, by reification of the definition, be made an act of conformity or of nonconformity to that definition. This fact is embodied in the creed of the practical politician: "What matters who makes the laws and how they are constituted? Let me but administer them, and I shall bend them to my will."

One of the functions of every status group is the reification for the various individual members of those cultural definitions which are relevant to group activities. Although official reification of the cultural definitions by priests or by courts or other social agencies is not entirely without significance for

individual conduct, the major and often sole way through which a cultural definition enters into the formation of behavior is through status-group interpretation. On the whole, it may be said that unless a cultural definition is reified for the individual by one or another of the groups to which he belongs, it will have no bearing on his conduct; he may "believe" in it; he cannot and will not be guided by it.

REIFICATION OF THE SYMBOLIC CONTEXT

There are a variety of ways in which a status group may reify a cultural definition for its individual members. From the available stock, the group may select those which accord with its norms and values and, as will be shown shortly, adapt them to its particular purposes. Or the group may deny the relevance of those that are clearly in conflict with its activities, or it may distort them to make them lend support to those activities. The child who brings from his home a cultural concept or value that runs counter to the interests of a peer group may, for example, be assured that the definition is only adult nonsense, an adult trick to discourage having fun, an old-fashioned or old-fogey idea, or something equally disarming. Within their play groups children are continually evolving denials of adult principles of proper conduct. Moreover, they frequently engage in extensive, if rather random, discussion of adult definitions of distant things, places, and persons and through such discussion reach interpretations that are satisfying to their needs and interests, however divergent from the original definitions. Thus if they find a play value and a certain excitement in the belief that there are still wild Indians out West, they tend to accept the evidence of the motion pictures and deny and distort the "truth" as obtained from home and school.

Adult status groups of all sorts likewise deny those cultural definitions which are clearly in conflict with their activities and distort others to lend support to those activities. Regional, sectional, and other versions of historical events such as the Civil War, for example, indicate how documentary evidences can be varied in terms of special needs. Status groups can make equally divergent interpretations of culturally defined values, institutions, etc.; and those which cannot be adapted to suit the group's convenience will be disavowed.

Reification of Language. The way in which status groups select from and adapt the symbolic context to their own ends is clearly illustrated by the normal reification of the culturally provided language. A language is a system of cultural definitions whereby meanings are assigned to a great variety of specific verbal sounds, combinations thereof, and, among a literate people, graphic representations thereof. But the members of society seldom speak or even write in terms of the culturally designated definitions. They speak and write in some special vernacular which differs both quantitatively and qualitatively from the official language—*i.e.*, from the language as embodied among a literate people in dictionaries, manuals of grammar, and the like.

In the first place, every language contains many more words than are nor-

mally used by any member of the society. There are, for example, about four hundred thousand words defined in a good dictionary of the English language; but the working vocabulary of the layman consists of only a few hundred and that of the scholar, of only a few thousand. The working vocabulary of a member of society is determined in part by such factors as age, sex, class position, and occupation. But equally important and occasionally far more important in determining how many of the culturally provided words he knows and uses are the status groups to which he belongs. Each of these groups has something of its own special and limited vocabulary, a selection by the group from all the words culturally provided to fit its special interests, its peculiar communication needs, and, possibly, its desire for secrecy as a prop to in-groupness. Thus the workers in a given craft will have a craft vocabulary somewhat distinct from that of all other crafts, and each durable work group within that craft will have some special terms unknown to other members of the craft; and each family, neighborhood, and community will have something of its own working vocabulary.

To some of the words in the selected vocabulary the group will give the more or less conventional meanings; to others, however, it may give group-determined meanings. A commonplace word may for some reason or other come to be associated with some object, act, or feeling other than that with which it is associated by members of the society at large. This is what happens when a child inadvertently discovers that a certain four-letter word provokes (and, hence, to the child means) laughter or embarrassment in elders. In more complex but related ways any status group may redefine a given word and assign to it a unique meaning; in some instances, indeed, a group will give to such an abstract term as "democracy" a no-meaning value, as is commonly the case with formal groups that are ostensibly dedicated to the preservation of democracy.

In general, the meanings which a given individual attaches to most of the words in his vocabulary are determined by one or more of his status groups and are more or less irrespective of the formal, culturally designated meanings of those words. Thus in the argot of thieves, as they characterize themselves, "soup" is not only a watery food but is also an explosive, not just something to have at dinner but something to use in the illicit opening of safes. To the students at a college, "education" may mean the discomforts incidental to securing a degree; but within the fellowship of the college faculty it may be taken to refer to the transference of knowledge via the formal methods of classroom and textbook. To one family, "dinner" may mean an elaborate and well-prepared meal eaten with relish and involving considerable conversation: to the family nextdoor, the same word may mean the hurried ingestion of whatever an indifferent mother happens to have on hand.

The induction of an individual into an established status group involves, among other things, teaching him the special word meanings of that group. He learns these special word meanings mainly through example, through the

use made of the words by the members of the group; and the meanings so learned are far more vivid and vital than any prior meanings that he may have learned by parental or other definition. It is for this reason that the child who has been told not to use such and such a word because it is naughty may nevertheless become an inveterate user of the word as he is inducted into the neighborhood play group. It is for this reason also that the student who has learned in college to define "democracy" in liberal—if highly abstract—terms may be found a few years later using the word to mean "democratic rule by us businessmen."

By their very nature, the meanings given to words by a status group reflect the activities (and, hence, the norms, values, structures, rites, etc.), verbal and otherwise, of the group itself. The group, that is to say, uses words and language as a whole as a tool, as a means of accomplishing and of justifying its otherwise-determined ends. In many, but not all, instances the status group takes over from the general language words having approval value and attaches them to its own operations. Thus all kinds of presumably pleasurable but certainly frivolous activities are dignified by various women's groups as "cultural" or by some term equally foreign to the activity itself. And thus it is that everything from the signing of petitions to the murdering of Negroes has at one time or another by some group or other been designated "the administration of justice."

Along with the selection of a limited vocabulary and the redefinition of some word meanings, there is usually some tendency on the part of a status group to develop and maintain special ways of speaking—atypical sentence structure, inflections, pronunciations, and the like. The result is a more or less pronounced status-group parallel to regional dialect. The cant of race-track habitués and the jargon of governmental bureaucrats are marked examples of this universal tendency of all social groupings, status and otherwise, to shape the culturally provided language to the special needs, interests, and ambitions of the group.

Reification of Myths, Legends, and Rumors. The myths and legends about distant places and times past (and, in the modern world, the factual and fictional data on places and events distant in space as brought to the individual via the newspaper, magazines, motion pictures, radio, etc.), which are a considerable aspect of the symbolic context of any people, are fully as elastic and adaptable to specific status-group needs as is the language through which they are conveyed. Local or national heroes, for example, are forever being reinterpreted to fit current circumstances; and each group imputes to each hero in which it has interest the appropriate characteristics. The reinterpretation process is illustrated by the way successive generations of biographers have reevaluated the great men of our own historical past. Over the years George Washington, for example, has become, successively, all things for all men. At times he has been the idealized father of our country, who could do no evil either as child or as man; at times he has been made out a typical eighteenth-

century aristocrat (of the landed gentry sort); and at still other times he has been characterized as a commoner who rose to greatness on behalf of the common man.

In subtle and informal ways every status group selects from the symbolic context those myths and legends that lend support to its activities, revamps others to serve its purposes, and denies the validity of those which run counter to its norms and explicit values. The Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, have ignored the standard historical version of the Revolutionary army as a ragged and reluctant agency of liberation. Each of the various work groups within a village, business, or industrial enterprise has its somewhat distinct version of the history of the organization of which it is a component part, a version compounded of selected, and perhaps distorted, elements of the general history of that organization. The strikingly different "official" histories of their participation that are published by the various branches and units of the armed services after a war (in which each organization tends to take major credit for winning the war) suggest something of the way in which even recent events can be distorted by group selection and interpretations.

Every status group, even the relatively short-lived adolescent clique, reifies the myths and legends—the "history"—provided by its local and general social context. Whatever it may be in the abstract, *e.g.*, in the school textbooks, the history that has meaning for human conduct is invariably that narrow and local version brought to the individual by one or another of the status groups to which he belongs. Thus in the view of every proud old family, the founder—characteristically, the founder of the family fortune—was a man of genius and nobility, whatever kind of brigand the local legends may make him out to be.

One of the clearest illustrations of status-group selection and distortion of history is the purchasing of a satisfactory family tree by a family that has gained a certain eminence locally. For a price, almost any "old" American family can have its ancestry traced back to one of the small company who came over on the *Mayflower* or to whatever their fancy dictates. The procedures and pretenses of the professional genealogists provide a simple example of what is accomplished in more complex and covert ways by every status group in its selection and adaptation of "historical" truth to fit its own convenience.

The selective and adaptive use of the "truths" provided by the symbolic context is even more easily demonstrated in the modification of communicated versions of current events to fit the preconceptions and the convenience of the members of different status groups. In most societies of the past and in many societies of the present, knowledge of events at a distance has been obtainable only by word of mouth. Reports on such events have been brought to the local community by travelers who observed them or by travelers who heard of the events second- or thirdhand. Even events that occurred in the local community have often been known to most of the members of that com-

munity second- or thirdhand; for example, the death agonies or deathbed wishes of a member would be reported by whoever was present to some members of the community and by them passed on to still others. Even in contemporary Western society, with its elaborate systems of official and semiofficial communication—newspaper, radio, magazine, etc.—there is still considerable dependence upon word-of-mouth news, both as a supplement (*i.e.*, news of a petty and personal sort) to the official sources and as a corrective (*i.e.*, “inside” information) to the public version.

In person-to-person transmission of any story—the report of an event, the description of a person or place, or whatever—changes invariably occur. These changes are of two characteristic orders: the story is refined in each retelling, with the result that it gains dramatic form and force; at the same time, the story is adapted to conform to the preconceptions of the teller and, in some instances, to fit those of the person or persons to whom the story is being told. Both the dramatization and the adaptation are ordinarily piecemeal processes and occur without much, if any, awareness of what is being done.

The laws of this, the rumor process, are by no means clear. It is quite impossible to predict in advance what specifically will happen, aside from dramatic refinement, to a given story as it passes from person to person. But that it will change as it spreads is certain. And there is considerable evidence to the effect that any story which gains wide circulation acquires a number of different and even conflicting versions. Each such version is, it would seem, not so much a personal as a status-group one; *i.e.*, the version that gains currency in any given circle of friends or acquaintances is the one which is fitting in terms of their collective preconceptions, values, etc.⁵

Not all the rumor stories that spread through a social population have significance for any given status group; but those that do will be adapted to the needs of that group. Such adaptation may be accomplished either by giving credence to that one of the current versions which is appropriate or by making an unsatisfactory version acceptable in the course of discussion about it within the group membership. The report that the family moving into a community includes an attractive teen-age daughter will be of slight interest to the local businessmen but may be of major interest to the adolescent girls and boys. Each of these groups may, then, develop on the basis of little knowledge its own version of what the new girl is like. If the local girls tend to fear outside competition, they may, depending upon the state of their morale, develop in anticipation a concept of the new girl which is either reassuring or alarming to them. On their own behalf, the boys may talk themselves into believing—as their values and interests dictate—that she is exceptionally attractive, or lots of fun, or perhaps both. In much the same way and for comparable reasons, the local “church set” may come to the view that the newcomers are the

⁵ For experimental data on this process see G. W. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (Holt, New York, 1947); and W. A. Peterson and N. P. Gist, “Rumor and Public Opinion” (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, pp. 159–167, 1951).

sort of people who will join in church activities; and the country-club crowd, if there is one, may arrive at the opposite view.

All this means that the individual's knowledge and understanding of past and present events are largely a function of the status groups to which he belongs. Much the same cultural stock of myths, legends, and current rumors is available to each of the members of the social population.⁶ But of this available stock, only those which have been reified by one or another of the groups in which the individual participates become meaningful to him, and in the process of making these meaningful the group itself provides much of the meaning.

Reification of Discrete Beliefs. In addition to the myths, legends, and rumors that define what has happened and is happening, every culture also provides a large stock of discrete beliefs that define what and why things are as they are. Some of these definitions will be representations of things or processes which are valid in the modern scientific sense that they have been derived from repeated experience and are capable of being tested; thus all cultures seem to provide a valid definition of the nature of organic death, and most of those beliefs that have to do with the procuring of food, provision of habitation, etc., are reasonably valid. Some beliefs are, from the scientific point of view, misinterpretations of experiences or unwarranted deductions from a single experience that is mistakenly assumed to be characteristic; thus the old belief that the sea "ended" just beyond the horizon may perhaps have been derived from the fact that sailors who ventured far from shore often did not return, and the belief that a vacant house is haunted may well have arisen from one occasion on which unidentifiable noises were heard in that house. Some beliefs are, again from the scientific point of view, simply representations of what is beyond the ability of human beings to experience; such is the case with all the beliefs that concern life after death.

The cultural stock of beliefs is remarkably stable. Even in this age of great respect for the scientific method of ascertaining the nature of things, most of the existing beliefs are both very old and untested, and many of the remainder are very new but also untested. Were this not so the claims and appeals made by the advertisers of everything from cosmetics to automobiles would provoke only mirth. The validity of a belief has, however, little bearing

⁶ And, it might be added, much the same stock of stories told via magazine, novel, comic book, radio, motion picture, and television. The idea, recurrently popular and occasionally given scientific sanction (see, for example, H. Blumer, *Movies and Conduct*, Macmillan, New York, 1933) that these sources of vicarious experience may make for good or bad conduct, depending upon the goodness or badness of the stories, completely overlooks the interpretive role of status groups. It may be seriously doubted whether any comic strip, motion picture, or television program can have positive effect on the conduct of any of those who read or see it; but if there is any such effect, it is status-group mediated. Perhaps a gang of boys who are looking for trouble can find something suggestive in the comic-book or motion-picture story of a gang of car thieves; to all others it will be just another story on the traditional cops-and-robbers pattern.

upon its durability except in so far as scientists and technicians in their professional capacity are concerned; and the cultural stock of beliefs is a more or less random mixture of both valid and invalid definitions of the nature both of things that are and of things that have no experiential basis. Moreover, those elements of the total cultural stock of beliefs which are accepted and acted upon by individual members of the society are determined, not by their relative validity in the scientific sense, but by their functional value to the particular status groups that have, through reification, given them meaning and utility.

The mere existence in the cultural stock of a given belief does not assure that each member of the society will accept and act upon it. It may have no bearing on the individual's behavior, other perhaps than verbal, because, as was indicated earlier, he has no occasion to act in reference to that aspect of the outer world that it represents. Thus if he earns his livelihood by fishing, the local belief that corn must be planted in the dark of the moon will hardly concern him. A given belief may, moreover, run counter to some other belief which he has, for whatever reasons, learned to accept; or it may be inconvenient in the sense that acceptance of it dictates actions other than those he is accustomed to taking or which run counter to some calculated personal interest.

As was suggested above, the particular beliefs held and acted upon by an individual are for the most part derived from participation in status groups. Each group selects from the available cultural stock those beliefs which happen to accord with its activities, adapts others to its own purposes, and rejects as invalid those which if accepted would inhibit some operation of the group.

Rejection by a status group of relevant but inconvenient beliefs is most forcefully illustrated by the way in which groups of miners and others who work in dangerous trades persistently ignore the hazards to their physical welfare. It is, for example, generally believed that prolonged breathing of rock dust results in tissue damage to the lungs (silicosis) which is conducive to tubercular infection. This belief has been validated scientifically, and presumably most hard-rock miners verbally recognize the danger; *i.e.*, they accept the belief on the symbolic level. But within most, if not all, of their work groups, the belief is so effectively negated that it is practically impossible to induce miners to take precautionary measures. The reason is fairly clear; overt, nonsymbolic action in terms of the belief would hamper the normative activities of the group if not actually jeopardize its continued existence. Protective measures are necessarily inconvenient and disturbing; workers wearing masks cannot converse readily with one another, for example, and the continual wetting of rock surfaces, another precaution, makes for sloppy and uncomfortable working conditions. Moreover, the best of available methods are only partially effective; and in the long run the only way that the individual miner can protect himself from silicosis is to quit the trade. To preserve its existence, as well as the occupation, and to maintain the conditions to which it is ac-

customed, the work group characteristically defines the belief about dust hazard as "sissy stuff." For the same reasons the same sort of rejection of validated beliefs occurs among groups of lead, mercury, and other miners of poisonous materials, among painters and others who work with poisonous materials, and among construction workers and others who are occupationally subject to fatal accidents.

Rejection or distortion of beliefs by a status group is, in many instances, a functional necessity not only for the maintenance of the group as such but also in many instances for the peace of mind of the individual member. Soldiers who must enter combat, willing or no, develop among themselves some sort of fatalistic philosophy of the sort reflected in the stock phrase, "If it (a shell or bullet) has your name on it, it will get you; if not, it won't." For modern Western peoples, at least, such fatalistic resignation to sudden death is necessarily a denial of the prevalent cultural belief that what happens to a man is in part of his own making.

Sometimes a belief inimical to the operation of a group will be accepted by the group but nullified by the provision of a circumvention ritual. The belief that sexual intercourse is the cause of conception is perhaps too self-evident to the members of our society to be denied; at any event, pregnancy is one of the recognized occupational risks of the prostitute. In at least one recorded instance, however, a group of prostitutes convinced themselves that pregnancy could be avoided by the simple expedient of lying on their stomachs for a few minutes after intercourse.⁷ The belief, and its supporting values, that respectable girls—those who would retain their marriageable value—do not engage in premarital sexual intercourse is no doubt inconvenient to many groups of young people in our society. It is a belief which can be and no doubt often is denied. But in one instance, cited earlier, adolescent peer groups worked out a rather elaborate ritual preliminary to intercourse whereby in their view the girl's participation was absolved of guilt; in the group definition she was in effect raped, and the fiction of her adherence to the belief in sexual virtue was thereby preserved.

On the whole it would seem that beliefs are less a determinant of human conduct than a justification for conduct. When, as certainly happens, men take action predicated on one or more beliefs, it is either because their own experience has given substance to the beliefs or else because the action is for them the most acceptable of the alternatives available to them, in which case they select from the cultural stock of beliefs those which lend or can be made to lend support to that particular course of action.⁸

⁷ R. Myers, unpublished master's thesis, Stanford University.

⁸ An amusing incident of this sort is reported by J. Useem in "The American Pattern of Military Government in Micronesia" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 93-102, 1945). American military authorities were endeavoring to enlist the aid of the natives of a South Pacific island in eliminating flies, and to that end they showed them motion pictures that demonstrated the way flies carry dangerous bacteria. The native response was that they, too,

IDEOLOGIES AND IDEOLOGISTS

Status-group reification of words, myths, legends, and discrete beliefs is a comparatively simple process. In each instance, the elements are more or less independent one of the others, providing a cultural stock from which the status group need only choose those items that fit, or most nearly fit, its operative ends, much in the manner of a modern housewife shopping in a supermarket. The selection of ideologies and their adaptation to status-group needs from the ideological stock provided by the culture is, on the other hand, a devious if not difficult process.⁹ Ideologies are often mutually exclusive, each

had once believed evil spirits were responsible for illness but that, having become civilized, they now knew better.

⁹ The idea that ideas are the major determinant of social action was perhaps most clearly advanced by Karl Marx. Through much of the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries social philosophers, including the economists and political scientists, had great faith in the inherent rationality of man. In the primitive psychology of the time, man was considered to be a sort of fact-digesting machine—an organic predecessor of the electronic calculators which he has since devised to solve complex mathematical equations that involve a number of interdependent variables. To Marx and many others, however, it seemed distinctly unreasonable for the masses of men to labor for the benefit of others, to die in military defense of political and economic systems from which they could not profit, and to be slavishly subservient to ancient customs as well as to grasping landlords and greedy capitalists. Marx concluded that man is not rational, that he seldom calculates in his own self-interest, and that he is dominated by irrational ideas. Of these ideas, that of a God and a life hereafter is the most degrading and provides the capitalistic exploiters of the masses with their major weapon. Religion, he concluded, is the "opiate of the masses." Through it they are reconciled to a life of economic enslavement; by it they are precluded from revolting against their masters and living in this world as religion promises them they shall in the illusory life to come.

It was Marx who gave to systems of ideas, specifically those related to class position and to the afterlife, the term "ideology." Although he himself advocated mass revolt against the established social order in accordance with a system of ideas that he advanced, Marx used the term "ideology" with contempt. Others have found in ideas, religious or otherwise, the explanation for social life in general or in the existence of a certain ideology the "cause" of some specific form of social life. To Walter Bagehot, for example, it was religious ideas that bind men together and blind their eyes to the fact that they are pawns in the group "struggle for existence," a social counterpart to the biological struggle for existence and the process by which new and improved forms of group life evolve. To Durkheim, systems of ideas—his "collective representations"—were essential constituents of what is now termed "culture," these ideas being superimposed upon numbers of individual minds and being solely responsible for the manifest solidarity (cooperativeness) of the members of a society. To Max Weber it was the rise of the "spirit of capitalism," an ideological outgrowth of the Protestant Reformation, that in turn led to the development of the system of capitalistic economic life; and although Tawney and others have demonstrated that the historical sequence may well have been just the reverse, the stress upon the causative nature of the "spirit" of things as against the things themselves continues in certain quarters down to the present time. Many of the anthropologists, for example, are enamored of the idea that it is the symbolic interpretation of the world and their place therein ("themes in culture" is one of the phrases used here) that determines the culture of a people rather than the other way around; and the neo-Marxian Karl Mannheim recently inaugurated a flurry

is a system of many interdependent elements, and most ideologies are represented by a priestly class whose interests may be contrary to that of a given status group. These characteristics of ideologies must be understood before it is possible to comprehend the ways in which an ideology can be reified to suit the needs of a status group.

An ideology consists of a number of interrelated beliefs about some matter of major concern to the members of the society—*e.g.*, about the family as an institution, women as a biological or social class, government, the economic order, war, peace, etc. These interrelated beliefs invariably cluster about and are dependent upon some primary concept of causation, which is usually a personification of the order of God, the Devil, the founders of the nation, or the like. Associated with these beliefs are various myths and legends that provide a sort of historical "validation" of the beliefs; *e.g.*, the New Testament accounts that Christ healed the sick and that he rose from the dead "certify" to his divinity; similarly, the myth that as a boy George Washington admitted to chopping down his father's cherry tree "proves" the honesty of his pronouncements as father of his country.

The beliefs and supporting myths and legends of an ideology are the base upon which a superstructure of ritual—*i.e.*, a fixed system of social action—operates. Ideological rituals range in form from prayer through voting for political candidates to seizing political power by force; but whatever its form—and the form always is complex and involves varied kinds of action—a ritual is, in terms of the beliefs, the means of securing or preserving some value, and sometimes a number of values. Thus the ritual of "keeping Negroes in their place" (by various forms of intimidation, legal and otherwise) is, in terms of the racist ideology, necessary in order that civilization can be preserved, since Negroes are, according to the beliefs involved, inferior and incapable of maintaining a civilized mode of life.

The ideology of democracy involves such beliefs as that the individual is a rational creature and that the judgment of ten men concerning something that affects them jointly is preferable to that of any one of them; it has as its major value the right of the individual to enjoy as much freedom of action as is consistent with the rights of others to such freedom; and it has among its rituals the election of political officials and the prevention, by force if necessary, of the imposition of any other system of government. Conversely, autocratic ideology includes such beliefs as that men are individually incapable of

of interest in the idea that an ideologically detached intellectual class can provide society with utopian programs of social reform that will improve the welfare of all the members of society rather than, as he believed to be the case with traditional ideologies, serving the interests of a single class within the society (*Ideology and Utopia*, L. Wirth and E. Shils, trans., Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1936). This thesis is central to the currently popular sociological field called "sociology of knowledge." Finally, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, there is a strong presumption both in sociology and elsewhere that the modern means of communication have made ideas a new and powerful agency for the domination of the many by the few.

reasonable action (as the autocrat defines "reasonable," of course), such abstract values as that the welfare of the state is prior to that of any one or all of its citizens, and such rituals as periodic purges of "suspect" elements in order to intimidate the survivors and thus assure their loyalty.

All ideologies that have endured over a significant period of time have been highly abstract, the beliefs included vague or at best ill-defined, the values of the loftiest order and hence without self-evident relevance for daily living, and the rituals invariably so devious that special training has been required to enable one to perform them. When, as has been the case with Christianity, Confucianism, Communism, and many other current ideologies, the origin has been traced to an authoritative source (the *Great Learning*, the *Bible*, *Das Kapital*, etc.), that document has characteristically been obscure, filled with internal contradictions, and susceptible to a wide variety of equally valid interpretations.

Since all the ideologies that have endured have been highly abstract, it is reasonable to assume that only those that are highly abstract have survival value.¹⁰ It is, furthermore, reasonable to assume that abstractness gives survival value to an ideology because it enables continual or periodic reinterpretation of it in the light of changing circumstances and experiences. Every society is subject to gradual and continuing change and to occasional periods of critical change; if it is to survive as a society, its institutions and other structures must be adapted to internal and external changes; if these structures are to be ideologically maintained, then the ideologies themselves must be adaptable.

In most instances the adaptation of an ideology to bring it into conformity with changing social practices has been the responsibility of more or less professionalized and organized "specialists in interpretation." Such specialists, who sometimes form a special priestly class in the social population as well as an occupational group, are variously designated as magic men, priests, scholars, lawyers, philosophers, etc. In contemporary American society some of the so-called social scientists serve mainly, if not exclusively, as specialists in interpretation for one or another of the current ideologies.

A priestly class is culturally obligated to reduce to concrete practice the abstract principles embodied in the ideology which they serve. To this end, the

¹⁰ The *Great Learning* (the presumed writings of Confucius) is probably the least abstract, and certainly the least obscure, of the documents upon which major religions have evolved. The rise of Confucianism to the position of a state religion in China illustrates, however, the principle enunciated above. For nearly three hundred years after his death in 479 B.C., the writings of Confucius were scattered and little known. They were gradually assembled and became in time one of the works respected—but hardly revered—by Chinese scholars. In 212 B.C. the first Emperor caused all available copies to be burned (along with many of the scholars) as subversive. They seem to have gained popularity as early Chinese efforts to establish a socialistic state waned and the family—which was idealized by Confucius—emerged as the basic form of social organization. Finally, the Confucian texts were officially "rediscovered" during the Han dynasty, and Confucianism then became the dominant ideology of China.

members are more or less systematically inducted into the mysteries of the ideology and the traditional interpretations of it. As a group they have, however, a vested interest in the preservation of lay faith in the ideology; their social prestige and their livelihood ordinarily depend upon it. Consequently, they tend in actual practice to adapt the traditional or officially sanctioned interpretations to the ideological needs of the faithful, with the result that in the long run a member of the priestly class is far more a social functionary than an authoritative representative of the ideology itself.

The Sacred-Secular Dichotomy. It is currently the convention to draw a categorical distinction between those ideologies which relate causation to some supernatural agency and those which are based upon naturalistic, including human, forces of causation. Thus Christianity is considered to be a sacred ideology, since the cause of all phenomena included in its scope is God; democracy, on the other hand, is thought to be a different kind of ideology, secular in type, since the causes of government—democratic or otherwise—are imputed by the ideology to man himself. Those who consider the distinction between sacred and secular ideologies both valid and important contend that the former are inflexible, since the divine will, however defined, is not subject to human influence. A society that operates in terms of sacred ideologies will therefore be stable and unadaptive, and all efforts to bring about changes in the social system will be promptly and effectively suppressed by the priestly class, which rules through the authority vested in it by the sacred ideology. Secular ideologies, on the other hand, are characteristically pliant, since what is by ideological assumption caused by man can be changed by man. A society that operates in terms of secular ideologies will therefore be dynamic; social changes will occur as the need arises, and the relevant ideology will be modified in accordance with those changes.

In support of the foregoing contention, contrasts are drawn between the "stable and rigid" life of Western peoples during the early Middle Ages and the disordered and dynamic state of social affairs that is supposed to have followed upon the rediscovery and elaboration of the secular knowledge of the ancients.¹¹ According to this interpretation, as long as Western peoples believed that the will of God (Christian version) was the cause of all things in heaven and earth, they adhered to the institutions and other social structures that had historically been identified with God's will; and they were neither inclined to devise new and different structures nor capable of doing so. But as this sacred view of things broke down and men began to seek in nature and in man himself the cause of things natural and social, they were em-

¹¹ For a detailed history of the intellectual aspects of this transition see H. E. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (2 vols., Heath, New York, 1938), especially Vol. II. The most ardent sociological exponent of the view that secular ideology has brought ruin to Western society is P. Sorokin (*Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 4 vols., American Book, New York, 1937, 1941). For a conventional analysis of ideology and its role in social life see G. L. De Gré, *Society and Ideology: An Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1943).

boldened to break away from divinely sanctioned practices and experiment with the development of new ones. Secular concepts, such as democracy, then evolved to support the new structures.

Actually, the idea that sacred ideologies differ in kind and in social effect from those of the secular type is itself an ideological interpretation of social history. It involves a variety of beliefs that are scientifically untenable and such easily disposed-of myths as that life in the Middle Ages was, in contrast to life today, both peaceful and static.

All calculated acts involve some idea of causation; so, too, does rationalization of uncalculated, emotional or habitual action—*i.e.*, the verbal justification for it. Many of the discrete beliefs provided by a culture concern cause: *e.g.*, the belief that sickness is caused by faulty elimination of body wastes; that prayer, cannon fire, or seeding the clouds with dry ice will cause rain; that poverty is caused by improvidence or by malfunctioning of the government; that a specified rite will cause an enemy to sicken and die; etc. As has been shown, any such belief, whether the cause indicated by the belief is a spirit, a force of nature, or a human being, is subject to selective and adaptive use. The fact that a ghost is supposed to cause something or other does not make the belief self-enforcing; unless the individual wants or wants to avoid the something or other, he will ignore the ghost. And no such belief actually enters into the formation of conduct unless it has been reified for the individual by some status group.

The causal concept involved in an ideology, like that in a simple belief, must be reified before the ideology can have any significant effect in the formation of an individual's conduct. And it makes little difference whether the cause incorporated in the ideology is sacred or secular, God, Nature, or man himself. For although supernatural causation—God, the gods, spirits good and bad, the ancestral spirits, or whatever—is in ideology fixed and unchanging, it is in actuality subject to the same reification as natural causation. In other words, what man defines he can redefine to meet his special and current needs. Only as long as men define the will of God as fixed will the concept of divine causation have a constant effect upon their conduct; and only as long as the will of God is compatible with their conduct will men define it as fixed and unchanging. The idea that sacred ideologies have a different kind of effect on man's conduct from those of the secular type confuses form with function.

Ideological versus Pragmatic Concepts of Causation. The ideologies that men have devised to explain the universe and their place therein are as varied as the tools that they have invented for the cultivation of the soil. The modern philosopher of science sees disease, for example, as a local and momentary consequence of the natural organic struggle for survival, a law of nature, while the Christian Scientist sees it as a result of the failure of the individual will to maintain its identity with the divine will. To some primitives, on the other hand, illness is the result of the evil intent of some living person. Equally wide differences exist in the explanations that have been and still are advanced

for the existence of the world, the rising and setting of the sun, etc. All such differences are, however, merely differences in form, however much they may seem to be differences in function. The modern American may be puzzled by the fact that certain primitives will not undertake any venture, such as a fishing expedition, without consulting the will of the gods, and he may be offended by the affirmation of sincere Communists that Lenin was the true apostle of Marx and the founder of the communal order through which man would eventually realize his social destiny. At the same time the modern American takes for granted the fact that the pilot of a commercial transport studies the reports of meteorologists before taking off into the air, and he probably considers that Christ was the Son of God and sent by Him to represent man's divine destiny.

The ideologies of the modern American, the superstitious primitive, and the sincere Communist differ widely in form; but they do not differ in function. For, like any ideology, sacred or secular, they function to provide a concept of final or ultimate causation for that which the ideology supports, whether this be a given system of government, of religious practices, of family life, or whatnot.

Modern science adheres to an ideological concept of causation, usually termed "positivism," which differs only in form from religious, political, and other ideological concepts of causation. But the idea of causation on which modern science operates, as distinct from the idea of causation to which it ideologically adheres, is limited and pragmatic. The idea on which it operates is a refined extension to larger areas of phenomena of the same mode of thinking whereby men have everywhere and always "solved" the commonplace and practical problems of daily life. The idea of causation at this level is sequences, the relation of events one to another. Even the subhuman animals learn through experience to recognize certain sequences and to conduct themselves accordingly. The ideas of causation embodied in many of the discrete beliefs of a society are simply traditionalized statements of recognized sequences; that they may not be valid is, from the scientific point of view, irrelevant; the basis for them is pragmatic.

The concept of causation provided by an ideological system is not of the pragmatic type. It does not deal with recognized sequences but with postulated origin, or, as it is usually termed, "ultimate cause." It is highly abstract and can be known by inference only. For example, the idea "with the coming of spring seeds sprout and trees bud" makes the climatic factors designated "spring" the prelude to plant growth—a pragmatic concept of causation. But the idea "God wills that the spring shall come" makes God the origin (the final or ultimate cause) of spring; God, it is evident, is an abstraction. One may observe the time sequence: spring comes, and then plants grow. God, on the other hand, can only be inferred from the manifestation—*i.e.*, spring—of His will.

The Process of Personification. The final or ultimate cause that is pro-

vided by an ideology invariably constitutes a personification of the forces, things, or processes that are supposed to bring about whatever the ideology supports; and it would seem to matter not at all whether the personification be called God, or Nature, or Social Destiny. Whatever the causative entity is called, and whether or not it is equipped with human form, the ideology always imputes to it such human attributes as purpose, intent, motivation, values, etc.¹² The personifying of causative forces is evidently one of the universal human processes, and it occurs on a number of levels. Adults may, for example, personify for children the physical forces which result in the appearance of frost as a cheery little man who comes during the night to paint the windows white; the playwright may personify the many and complex social forces which may upon occasion result in poverty and unhappiness by a grasping and hardhearted character; the disgruntled man-in-the-street may blame all his troubles (and in so doing personify them) on "those men in the Kremlin"; and the Russian propagandists, in turn, may blame the hunger of the Russian people or the threat of war on the collective person "Wall Street capitalists."

The personification that represents final causation in an ideological system is an abstraction that differs from an actual person in at least two significant regards. In the first place, the powers of the personification are superhuman; everything bends to the will of God, to Mother Nature, or Social Destiny. In the second place, and of primary importance for social control, the personification is at once beyond question and subject to revision. For it is not a concrete human being, but a symbolic construct embodying human attributes. As the cause of something or other, there is a world of difference between Mr. Jones the living person and St. Jones the symbolic construct. Mr. Jones is whatever he happens to be—perhaps a thin, irritable, middle-aged man of uncertain antecedents and elastic morals. His mother and his wife, perhaps even his children, may be able to disregard somewhat his unpleasant qualities and stress his admirable ones; but they cannot entirely ignore the fact that he is lazy and improvident and the cause (pragmatic) of their poverty. When, however, he has departed this life, it becomes possible for those who remember him to remake him, if not in their own image, at least to suit their own convenience.

¹² The current distinction, mentioned above, between sacred and secular ideologies seems to hinge upon the degree to which the representation of final or ultimate cause includes human form as well as human psychological qualities. Thus an ideology involving the concept "God," who is so equipped in Christianity and most religions, may for convenience be described as "sacred" to distinguish it from an ideology involving such a metaphysical concept of final causation as "destiny," which does not involve human physical characteristics. The latter kind of concept is mainly, however, the plaything of philosophers; and it is to be observed that ideologies that incorporate the metaphysical type of causation acquire supplementary human form when and as they gain acceptance among the laity. Thus the Hegelian theory of the state, specifically the German state, became a popular political ideology in Germany only when Hegel's "destiny" was given personal representation by Hitler; and Marx's philosophy of revolution, with its metaphysical concept of inevitability, acquired Marx the person (later Lenin and, subsequently, Stalin) as an important element of the popular ideology that evolved from the philosophical doctrine.

For he has become a symbolic construct; and as such he may be used, variously, to haunt the house in which he died or to explain why his son, grown rich, has the abilities necessary to acquire wealth.

In the so-called secular interpretation of social institutions and social events, origin is referred to persons, either living or dead. Thus the American commonwealth was founded not by the "will of God" but through the genius of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, *et al.* Thus, too, World War II was caused not by the Devil but through the devilish efforts of the ex-housepainter Hitler. The difference between God and Hero Washington as the origin of a human institution and between the Devil and Hitler as the cause of a great war is, however, mainly one of form.¹³ Since Washington and Hitler are now known only via symbols, they are in fact only symbolic constructs and can be, as they have been, revamped to suit the convenience and needs of those who believe them causative forces. The living president, dictator, captain of industry, or military leader differs in this respect only in degree from the dead hero or villain. To a considerable part of the American population, Hoover during his term as President was first the embodiment of all the forces and circumstances that were *de facto* responsible for American economic prosperity and then, when the tide of events changed, the "cause" of the great depression, to be replaced in the role of hero and savior by Roosevelt. During the latter years of World War II, Stalin was in the view of many Americans the genial genius of Russia, one of the trio of godlike leaders who were saving the world for democracy; but with the Devil, Hitler, removed from action and international disharmony still painfully evident, Stalin was remodeled to provide Americans with the requisite villain. Genial Uncle Joe became in a remarkably short time the personification of all the forces making for international conflict. At the same time, the definition of the social system—Communism—which Stalin represented underwent parallel change, and the American ideological

¹³ The world of the modern individual may contain fewer gods and devils, fewer ancestral spirits, fewer ghosts that walk at midnight than does that of the primitive or the Asiatic peasant. But the difference is largely one of form, for the modern man peoples his world with heroes and villains—*e.g.*, Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill—just as the pre-modern does with gods and devils; and the heroes and villains of the modern world differ only in detail from the supernaturalistic entities dreamed up in explanation of their world by unsophisticated peoples.

An amusing but hardly exceptional example of modern personification occurred in the spring of 1950 when certain crops in Central Europe were affected by blight. The Russian propagandists "explained" this unfortunate occurrence under the best of all governments as the result of the evil efforts of American capitalists, who had spread the disease by airplane (*Time*, July 24, 1950, p. 32).

Russian propagandists use the crudest forms of personification, presumably on the assumption that the people they are trying to influence are symbolically untutored. The process of personification can, however, be accomplished with subtlety. See, for example, the Stalinist interpretation of the world's ill in *Time*, July 17, 1950 (cover picture and the article, "The Cat in the Kremlin," p. 23) For descriptions of rainmakers in scientific garb see *Time*, June 12, 1950, p. 57 and July 24, 1950, p. 57.

version of world affairs shifted from Democracy and Communism versus Fascism to Democracy versus Communism.

THE REIFICATION OF IDEOLOGIES

Since the existence of a given ideology in the cultural context does not make mandatory that it be accepted, and since an accepted ideology can be adapted to support almost any sort of actual conduct, it is through their reification that ideologies become factors in social control. Although official interpreters—priests, lawyers, etc.—do play some part in the reification of ideologies, as will be indicated shortly, the process is mainly and most effectively accomplished by status groups.¹⁴

Status-group reification of an ideology to make it accord with the group values and norms may be accomplished in a variety of ways and, especially when the ideology has a well-entrenched priestly body of representatives, is an exceedingly complex process. When, however, an ideology has been systematically reified—that is, when it has been successfully adapted and sanctioned—by a status group, it can exert considerable influence over the conduct of the individual member. For convenience of analysis, the various ways through which status groups reify the various ideologies in the symbolic context will be considered first and apart from the methods by which they may upon reification exert control over individual members.

Exemption of the Self-defined Elite. Every status group finds some one or more of the ideologies in the symbolic context so incompatible with its values and norms that negation of the ideology is easier to accomplish, *i.e.*, it is logically less inconsistent, than is reification. The very fact that the members of the group hold themselves apart conceptually and in terms of their values and activities from the larger society sets them somewhat at odds with those ideologies which, in theory, have universality. When such an ideology

¹⁴ The individual member of society can upon occasion resolve his own ideological conflicts or the opposition between his conduct and an ideology by one of several methods. He may work out a personal version of the will of God or the nature of his king or president; he may more or less successfully become a disbeliever or agnostic, thereby freeing himself from reliance on a cultural ideology and enabling himself to work out one more suited to his special needs; or when, as in the modern world, alternative ideologies are available, he may become a convert to that one which promises to resolve his predicament, whether that predicament be one of mental confusion or of a more tangible order, such as discontent with his economic status.

The ideological discontent of many members of contemporary society is evidenced by the high rate of individual mobility into and out of the existing religious sects, political parties, and social philosophies and by the continuous rise and decline of new religious, economic, political, health, and other cults. Such discontent suggests that individual effort at ideological redefinition of the larger universe, or some aspect thereof, is often unsatisfactory. At any event, those individuals who are first to join the newest cult are commonly also those who are first to drop it in favor of a still newer one. And, as every practicing politician knows, the ready converts to one political party are always susceptible to re-conversion to another.

cannot be effectively adapted to provide sanction for their claims to distinctiveness—when, in effect, it makes them subject to the same causative forces as the members of society at large—the status group may negate the ideology by denying that its members are included, in whole or in part, within the scope of operation of this particular ideology.

An ideology either implicitly or explicitly defines the field, *i.e.*, the class of persons or, less commonly, the physical area, which is subject to its causative forces. Only the true believers in a religion can know and obey the will of the god of that religion. Only those who, by ideological definition, are members of the superior race possess the qualities of that special race of men and can, therefore, behave in the ways that are superior. Only those born of aristocratic parentage can inherit those special qualities which are responsible for (*i.e.*, cause) the fact that the aristocratic class lives in ways which the commoner cannot achieve.

The fact that an ideology includes within its scope only certain categories of persons may be conveniently termed “ideological in-groupness.” In terms of our various existing cultural ideologies, we Americans constitute a group distinct from other groups such as Germans and Chinese. But there are groups within groups: women, according to ideological fragments remaining from the old patriarchal family, constitute a group apart from men; racial ideology holds that whites are a group apart and superior; class ideology gives special genetic attributes to the members of the best old families; and regional ideology makes New Englanders a breed apart from Texans, and vice versa.

On the ideological level various groups may overlap and even conflict with one another. But what is significant in the present connection is that ideologically all the members of each group (nation or whatever) are equally subject to the requirements of the ideology. All Christians are subject to God’s will, Christian version; all whites, in the general version of racism, are superior and charged with upholding the superiority of the white race; all members of the upper class are superior and, ideologically, must conduct themselves in a superior fashion. In sum, by ideological definition all those within the category are subject to and act in accordance with the ideology.

The members of a given status group who are by ideological definition included in its scope but who conduct themselves in contraindicated ways may claim exemption by setting themselves apart from the ideological in-group as an elite. They do not, in this instance, deny the ideology; rather they develop and maintain the status-group fiction that as the elite of the group they are not subject to the same forces or obliged to adhere to the same values and standards of conduct as the group commoners. Their special freedom from the operation of the ideology may, in their view, stem from exceptional virtues, rare wisdom, an exclusive discovery, or some comparable claim to distinction.

Such self-exemption from ideological requirements is a common practice among all sorts of leadership cliques. Political bosses, high-level business executives, military high commands, and others who direct and manipulate the

activities of an ideological in-group frequently conduct themselves in ways which are in marked contrast to the ideological requirements.¹⁵ The inner circle of practical politicians who rule an American city will, for example, do so by methods which are in all regards a violation both of the spirit, if not the letter, of the city's charter and legal enactments and of the basic concepts involved in democratic ideology. They may be more or less "believers" in the democratic form of government, not only in their public pronouncements but privately. Yet they rule via corruption and make personal profit from corruption. Ordinarily, it would seem, they justify this contrast, to themselves at least, by claiming, in effect, that democracy is good for the people but that to get things done in government, power must be concentrated in the hands of a small group of superior men—themselves—and that the graft they collect is only a necessary payment for the superior ability which would otherwise not be applied to the ruling of men.

The rather flexible ethics of men of business are too well documented to need comment. Among themselves businessmen may condone, to say nothing of engage in, a variety of arrangements and deals which are just inside the law but which clearly do violence to such ethical elements in capitalistic ideology as that "a man's word is as good as his bond" or "competition is the life of trade." They may, in effect, deceive, not one another, but segments of the larger society; or they may conspire in the restraint of trade. Such men are, however, often the most vocal advocates of the capitalistic system; and they invariably demand that their employees live up to such trust as is imposed in them. For example, the directors of a bank may attempt to rig the market for stocks or bonds that they are floating; but should a bank clerk or a customer rig a personal bank account, the directors would consider this a criminal act. Their own contracapitalistic act is probably rationalized elaborately; but the nature of such rationalization can perhaps be suggested by the stock phrases "business is business" and "what the public does not know won't hurt it." Churchmen likewise often set themselves apart from Christian laymen, claiming as the spokesmen of God the right to a certain freedom from His will.

Class ideology usually assigns certain responsibilities to upper-class position which are in a sense the penalty for occupying that position. But within the upper class there are various status groups (family, age, sex, prestige, etc.), some of which may consistently ignore their traditional and ideological responsibilities and perhaps demand extra-special rights from the society at large. One of the several families which constitute the local upper class may, for example, fail to pay its bills, be autocratic in its dealings with the local commoners, or otherwise fail, in the view of the class as a whole, to live up to its position. The members of this family may justify such failure on the grounds that they are the *crème de la crème*. Or they may pass off their deficiency by vague reference to the exceptional qualities of the family or some-

¹⁵ For details of the way in which military leaders do this see H. Mullan, "The Regular-service Myth" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 53, pp. 276-281, 1948).

thing equally vague that is supposed to distinguish them from the other upper-class families—a distinction, of course, in the direction of superiority. Neighborhood or other cliques that form within a given class level in a somewhat similar way may justify conduct on their part that is unbecoming to members of their class. The club that has become, and become noted for being, “fast” may actually pride itself on its freedom from the normal moral and ethical restraints, the members feeling that their conduct demonstrates their superiority to the common herd—*i.e.*, the people who live nextdoor.

Self-exemption from an ideology is, perhaps, most strikingly illustrated by the way the members of various illegal and socially ostracized groups, such as professional criminals, sex perverts, and prostitutes, absolve themselves from some of the ideological requirements of the society at large. The ordinary hoodlum is probably quite unaware of the conflict between his conduct and ideology; he sees it, if he reflects at all, as a conflict between sensible people like himself and the stupid cops. But the really successful criminal is quite as aware of the larger society in which he operates as is the successful businessman. Like such businessmen, but to a more marked degree, successful criminals simply set themselves apart from society. They are thieves, the smart men; others are suckers, the men not smart enough to be thieves. Sex perverts have comparable rationalizations for the fact that their sex life is contrary to the ideological sanctions; they are “peculiar” and hence freed from the socially normative sex values and moral codes to conform to the peculiar norms of the pervert group to which they belong.

When the activities and values of a status group are in general but not in complete accord with an ideology, the group may justify its specific violations of that ideology on the grounds that it is absolved from adherence thereto under special circumstances or to some extent. Probably every status group, as every individual in his individual capacity, takes liberties with one or more of the ideologies that it otherwise acknowledges. A status group may tell itself in effect that “a little sin won’t do us any harm.” Many relatively sedate and conservative clubs, for example, set aside one night during the year when the members traditionally “raise the roof.” The family that is normally subservient to the private aspects of capitalistic ideology (“a penny saved is a penny earned,” etc.) may upon occasion take a vacation from normality, financial and otherwise, on the ideological grounds that a change is good for the soul if not the pocketbook. Adolescent peer groups which subscribe to the sex morals of the old family system may break the tabus on the big night of graduation from high school, or something of the sort, with the comforting thought that for once the rules (God’s, presumably) do not apply.

Temporary absolvment from an ideology has been a fairly common device of most societies. During most folk festivals the participants traditionally ignore ideologies which they would not think of violating at other times. The temporary absolvment from an ideology by a status group is simply a small-

scale noncultural parallel. The essential difference is that only the members of the status group accept the idea that they are for the moment absolved from the ideology. Parents, friends, and neighbors may think quite differently.

Denial of Validity. Temporary or partial absolvment "for cause" from adherence to ideological requirements blends, imperceptibly, no doubt, into outright denial that the ideology applies to a given practice, for temporary absolvment can extend to permanent absolvment. But the flat denial of the relevance of an otherwise accepted ideology to some general practice is usually the consequence of sharp adverse experience in trying to live up to the ideology. Groups, like the individuals of which they are composed, may become disillusioned with ideologies and in the course of time completely deny their validity. Such disillusionment may be a consequence of the fact that the group is inept, as is the case when a reasonably honest business firm fails through inefficiency or adherence to antiquated methods; or it may result from the fact that the ideology is itself irrelevant to the group values and goals, as it is when the farmers of a region have gathered repeatedly to pray for rain; or it may be, and perhaps most frequently is, the result of a conflict between highly abstract ideological values and the more vital, real values of the members of the group.

Conflict between cultural ideologies and the basic values of the members of society is nowhere more evident today than in the distinction between what men are obligated to do in terms of national ideology (the obligations of the good citizen, American, English, or whatever) and their ideological and experiential obligations to family, friends, business associates, and themselves. The businessman who is called upon to pay ever-higher taxes "in the public interest," to cease producing certain products at a profit and produce others "for the nation's security," etc., often faces the alternative of acting according to the current priestly (bureaucratic) definition of good citizenship and in so doing letting down his family, his employees, and the business establishments with which his own is integrated, or of continuing to act as a sound businessman and in so doing serve poorly the nation's ends. The evidence, of which there is much, indicates that on the whole businessmen everywhere lean toward the latter alternative and are just as loyal to the nation at large as proves profitable or legally inescapable. Hence the black markets and gray markets which invariably appear when a government attempts by fiat to rearrange the economic system.¹⁶ There is, furthermore, evidence which suggests that the violation of such fiat is mainly a group, as distinct from individual, affair; businessmen, their suppliers, and their customers work out in their special groupings the permissive liberties that can be taken with the law. On the whole, it would seem that in the process such groups come to the view that far from being the will of the people, government is at most a necessary evil.

¹⁶ For data on the black-market operations conducted by otherwise law-abiding businessmen in America during World War II see M. B. Clinard, *The Black Market* (Rinehart, New York, 1952).

That view has certainly become prevalent in many quarters in recent decades during which governmental demands on citizens have increased rapidly in scope and intensity.

Professional military men are no doubt ideologically distinct, so far as war and warfare are concerned, from the civilian population. They have something of their own history—the history of warriors—and their own ideological systems. But the conscripted civilian soldiers, who make up the bulk of modern wartime forces, have no effective and comparatively little ideological preparation for war. There would seem to be some national differences in this respect; but American civilian soldiers, at least, soon become disillusioned with American nationalistic ideology and deny its validity. The realities of military life all seem to do violence to the ideals implied by the ideology—for example, the existence of an autocratic officer class is undemocratic. Even more disillusioning is the discovery that the demands made on the soldier in the name of nationalism run counter to his personal and more effective loyalties to family and friends and above all else to his own self-interest. Such disillusionment is furthered and fostered by the disillusionment of the other soldiers with whom he is in direct association; and in the tenuous but significant status groups that develop among such soldiers, it soon becomes normative to deny the validity of nationalism (hence the characteristic “cynicism” of the soldier) and to accept and operate in terms of status-group ideals that are, in their view, more realistic. They fight, when there is no feasible alternative, to survive as individuals and as a group and not, as nationalism requires, for the “good and glory of the nation.”

Systematic Reification. The reconciliation of status-group conduct with ideology by means of self-exemption, absolvment, or denial are commonplace procedures; but the resulting concord between conduct and ideology is limited in scope, temporary in duration, or both. By systematic reification, however, an ideology may be brought into total and enduring accordance with the norms and values of a group or with the cultural practices of a society at large.

As was indicated earlier, an ideology provides principles so abstract that they must be interpreted before they can be applied to concrete circumstances; and since they are so abstract, they are subject to various interpretation. Consequently through systematic, *i.e.*, logically consistent, interpretation of ideological principles, almost any form of conduct can be defined as being required or permitted by this ideology or as being precluded by that ideology. Thus what is a sin in the eyes of God, what is treachery to the nation, and what is contrary to democratic principles depend entirely upon how the will of God, the welfare of the nation, and the nature of the democratic process are defined. An authority, *e.g.*, the Bible, can of course be found for almost any definition; hence it is the definer who in fact determines what conduct is permitted, required, or prohibited by a given ideology.

For example, Christianity has been at various times the ideological base or, more properly, excuse for a great variety of things: the early Christian martyrs

died, sometimes literally in the lion's den, that Christianity might live and, incidentally, that they themselves might ascend to the kingdom of heaven. In the name of Christ and for the glory of God, feudal knights and masses of the medieval peasantry fought and died to liberate the Holy Land from the heathen; in the same name they repeatedly fought one another. For good Christian purposes the Jews were driven out of Spain and have been repeatedly massacred by Russian, Polish, German, and other good Christians. God, it seems, sanctioned the bloody Spanish conquest of Central and South America. On behalf of the same God, differently interpreted, the Puritans settled in America, and their descendants engaged in the profitable rum-and-slave trade. There is, perhaps, nothing that men can do which has not been done under the name of Christianity; and other religious ideologies have demonstrated equal flexibility. Political, economic, and even the currently dominant scientific ideology have been put to ends as widely varied. In the name of democracy, rather lightly spoken perhaps, modern Americans have recurrently made war on such misguided children of God as the Germans; and Americans and Germans have joined together and fought against the anti-Christian and antidemocratic Russians. To imagine that the ideology of Christianity is responsible for the conduct of Christians or that the ideology of democracy causes men to live together in democratic ways is to ignore the evidence of history and current events.

Systematic reification of an ideology may be accomplished by any status group acting independently of the larger society.¹⁷ There are always local and informal versions of every doctrine, religious and otherwise. Indigenous "heathen" beliefs and practices have everywhere been combined with the Christianity brought to the primitives by missionaries; and every family, community, and other group within Christendom flavors Christianity to suit its own taste, just as it does the cultural myths, legends, and discrete beliefs. The ladies of the Baptist sewing guild, for example, may sincerely believe that it is un-Christian to bear evil tales; but they may easily convince themselves that their special kind of gossiping does not fall in the category of bearing evil tales. Whole church congregations have in the same way set themselves up on occasion as the proprietors of gambling establishments (the church

¹⁷ The following books and articles provide a variety of research and historical data on the procedure by which and the extent to which status groups of one sort or another have bent cultural ideologies to fit their own convenience: G. H. Armbruster, "An Analysis of Ideologies in the Context of Discussion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 50, pp. 123-133, 1944); S. D. Clark, "The Religious Sect in Canadian Politics" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 207-216, 1945); S. D. Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Ont., 1948); V. E. Daniel, "Ritual and Stratification in Chicago Negro Churches" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 7, pp. 352-361, 1942); J. F. Embree, "Some Social Functions of Religion in Rural Japan" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 47, pp. 184-189, 1941); C. J. Nuesse and T. J. Harte, eds., *The Sociology of the Parish* (Bruce Pub., Milwaukee, 1951); M. H. Wilson, "Witch Beliefs and Social Structure" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 56, pp. 307-313, 1951); and J. M. Yinger, *Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion* (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1946).

"bank night" enterprises) on the theory that, if it is for the glory of God, it is not contrary to divine will.

The democracy of one place frequently has only ideological resemblance to democracy as practiced in another; that is, each community interprets democracy to make it accord with its own values, structures, and specific practices. In one place it may be "democratic" to mix white and Negro children in the classroom; in another democracy permits and racist ideology requires the segregation of Negroes. Local and informal reification of ideologies takes many forms, but that any ideology can be and commonly is so interpreted as to make it sanction local norms can hardly be doubted.

Role of Official Interpreters. Official reification of an ideology, such as that accomplished by Papal edict, by Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law, and by an announced change in the Communist "Party line," comes rather slowly and is usually an ideological catching up with social actualities.¹⁸ In the actual administration of ideological principles at the local level, however, the official representatives of an ideological organization tend to apply the official interpretations in terms of social realities, in ways that are locally acceptable. In so doing, they are in effect making local and specific reifications of ideological principles. Although they are functionaries of the organization, they are also human beings; and their status as human beings and, hence, the respect with which they will be looked upon locally depend largely upon their interpreting the law—of God, of the commonwealth, or of nature—in ways satisfactory to the local community and, often, to specific status groups within that community in which they have membership that they value. The priest, the judge, or the physician who decries as sinful, illegal, or unscientific that which is normative within the community (whether it be incest, shooting deer out of season, or taking Dr. Quack's Miracle Elixir) may thereby gain the respect of his fellow professionals; but few if any of them will be near at hand, and the act will jeopardize his position in the community of laymen with whom he must live, upon whom he is largely dependent, and whose respect is necessary if he is to have any significant influence over them.

The perpetuation of a malfunctioning *status quo* in such countries as Spain,

¹⁸ One of the most impressive demonstrations of the fact that priestly interpretations tend to be adjusted to social circumstances, rather than the other way around, is provided by D. Hatch and M. Hatch in "The Effect of the War on the Philosophy of the Educational Policy Commission" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 9, pp. 395-400, 1944). The authors found that the Educational Policy Commission, official spokesman for the professional educators of the United States, was strongly and persistently pacifistic in its pronouncements until 1940, somewhat indecisive in regard to war in 1941, and after American entrance into war equally strong and persistent in the assertion that the war was essential to the preservation of the American way of life.

D. Tomasic ("Ideologies and the Structure of Eastern European Society," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 53, pp. 367-375, 1948) has demonstrated that the often abrupt changes in the official Russian Communist "Party line" are attempts to adjust ideological interpretations to social changes that have come about in spite of previous interpretations or to changes that have failed to come about in accordance with previous ideological requirements.

Ireland, and Italy has often been blamed upon the existence in each of these countries of a reactionary Catholic clergy which is presumed to hold the mass of the people under stern ideological control and thereby to make them conform to antiquated forms of land tenure and the like; and this presumed domination of society by churchmen has been decried as clericism. It is no doubt true that the Catholic clergy of Spain, and to a lesser extent that of Italy and Ireland, gives representation to religious principles that are in general accord with the established landholding and other practices of the society; but it does not follow that they are singlehandedly preventing changes in these practices through insistence on the inviolable nature of the principles that they represent. There is ample historical evidence to suggest that the Catholic clergy, like the representatives of any ideology, whether sacred or secular, can readily adapt their principles to changing social practices, as they so clearly did in France and elsewhere; and that when they fail to do so, the result is not the prevention of changes that are under way but revolt from the Church and its representatives.

Those who represent the organized expression of any ideology, as the schoolteacher does the culturally sanctioned body of knowledge, as the politician and other political functionaries do the ideologically supported system of government, and as the man of medicine does the magic or the science of healing that is current in his society, tend always to compromise their official and ideologically indicated duties by consideration of the needs, values, and status-group beliefs of those over whom they exercise nominal authority.¹⁹ The clergyman, Catholic or whatever, like the local policeman and for the same reasons, is tolerant toward his flock, being reasonably careful to ignore the fact that they violate a variety of religious principles; the jurist interprets the law in the light of local circumstances; the schoolteacher teaches a brand of history colored by local prides and prejudices; and even the modern physician is inclined to temper scientific truth to some extent in terms of local diagnostic and therapeutic preferences. Should any such functionary fail to reify the doctrine he represents and thereby bring it into accord with local, mainly status-group, norms and values, he as a person comes to be locally defined as a sort of traitor and is then subject to much the same rejective treatment as is the agent of a politicomilitary conqueror—treatment that may range all the way from subtle character assassination to sudden death.

Sectarianism. When, as has often happened historically, the official in-

¹⁹ An excellent study of the way in which religious leaders ask of their congregations that which the latter wish to give is reported by J. W. Eaton in "Controlled Acculturation: A Survival Technique of the Hutterites" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 17, pp. 331-340, 1952). For other materials see E. E. Evans-Prichard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* (T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1937); C. W. Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 49, pp. 165-180, 1943); L. Pope, *Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1942); T. W. Sprague, "Some Notable Features in the Authority Structure of a Sect" (*Social Forces*, vol. 21, pp. 344-452, 1943); and B. B. Whiting, *Paiute Sorcery* (Viking Fund, New York, 1950).

terpretation of an ideology, religious, political, economic, or otherwise, is both strict and constant and the representatives of that ideology are rigidly and effectively controlled by the organization, any considerable gap between ideological principles and actual social conduct may be bridged by sectarian breaking away from the "body ideological." This may be accomplished with or without the assistance of local representatives of the ideology. If without, it is accomplished by some layman's arising to preach the gospel according to local preferences; and the official representative is deserted by those who find the new version more compatible than the old. When the dissenters are a minority of the local population, the effect of a sectarian breakup is a schism.

Temporary schisms are perpetually occurring among the congregations of churches, local members of political parties, local advocates of capitalism such as chambers of commerce and Rotary Clubs, and other nominal adherents to a cultural ideology. The quarrel in such instances is usually over some minor and practical matter, and it is ordinarily subject to resolution. The formation of a new and relatively durable sect—political, economic, religious, or whatever—is an act of true rebellion and does not reflect minor differences of opinion. It is an expression, rather, of a deep-seated and significant contrast between the status-group norms of the participants and the ideology to which they are nominally subject. The emergence of a new sect involves not so much the formation of new norms of conduct—although some may emerge—as it does the systematic reification of the ideology to make it accord with existing norms and the establishment of a body of representatives that will give this new version of the ideology official sanction.

Through the Middle Ages religious sectarianism was characteristically accomplished through the formation of new orders which retained at least nominal alliance with the Church hierarchy. There was, in addition, some tendency for each bishop and archbishop to carve out for himself a semi-independent religious principality. That tendency still exists in the Catholic Church, Irish Catholicism having little in common, for example, with French Catholicism. In recent centuries, however, it has been Protestantism which has been most subject to sectarian fragmentation. Possibly the rigidity with which the officials of the established Protestant churches held to their dogma was in considerable measure responsible for this. Perhaps the widely differing local conditions, especially in the United States, precluded the inclusion of, for example, all good Methodists under one ideological flag. At any event, the Protestants have become so much differentiated ideologically and organizationally that about all they have in common is opposition to the Papal interpretation of God's will.

Political sectarianism takes many forms. In some times and places it is always synonymous with treachery. Under political dictatorship, for example, any group that dissents from the official interpretation of loyal conduct is defined, and is usually treated, as an enemy of the state. One of the peculiar and possibly most significant aspects of democratic ideology is that it sanctions

sectarianism when the dissenters follow certain prescribed rites, *i.e.*, when they revolt via the elective system rather than physical force. The rise of new political parties within, as distinct from in opposition to, the political system has under democracy been a peaceful—"legal," as it is usually designated—parallel to the growth, under monarchy, dictatorship, and other authoritarian systems, of subversive and revolutionary groups. In contemporary France, indeed, political sectarianism has gone so far that a stable national government is unobtainable; and in some instances French municipal governments have even operated, presumably to the satisfaction of the local citizenry and without effective check from the national Government, under the ideological guise of Communism. They have thereby achieved the ultimate in ideological absurdity.

One of the more interesting forms of economic sectarianism is the historic rise of local consumer or producer cooperatives within the context of capitalistic society. Usually the outgrowth of local dissatisfaction with some consequence of adherence to capitalistic practices, the cooperative is formed as an organizational alternative to free enterprise. On the ideological side, the cooperative is necessarily a violation of the generally accepted "laws" of economics; to square ideology with practice, the cooperators work out or borrow a new interpretation of capitalism, one in which free enterprise is good except in the case of the activity covered by the cooperative.

IDEOLOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE STATUS GROUP

There is a tendency, very much pronounced in the modern world, to exaggerate the role of ideology in the determination of human conduct. As was indicated earlier, it is commonly presumed that those who profess belief in Christianity are per se good Christians, that those who give proper lip service to democracy act in ways that are democratic, etc. On the same assumption Christian missionaries attempted for centuries to make ideological conquests of Asiatic and other heathens, and the United States undertook in the years immediately following World War II to "teach" democracy to a militarily defeated Germany and Japan. It is on this same assumption, also, that continuing efforts are made in the United States and elsewhere to prevent the dissemination of "bad" ideologies and foster the spread of those officially deemed "good." That the basic assumption is false and that all effort to induce people to conduct themselves in "good" ways by converting them to the ideologies that sponsor "good" conduct is wasted cannot be doubted.

The mere existence in the cultural heritage of a given ideology does not assure that the individual's conduct will be affected thereby; nor do social efforts to instill ideological principles.²⁰ The individual may be taught to speak

²⁰ J. W. M. Whiting (*On Becoming a Kwoma*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948, Chap. VIII) has shown that even in a primitive society where the socialization processes are far more effective than in our own, the induction of the individual into tribal religious beliefs is not sufficient to assure individual conformity to the norms of conduct supported

in the discourse of the ideology and even to go through some of its rituals; e.g., he may talk piously of God and attend church upon occasion, he may fervently pledge allegiance to the flag and even pay his taxes without inordinate grumbling, he may be a devout democrat (or Communist or anarchist) and cast his ballot at every election, and he may profess filiality to his parents and come bearing gifts on Mother's Day and Father's Day. But unless the ideology is reified for him by one or another of the status groups to which he belongs, his attachment to it will be no more than skin deep.

An ideology that has been selected by a status group from the cultural stock, adapted to provide ideological support for the group norms, and validated and sanctioned by the group is thereby made operationally meaningful to the individual and applicable to his daily conduct. And an ideology that has been reified in this way can be an effective supplement to other forms of status-group control. It never operates independently of or in opposition to other forms of control, and its effect is only to encourage further individual adherence to the group norms. That is to say, the good Christian behaves as he does primarily because of the normative requirements of one or more of the status groups to which he belongs; Christian ideology, status-group version, can at the most serve to hold him to those norms when he is tempted to deviate from them and when other and antecedent group controls are weakened or inoperative.

An ideology that has been reified by a status group becomes a symbolic extension of the group itself, a sort of projection of the group, its norms, and its values beyond the group's actual presence. The ideological causative force—God, Nature, the King, the President, or whatever—then serves as a symbolic agent of the group, representing the group and enforcing upon the individual conformity to its norms when he is beyond the group's direct control. To the extent, usually considerable, that the individual member accepts a group-reified ideology, he carries with him wherever he goes an idea of God, or whatever the personification of final or ultimate cause may be, that is made not in the image of man in general but in the image of the specific status group, an image that supplements and perhaps corrects for the individual's personal concept of that group.²¹

by those beliefs. Such beliefs must be reinforced by group sanctions—*i.e.*, made to apply to specific aspects of conduct—before they have any appreciable effect upon conduct.

²¹ How this operates is well illustrated by the spirits of the ancestors who constituted an ideological status group for every Chinese under Confucian ideology. In this particular system of beliefs, values, rituals, etc., the spirit of an individual was supposed to go upon his death to the land of his ancestors. His reception by his ancestral spirits would depend, however, upon how well family affairs were going on earth. During life it therefore behooved every man who desired happiness in the hereafter to conduct himself in ways conducive to his family's welfare and future, including the provision of filial sons to carry on after his death. Aside from sheer survival, what constituted the welfare of the family was largely a matter of current family definition; for one it might mean the honor of producing a scholar, for another an increase in material wealth, and so on. Whatever the

Moreover, a status-group-reified ideology—which is quite a different thing from an ideology lying loose, as it were, in the cultural heritage or one being promoted by some outside agency—lends a degree of omnipotence to the status group. The direct controls of the group are fallible; the individual may escape detection in the violation of group norms, and he may be unjustly punished for a violation that he did not commit. The controls exerted over an individual by a group-sanctioned ideology have the unique virtue of being at once infallible and ever present. The ideologically promised rewards and the threatened punishments of God, Nature, or other personifications of final or ultimate causation are *de facto* beyond test. They either lie in some hypothetical future world (as is mainly true of sacred ideologies) or else are so interwoven with other and inseparable causes as to be indistinguishable therefrom. Who can tell, for example, whether the advent of a war is punishment for the failure of the society to live up to democratic (or Christian, for that matter) ideology or is just a prelude to the fulfillment of that ideology, the war that will, unlike all its predecessors, end all wars?

current definition, it was projected into the ancestral spirits, who thus came to represent ideologically the particular norms and values of the family as a group; and unlike the actual family, the ancestral spirits were omnipotent and omnipresent. Every member of the family thus carried with him wherever he might go an idea of the ancestral spirits, watching over him and capable of eventually rewarding or punishing him, that was in fact simply a symbolic representation of the family itself.

This system of ideological control was, moreover, constantly augmented by a great variety of direct status-group controls, including those, mentioned earlier, exercised by the clan or great family. The reward for filial conduct was, therefore, much more than a warm ultimate welcome in the hereafter; it was a warm welcome at home and, perhaps, special commendation at the annual gathering of the clan.

For an extended discussion of Chinese ancestor worship see F. L. K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestor's Shadow* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1948). For discussions of the ways in which belief in a life after death may influence the conduct of contemporary Western peoples see W. M. Kephart, "Status after Death" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 15, pp. 635-643, 1950), and J. Wach, *Sociology of Religion* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944).

CONTROL IN THE STATUS-GROUP SYSTEM

The external circumstances to which a status group must adjust are extremely complex and always subject to change, and they vary widely from group to group. A group selects various elements, including the ideological, from the particular subculture that its members represent and puts them to its own uses. The group may exercise a certain selectivity in adjusting to the physical universe in which it operates; playing children, for example, may select a vacant lot in which to stage their games. The group may isolate itself to some extent from the general social context; thus a gentlemen's club may provide its members with a quiet refuge from the turmoil of city streets. But every group, however exclusive and aloof, is restricted in what it can do by the external circumstances to which it is subject; it cannot escape those circumstances. Although it provides a little world for its individual members, a world with its special norms, values, rites, etc., that little world is necessarily dependent upon the larger social context. Even the criminal gang, living in opposition to the larger society, cannot steal what does not exist; and it must evade or else make its peace with the police and other agents of society.

All status groups operate within a social context; but some—friendship coteries, local bridge clubs, modern family units, and many other kinds of groups—do so without systematic ties to other status groups. Their activities are not directly and continuously dependent upon related status groups. As groups, they are in a position somewhat analogous to the individual who is foot-loose and fancy-free, *i.e.*, who is not dependent upon and responsible to a family, an employer, or other durable association. An individual's freedom is, of course, entirely relative. He can, perhaps, come and go at his own convenience rather than at the need or wishes of a wife and children; but on the other hand he lacks a family to come to when he is so inclined. A free-floating status group is likewise somewhat able to "come and go" as its members wish. It can assemble at their convenience and choose, within available options, where to gather. Thus a casual play gang may get together sometime after school or sometime Saturday morning and then decide where to go and what to do.

Most status groups, however, are dependent upon more or less structured relations with other groups. When a foot-loose family settles down in a community, it becomes in many respects dependent upon and hence subject to the control of other families in the neighborhood; when the neighborhood boys join a Boy Scout troop, they cease to be a casual play group and become,

both as individuals and as a group, subordinate to the troop as a whole, which is itself subject to the established rules and traditions of Scouting; and when a small business is absorbed into a large corporation or when an unincorporated village becomes a corporate part of the county and state, something of the same order occurs.

The Formal Structure versus the Status-group System. The larger forms of social organization, such as a primitive tribe, a modern corporation, a religious sect, a military force, a political party, or a society for the prevention or preservation of something or other, are generally regarded as entities into which the various individual members are integrated and upon which in turn each individual is dependent in a manner roughly analogous to the way the individual cells of an organism are integrated into and dependent upon the whole. This concept of the nature of the larger forms of social organization is implicit in the structure of any such organization and is often made explicit by the organization's ideology. Thus, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, citizenship is an individual matter, a status position within the political organization which involves various personal rights and obligations; and in most respects government proceeds as though the citizens under its jurisdiction responded to law as semiautonomous behavioral units. In comparable ways a primitive tribe, a modern corporation, a religious sect, a military force, or a society for this or that proceeds as though it consisted of an organizational integration of individual human beings.

A convenient social fiction, particularly useful for organizational bookkeeping purposes, this concept of the nature of organizational membership has at times been incorporated into anthropological, sociological, and other attempts at scientific analysis. It has been especially noticeable in discussions of political organization, the operation of government and other agencies of law, and, until very recently, of modern industrial organizations. And on the official level, organizations do for the most part operate as though an organization were an entity composed of individuals who are integrated into a whole by the organizational traditions, rules, regulations, etc. The official efforts of an organization to realize this fiction result in what may be described as the theoretical or paper plan of the organization and in the case of tribal, clan, and similar kinds of organizations, as the formal cultural institution. When most social scientists speak of "organization," they generally mean, although they may not be entirely aware of it, the formal structure rather than the operative one, the paper plan rather than the program of actual action, the theoretical system rather than the one to which men operationally adhere.

For the student of social control, if not always for other social scientists, the paper-plan aspect of an organization and the actual conduct of the members of that organization must be clearly distinguished.¹ In terms of the latter,

¹ Recent sociological recognition of this contrast is clearly evidenced in the following books and articles, which provide some of the objective data upon which the present analysis is based: M. Dalton, "Unofficial Union-Management Relations" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*,

an organization operates, not as a large number of individuals organizationally integrated, but rather as a considerable number of status groups which are more or less articulated one with the others. From this point of view, which is essential to an understanding of the controls that are actually exercised in organizations, a tribe, clan, corporation, political party, or other large form of social organization operates as a system of status groups.

The distinction between the formal structure and the status-group system is perhaps most readily apparent when approached in terms of an individual member. In theory the individual joins, is employed by, or is inducted into the Church, the political party, the corporation, the army, or some other organization and is thereafter subject to its official rules and regulations. Actually, however, his membership in a large and relatively impersonal organization is important to him mainly as a context for one or more of the status groups to which he belongs. In almost all instances, his status-group membership is of primary and his organizational membership of secondary importance to him. The fact that he is a member in good standing of such and such a tribe is, as was indicated in an earlier chapter, a matter of generic status and is of direct significance to him only in certain limited kinds of situations—*e.g.*, when he walks down the village street, when he encounters a member of a different tribe, etc. For the rest, what is important to him is that as a member of such and such a tribe he can and does belong to this and that status group. Most of the effects of tribal membership come down to him, not directly, as is the formal assumption, but by way of one or another of the status groups that are dependent upon the tribal organization for their existence.

And so it is with membership in any organization. In theory the individual joins the Church (Catholic, Protestant, or whatnot); in relevant practice he joins a specific congregation, operating within the framework of the Church, and comes in time to belong to one or another of the even more intimate status groups that exist within the context of the congregation—the choir, the young girls' group, the Ladies' Aid, etc. From the point of view of official manage-

vol. 15, pp. 611-619, 1950); W. Firey, "Informal Organization and the Theory of Schism" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 13, pp. 15-24, 1948); D. G. Mandelbaum, *Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1952); D. C. Miller and W. H. Form, *Industrial Sociology: An Introduction to the Sociology of Work Relations* (Harper, New York, 1951); P. Selznick, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 8, pp. 47-54, 1943); P. Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 13, pp. 25-35, 1948); P. Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1949); R. H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 12, pp. 342-348, 1947); D. B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (Knopf, New York, 1951); and W. F. Whyte, "Small Groups and Large Organizations" (in *Social Psychology at the Crossroads*, J. H. Rohrer and M. Sherif, eds., Harper, New York, 1951).

Something of the way in which informal operations enter into the conduct of government is indicated in the popular article "Corruption in Washington" by B. Bolles (*Harper's Mag.*, January, 1952, pp. 27-33). See also his rather bitter book *How to Get Rich in Washington* (Norton, New York, 1952).

ment, the worker is employed by the corporation and works for it; but, as we have seen, his employment must be sanctioned by one of the many work groups within the corporate system; and he will be far more subject to the controls of that group than to regulations and orders coming directly to him from the head office.

The distinction between the formal structure and the system of status groups is always operationally clear; thus the office coterie never confuses its interests with those of the corporation by which the members are employed. The distinction between a single status group and a system of status groups is, however, often vague and sometimes variable. A tribal village in times of war or other crisis may operate in some respects as a single status group, each member being more or less effectively controlled by all the other members, although most of the time it will operate for most purposes as a system of status groups—*i.e.*, the units of behavior will be family groups, peer groups, and other related groups of the same small, intimate order. The many people who work for a modern corporation may to some extent present a united front toward those who work for a competing enterprise; but in most respects the corporation is a system of status groups (or, in the case of such large and dispersed corporate organizations as General Motors, a system of systems of status groups), each of which varies considerably in terms of its values and norms from the others and is inclined to go somewhat its own way.

Systems of status groups, like the units of which they are composed, are infinitely varied in durability, structure, and major function. For social control what is mainly important, however, is the extent to which the groups of which a system is composed are dependent upon the organization for their existence and, hence, the extent to which they must conform to the rules, regulations, traditions, or vested authority of that organization. That dependence is not determined by the extent to which the individual members of the groups are individually dependent upon the organization for their income or other valued rights; it is, rather, a consequence of the relationship of the group *qua* group to the other groups which together constitute a system. For example, each of the small boys in a neighborhood is completely dependent upon his respective family for sustenance and upon the community for streets and other places in which to play. But the local boys' peer group as a group is not part of a system of groups, since it is not bound either by necessity or by traditional ties to any one or all of the families or to the community as a whole; as a group it is independent unless it is incorporated into a system, as it would be should the members join some organization, such as the Boy Scouts. Each of the workers in a business enterprise is dependent for his income upon membership in that enterprise, and the continued existence of a given work group is of course dependent upon the maintenance of the enterprise; but the ability of the group as a group to conform to or to violate standing organizational rules or orders from management depends almost entirely upon the position of the group within the system of status groups. As highly respected patternmakers

in an industrial plant, the group as such may have great liberties and may be able to dictate considerably to other groups; as disdained Johnny-come-latelys they may be constrained to proceed with the greatest regard for the established rights of all other groups and a careful regard for the official rules.

FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

The relationship between the formal structure and the status-group system operating within it is not always constant and differs markedly from organization to organization. In some special circumstances, such as military occupation of a conquered people and when a corporation or other organization is being rapidly and autocratically changed by leadership, the status-group system may operate in constant and consistent opposition to the formal structure of the organization. In many instances, however, the relationship is to a considerable extent symbiotic, mutually helpful—the formal structure of the organization enables the various status groups to exist, and the status-group system operates to counteract the tendency toward total ineffectiveness which is inherent in many forms of organization. The extent to which the relationship is symbiotic depends upon a number of factors; of these the most important apparently is the form of the organization, the particular kind of formal structure, within which the status-group system exists. For convenience of analysis, the relationship between the form of an organization and the integrity of the status-group system will be considered in terms of polar extremes; at the one extreme is that form of organization which constitutes an alliance between the groups; at the other is that form of organization which constitutes a federation of the various groups under its jurisdiction.

Alliances. In many instances an organization takes the form of a fragile and restricted alliance between a number of quasi-independent groups or their representatives. The units brought into the alliance may be status groups, as is the case when a number of rural families do their purchasing of fertilizer and other farm supplies through a consumers' cooperative; or they may be organizations, each with its system of status groups, as is the case when a number of primitive tribes or modern business enterprises operate under a system of reciprocal agreements.

An alliance is the product of the calculated self-interest of the groups or organizations involved, and very dissimilar groups may come together in an alliance as a consequence of some common interest. Thus primitive tribes may join forces for some specific purpose, such as war or trading; villages, primitive and peasant, may hold a joint festival; business competitors may agree to restrict production and to divide the market; and a number of established political units, such as counties or municipalities, may form a district agency in the effort to solve some such joint problem as mosquito abatement or smog control. In many societies, including our own, families commonly become allied through intermarriage, as a sort of defense against the members of inferior

families or else to aid the bride and groom who constitute the focal point of the alliance.

In the furtherance of their common interest, each of the participant groups or their representatives voluntarily assumes a new responsibility—that of working, fighting, or otherwise cooperating with the other groups in the achievement of a specified goal. No group, however, renounces any more of its pre-existing rights than is imperative in order to realize the goals of the alliance; and no group assumes new obligations except with the greatest reluctance. Thus each of the allied military forces characteristically retains its own traditional organizational forms, its special uniforms and other identifications, etc.; and each of the businesses that conspire together in restraint of trade continues to do what it did before but restricts the level or area of its activities according to the agreement.

As a form of organization, the alliance is characterized by a poorly articulated status-group system (or, as may be the case, system of systems). The units of that system have limited and tenuous relations one to the others and are held together only by a common interest rather than by interlocking group norms and values. The alliance has, therefore, extremely segmental control over the conduct of the constituent groups and is in constant jeopardy. At any time one or more of those groups may decide that the gains in fact or in prospect are not adequate compensation for the losses and thereupon withdraw from the alliance. The control exercised through the alliance is, therefore, accomplished mainly by compromise, the support of the constituent groups being bought by a constant stream of concessions and offerings made, usually, by a leadership clique on behalf of one or another of the groups. When circumstances prevent the continued granting of such concessions and offerings, the alliance disintegrates. The alliance is, in sum, a fair-weather form of organization. Military allies may, it is true, stick together through a series of defeats, but only when and because one of the allies can and does continue to provide more and more support to the others and when at any event the alternative—capitulation to the enemy—is even less attractive.

The formal alliance should not be confused with the informal working agreements that may arise between two or more groups or systems of groups and that are commonly spoken of as alliances. Such "alliances" are in no sense organizations, and they have no formal structure. Usually, but not invariably, they are developed by representatives of the various groups rather than by the groups as a whole. This is what happens when the various mothers in a residential community come, through experience, to a vague, tacit, but often effective agreement to watch over one another's children; in effect, each mother says to all the others, "I'll take care of your children when they are playing around my house if you will do the same at your house for mine." A good many of the operations of communities, heretofore considered as status groups, are in fact achieved by informal little working agreements of this sort between

like-minded members of various families. Such "alliances" tend to form the basis for the development in time of status groups with their own norms and values.

Somewhat more complex and socially significant are those informal working agreements, through which a sort of truce is maintained, which may arise between the local police and the organized criminal interests, between building inspectors and contractors, between competing business enterprises, and between the various craft unions in a given locality. In some instances a working agreement is simply a matter of convenience for all the persons and groups concerned; thus the local pharmacists may work out an arrangement whereby each establishment takes its turn providing emergency service evenings and Sundays. At the other extreme are those working agreements through which special group interests are satisfied at the expense of the society or the community at large. Informal working agreements are, in fact, one of the characteristic ways whereby the laws of political organizations and the rules, regulations, and orders of other kinds of organizations are systematically violated. Within most political units there will be "working arrangements" between the various groups interested in violating the law and the police, the courts, and other agencies of the law. Of the former groups the most spectacular are those organized criminals who are engaged in the business of providing the general public with illegal opportunities for gambling, prostitution, etc., and those engaged in more or less systematic theft. But even the otherwise legitimate business, club, or other group may find it expedient at times to enter into working agreements with the police or some other governmental agency in order to evade, at comparatively small cost, some law or other. Such arrangements may be quite durable and highly traditionalized;² on the other hand, they may be entered into by negotiation and for one specific instance, as when a club that wants to have a lewd party induces the local police to see no evil in the occasion.

Within the formal framework of such large organizations as industrial enterprises and military forces, various status groups frequently enter into informal "alliances" to circumvent rules and orders. In such cases each of the several groups involved endeavors to preserve its established rights (usually informal in nature) by temporarily joining forces against some other group or the organizational rules and regulations. The result is a restructuring, probably temporary, of the status-group system. It does not, however, have the formal structural aspects of the alliance as a form of organization.

The informal "alliance" is a casual arrangement that grows up, or is entered

² It is an underworld legend that St. Paul, Minnesota, was for many years a safe hide-out for the criminal. Apparently an informal but quite effective "alliance" had developed between the police and professional criminals in which the former tacitly agreed not to notice the presence of wanted criminals provided they, in return, committed their crimes elsewhere. According to the legend, at least, the city was during this period safe for both the criminal and the honest citizen; *i.e.*, criminals respected the traditional agreement because of the controls operating among them.

into, between the members of two or more status groups or status-group systems that discover the existence of one or more interests in common that can be better satisfied jointly than separately. It is a practical means of resolving the problems of the constituent groups; for example, the "alliance" between police and vice interests resolves the inherent and continuing conflict set up within a society that demands prostitution on the one hand and legally prohibits it on the other; and the simple "alliance" that may grow up between the mothers in a residential community in which they tacitly agree to watch over one another's children resolves the conflict inherent in the desire, on the one hand, to give children considerable freedom of action and, on the other, to prevent them from injuring themselves or one another.

As a means of dealing organizationally with such problems as maintaining peace between nations, the formal alliance has nothing in common with the informal working agreement. In such endeavors the formal alliance is unlikely to be functionally effective; for the alliance is made, not between status groups or organizations, but between government officials. Such officials—kings, presidents, or dictators—are unlikely to be truly representative of the values, sentiments, interests, etc., of all the various groups within their national populations (with the result that the alliance is contrary to the "will" of many of those who are supposed to put it into effect); and they never have the power to enforce upon their own people the terms of the alliance. The same difficulty is inherent, to some degree or other, in all formal alliances, such as those entered into during times of war (or preparation for war) by the military and political leaders of different nations, those effected from time to time between the officials of different religious sects, and the trade and other agreements that are sometimes established by the heads of competitive business enterprises.

As was indicated earlier, a wartime alliance between two or more military forces will endure as long as one of them buys the adherence of the others, as the United States did of its allies in both World War I and World War II. Even then, the alliance is seldom more than skin deep; it exists, more or less, on the higher levels of command; but since it is not supported by a system of status groups and organizations, it is continually violated by the men who do the work and the fighting. Some working agreements usually develop among the members of the various military forces whenever they are brought by circumstances into association; but such "alliances" are more likely to have some form of sabotage as their objective than the fulfillment of the objective of the formal military alliance—*i.e.*, they are more likely to minimize the dangers and discomforts of war than to maximize fighting effectiveness.

The most successful of all international alliances is, without doubt, the Universal Postal Union; it has often functioned with reasonable effectiveness even when some of the national governments in the alliance were otherwise engaged in warfare against one another. Its success is no doubt a result of the fact that the people of each of the nations involved have and more or less clearly recognize a common and continuing interest in the safe delivery of

mail. So far, at least, no comparable common and continuing interest has existed to support the various other international leagues and unions that have been established over the past two centuries. Whatever the intent behind them, they have in time become "front" organizations, used as an idealistic cover for the crass bargaining and manipulation of practical international politicians.

Federative Forms of Organization. The groups or organizations that enter into an alliance are independent units in the sense that they have in the past and probably could in the future survive without the support secured through the alliance. They have what in political terminology is designated as "sovereignty," the power of self-determination. That power is, of course, always qualified and entirely relative. In comparison with the groups that are combined into a federative form of organization, those which form an alliance are, however, self-sufficient.

In the federative form of organization the various constituent parts (both the formal agencies of the organization and the informal status groups) are dependent for their very existence on the maintenance of the organization. In some instances an alliance may evolve into a federative form of organization; this is what happened when, upon the termination of the loose alliance through which the American colonies won freedom from England, the colonies discovered that they could not exist as sovereign political units and reluctantly formed the Federal government of the United States. Economic considerations have in many instances brought about the consolidation, along the lines of a federation, of numbers of independent business enterprises. Most modern industrial corporations are federations of formerly independent productive or distributive units; General Motors Corporation, for example, includes within its over-all organization such once-discrete productive units as the Chevrolet, Buick, and Cadillac plants and a host of formerly independent parts suppliers. The federation of business enterprises, either to reduce competition or to unify the productive process, or both, is one of the outstanding organizational developments in recent American history. On the whole, European industrialists have shown a preference for the uneasy alliance—*e.g.*, the cartel—as a means of reducing competition or increasing productive efficiency.

The federative form of organization may, then, come about as a consequence of the merger, consolidation, or other calculated integration of formerly independent units. More often, perhaps, a federative form of organization is the product of functional developments within an initially unstructured unit. As a business, political, religious, educational, or other organization grows, departments, each with its assigned task, are established out of functional necessity; and as the departments grow, the personnel forms into an increasing number of informal status groups; the end result is a multiplicity of departments and status groups united in a federative manner by the organizational system.

The nature of the federative form of organization can be most clearly seen in the formal structure of all large political, economic, and religious organizations. The whole is invariably broken into a number of departments (or bu-

reus or agencies); and in many instances each such department is further differentiated into subdepartments, and the latter into subsubdepartments. Organization of this sort provides for a division of labor among groups, each having a specialized function. It does for an army, a government, or a corporation what the division of labor on the individual level may do in the specific shop or office—*i.e.*, reduces the loss of time involved in shifting from task to task and facilitates the acquisition of specialized skills and knowledges. Such is, at any event, the purpose of having special sales, advertising, purchasing, production, and other departments in a large business enterprise; of having infantry, artillery, transport, quartermaster, and other corps in an army; and of having economics, physics, philosophy, and other departments in a college.

In principle, each of the constituent departments of a federative form of organization has just sufficient freedom of action to enable it to function to the best advantage of the whole organization. Its position in the organization is in many respects comparable to that of an individual in a status group; like the individual, the department has a more or less well-defined role, or system of related roles, relative to each of the several other departments which make up the whole. This role consists of a body of rights and obligations, codified in the case of corporations, political units, military organizations, etc., which has either been worked out empirically or has been derived from some traditional source. The rights, which include such things as a proportionate part of the organization's budget, staff, and other facilities and specified powers over other departments, are an organizational grant made to enable the department to fulfill its functions. In principle, the rights and obligations of each departmental role exactly balance, to the end that each of the several departments is worth its cost to the organization as a whole. In principle also, every department and subdepartment is so dependent for its survival upon the organization that it strives to fulfill its obligations so that it may enjoy its rights; for example, each department chief and every individual worker is loyal to the organization and efficient in the performance of his duties because, if for no other reasons, he recognizes that failure to do so will ultimately mean the liquidation (or, more probably, reorganization) of the department and loss of his position in the organization itself.

Within the formal structure of any federative form of organization there invariably exists a complex web of informal status groups. These status groups form on one basis or another (sex, propinquity, craft or other technical interests, comparable position within the organizational framework, etc.), both within departments and subdepartments and between them. The kind of work group that has been referred to so frequently in previous chapters usually draws its membership from some one department; but interdepartmental coteries are not uncommon and, in many instances, are important units in the status-group system. Through such interdepartmental coteries secretaries, for example, may cut hampering organizational red tape, work out standard pro-

cedures for "beating the head office," effect exchanges prohibited by formal departmentalization, and spread confidential information of use to their respective superiors.

The informal status-group system that operates within the structure of a federative form of organization sometimes makes an otherwise unworkable organizational structure work; quite as often, no doubt, it operates to keep the general efficiency at a low level and to prevent or at least sabotage efforts at reorganization in the interests of functional effectiveness. In either event it constitutes a power structure comparable in all respects except that of size to the power structure which usually evolves in such formal status groups as clubs and which was analyzed in an earlier chapter.³

"RATIONAL" VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION

Many of the federative-form organizations of contemporary society, such as the business corporation, the urban political unit, the government bureau, and the college and university, have been established in a more or less calculated way to achieve more or less definite ends. The formal structure of such an organization is usually designated by contract and is often supported by law; and the conduct of the organization is in principle determined by elected, appointed, or other administrative officers operating within limits specified in the organization's charter. That charter, in turn, is subject to modification by some designated procedure. Participation in such organizations is characteristically voluntary; each member of the organization has a contractual relationship with the organization as a whole, and the contract can be severed under specified conditions at the will of either the member or of the organization as represented by its administrative officers.

Thus a business enterprise originates in the calculated endeavor of one or more individuals to make a financial profit by providing some goods or service desired by others; the founding of a college or university has usually been the deliberate attempt by one man or a group of men to foster formal education (and, no doubt, to perpetuate their own names); the establishment of a city government has invariably been an effort by some or many of the local residents to obtain for themselves police and other services not otherwise provided; and the establishment of a new governmental bureau has usually been undertaken by legislators in the hope that the new bureau would accomplish something not done by the existing agencies. In the establishment of a business, an educational institution, a new political unit, or another government bureau, more or less formal contractual arrangements are concluded. The business

³ In the analysis that follows, a number of comparisons will be drawn between the structural attributes and operations of the status group and of federative-type systems of status groups. Whether the "laws" of the latter are simply large-scale manifestations of the former (e.g., whether the various status groups of a system seek and value status therein) is a problem that deserves study. For some theoretical speculation bearing on the problem see the article "Microsociology and Sociometry" by G. Gurvitch (in *Sociometry in France and the United States*, G. Gurvitch, ed., Beacon House, New York, 1950, pp. 1-31).

is incorporated, the college is given a charter, the town obtains its charter, the bureau is founded by law; and in all instances the purposes, structure, and other salient aspects of the organization, as well as some specified agency and means for modifying the organization as circumstances require, are designated. And whether it is a business corporation, a college, a town government, or a bureau, all those who participate in the organization do so "at will." The stockholder may sell out his interest whenever he pleases, provided only that he can find a buyer; the corporation president and other officers can resign whenever they feel so inclined, and all the workers have the right to do the same. No officer, teacher, or student of a college need remain within that organization; no resident of the town is forced to live within its boundaries; no bureaucrat is actually chained to his desk.

Since so much in the maintenance and operation of this type of organization depends, or seems to depend, upon individual calculation, they are often designated "rational" or "voluntary" and distinguished categorically from such organizations as tribes, clans, feudal units, and monarchical governments, which are regarded as "institutional" in character. By this definition an institutional organization is one which has origins reaching back into the mists of history; which is culturally maintained, the form being transmitted more or less intact from generation to generation; and in which membership is non-voluntary, being the result of birth, adoption, or some other condition over which the individual himself has had little, if any, control. In principle, the members of the various subsidiary groups which make up the institutional unit behave in culturally designated ways; *i.e.*, each member has been socialized into those forms of conduct which his special role in the organization requires. And in principle, leadership in the institutional organization—invested in the patriarch, the tribal elders, the feudal lord, the monarch, etc.—is rigorously limited in scope by tradition; and the whole system is ideologically reinforced by sacred concepts of origin and function.

Contemporary Ethnocentrism. There are certainly some significant distinctions between a modern corporation and a primitive tribe, between an incorporated American town and a Chinese clan or great family, and between a governmental bureau and one of the nomadic tribes that traditionally preyed upon the ancient caravans. On the whole, so-called rational organizations are larger than those of institutional character; they usually have one function or a small number of functions rather than many; they generally involve greater division of labor within the membership; and membership is, initially at least, contractual rather than traditional. In terms of form—*i.e.*, the designated organizational structure and the pretenses or beliefs that explain and justify that structure—there is a vast difference between modern rational organizations and the institutional organizations that have predominated in premodern and primitive societies.

The current tendency to think of rational organizations as differing in kind from those of institutional type is, however, a consequence on the one hand

of failure to distinguish between formal structure and actual operation and on the other of the ethnocentrism of modern men.⁴ This tendency involves the assumption that the rational type, which looms so large in modern societies, is characteristically adaptive, constantly subject to the guidance of its designated leaders, and, as a consequence, efficient in the performance of its designated tasks. In this view—which is popular with political scientists, economists, journalistic commentators on current affairs, utopianists, and other exponents of modern society—the corporate organization, the democratic political unit, the governmental bureau, and the like are organizational parallels to the rational individual. They are, in fact, viewed as vast and complex organizations of rational individuals. The inversion of this view is that premodern peoples, primitive and otherwise, have been individually lacking in rationality, have behaved as they have in accordance with custom and tradition, however inexpedient, and have therefore engaged in organized activities that have been dictated by tradition rather than by reason.

As was mentioned earlier, the idea of the rational individual, popular in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, was gradually abandoned as massive evidence against it accumulated. As a consequence, the idea of rational organization came to be left without its individual basis, a fact which political scientists, economists, and others may be expected to discover in the course of time. Even now, however, there continues to be much specious discussion of the unique character of modern forms of organization, including democratic government, of the "logic" of their leadership, and of the expediency and efficiency of their operations. Political students, for example, still diligently analyze charters and tables of organization and continually debate the respective merits of this as against that form of municipal or other government.

As will be demonstrated shortly, the formal structure of any federative form of organization, political or otherwise, is at most the framework within which the members of that organization operate. It has little more to do with the determination of their behavior than the house in which a family lives has to do with determining the character of family relations. An institutional framework is distinctly different from such a rational framework as that of a corporation or a governmental bureau; but the real life—*i.e.*, the functional activities—within the rational framework always tends to parallel that which occurs in the institutional framework.

⁴ This failure to distinguish between the formal structure and the actual operation of large organizations is most apparent in the otherwise excellent analysis of bureaucracy by M. Weber (*From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. and trans., Oxford, New York, 1946, pp. 196-244). Weber considered bureaucracy the most rational form of social organization, the highest achievement of man's intellect, and a mode of organization that invariably fulfills its designated social functions with maximum efficiency. Had he been aware of the fact that the actual operations of a bureaucratic organization often run counter to the formal plan, he might have come to just the opposite conclusion.

Thus, although in terms of form institutional organizations no doubt differ in kind from rational organizations, in terms of function, which is what concerns the sociologist and social psychologist, the difference between them is only one of degree. The variation in the functional effectiveness of an exceptionally efficient business, for example, and an average governmental bureau is probably no greater than that between an average governmental bureau in modern society and an average Chinese clan or primitive tribal organization. Moreover, the difference in degree between the actual operations that occur in institutional and rational organizations is far less than is generally supposed. The primitive magic man's supernaturalistic methods of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused member of the tribe does not differ in consequence from the "justice" that is meted out through modern systems of police and judicial action as much as is often supposed. The oracle's prediction of the consequences of undertaking a war could hardly be less valid than the predictions of modern soothsayers—including the military high command. The priestly incantation and the modern corporation's annual balance sheet—an accountant's hopeful prayer that a profit has in fact been made—are not distinct in kind: both are traditional rituals involving rigorous manipulation of unknowns in order to achieve hypothetical answers to unsolvable problems.

THE TENDENCY TOWARD ORGANIZATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: BUREAUCRATIZATION

Any federative form of organization within which a status group operates, whether that organization be rational or institutional and whatever its particular structure, influences group action in much the same way as the status group does that of the individual member. The phenomenon is, however, sufficiently different in its outward characteristics to warrant separate analysis here, although it should be kept in mind throughout the discussion that individual human beings do the behaving and that a phrase such as "action of a status group" is simply a short-cut reference to status-group operations, as previously analyzed, which affect the conduct of individual members.

As has been indicated, once it is well established, a status group strives not only to survive as a group but to maintain its norms intact, each individual member of the group clinging tenaciously to the rights of his status role, with the result that the group as a whole resists and resents any external infringement on the group's ability to satisfy these rights. As a consequence, each of the several status groups (and, as groups of such groups, each department or other official unit) within a federative form of organization characteristically resists changes within that organization which seem likely to disturb, to say nothing of reduce, the group's activities. This characteristic conservatism means that the status-group system tends to exercise a stabilizing effect on the organizational structure.

In its formal aspects, *i.e.*, the official operations of a federative form of organization, stabilization consists of rigid definition of the status within the

whole of each of the several departments and subdepartments and codification of the activities within and between such units. The development of structural rigidity and operational fixity is usually described as bureaucratization; and the organization, whether it be a religious institution, a military force, a business enterprise, or a town government, which exhibits these qualities in considerable degree is usually characterized as bureaucratic or designated a bureaucracy. In actuality, of course, bureaucracy is a matter of degree; American railroads are more bureaucratic than airlines, the Catholic Church more bureaucratic than the American government, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue more bureaucratic than most American (but certainly not most European) universities.

Bureaucratization is at once a means of achieving organizational efficiency and of perpetuating inefficiency. Through bureaucratization past empirical experience is made the basis for current and subsequent action; it is, therefore, a larger manifestation of the structuring of the status group which was discussed earlier. As the organization learns through trial and error how to accomplish tasks and how to avoid failures, it embodies the lessons in structure or code, much as the individual establishes in habit the results of his learning.⁵ As long, therefore, as the functions of the organization remain stable and the conditions in which those functions are fulfilled remain constant, bureaucratization makes for an increase in organizational efficiency.

Jurisdiction. Rigidity of organizational structure, one aspect of the bureaucratic organization, involves fixed and detailed division of labor between the departments and subdepartments of the organization. It makes each subunit totally responsible for a designated activity and thus necessarily gives each unit monopoly rights over the powers deemed essential to the fulfillment of its responsibilities. As a result, each of the several formal units within the organization has jurisdiction over a fixed segment of organizational activity. Determination of the jurisdiction of a given unit or kind of unit has at times involved war, as it did when the Union was threatened by the secession of the Southern states, but is more commonly a matter of slow, evolutionary development. The relatively recent emergence of the Army Air Forces as a separate arm of the Army and the subsequent development of the Air Force as a military agency equivalent to the Army and the Navy provides a large-scale illustration of such gradual development. Although in the initial establishment of a department store, a university, an industrial enterprise, or other

⁵ Some very interesting empirical data on the evolution of bureaucratic procedures and structures is to be found in *Catalogues and Counters: A History of Sears, Roebuck and Company* by B. Emmet and J. E. Jeuck (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950). On the universality of bureaucratization see F. S. Chapin, "The Growth of Bureaucracy: An Hypothesis" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 835-836, 1951). A discussion of the formalization of bureaucratic procedures is provided by R. Dubin in "Decision-making by Management in Industrial Relations" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 54, pp. 292-297, 1949). For a variety of articles reflecting different ideas about bureaucracy see R. K. Merton *et al.*, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1951).

rational organization, various departments may have been set up according to a predetermined plan, their actual jurisdiction is invariably worked out through empirical experience; and new or different kinds of departments may be developed as a consequence of experience and, most especially, as a result of expansion in the size or the functions of the organization.

In institutional organizations, such as the large family, the clan, and the tribe, jurisdiction has frequently been decided by assigning to each sex and age grouping certain activities which are its special province; in many societies, for example, women have monopolized household work, including child care, and men have had a corresponding monopoly on fishing, hunting, gardening, or other outside work. In contemporary business, political, and religious organizations jurisdiction is usually decided on the basis both of a suitable division of labor and of regional or other areas of operation. A large corporate business, for example, may have such various departments as planning, sales, production, and finance and also a number of crosscutting divisions, each producing and distributing a special product or group of products; and each department and division may, furthermore, have a number of quasi-independent regional offices. The departmental and divisional structure of a corporation such as General Motors is incredibly complex; its complexity is exceeded, in fact, only by that of the departments, bureaus, and agencies of a modern national government.

The jurisdiction of each of the several departments and other formal units within an organization is defined by tradition in the case of institutional organizations; by law and judicial rulings in the case of government; and by administrative rulings, often reflecting historic tradition, and sometimes law, in the case of military, religious, and business enterprises. However complex and at times perplexing such rules, regulations, or laws may be, they do at least make jurisdiction explicit; each department head knows, or at least can ascertain, the rights of the unit that he represents. But in actual practice, formal jurisdiction is invariably complicated by the informal jurisdictions cut out for themselves by the various status groups which have grown up within and between the various formal units. As was indicated earlier, informal jurisdictions are in some instances the means whereby unworkable formal divisions of authority are made workable; thus it is through informal working arrangements that some of the functional absurdities of city, county, and state governmental jurisdictions are surmounted. If, for example, city police really did adhere to the law and abandon the chase of a criminal who has crossed an imaginary line and hence escaped from their jurisdiction, criminals would be caught even less frequently than they are. By informal working arrangements, which may be official alliances but are more often interdepartmental status-group operations, jurisdictional lines are blurred and crossed. At the same time, however, new and perhaps equally rigid informal jurisdictions are established.

Informal jurisdiction is always extralegal; it violates the formal demarcations of the organization and is never recognized officially (except, however,

when formal reorganization occurs on the basis of the informal). It exists in and through the norms of status groups, largely implicit, and is difficult both to ascertain and to define. Nevertheless, informal jurisdictions are sometimes more important to the operation of an organization than the formal, and they are always tenacious. The reorganization of a governmental agency by legal fiat, for example, may lead to the dissolution of existing departmental units and the establishment of new ones; but as a rule the preexisting informal jurisdictions survive, only slightly, if at all, disturbed by the changes in the formal structure.

Rank and Office. The phenomena of rank and office, which were analyzed earlier in their status-group manifestations, are developed to the *n*th degree in bureaucracy. The bureaucratic structure differentiates the various departments and subdepartments into some sort of rank order and specifies the nature of the relations of each to all the others; each department has, in effect, a defined rank which is comparable in many ways to the rank of an individual in a formal status group. Characteristically, the members of a given department are jealous of the rank rights of their department and tend to be snobbish toward the department that is their rank inferior and somewhat in awe of the one that is their rank superior. The great importance that bureaucrats attach to the rank of their department can best be described as a group parallel to the attitudes and values that the individual attaches to his rank in formal status groups.

In addition to the fixing of the ranks of the various departments, bureaucratization involves an increasing stratification of the personnel of the organization as a whole. In any full-fledged bureaucracy, the members are classified into a number of fixed and clearly defined classes, each of which has its special role rights and obligations and its designated place in the organizational hierarchy. The organizational rating of the individual is determined by some highly systematic and rigid procedure. In the typical civil-service procedure, for example, the candidate for a given position is scored in terms of years of formal education, performance on an examination, prior practical experience, etc. In many cases seniority is a major factor in determining the rating of the bureaucrat.

The organizational rating determines the pay the individual will receive, the work he is officially qualified to do, the length of his vacation, and, in modern governmental and business bureaucracies, the tools he is permitted to use, the washroom he may visit, and where and when he may eat his lunch. In institutional organizations rank, which may be determined by age, by sex, by inheritance, or by a combination of these factors, determines in some comparable way the official rights and obligations of the members of a tribe, a clan, or other organization. Thus under feudalism the rights and obligations of those born into the class of serfs were categorically distinct from those of the class of lords.

Bureaucratic office differs from that of the formal status group only in

quantitative ways. Typically, bureaucratic structure provides for a large number of very rigidly defined offices, all of which are arranged in a fixed hierarchal system. The authority granted each officeholder is specified, not only in respect to the personnel directly under his command but also in regard to the officeholders superior and inferior to him. The "chain of command," as it is often called, tends to become almost as fixed in political and business organizations as it is in military forces and religious orders. Each office has, in effect, its special and delimited jurisdiction over the activities of the organization, just as each department or subdepartment has its jurisdiction or function defined by the bureaucratic structure.

Routinization. Interwoven with, but conceptually distinct from, the fixing of departmental and other jurisdictions within an organization is the routinization of operating procedures. Like the former, the establishment of fixed ways of doing specified things is a means of profiting by organizational experience. Through formal and other rules, often elaborately detailed, what has been learned in one place and at one time about how to accomplish a given task is generalized to apply to that task wherever and whenever it arises within the organization.

Routinization of an activity assures that the most efficient method of accomplishing a task will be followed throughout the organization. Moreover, the routinization of a procedure (efficient or not) is necessary for the fulfillment of any task which requires the coordinated action of large numbers of persons. In most of the activities of human beings, the work of one—whether that of an individual or of a department in an organization—has no significance apart from that of all the others; there must be coordination of the various activities which together result in a product or other desired end. In small, intimate groupings coordination of differential activities can and often is worked out as the work is done, although in repeating the task the same group tends to adhere to its own precedent. In large, impersonal, organizations, where the division of labor is complex and specialization in activities is marked, coordination of all those individuals and units involved in the completion of even a simple task is extremely difficult. Thus just to move a letter from a given pickup box in New York City to Los Angeles requires the coordinated actions of some hundreds of postal clerks; should any one of them fail to follow the prescribed procedure for dealing with a letter addressed to Los Angeles, its course would be interrupted, and somewhere along the line a clerk would have to follow the procedure designated for dealing with missent letters destined for Los Angeles, or it never would arrive there.

If only because of the difficulty of working out by trial and error the coordination of specialized activities that is required by any operation within an organization, a solution, once it is reached, tends to become the rule, that rule to be followed meticulously wherever it applies. In modern industrial production, and to a slightly lesser extent in modern distributive procedures, the functional basis for rules of this sort may be evident even to the uninitiated.

It is obvious, for example, that the various parts which will together make up an automobile or an electric toaster must fit together and must therefore be made in accordance with fixed specifications; it is almost as obvious that the proportion of the various parts must be kept constant, and hence that rigid production schedules are necessary. As a matter of fact, where and to the extent that the activities of an organization produce a tangible result—the delivery of a letter, the manufacture of a machine, a building, a package of breakfast food, etc.—the need for coordination is relatively evident; and any failure in coordination can be and usually is readily corrected.

The functional need for coordination of economic, political, religious, educational, and other activities which result in intangibles is, on the other hand, less obvious. The machinist can, perhaps, understand to a degree why he must cut key slots of a specified size at a specified location on the bars which come to him by conveyor; the stenographer, and perhaps even her superior, may never understand why headquarters requires that four or six or ten copies must be made of every letter and one of them sent to each of several departments or subdepartments. In origin at least, red tape and procedural channels are routine methods, presumably founded in empirical experience, for the coordination of the activities of each of the departments and subdepartments of an organization. Although routinization inevitably restricts and perhaps precludes experimentation and the possible development of new and more efficient means of doing tasks, without it no organization could possibly operate.

Within all large bureaucratic organizations, formal routinization of the sort considered above is qualified by the informal procedures that have been worked out by the various informal status groups. Some, but by no means all, of the activities of these informal groups consist of short-cutting red tape. Clerks, bookkeepers, priests, teachers, soldiers, policemen, and all other organizational functionaries pride themselves on their ability to get things done in spite of the more or less elaborate and, to them, cumbersome procedures designated for them. This getting things done "in spite of" involves the aid of others in the organization—the friend in the main office, the one in the accounting department, etc.—who together constitute a status group of some integrity and durability. Getting things done may constitute an actual violation of rules; in politics it usually does. It may, on the other hand, consist of accomplishing the desired end through informal, largely personal, methods and then sanctioning that accomplishment by filling out the proper forms. This is what happens when a secretary obtains needed supplies on a personal loan from the supply department and then, at her leisure, orders them officially; it is what happens when in the urgency of the moment one military arm borrows from another with the promise to clean up the paper work when time permits.

The informal operations within an organization may at a given time serve the interests of efficiency; but, like the informal jurisdictions within that organization, they are ill-defined and difficult to detect. They likewise tend

to be self-perpetuating, to the end that the establishment of new and more "rational" routines may be nullified by the continuance of preexisting informal procedures.

The Nature of Bureaucratic Equilibrium. To the extent that an organization has become bureaucratic, the various parts of the whole, both formal and informal, have worked out an accommodation each one with all the others. Both structurally and operationally they have achieved an equilibrium, or balancing, of the personal and group forces within the organization. Such equilibrium is, or tends to be, static in character; that is, a change within the organization is more or less effectively canceled out by compensating modifications in other parts or aspects of the organization, with the result that when the disturbance has passed, nothing has really been changed. Thus the appointment as departmental chief of an energetic man with new ideas will be disturbing to the members of that department and, perhaps, to the organization as a whole (if only because the workers in the other departments may begin to wonder if they, too, may not have to put up with—and subdue—new leadership in their respective departments). As a rule, however, the adjustment that is eventually worked out is one in which the innovations introduced by the new administrator are more or less nullified.

There has been much discussion over the years about the need for the rationalization of such so-called rational organizations as those of modern business, industry, and government. As the term is used, to render rational is to eliminate all activities which do not contribute directly to the organization's functional goals and to simplify and otherwise refine the procedures which do contribute to those goals. In sum, under a truly rational organization the largest possible product (tangible goods or intangible service) would be produced by the smallest possible number of workers, due consideration being given to the level of the arts, *i.e.*, the available technology. Under rationalization, all waste motion would be eliminated, all unnecessary workers either assigned to new tasks or discharged, etc.

Actual efforts—and many have been made—to rationalize in the above terms long-established and woefully inefficient industries and governmental bureaus have proved uniformly ineffectual. For twenty years and more prior to World War II, English economists and industrialists talked about and often attempted to do something about the low productivity of English industrial workers; for years following that war, the Labor Government promised that it would do what private industry could not—that it would rationalize industry by nationalizing it. Such evidence as is available indicates that little if anything has come of all the talk and effort. In those instances in which man-hour productivity has actually risen, the gain can usually be traced to the introduction of new laborsaving machines; not the men, but the machines have become more efficient.

Perhaps the historical development of civil service provides the most striking demonstration, if not an entirely representative one, of the near impossi-

bility of rationalizing a bureaucracy. During the latter half of the last century there developed in all Western countries a great deal of agitation for civil-service reforms. The long-standing political-patronage practice by which elected politicians staffed governmental agencies with their relatives and friends was thought to be the reason for the evident inefficiency of such agencies; and it was proposed that business methods be introduced into the selection of personnel and the operation of government agencies. Gradually the various countries, including the United States, established civil-service commissions, nonpolitical agencies charged with the duty of selecting the operating personnel (as distinct from the appointed policy makers) for all governmental bureaus. The various state and municipal governments in the United States followed the lead of the Federal government, and today most political functionaries operate under some sort of civil-service agency.

There can be no doubt that the development of civil service has reduced political nepotism, depersonalized and standardized the selection of personnel, and significantly reduced that kind of bureaucratic corruption which takes the form of favoritism toward those with whom the bureau deals. But it has not resulted in the expected rationalization of bureaucracy. On the contrary, it has actually sponsored certain new forms of bureaucratic inefficiency.⁶ Every civil-service agency has in the course of time become bureaucratic in character and has come to reflect in its selection procedures and its rules regarding personnel the values of bureaucracy, values which are summed up in the phrase "once hired, never fired, finally retired." It usually happens, therefore, that a political administrator who would like to rationalize his bureau finds himself hampered by the civil-service rules in any effort to reduce his staff, to shift members of his staff from needless to useful activities, or to bring into his organization men whom he believes to be competent and energetic. The development of pension programs, systems of seniority, etc., in business and industry have worked to somewhat the same ends as civil service has in government.

Whatever the specific reasons why a program of rationalization fails, or at least fails to accomplish all that was expected of it, the underlying reason is that few people actually share the values of the rationalizers. Abstractly, almost anyone will agree that efficiency is desirable; but when the principle is applied and it appears that a man who has worked long if not loyally for an organization must be fired in the interests of efficiency, that an incompetent stenographer would be more valuable to the organization if she were relieved of her typewriter and set to sweeping the office floors, or that taking a break for Cokes and a smoke is wasteful of time and the company's (or the taxpayers') money, almost no one is in favor of efficiency.

Whether bureaucratic organizations draw to them individuals who are by temperament conservative and fearful of the unfamiliar or whether those

⁶ For data on this matter see W. S. Carpenter, *The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1952).

who participate for long in such organizations become so as a consequence is not clear. The fact is, at any event, that once established in the rules of the formal and the norms of the informal groups within an organization, bureaucratic attributes have exceptionally high survival value.

The Dynamics of Bureaucratic Organization. There is an interesting and revealing contrast between the dynamics of organisms and those of bureaucratic organizations, a contrast that makes most analogous comparisons of them (the famous "organic analogy") false. The internal equilibrium, or tendency toward the achievement of an equilibrium, within any healthy organism is positive rather than negative. The organism tends to adjust itself in terms of a new internal factor rather than to resist or ignore that new factor; thus the ingestion of food occasions a rise in digestive activity, perhaps involving changes in blood pressure, respiratory and heart rates, and the like. But as has been indicated, bureaucratic organizations do not adjust themselves to internal change but tend rather to "digest" any internal change in such a way that the *status quo* is preserved; they nullify internal disturbances in a way comparable to that by which organisms may upon occasion develop immunity to poisonous substances.

More striking is the contrast between organic and organizational adjustment to external changes. The survival of organisms is everywhere dependent upon adaptation, upon their changing their behavior (if not structure) to meet changes in the conditions of life. Bureaucratic organizations, on the other hand, tend to have both high survival value and the ability to survive without adapting to changing external circumstances. There are significant exceptions, as will be noted shortly; but on the whole the survival of a bureaucratic organization depends upon its internal structure and operations rather than upon its ability to justify its existence in terms of service to the society at large. As a consequence, the life expectancy of a bureaucratic organization increases with each passing year, in contrast to that of an organism, which invariably diminishes as it grows older.

On the whole, the older an organization is, the more its primary function becomes that of survival. This tendency is reflected in the way in which socially antiquated monastic and other religious organizations have persisted unchanged in the face of major changes in their social context; in the fact that the little Church colleges which grew up in America a century and more ago to meet the educational needs of the time have survived wars, depressions, and other adverse circumstances and continue to exist in spite of the declining need for their services; in the fact that many of the existing governmental bureaus have outlived the conditions that gave rise to them and now operate only to maintain themselves; in the fact that Washington is cluttered with little private bureaucracies giving national representation to once-virile but now ineffectual societies for this and against that; and in the fact that American railroads have been able to ignore in considerable measure the competition of truck and passenger-plane transport.

THE CULTURAL BASIS OF BUREAUCRACY

Although a given bureaucracy may outlive its social function and continue, as it were, in a vacuum, bureaucratic organization does not exist apart from cultural sanctions. To put it another way, the particular kinds of organizations that will develop bureaucratic attributes and the extent to which they will develop those attributes depend upon the base culture. No doubt bureaucratization is a universal phenomenon, at least in the sense that the functional effectiveness of any large-scale organization depends upon its acquisition of some bureaucratic qualities. But different peoples have shown different tolerances for various kinds of bureaucratic organizations and different abilities to evolve bureaucratic organization of any kind. The Chinese developed and for centuries maintained an elaborate and, on the whole, effective political bureaucracy which encompassed, superficially in some respects, the whole of China. They did not, however, develop any religious bureaucracy, whereas the Europeans did so during the Middle Ages when they were still incapable of maintaining complex political bureaucracy. Nor did the Chinese develop financial or other society-wide economic bureaucracies; Chinese business was always local and small-scale, the local craft and traders' guilds being the largest units of economic organization, although in a haphazard and unorganized way goods did move in trade throughout all Asia.

Other contrasts are to be noted. Western peoples have shown a remarkable toleration for religious bureaucracies, however antiquated, and a marked intolerance toward penal and other social-welfare agencies, such as the private poor farm, that seem to have outlived their usefulness. While all Western peoples have developed within the past few hundred years a vast number of political bureaucracies, there seems to be considerable national difference in the character and effectiveness of such organizations. The French, for example, seem on the whole to be at once very tolerant of and markedly disrespectful toward their bureaucrats; the bureaucrat is looked down upon as a sort of poor relation, a political pensioner to be put up with as best one can and circumvented at every opportunity. The English, on the other hand, seem as a rule to hold their political bureaucrats in considerable esteem and, at the same time, to demand a certain minimum of routine efficiency from them.⁷ Moreover, it has long been assumed, with what reason it is impossible to say, that the Germans have a genius for bureaucratic organization in politics, business, religion, etc., and that the Italians are characteristically incapable of reducing any procedure to bureaucratic routine.

Competition as Death on Bureaucracy. The best indication that there is a cultural basis for bureaucratic organization is the fact that in recent Western history, circumstances—including the industrial revolution and the concomitant values and ideologies—have been adverse to the bureaucratiza-

⁷ Such is, at any event, the thesis of J. D. Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service* (Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1944).

tion of those organizations that have been engaged in the production of economic goods and services. No doubt every business organization has tended in time toward bureaucratic stability, but by and large its survival has depended upon its ability to compete in the more or less free market for workers and for purchasers of its goods or services. Except where and to the extent that a given organization has been able to achieve and maintain a monopoly over these markets, it has been forced by the threat of bankruptcy to keep up with the times—to adopt new techniques as they have come along, to adjust its products to changing demands, and to keep its worker productivity at least up to the level set by competitive organizations.

This has meant that business enterprises, as distinct from religious, educational, governmental, and other organizations, have in the long run been incapable of existing in terms of their own internal values. To survive they have had to remain reasonably adaptive, their internal equilibrium being, therefore, dynamic rather than static in character. Since adaptation is always difficult, there has been a persistent tendency for business enterprises to strive for monopoly and, where this goal is impossible, to form working agreements with competitors. In England, where both procedures became commonplace some decades ago, businesses have frequently developed so far in the direction of bureaucratic organization that they are hardly distinguishable organizationally from governmental agencies. Here in America both monopoly and cartel arrangements were for long politically tabu; and although the growth of nationwide labor unions (highly bureaucratic in organization), the demands of large-scale warfare, and the development of various social-security programs have definitely tempered economic competition during recent decades, American business is still relatively adaptive.

The rationalization of bureaucratic organizations, apparently, is possible when and only when the alternative is liquidation. Under the kind of competitive conditions that have been normal for American business organizations for a century and more, liquidation has been the real and the evident alternative to keeping up with one's competitors. The worker in a business or industrial plant could be forced to give up his cherished rights and take on new obligations when for him the alternative was even less desirable—looking for a new job or, perhaps, being jobless.

Interestingly enough, the kind of competition in which military organizations occasionally engage—*i.e.*, warfare—seems to discourage bureaucracy not at all. Perhaps it is the fact that every military organization operates most of the time under conditions of peace rather than of war and the further fact that the outcome of a given conflict is determined more by political and other extraneous factors than by the fighting efficiency of an armed force that make possible an enduring bureaucracy in military life. At any event, the military forces of all modern nations can be quite justly accused of having been at all times prepared to fight the last war but not the next one, with the result that great advantage has often accrued from minor military innovation.

BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION AS AN AGENCY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The internal structure and operating procedures of any federative form of organization, most clearly and rigidly of one that has become bureaucratic, provide values, norms, and delimited roles for the various groups, both formal and informal, of which that organization is composed, even as the small status group does for its individual members. The organization tends, moreover, to hold its subsidiary units to the general norms and to their respective roles and thus to maintain, or when disturbed to reestablish, internal equilibrium by devices not unlike those used to control the individual in a status group. The formal aspects of internal control—*e.g.*, budgetary allotments for the various departments and subdepartments, formal assignments of functions, etc.—are mainly important as attempts to put into effect administrative decisions; and they will be considered in this light in a subsequent chapter.

The informal methods by which the status-group system endeavors to keep each of the groups of which it is composed in its place range from the threat or administration of economic punishment to the threat or actuality of reduction in the informal status of the group in the organization as a whole. All these devices are in principle simply an extension to groups of the controls exercised over an individual by a group. All dependent subgroups are in some or many ways economically subservient to the larger organization. Thus regional or other departments of a corporation, political agency, college or university, and the like secure all or some of their financing from the home office and many of the goods and services which they use from other departments of the organization. Within the formal arrangements, which may be very specific, there is invariably a good deal of informal give-and-take between the various departments and other subgroups—*e.g.*, loans and other exchanges of goods and services, mutual blinking at the letter of hampering regulations, protective collusion, etc., that may be effected through informal alliances. The specific nature of such give-and-take depends, of course, upon the operations of the organization; in industry it often involves, among other things, covert collaboration between such productive units as the foundry, the machine shop, and the assembly. The machine shop might, for example, cover up a mistake made in foundry in return for prior or subsequent concessions from that department. In a college or university there is normally a good deal of informal as well as formal interdepartmental aid to students, and even the use of physical facilities may be exchanged on an informal basis. In political and other bureaucracies, including the religious, the informal arrangements whereby one department helps another and is in turn aided or protected are many and devious and often more important to the operations of the organization as a whole than the formally designated procedures.

The extent to which a given subunit participates in the give-and-take of informal interdepartmental relations and how much it is required to give in order to get depend in considerable measure upon the informal status of that

department in the organization as a whole. The unit which, for whatever reasons, has acquired or is acquiring an unfavorable reputation will find it increasingly difficult to achieve and to maintain satisfactory working arrangements with other related departments. It will get less and have to give more than normal in return. Moreover, it can be punished in a variety of more or less economic ways. Other departments can, through both their formal administrators and the sly, informal efforts of subordinates, gang up on the unfavored one, to the end that its official performance will suffer; it will not be protected from the results of its errors and inadequacies, and to it will be attributed an excessive amount of the blame for failures of the organization as a whole. Should, for example, the advertising department of a large business organization be suspected of trying to run away with the whole show—sometimes described as “empire building” and a major violation of the *status quo* of any organization—the sales department, backed perhaps by production and other units, may endeavor to explain a decline in sales, or a less than anticipated rise therein, as the result of inept advertising.

Even in military operations, the support that one company gives another and that one branch of the service gives another (*e.g.*, that the artillery gives the infantry) is more often a function of the status of each in the eyes of the other than of official rules for coordinated effort. That unit which has markedly or persistently violated the vague norms of the service and deviated undesirably from its designated role can be and often is actively punished by other units upon which it is dependent.

One of the simpler and more common devices of punishing subgroups within almost any kind of bureaucratic organization is that of shifting to them undesirable personnel. “Dumping” troublemakers (and any individual is a troublemaker who cannot or will not conform to the group’s norms) is the usual bureaucratic alternative to firing them; it is a control device only when one department is singled out as the dumping ground for all the others. In colleges and universities, dull or difficult students often are “dumped,” and almost every institution of higher learning has at least one academic department held in such low repute that the other departments endeavor to use it as a dumping ground. Churchmen accomplish much the same end by assigning to impoverished or difficult congregations inferior pastors or priests; and in a police or fire-fighting force, that squad or company that is in poor favor will, whatever the official policy, somehow get only the culls of the force.

The rank of each of the several departments and subdepartments in a bureaucratic organization is, as has been indicated, fixed by the structure of that organization. But just as the individual member of a status group usually has status as a person as well as formal rank, so the subgroups in a bureaucracy have informal status in addition to their official rank. The informal status is based upon such criteria as the department’s willingness and ability to “play ball” with other departments and, unlike formal rank, is subject to change.

In a well-established bureaucracy each of the departments and subdepart-

ments has considerable pride in its informal status relative to that of the others. The benefits of such status may be intangible and even undefinable; but characteristically "good" bureaucrats are both loyal to and proud of the particular department or other unit of which they are members. As a consequence the group as such is usually sensitive to the possibility of its losing status in the eyes of the other groups; and to preserve the group status the members may, individually and collectively, strive to conform to the informal norms of the organization as a whole and go to considerable lengths to prevent the group from losing face; thus they might, for example, protect their department chief from justifiable criticism because such criticism would reflect on the department as a whole.

Probably it is the fact that each of the subgroups within a bureaucratic organization is jealous of its relative status which, more than any other single factor, makes for the characteristic conservatism of such organizations. Certainly a department's pride in its status supplements the individual member's contentment with and preference for the established ways of the department; and any proposed or impending change will be evaluated by each of the members in terms of its potentially disturbing effects on him personally and on him as a member of the group as a whole. There are, evidently, few innovations that can successfully pass both tests.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A MODE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The norms of status groups and the rules and regulations of any organization are, strictly speaking, laws. They are the laws to which the individual member must subscribe or suffer some sort of penalty. Such laws are, both in the mass and in any specific instance, far more important determinants of human behavior than are the regulations specified and enforced by that particular kind of organization that is called government. That government is the most effective way both of controlling the behavior of large numbers of people and of solving their problems is, however, one of the ideological presumptions of the present era; and there has occurred over the past two hundred years and more a profound increase in the number of governmental organizations and the scope of their action. As a consequence, it is now conventional to think of law as the rules of conduct promulgated by government and as affecting, more or less equably, all those who come within that organization's jurisdiction.⁸

Government and Coercion. The distinction between governmental and nongovernmental organizations has little functional meaning; for in actual

⁸ Apparently when the philosophers of law speak of law as a mode of social control they mean the endeavors of government to effect changes in social life—i.e., governmental rules as an instrument of social reform. See, for example, R. Pound, *Social Control through Law* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1942). Pound has argued that the recent drift from the major use of this kind of law as a support of the *status quo* to its use as social control, in the foregoing sense, is contrary to justice. See his *Justice According to the Law* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951).

practice agencies which are by definition governmental frequently compete with one another, have overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions, and may even operate to the same ends as organizations that are presumably nongovernmental. The concept, explicit in democratic ideology, that government, unlike other kinds of organizations, is "of, by, and for the people" is hardly distinguishing. Many agencies that are formally defined as governmental serve special interests; *e.g.*, the Interstate Commerce Commission is a coordinating agency for American railroads and has shown precious little concern for the American people; the United States Department of Agriculture has long been openly engaged in raising the relative economic status of American farmers at the expense of the nonfarm population; etc.

The common denominator in government as formally defined is primary reliance on coercion as its mode of control. Force, variously camouflaged, is the basic method by which any governmental organization maintains itself, supports itself, and endeavors to affect the behavior of those individuals who are subject to it. Although a given governmental organization may buy and sell in the market place and otherwise operate as though it were a private corporation, having in its personnel no police or other agencies of force, it is still based upon coercion; for like all governmental units it is supported by taxation, and taxes, by whatever agency collected, are secured by coercion. One of the few things that can be said about societies in general is that almost no one voluntarily pays his taxes; from the individual's point of view taxes and tribute are but two words for the same thing.

Primary reliance upon coercion is characteristic of government as formally defined; but even this characteristic is not distinguishing. In any society, and very clearly in our own, individuals and groups not socially defined as governmental may at times resort to coercion. To say that government is socially sanctioned organizational use of coercion is not particularly meaningful; for it frequently happens that society, or the local community, sanctions group coercion in violation of the recognized government. Local bandit gangs, subversive groups of one sort or another, and violent mobs often receive the support of the local citizenry although they are in clear violation of the traditionally recognized government. For centuries the Chinese people have in each locality played off bandits and governmental agencies, favoring for the moment that side which demanded the least in tribute. In contemporary America it is not at all unusual for citizens to support, if only tacitly, the coercion-based activities of gangsters and racketeers and to refuse to renew the terms of elected officials who are "unreasonable" in their enforcement of the law which they are required by government to enforce.

There is, in fact, no logical consistency in the actual uses made of coercion in a given society, least of all in our own. This fact is consistently avoided by the high priests of formal law, the academic legalists, who like to draw categorical distinctions between government and not-government, between law and not-law, and otherwise to make logic-sense out of what is in fact only

a current social circumstance.⁹ Of formal government, about all that can be said with reasonable consistency is that it operates primarily on the basis of coercion and that it strives, whatever its formal structure—whether, for example, totalitarian or democratic—to maintain a monopoly over the use of coercion. It does not rely wholly on coercion; nor does it ever entirely succeed in monopolizing coercion.

Representative Law. Coercion is sometimes used by a nongovernmental group or organization to enforce adherence to its norms, to what may, for convenience, be described as representative law. Operationally, it matters little whether the group is a gang of ruffians punishing one of their number for infraction of gang rules, the terrorists of a labor union beating into submission a scab, the hired hoodlums of a racketeer forcing a little independent businessman to join their protective association, the city police arresting and the court fining a motorist for overparking, or agents of the FBI shooting down a trapped criminal. In each such instance, in countless other comparable instances in any modern society, and in somewhat similar instances in every society, primitive or civilized, the use of coercion is an effort to force members to conform to group or organizational norms.

Enforcement of representative law is simply a reinforcement of existing group norms, a coercing of the individual who is insensitive to the more subtle controls of the group. Whatever the agency of enforcement, police or local toughs, that enforcement secures the sanction of the group that the agency represents. Characteristically, representative law expresses the sentiments, values, normative standards of conduct, and the like which are more or less common to the various status and other groupings within a large formal or informal community—a town, a city, the workers in a given industry, all the businesses engaged in a given field, etc. Representative law is, therefore, the most effective form of law; and it need not be codified or explicit, although formal governmental agencies frequently make it so.

Informal sanctioning of the use of coercion in the enforcement of representative law takes many forms. The tacit and occasionally explicit support that a community sometimes gives to a man who has beaten or perhaps even murdered his wife reflects the fact that his action was in accord with representative law, however illegal the act in other terms. The persistence, in all modern societies, of organized prostitution, gambling, abortion mills, and other thriving illegal practices indicates that the laws against them are not in accord with representative law, *i.e.*, that there is more community support for these activities than for the efforts to suppress them.¹⁰ The decisions of

⁹ For valiant attempts to make some sociological sense out of current uses of law, governmental and otherwise, as a means of social control see G. Gurvitch, *Sociology of Law* (Alliance Book Corporation, New York, 1942); and N. S. Timasheff, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939).

¹⁰ No one has ever attempted to ascertain quantitatively the extent to which and the specific conditions under which determined governmental action can through coercion

juries frequently reflect the preference for representative law as against "justice" in accordance with the statute law of the relevant political organization. The squeeze, which has for centuries been a universal aspect of politico-economic life in China, and the graft, black markets, and other illicit operations characteristic of contemporary Western societies are more or less in accord with representative law, although the community of interests thus served is often difficult to define. Black marketeers may represent the values and interests of all those, including producers, raw material suppliers, etc., who want more goods than the law of some governmental agency allows. The terrorists of a labor union presumably represent the desire of the union members to maintain a collective monopoly over the market for their particular kind of labor and thereby achieve a higher wage than would otherwise be possible. At any event, when the threats and punishments administered by union terrorists serve to force a deviant individual or group into conformity with what the majority of individuals and groups within the labor organization consider desirable conduct, such action constitutes enforcement of representative law.

bring about changes in the norms of any community of persons. All such efforts are tyrannical in character and will be analyzed as such in a subsequent chapter. Such efforts invariably encounter strong resistance, and there is a very long and discouraging history of attempts of government to work major changes in social life. The evident failure of the Russian Communists to produce, by ruthless enforcement of legal fiat, the utopian society proposed by Marx and Lenin (e.g., their reluctant sanctioning of the family as the basic unit of social life, resignation to the fact that private property and private enterprise could not be eliminated, total abandonment of the ideological principle "to each according to his needs") has much historical precedent. Thus the Roman Emperor Diocletian (245-313 A.D.) failed in an attempt to socialize the production and distribution of the basic necessities of life by fixing the prices of such things as meat, cereals, and wine. The punishment for overcharging was death or deportation, but the price-control program was a complete failure. Black markets sprang up throughout the Empire, legal control was nullified by local administrative laxity, and violation of these laws was sanctioned by the local community. The experience of the Chinese, who upon a number of occasions attempted to introduce some degree of socialism, was much the same. See *Food and Money in Ancient China* (N. L. Swann, trans., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1950).

Even minor attempts to change local norms of conduct by law often encounter strong and fatal resistance. Thus the British, noted for their respect for law and their patience with governmental regulations, have refused to accept enforced vaccination against smallpox. A law passed early in this century languished for lack of enforcement and was repealed in 1948. Commenting upon an outbreak of smallpox in 1951, an English public health officer explained the lack of preventive vaccination as the result of the fact that "the British are a pigheaded people, and the moment you mention compulsion they start fussing about liberty." (*Time*, Jan. 29, 1951.)

For news reports on recent public resistance to law, specifically to taxes on cigarets and distilled spirits that exceeded the tolerance of the public, see *Time*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 35; May 26, 1952, p. 93; and Sept. 22, 1952, p. 94. For sociological analyses of public resistance to economic regulation by government see M. B. Clinard, *The Black Market: A Study of White Collar Crime* (Rinehart, New York, 1952); and F. E. Hartung, "White-collar Offenses in the Wholesale Meat Industry in Detroit" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 54, pp. 25-32, 1950).

As was indicated earlier, bandit gangs and even street ruffians may at times and in some respects enforce local representative law.

Many formal agencies of law enforcement in actuality enforce representative law rather than formal law. In primitive tribal life the tribal chieftain, the council of elders, or the "king" frequently reflect representative law in their decisions; the shaman, the voodoo doctor, or the magic man is in the main an agent of representative law; and although supernaturalistic forces may be called upon to administer punishment for infraction of such law, many primitive communities have their own version of the modern police force. In some societies the priests, nominally agents of sacred law, actually administer representative law, defining as an act against the gods the act which violates local standards of conduct. In all modern societies, the complex and multitudinous agencies of government—local, state, and national; police, judicial, and administrative bureaucracies—usually have as one aspect of their function the enforcement of some representative law. Some of the representative law that they thus enforce is codified and explicit, but much of it is not; much of it is, in fact, contrary to explicit law. The policeman who herds a group of noisy revelers down the street toward home rather than arresting them for disturbing the peace is, for example, acting more in accord with representative than with formal law. A good policeman, and in fact even a good jurist, is one who knows the representative law and therewith tempers formal justice with "common-sense" mercy.

The Law of Compromise. The community of interests and values which lies behind representative law and makes its enforcement possible is necessarily limited to a relatively few and basic matters. All the families in a residential area can perhaps agree on the need for street lighting, a sewerage system, and a water supply. All the farmers in a region will, perhaps, concede their joint need for a school for their children, for roads of a certain character and quality, and for keeping down crop-destroying deer and cattle-killing predators. Most of the families, businesses, clubs, and other groups within a city population can perhaps agree that streets should be paved and holdup men prevented from plying their trade. The areas of agreement, hence the scope of representative law, will depend largely upon the cultural homogeneity of the population, being generally greater among a primitive and peasant people than among a culturally polyglot aggregation such as that which constitutes the city of New York.

But within any community there are inevitably many contrasts in group and organizational interests, values, and norms. Where such contrasts lead to intergroup rivalry—*e.g.*, the competing of business establishments for customers, or the competing of families with one another for prestige in the community—representative law tends to fix the conditions of competition but not to repress the expression of the competing interests. Where, however, the interests are conflicting, to the end that, should those of one group or organiza-

tion be satisfied, one or more others will be damaged, there is usually regulation of a more or less repressive sort by what may be termed the "law of compromise."¹¹

Law of compromise differs only in function from representative law. It may be either explicit or implicit, and it may be enforced by some formal or almost any informal agency. And like representative law it is sanctioned even by those groups who are thereby precluded from full realization of some interest or value. As is the case with representative law, law of compromise has in the main developed through long empirical experience and become embedded in social tradition.

In some instances, law of compromise seems, at least on the surface, to favor the interests of one group or kind of grouping at the expense of another. Thus the etiquette of race relations in the South, as the complex of representative and compromise laws there maintained is sometimes called, may appear to give the whites dominance over the Negroes. It does operate, of course, to keep the Negroes "in their place"; but at the same time it also keeps the whites in their place. The Southern white mistress would no more think of accusing her Negro cook of stealing the remains of the dinner roast than she would of sitting down to table with him; and if the informal law prevents the Negro from voting, as is his constitutional right, it also permits him to ignore a good deal of irksome "white man's" law, such as that surrounding marriage. The informal law—and there is a good deal of it in most societies—that keeps the various classes in their respective places is likewise more compromise than dominative in character. Its nature is reflected on a small scale and simple level in the way in which a community will permit its noisy youngsters to have their fun up to a point, after which they must, perhaps, show consideration for their elders.

A good deal, but by no means all, of compromise law is equable in the sense that it demands the same order and degree of sacrifice from all the individuals and groups involved. Thus, if such be the cultural concepts and values, each of the families in a neighborhood will be prevented from burning its trash or throwing its household slops into the gutter in order that all may be free of smoke or flies and noxious odors. The sanitary and other public-health and nuisance regulations of our modern towns and cities are either a codification of compromise law or else, having originated in legislative action, have gradually gained general sanction and as they have done so have become enforceable. On the whole it seems generally impossible to enforce, through police and related official action, formal laws regarding sanitation unless they reflect or acquire the support of informal law. The same thing is true of traffic laws; even the perpetually exasperating traffic signal and parking meter are historical outgrowths of informal codes of conduct developed empirically by the early

¹¹ A. Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study of Representation of Interests* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942).

motorists and gradually codified and officially enforced as, with the growth of traffic, informal enforcement became impossible.¹² There was a time when motorists could and would gang up on the one who violated the drivers' tacit code of good conduct; today informal efforts at coercing the reckless and inconsiderate driver are limited mainly to horn-blowing complaints.

What conduct is prohibited or demanded by representative and compromise law is largely determined by the basic culture and the various subcultures of a people. A great deal of such law in China, for example, has to do with the preservation of family and clan values which are unknown in the West. Conversely, much of our own representative and compromise law operates to preserve individual values, concepts of public sanitation, and standards of material welfare that are incomprehensible to the Oriental. Similar, if less striking, contrasts can be found between regions in the United States, between various classes in a given region, etc.

Moreover, there are many contrasts in the extent to which and the areas in which various peoples rely on representative and compromise law. The Chinese seem, in the main, to be greatly controlled by such law, certainly more so than Americans, for in America there is still much trial and error in the relations of groups and organizations one to the others. The English, like the Chinese, appear to be exceptionally respectful of their representative and compromise laws, many of which are not formally codified. Old customs and "the right thing to do" constantly take precedence over individual, group, and organizational self-interest. It is, in part, because of the general reverence for representative and compromise law that life moves, on the surface at least, so complacently in England and that English politics, business, and other activities are often conducted on such an apparently restrained level that they seem, and at times no doubt are, uncompetitive. By comparison, French politics and American business might seem to the outsider to be unrestrained by anything except the enforcement of formal law, although in fact the difference is mainly one of degree. French political parties and American businesses are controlled, as are all organizations, by their own rules and regulations, by their status-group systems, and by the relevant representative laws of the societies in which they operate.

¹² Currently the laws regulating congested urban motor traffic are often "decreed" by traffic technicians employed by the municipality. The rules and regulations they devise are, it would appear, either designed in terms of motorists' habits and preferences or else they are simply unenforceable. For an amusing discussion of the grievous problems the traffic engineer faces in endeavoring to work out devices and procedures that will be acceptable to drivers and at the same time expedite the flow of automobiles through city streets see J. Stanton, "The Battle of the City Streets" (*Life*, Mar. 30, 1953, p. 135).

Part III

SOCIAL CONTROL AND COUNTERCONTROL

SOCIAL ISOLATION

The idea that the individual is but an aspect, or manifestation, of his society evolved, as was indicated earlier, as a corrective for the antecedent view of society as merely the sum of the individuals composing it. Society, and every constituent group and organization, is certainly much more than the sum of its individual members; on the other hand, the idea of the individual as a manifestation of society makes him a passive functionary of his society and of the various dependent groups and organizations to which he belongs. This latter view may be in closer accord with social realities than the former, but it falls considerably short of representing those realities. No man is an island apart; yet few men are in all respects passive participants in the society of which they are a part.

In the preceding chapters attention has been directed to the ways in which social control, operating on the basis of the individual's desire for social status, induces him to conform to group standards of conduct whatever his personal inclinations or situational temptations. The social control to which the typical member of any society is subject and is responsive accounts for a very considerable portion of his behavior. No one ever entirely escapes from such control; and most people are for most of their lives subservient to such control. There is, however, the other side of this particular coin to be considered. It is the quantitatively lesser side; but it is that part of the whole which in large measure accounts for the fact that human society is always and everywhere subject to change, however slight.

Some of the changes that continually occur in any society are accomplished through gradual, adaptive modification of the structures and standards of status groups or by evolution of new groups with new structures and standards. Such changes indicate the active, rather than passive, way in which men individually respond to social control; they are not violations or evasions of social control but, rather, an aspect of social control itself. Many of the significant changes that are brought about in any society, on the other hand, are accomplished by what may for convenience be termed "countercontrol." Countercontrol is the other side of the coin; it results from the efforts, continually being made but rarely successful, of an individual to gain ascendancy over the other members of a group, of one group to gain ascendancy over another, or of an organization to gain ascendancy over groups or some other organization. To become ascendant, an individual, group, or organization must effect, by force or otherwise, changes in the established standards of some established group

or organization, *i.e.*, must counter the social control of that group or organization.

The remaining chapters of this work will be devoted to the analysis of ascendancy and the restrictions thereon. There exists, however, a sort of twilight zone between social control and countercontrol that should be explored before analysis of the latter is undertaken. It might, perhaps, be described graphically as the zone or area of transition between individual subjugation to social control and individual efforts at ascendancy. It covers, at any event, those circumstances in which the individual is socially isolated and hence is neither subject to social control nor striving for ascendancy over some group or organization. To the extent that he is socially isolated, the individual is free to determine his own conduct within the limitations imposed by the physical and social circumstances in which he finds himself.

Anomie. One version of the theory that contemporary society is unique and distinct in kind begins with the assumption that in the societies of the past and in the primitive and peasant societies of today every individual is a total conformist; that in such societies the individual is invariably bound to and is of necessity in all respects subservient to the family, village, tribal, or other groupings of which his society is constituted. Under these conditions all conduct is normative; and there is no scope for the expression of idiosyncratic motives, tastes, values, sentiments, etc. The corollary to this assumption is the idea that in such societies the life of the individual is ordered and his relations with his fellows are in all respects harmonious. Here the individual would, in truth, be but a manifestation of society.

According to this concept, modern society is, by contrast, disordered and unstable, with the result that the individual member is frequently and often in major respects left to his own devices and, unguided either by cultural precepts or social control, is forced to wander at random among what one author has termed "the lonely crowd."¹ The lack of firm and gratifying social attachments is thought to result in much deviant individual conduct, which in turn leads modern people frequently to come into unhappy conflict with one another and almost as frequently to lead socially isolated, semiautonomous lives. To this presumably unnatural condition of affairs sociologists have given the name "anomie."

The error in the foregoing concept lies not in the idea that modern individuals may lead somewhat formless lives. Some do, through either personal inclination or imposed necessity. The error, rather, stems from the assumption

¹ D. Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950). The same thesis is developed by S. de Grazia, *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948); M. M. Wood, *Paths of Loneliness: The Individual Isolated in Modern Society* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1952); and P. Selznick, "Institutional Vulnerability in Mass Society" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 56, pp. 320-331, 1951). For a study of social isolation per se see P. Halmos, *Solitude and Privacy* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1953).

that anomie is an unnatural state of affairs, peculiar to our own society, whereas it is in fact a normal—i.e., always present—aspect of social life. No evidence has yet been adduced to demonstrate that a higher proportion of modern peoples experience a greater degree of anomie than do the members of primitive, peasant, and other premodern forms of society. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that every society, whatever its form and size, produces its quota of malcontented, dissentious, unsociable, and lonely members and that social estrangement is the occasional lot of all human beings.²

Those who think that anomie is an unnatural state of affairs that is found only, or at least mainly, in modern societies display an ethnocentrism equal to that of a physician who might conclude, since all his patients are members of modern society, that physical illness is unique to and hence a product of modern life. The conditions subsumed under the term "anomie" are unquestionably atypical; but they are no more unnatural than is physical ill health and no less universal.

The condition of social isolation, which gives rise to, or at least permits, normless individual conduct, is not the product of some specific kind of society, modern or otherwise. Nor is it a fixed, categorical matter. Any one or a combination of a great variety of factors may enter into the production of social isolation, and that isolation may take any one of a wide variety of degrees and forms. The factors that may enter into the making of social isolation are at least as many and complex as those responsible for physical illness, and the forms of social isolation are at least as varied as the pathological conditions that may occur in the human organism.

ISOLATION AND DEVIATION

Social isolation is interesting to the social psychologist mainly because it is associated with deviant individual conduct. The relation between isolation and deviation in conduct is not, however, a constant or a consistent one. In general, a person who is in some respects markedly deviant is also in some re-

² The earlier anthropological reports on primitive societies tended to describe primitive cultures in highly abstract terms and to imply total individual conformity to the cultural standards. Modern field studies of both primitive and peasant societies, on the other hand, provide a wealth of data on variations in individual conformity to the cultural norms and indicate that social isolation and idiosyncratic conduct are entirely commonplace in such societies. Whether the range of individual deviation from the norms and the frequency and degree of social isolation are as great as in modern Western societies is not ascertainable. Barnett (H. G. Barnett, *Innovation: The Basis for Cultural Change*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1953) seems to believe that they are.

Perhaps the most striking evidence bearing on this point is that provided by Goldhamer and Marshall (H. Goldhamer and A. Marshall, *Psychosis and Civilization: Two Studies in the Frequency of Mental Disease*, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1953). They find from a study of institutional records that there has been no measurable increase in the frequency of psychosis in New England over the past hundred years; although, according to those who think anomie peculiar to modern society, social isolation has greatly increased during this period and such isolation is commonly the basis for psychotic breakdown.

spects socially isolated. Thus the known homosexual will ordinarily be excluded from membership in groups which would otherwise be open to him, the ne'er-do-well may be disowned by his family and to that extent subjected to social isolation, and the unsociable person is by definition one who lacks the normal complement of friends and acquaintances. It is, however, possible for an individual to be socially isolated without being deviant in any way other than that imposed by the fact of isolation, a possibility that has been dramatized in the old stereotype of the Englishman dressing for his solitary dinner in the wilds of Africa. Deviant conduct may result in isolation or isolation may lead to deviant conduct; and in any given instance it is often impossible to ascertain whether isolation or deviation came first. Thus a man who appears to be so shy that he is unable to gain membership in friendship coteries and other informal groups may actually be shy because in childhood he was isolated from association with his peers. On the other hand, what is interpreted as shyness may in actuality be ennui induced not by too little social participation in early life but too much of it.

All status groups, it will be recalled, tolerate considerable member deviation from the group norms, and many of them harbor one or more markedly atypical members. As used in the present connection, deviation refers to extreme deviation, to conduct which so violates the norms of a group to which the individual would normally belong that he is excluded from membership. What would constitute the normal group attachments of any given individual are, of course, difficult to ascertain; but without some idea of what is, or would be, normal for that individual, it is impossible to ascertain either the extent to which he is socially isolated or the respects in which his conduct is deviant.

No human act is *per se* deviant. The fact that an Eskimo munches happily on a well-rotted fish head and upon occasion cohabits with his neighbor's wife does not make him a deviant individual. On the contrary, both these acts are normative in Eskimo society. Even suicide has been in some times and places normative conduct for some classes of individuals under some circumstances. Deviation is not, moreover, synonymous with personal unhappiness or discontent. The fact that an individual's overt conduct runs counter to some of his personal inclinations and preferences does not make that conduct deviant. If it did, then all conduct induced through the operation of social control would be deviant; for subordination to social control is always contrary in some respect or other to the interests or wishes of the individual. Actually, the deviant act is more often than not a control-free outward expression of some dominant aspect of the individual's self; thus from the psychological point of view deviation may be a mode of adjustment, whatever its long-run consequences to the individual.

The more apparent forms of deviant conduct are those which constitute violation of generally sanctioned cultural standards. Such violation may be positive or negative, or both. It is culturally normal among all the classes and most of the status groups in contemporary American society for the young

adult to marry and settle down with a member of the opposite sex; the procedure constitutes a cultural standard or complex set of related norms to which society at large and most of its constituent groups expect the individual to adhere. These norms may be violated in a variety of ways. The individual may, for whatever reasons, fail to marry and thus in time become by social definition a bachelor (or spinster); he may marry and soon thereafter desert his spouse; he may marry a succession of women without going through the formality of divorcing each in turn, becoming thereby a bigamist; he may marry and fail to settle down in the conventional way; etc. In many instances, violation of the cultural and subcultural norms of conduct, *i.e.*, extreme deviation from them, means exclusion from many otherwise available status groups; and it sometimes means the loss of generic as well as specific status, as is the case, for example, with a convicted murderer when he is forcibly removed from society at large.

Deviant conduct that violates, in whatever way, only the norms of a particular status group and not those of a cultural character may preclude membership in that group but not affect status in other groups or in society at large. A man who wearies of bridge, for example, and refuses to play the game any more will lose his membership in the local bridge club, although his status elsewhere may not be at all affected. A Methodist who becomes enamored of Catholicism will probably be dropped by many of his former friends and acquaintances; but he may at the same time acquire membership in a number of new groups.

Social isolation, like deviation, is relative to some sort of normal; and it may vary both in degree and in kind. If it were normal for each of the housewives in a given residential neighborhood to associate with some other or others for an average period of one hour a day, one who associated with her neighbors not at all would be totally isolated, and one who engaged in neighborly activities for an average of half an hour a day would, in a manner of speaking, be half isolated. Actually, of course, involved time is only one of the dimensions of participation in a group; but the illustration will perhaps serve to indicate one aspect of degree of isolation.

The other aspect of degree of isolation stems from the fact that ordinarily full social participation means membership in a considerable number of status groups—*e.g.*, in a family, a neighborhood, a work group, a recreational coterie, etc. What will constitute the normal number of such groups depends upon many factors, such as the society, class, sex, age, and occupation of the given individual, and varies widely from individual to individual. But for each individual there is, presumably, some sort of normal expectation. In our society the small-town businessman, for example, is expected to belong to some religious group or other, to one or more "civic improvement" clubs, to a family, to a neighborhood, and to one or more recreational coteries composed of men of his own age and general station in life. As a general rule, full or normal social participation tends to mean the individual's involvement in group activities

for most of his waking hours, the major exception being the man whose occupation requires his working in solitude. The individual who fails to participate to the extent that is normal for him is to that extent socially isolated, whatever he himself may think about it. Thus the small-town businessman who did not belong to any of the local civic clubs would be somewhat isolated; and should he also fail to have a family, to associate with his neighbors, and to belong to some recreational coterie, he would be so markedly isolated that he would be judged queer. The fact that a dental technician works for most of the day in solitude will not be held against him; but should he also eat his meals in solitary splendor, devote his evenings to reading and other independent recreations, and live by himself, he will be considered odd even by his fellow technicians.

The simplest kind of isolation is that which involves, however it may have come about, the absence of persons with whom to associate. For convenience this kind of isolation may be termed "physical," although its origins are usually social. Far more common is isolation that involves a failure of the individual, through inability, preference, or whatever, to establish and maintain communications with those about him; for it is rare in any society for an individual to be for long physically isolated from his fellows, and in most instances physical isolation is but a reflection of a basic inability or unwillingness to participate socially. Thus a man who becomes a hermit, living in his cave or his wilderness farmhouse, would probably tend to be isolated wherever he was.

IDIOSYNCRATIC ISOLATION

Although the distinction is not categorical, a contrast may for purposes of analysis be drawn between social isolation which has as its immediate antecedent some idiosyncratic attribute of the isolated individual and social isolation which is forced upon the individual by external circumstances. The idiosyncratic attribute that makes for isolation may, of course, have originated in external circumstances, hence the stress in the foregoing distinction on "immediate antecedent" of isolation.

In most status groups the minimal requirement for membership and full participation is the possession of normal physical competence, reasonably good health, and average mental ability. What is normal, reasonable, and average varies considerably; thus the physical requirements for membership in an athletic club are considerably greater than those for membership in a bridge club, while the mental requirements for membership in the latter may far exceed those for membership in the former. In any society there are, moreover, some status groups that have evolved to satisfy the needs of classes of physically atypical persons; and membership in such groups is limited to those individuals who are physically atypical. Thus in order to belong to the society of beggars that operated in the larger cities of Europe a century and more ago, one had to be or become physically crippled; and physical illness

is a requirement for membership in the casual friendship coteries that develop among the mobile patients in a modern hospital.

On the whole, however, the values and activities of a status group seem to be designed for individuals possessing the average physical and mental characteristics of the members of the society, class, sex, and age categories from which the group draws its membership. As a result, the individual who happens to possess exceptional physical stature or powers, unusually good health, or extraordinary mental abilities may find himself excluded from membership in some groups and discouraged from maintaining membership in still others. A boy who has reached physical maturity well in advance of his contemporaries may, for example, become somewhat isolated from his peer groups because of his physical superiority; likewise, an unusually bright youth may be disqualified from participation in the games and other activities of his contemporaries because of his superior mentality. Child prodigies and so-called men of genius seem characteristically to be socially isolated; to some extent their isolation stems from preoccupation with nonsociable activities, but exceptional mental capacity may of itself discourage if not preclude participation in groups that are geared to average mental abilities.

Isolation is no doubt much more frequently occasioned by subnormal than by superior physical or mental attributes. The moron and the idiot, and in some instances even the dull normal person, are incapable of acquiring the social skills and other attributes that are necessary to gain acceptance in the company of mentally normal people. Many of the mentally subnormal, in fact, do not learn even to want to belong to status groups; for them status may consist of crude and momentary signs of approval from any person who happens to be present. Thus a mentally deficient individual who has been institutionalized can often be shifted from place to place without experiencing the loss of status which is the usual consequence of a change of residence and social context. The physically handicapped, such as the congenitally crippled, the blind, and the chronically ill, on the other hand, seem generally to want social status; they are, however, often forced by their disabilities to endure considerable social isolation.

The extent to which any physical deficiency will make for social isolation depends upon the culture, the subcultures, the nature of the deficiency, and the personality of the individual. Social tolerance of physical disabilities, particularly those of a congenital nature, varies greatly. Migratory primitives, such as the Australian aborigines, cannot for evident reasons grant social membership to the physically incompetent individual. As a rule, subsistence societies, primitive or peasant, reject or at least give little aid to the halt, the lame, and the blind. Even when there are no pressing economic reasons for abandoning or destroying the physically handicapped, social values may operate to isolate those with subnormal physical attributes; thus in premodern Europe the cripple was often abused and denied normal status on the grounds, entirely

ideological, that a crippled body harbored a crippled mind, or that the physical handicap was a sign of sinfulness or of God's disfavor.

In modern Western society there exists a very considerable social tolerance of, amounting at times to a sentimental bias toward, the physically handicapped. The actual acceptance of a crippled, blind, deaf, or otherwise disabled person depends, however, on a variety of factors. Other things being equal, the extent to which a person with a given handicap will be socially isolated seems to depend upon his own personality. If he is, or can appear to be, cheerful and unconcerned, the crippled person may enjoy membership in a considerable variety of status groups and be isolated only to the extent that his particular disability mechanically precludes social participation.

In some instances a very minor physical atypicality, such as buck teeth, crossed eyes, or a skin blemish, seems to be more isolating than an actual physical handicap. Such is perhaps especially the case with young women in our society, in respect to whom such a premium is placed on physical beauty as currently defined. At any event, the tremendous efforts made by many modern women, young and old, to achieve a sort of normative, undistinguished physical appearance, and the status-value claims that are made by the advertisers of cosmetics, devices for the control and modification of the torso, etc., suggest that physical appearance does play some part in determining an individual's social acceptability in some kinds of groups.

Unsociability. A person who is hampered in his status strivings by some minor peculiarity in appearance, such as a facial blemish, is not so much physically as psychologically handicapped. He is likely to be hypersensitive regarding that defect and fear that he will because of it be accorded atypical status, if not definitely rebuffed; as a result, he may fail to make the normal efforts to gain membership in status groups, or he may otherwise behave in ways that are judged unsociable.

The expression of unsociability ranges from outright social withdrawal, as in the case of the individual who simply refuses to be drawn into normal associations, to persistent awkwardness in the playing of social or status-group roles. Such terms as "aloofness," "bashfulness," "shyness," and "rudeness" are commonly used in an effort to designate various degrees and kinds of unsociable conduct. There are a number of folk stereotypes of persons who are, by assumption, unsociable in all respects—*e.g.*, the recluse. No doubt some individuals are generally socially undermotivated, socially inept, socially hypersensitive, or socially self-conscious, in which event they may be generally isolated. More common, one would think, are those who are unsociable in some respect or other regarding certain kinds of status groups. Thus a young man may have and enjoy full membership in groups composed of men but be incapable of normal participation in mixed groups because he is, if only for a time, bashful in the presence of girls.

Although unsociability may at times stem from an acquired overconcern with some minor physical defect, it is in many instances the result of atypical

socialization. On the one hand, the individual may not have had the opportunity to acquire those positive attributes of personality that, in his particular context, constitute sociability. A socially impoverished childhood—*i.e.*, comparative isolation during childhood—may have precluded his having normal social training, with the result that when the opportunity for normal social participation presents itself, he is inept. Such lack of training can, presumably, be overcome in the course of gradually increasing social participation. On the other hand, a traumatic social experience in childhood or youth may, as was indicated in an earlier chapter, psychologically scarify an individual for life.

One of the more striking illustrations of how unsociability may be induced by early traumatic experience is provided by the stammerer or stutterer. Usually, but not invariably, a person with a marked speech defect is thereby precluded from enjoying many of the associations that would otherwise be available to him. His circumstance is the exact opposite of that of the deaf individual; he can hear all that goes on around him, but he cannot respond verbally in the normal way. His role in status groups tends, therefore, to be an atypical one, a role that is verbally passive, however active it may be on other levels. Moreover, he is usually hypersensitive regarding his speech defect and, like a person who is hypersensitive about some physical defect, is somewhat discouraged from making the normal efforts to gain status. Isolation of some kind and to some degree seems, as a result, to be the usual lot of the person with a speech defect.

Most speech defects are, it now appears, social rather than anatomical in origin and are usually acquired in childhood as the result of a traumatic social experience or, more commonly perhaps, of a marked and persistent conflict in the social environment. Once acquired, the defect is likely to lead to a variety of unhappy experiences (such as, for example, being laughed at by schoolmates) which at once reinforce the defect and establish positive attributes of unsociability. The attributes of unsociability may then, in turn, result in social adversity which aggravates the speech defect, and so on. Unless the process is checked, it can result in almost total isolation.

Some of the terms that are used to designate kinds of unsociable conduct imply that the individual lacks the normal needs for status; thus the term "aloof" suggests a lack of interest in or disdain for the company of others. It is certainly true that an individual may be uninterested in and even disdainful of those whom he considers his social inferiors. It is rare indeed that a college professor cultivates the company of students or that students strive for the companionship of their professors. Desirable social status is, as has been shown, variously defined; and no person will desire to obtain membership in all the status groups that exist in his society. It does not follow, however, that a person who is socially aloof feels no need for status. Although the intensity of the need for status no doubt varies considerably between individuals, it is doubtful that any individual is entirely free from such need; and it would appear that most of those who behave as though they were apathetic toward

or disdainful of peer and other groups in which membership would be appropriate for them are pridefully trying to hide the fact that they are shy or socially inept.

An individual may, it is true, be so isolated in childhood that he fails to acquire the full complement of status needs. Atypical socialization consequent upon partial isolation in childhood may result in a channeling of the individual's interests and outlook. An excessively mothered child may grow up largely unaware of the fact that there is a larger social world in which to live and as a consequence be markedly isolated from peer-group life. A child who has known "all work and no play" may become the adult who lives only to work and plows through life largely untouched by concern for the feelings and opinions of even those with whom he works. A child prodigy may be so encouraged to concentrate on mathematical physics or some other adult field of activity that he becomes sensitized only to those of repute in this special field. In general, however, it may be said that social isolation is not only unusual but is also unwelcome. The world can be, and sometimes is, too much with us; on the other hand, few people seem to enjoy the "freedom" that comes with isolation from their fellow men.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL ISOLATION

As he approaches maturity, an individual may find himself more or less isolated because of unsociable attributes of personality that he acquired during social isolation in his childhood. As a child he may, however, have been socially isolated by external circumstances. Circumstantial isolation may be occasioned by a great variety of factors and may, of course, occur in maturity and old age as well as in childhood.

Physical isolation, in which the individual is precluded by sheer distance from normal association with his fellows, is often a temporary or periodic consequence of occupational activities. The shepherd is the classic illustration of a person who is isolated for considerable periods by the demands of his occupation. Fishermen, hunters, cattlemen, and many other workers, both primitive and modern, spend long periods in isolation from all but their fellow workers, and sometimes even from these. Isolation from all but one's family was the normal lot of most of those who pioneered in the settlement of the North American continent; and it is likely to be one of the disadvantages of pioneering even in the modern world, although to a somewhat lesser extent because of modern means of communication and transportation.

No one really knows whether the shepherd enjoys his enforced solitude or whether the early pioneers went out into the wilderness to escape the social entanglements of home. But physical isolation that is incidental to an occupation or a way of life is at least socially sanctioned, and the individual who endures such isolation is at least comforted by the thought that he is not abnormal. Often, in fact, society makes certain concessions to those who are

isolated by their occupation, presumably by way of reward. Thus seamen, lumberjacks, cowmen, etc., are currently permitted and expected to avoid some of the normal responsibilities of social membership and are somewhat encouraged upon occasion to celebrate their return to "civilization" in violent and expensive ways. Many fishing peoples have greeted the returning fishermen with some traditional celebration, and primitive hunters were often welcomed back into normal social life as heroes.

Social, as distinct from physical, isolation that results from external circumstances is, however, seldom sanctioned and is even more rarely compensated for by society. An old man or woman, for example, who has outlived his generation and become the sole local survivor is certain to be somewhat isolated, and in modern society his isolation is not likely to be compensated for by special considerations and signs of respect.

The isolation of the very old may be in whole or in part a consequence of the disabilities that usually come with advancing years. But even a physically and mentally sound aged person will be isolated by circumstances, the extent and degree of his isolation depending mainly upon the culture of the society. Some societies, such as that of premodern China, have provided special and highly respected and rewarding social roles for the aged; others, including our own, have made no such provision, except perhaps institutionalization in the company of the equally aged. In our society, at least, it is the normal role of the very aged to be socially isolated. Such personal attentions as the aged person may get are mainly dutiful. He usually lacks any functional place in the social system; and he is usually incapable of full participation in any status grouping, if only because his interests, values, etc., are those of another generation. It is for these and related reasons that attention has recently shifted somewhat from the social provision of financial security in old age to the provision of what is often termed "psychological security." So far, however, no one has discovered any means by which modern society can assure the very old or even the moderately old person a sense of being needed and wanted—*i.e.*, meaningful status—by his younger fellow men.

Role Conflict and Social Detachment. One of the most complex of the circumstances that may result in social isolation is that in which the individual is caught between two dissident controls, neither of which he can submit to without violating the other. The circumstance is usually described as involving "role conflict," and the individual subjected to such conflict is sometimes referred to as a "marginal person."

Role conflict is more likely to result in a partial detachment of the individual from one or both of the status groups which require him to play conflicting roles than to outright isolation from either of them. The behavioral characteristics of a person who is thus partially detached are, from the point of view of the group, suggested by such evaluatory terms as "cynical," "sardonic," "pessimistic," "sarcastic," and the like. The degree of an individual's detach-

ment from a group may perhaps be described as ranging from mild discouragement with the group to complete disillusionment with the group's standards and values.

In any society the individual usually belongs to and is subject to the controls of a considerable number of status groups, some of which will be dependent elements of different organizations. As long as membership in one such group does not preclude membership in another one of them, differences between their standards and values do not pose problems of role conflict to the individual. A man's club may absorb more of his time than his family would like; and his occupational group may demand more of his time than he, his club members, and his family willingly give. But there need be no fundamental dissidence between what is demanded of him in his roles as worker, as father of a family, and as club member. Each of these groups may control part of his conduct, but not the same part.

When, however, the norms of two or more groups to which he belongs are in categorical opposition and affect the same part of his conduct, he is the locus of conflicting forces. Thus his family may strive to keep him sober, his clubmates to get him drunk; his neighbors may demand that he devote his Sundays to keeping his garden tidy, whereas the local church requires that he spend them in religious services and contemplation; his fellow workers and the organization within which they operate may impose standards of conduct inimical to the interests of his wife and children; etc. Some conflicts of this sort are perhaps inevitable in any society, for complete functional integration of the various groups that together make the social whole is never realized. Even in the relatively stabilized and integrated system of premodern China the individual was invariably subject to some opposing social pressures; thus it was apparently traditional in the Chinese family for a son to be the locus of some conflict between the women and the men of the family, each reflecting somewhat different ideas of what constituted filial loyalty and the ideal career for a son.

The prevalence and intensity of role conflict in a society seem, however, to be determined in part at least by the rates at which changes are occurring within the social system. In a society such as our own which has for long been undergoing rapid and almost continuous change in most of its aspects, the disparity between the demands of various groups is great; and intense role conflict, with some consequent social detachment, is a common experience.³ In our society the norms to which the child is expected to conform by his parents and other interested adults are almost invariably opposed in many respects to those to which he is required to adhere by his peer group; and it is not unusual for the youth who goes off to college to encounter there norms

³ See, for example, E. C. Hughes, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 50, pp. 353-359, 1945); S. A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 14, pp. 707-717, 1949); and S. A. Stouffer and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 56, pp. 395-405, 1951).

which are in conflict with many of those which he has previously—in his home, his early play associations, and even his high-school experience—been induced to respect. Still later he may find that some of the things which were right and proper at college are regarded with scorn by mature and practical men of affairs.

Ordinarily, perhaps, the individual who is exposed to conflicting group pressures prefers membership in one of the groups to membership in the other. As he empirically discovers that he cannot burn the candle at both ends and satisfy the demands of both, his preference becomes manifest; he may more or less detach himself from his family in favor of the club, or vice versa; he may resign himself to the disapproval of his neighbors and settle on church-going; he may decide that a good job is more important to him than the companionship of roisterous friends; he may conclude that the views and values of his current business associates are more valid, or at least more practical, than the idealistic theories to which he was exposed during his college days. Detachments of this sort are often an aspect of the process of growing up in our society, and in any event they may not impose any considerable strain on the individual.

When, however, the value that an individual places on membership in each of two groups with conflicting norms is high and equivalent, the only means by which he can escape the stress of that conflict may be detachment, more or less complete, from both groups. For whatever he may do, he is, from the point of view of one of the groups, disloyal to it. Under these circumstances there exists a "balance of power" which, in political parlance, is favorable to the "third force," *i.e.*, to control by some other group to which the individual was previously unattached or by some individual seeking to exercise leadership over him. For an individual, as for a nation, the position of being caught between equivalent forces is an uneasy and unstable one. Ordinarily the individual soon comes, in search of what might be described as his "peace of mind," to reject both groups, denying the validity of their values and norms and the importance to him of status within them and attaching himself to some group or concept which is new in terms of his prior experience. A woman may be of two minds and hence of none about keeping up with the high-style standards of the local smart set or winning the approval of her neighbors as housewife and mother; and she may resolve the opposition by abandoning both in favor of amateur dramatics. A college teacher may find himself exhausted by the struggle to be both a fine teacher in the eyes of his students and a fine scholar in the eyes of his colleagues, a conflict that might be resolved by his shifting into the role of college administrator. Cults—political, moral, religious, esthetic, etc.—commonly draw their membership from the ranks of those who have been caught between divergent groups of one sort or another. The college student who goes "arty" may simply be retreating from the counterpressures of his home background and the college academic outlook. The slum-bred boy who joins the local gang of toughs or the "zoot-suit"

set may be thereby resolving the conflict between his immigrant family and the new world represented by school and other agencies.

When the "third force" to which a marginal individual becomes subject is, in terms of local values, of higher social prestige than the two conflicting groups which he is endeavoring to escape, his efforts to detach himself from those two groups and gain acceptance in the third one may be both a resolution of conflict and a form of social climbing. Not all upward mobility is the result of detachment, nor is detachment always a consequence of group conflicts. Frequently, however, an individual who is seemingly ambitious to improve his economic or social status is not actually hypermotivated but has, rather, come to devalue two or more conflicting groups to which he belongs. He has come to reject, by rationalistic processes, the standards of both groups and the desirability to him of belonging to either. As an alternative, then, he adopts as his goal membership in the third group, the value of which is assured by the fact that it has high prestige in society at large. Raising his sights is for him only a means of reassurance; his ambition, if such it may be termed, is not to achieve something better than he has known but to replace the groups whose conflict with each other has destroyed the value to him of either one.

Personal Adversity and Social Detachment. Closely related to detachment that is brought about through role conflict is the detachment of an individual from a group as a consequence of one or more adverse experiences in that group. What will constitute an adverse experience in a group depends upon the particular individual involved, for what will be a shocking or disgusting experience to one may be no more than a trivial incident to another. As a generalization, about all that can be said is that adversity, in group life as elsewhere, is a function of expectations; to the extent that an experience differs from the anticipated, it is disturbing; to the extent that that difference is on the individual's value scale less than, rather than in excess of, the expectation, it will be disgusting, discouraging, or disillusioning. Thus the civilian soldier who returns from war more or less disillusioned (with war as such, with military authority in the abstract and the specific, with the rightness of his country's cause, etc.) quite probably went off to war with romantic and other illusions to lose. Similarly, the man who becomes disgusted with the country-club set probably expected from that group more than any such group could supply.

Adverse group experience may stem from the fact that the individual's values are or have become different from those of the group or from the fact that the status role he achieves in the group is less than satisfactory. Where the individual is born and trained into the group, as he is in the case of family or clan, he normally acquires the appropriate group values and sentiments; but the novice with an established system of values who comes into a group may find his values in sharp and persistent conflict with those of the group, and his experience with group membership may thus be disappointing. Thus the

"mama's boy" may have his delicate sensibilities affronted by the crudities of his peers; the young bride may be dismayed to discover the kind of family she has joined by marriage; the idealistic political reformer may be shocked to discover that the political party which he has joined is, in his terms, corrupt and venal; the young priest may be disillusioned when he learns that the priesthood is not entirely devoted to the glory of God and the welfare of mankind; and the young matron may be repelled by the fact that suburban "society" is engrossed in bridge and drinking bouts rather than art and uplift.

An individual who is incapable of reconciling his personal values and sentiments with those of some group which he has joined may simply withdraw from it and try some alternative group. There is a good deal of such testing of group membership in contemporary society, where the individual usually has available to him a number of alternatives. When, however, an alternative is lacking or the adversity is generalized to include all groups of the kind in which experience was disappointing or disillusioning, the individual may become in this particular respect isolated; *e.g.*, he may withdraw entirely from political activities, or he may turn from priestly novice to atheist. Such isolation is usually, although not invariably, quite segmental. Moreover, since his status needs and his time and energy may remain constant, the person who has become isolated from one kind of group may extend his participation in other groups. Thus the man who drops out of the country-club set may simply devote more time and interest to his family and occupational groups, and the woman who sickens of bridge and petty gossip may intensify her household labors.

Adverse group experience is occasionally the consequence of invidious comparison. A child who is brought up in an immigrant family, in lower-class ways and associations, in the culture of the small town, or in a rural family and community may subsequently acquire a scale of values which makes such earlier group attachments seem undesirable. Thus a country boy who has gone to and for a time lived in the great city may, because he has taken on urban standards and values, find upon his return home that everything there appears rude, uncouth, and inferior in every way. If he has also acquired firm group attachments in the city, the discovery that he is no longer gratified by the kind of life that he knew in his youth simply terminates the sentimental attachment that he has had to the groups of his early life and their norms. Often, however, an individual who has been exposed to a new and, in social terms, larger life becomes disillusioned about his former life without at the same time coming to adopt as his own the standards, values, sentiments, etc., of the new. He is then more or less isolated from both; and unless he finds satisfactory alternatives, the resulting condition is one of acute anomie.

Social, occupational, or even spatial mobility invariably involves the hazard that the individual who is moving may become stranded between the old and the new, between old sentiments and values and new and between old group attachments and those that have not yet been made, and hence isolated from

both. This hazard is no doubt one of the factors that makes even most modern people reluctant to change occupation or residence. But wherever it is culturally permissible for the individual to rise in the social scale—and in every society some such possibility exists—some individuals are motivated to do so; and there is more or less intense and constant competition for higher status, including the higher roles in any given status group. In such competition it is inevitable that most individuals will fail, and for a given individual a failure of this sort may constitute an adverse experience sufficiently severe so that he adjusts to it by withdrawing from the group and rebelling against its values.

Frustration (as the failure to satisfy motivations and fulfill self-goals is often termed) in group life need not lead to isolation from the group. Some disparity between self-role (what the individual wants and considers himself qualified to obtain) and assigned role is no doubt so common as to be normal; in fact, if all the members of a social group were perfectly adjusted to their assigned group roles, there would be no need for social control. It is only when the self-role is markedly and constantly at odds with the assigned role that the resulting frustration is likely to lead the individual to withdraw from the group. An apprentice, ambitious to gain acceptance as a journeyman, may stay with his craft year after year in the hope that someday his skills will earn their just reward; a clubwoman ambitious to be president may patiently await her turn; a parish priest may live out his life in prayerful expectation that his virtues will finally earn for him the coveted bishopric; etc. But when the need for higher status, for greater recognition, and for more and better role rights is urgent and unsatisfiable, the individual may become either demoralized or rebellious. If his faith in himself is comparatively weak, he may assume responsibility for his failure; if he is made of sterner stuff, he may blame the group and rebel from it, resigning his unsatisfactory membership in the group and depreciating the norms and values to which he formerly subscribed, thereby freeing himself from the control of that group.

SOCIAL ISOLATION AND PERSONAL INSTABILITY

An individual who as a consequence of any of the various circumstances described has gained freedom from social controls in one or another area of life may utilize that freedom in some way of his own devising; for example, he may give up the country club and its activities in favor of the solitary pleasures of reading or some hobby; he may leave his occupational niche for the comparative independence of subsistence farming or, if he can afford it, a life of leisure; or he may even try to pull up all his social roots and begin life anew in some other place and different social context. Usually his freedom is both limited in scope and short-lived; even the hobo becomes in time attached to the casual company of hobos, the expatriate soon finds himself associated with and subject to others of his kind, the solitary farmer is likely soon to acquire friends and acquaintances, and the hobbyist may shortly discover

that the making of things is much more fun when he can share his work, and perhaps his workshop, with others.⁴

In any society there are always no doubt some individuals—and in a dynamic society, such as our own, many—who are in one or many respects in process of transition from old to new group attachments. Such persons constitute, for the moment, the socially unstable segment of the population—the unattached, the marginal, or the isolated. Because they are for the moment “free,” they provide the materials from which new groups, with new norms and values, can be made. Sometimes such new groups evolve casually, through random trial and error; such is the case when a number of families, having moved to the backwoods to escape town and city life, evolve among themselves various communities of action, or when solitary readers form friendship groups from what began as nodding acquaintances at the public library.

More often, however, the new groups which are developed from the unstable segment of a social population are a function of aggressive leadership. From the ranks of the unstable the promoter of a new political party or “movement” draws his followers; from their ranks come the adherents to a new cause, the converts to a new religious faith, and the zealous participants in the newly discovered way to health, wealth, or happiness. The unstable segment provides a manufacturer with his first customers for a new gadget, a reformer with his supporters, and a radical leader with his following.

Sociopathic Isolation. Most status groups (and organizations), it will be recalled, depend for their survival upon the good will of the society at large. Even the more or less transitory and definitely atypical movements, cults, and religious sects that draw their membership from the unstable segment of a social population are usually passively tolerated if not positively sanctioned by the society at large. Those who join groups of this sort may be, as they usually are in our society, socially defined as constituting the “lunatic fringe”; but the general sentiment is that such people are more to be pitied than censured. They are considered foolish, perhaps, but hardly dangerous to the welfare of the society as a whole.

Every society has some cultural standards, however, that cannot be violated by an individual or a group without loss of generic status. These are the standards, sometimes designated as “mores,” that are generally considered essential to the survival of the society itself. The individual who is known to have violated one of these standards becomes, by social definition, antisocial and subject to some more or less specific form of punishment. The minimal punishment is social ostracism, the maximum is death. The determination of

⁴ As a consequence isolation is always a relative condition. Even those social outcasts who live in an alcoholic miasma in the submarginal areas of our cities, the Skid Row “bums,” who have neither occupational, familial, nor residential attachments, do in fact belong to one or more groups composed of their own kind. For a popular, but informative, description of Skid Row social groupings and their norms, see “The Shame of Skid Row” by J. Ellison (*Saturday Evening Post*, Dec. 20, 1952).

guilt and the administration of punishment may be made by subtle and informal procedures, as is often the case in peasant societies and in some primitive systems; by complex and formal supernaturalistic procedures, presumably operating in terms of social consensus, as in those primitive societies where the magic man or seer ascertains the will of the gods and the facts of the case; or by organizational operations of a political or religious character, as in the Church courts of the Middle Ages and in all modern civil societies.

Since antisocial conduct brings at the very least general social ostracism—i.e., loss of generic status—and since it is normal for human beings to value such status, the person who behaves in antisocial ways is now technically described as sociopathic; he is “socially ill” in the sense that he has through antisocial conduct offended society at large and thereby jeopardized his position in society.⁵ He is in these respects a morbid or malfunctioning element of the society in a way somewhat analogous to the gangrenous finger or diseased eye of the human organism. To some extent or other and in some way or other society plucks out the individual who has markedly offended it and casts him out.

What will constitute sociopathic behavior depends, of course, upon the crucial standards of the particular society. Treachery, although variously defined, seems to be considered antisocial in all societies. Murder, also variously defined, is almost everywhere an antisocial act and is usually punishable by death. Every society has some system of personal and collective property rights, the violation of which is judged to be contrary to the welfare of the society at large and, hence, to some degree antisocial. The cultural standards of societies, like the standards of specific status groups, are, however, infinitely varied, with the result that the act that is antisocial in one time and place may be socially sanctioned in another.

In modern Western society, for example, the homosexual is defined as sociopathic. To the extent that his atypical sexual interests and practices are known, he is scorned and perhaps even shunned by the sexually normal. He is not, ordinarily, divested of all social status; but his status rights are considerably reduced in both subtle and evident ways. In his relationships with hotel clerks and other functionaries he will most probably be treated with prejudice; if he belongs by birth to one of the “best” families, he will undoubtedly receive from the other best families considerably less than is his by right; if he be-

⁵ The major theoretical treatment of the sociopath is that by E. M. Lemert (see his *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1951). The analysis presented above follows in general the concepts that have been developed and documented by Lemert.

Juvenile delinquency is the form of sociopathology that has been given most sociological study. For an analysis of current data and concepts in this area see P. W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949). Examples of the many specialized studies are A. J. Reiss, Jr., “Delinquency as the Failure of Personal and Social Controls” (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 196–207, 1951); and H. M. Shulman, “Delinquency Treatment in the Controlled Activity Group” (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 10, pp. 405–414, 1945).

comes entangled with the police, he may be treated with exceptional harshness and a fine disregard for his legal rights, treatment that will receive passive social sanction. The outcry that arose over homosexuality in the United States Department of State in the early 1950s illustrates the general current feeling of distrust and disgust toward homosexuals; and the summary dismissal from that service of men who were suspect—action which was contrary to normal bureaucratic procedure—indicates the inferior social position of the homosexual in our society.⁶

Some societies have, however, given positive social sanction to homosexual conduct. Among the upper classes of Rome during some periods homosexuality was considered entirely normal; during the Middle Ages the priests were often allowed to keep as "mistresses" a number of boys, who were often castrated in order to preserve their youthful characteristics. In premodern China homosexuals, both male and female, occupied a special social category and fulfilled a special function (as theatrical entertainers—actors and actresses, who never, however, appeared together); but their position, while different from that of ordinary people, was more or less equivalent to it. They were not, at any event, subject to legal or other discriminations.

On the other hand, in premodern China, even as during our Middle Ages, a person convicted of theft was treated with a harshness that is in marked contrast to the way we now deal with crimes against property. The thief was stripped of all generic status rights; and to make certain that he would not regain them, he was often marked for life as a thief by the amputation of body parts. The modern theory, and to some extent the actual practice, is to consider thieves and some other classes of sociopaths as victims of a disease of the personality that can and should be cured.

The fact that a sociopath—*i.e.*, a person who is known to act in some anti-social way—loses his generic status in part or in whole may or may not mean that he becomes a statusless creature. He will probably lose the specific status previously provided him by the various groups to which he belonged. But whenever there are any considerable number of sociopaths in a social population, they tend to form into status groups of their own, thereby giving one another some substitute for the status rights that they have lost through their antisocial conduct. The primitive who steals and is apprehended may become as a consequence a solitary outcast, completely isolated from the members of his tribe and acceptable in no other tribe. To a lesser degree, something of the same sort happens to the individual convicted of a particularly repugnant murder in modern society; from the time of his conviction until he is welcomed—if he is—into the company of fellow convicts in the penitentiary, he is socially isolated.

⁶ Some 425 employees of the State Department were dismissed between 1947 and 1953 on the grounds that since they were sexual deviants they were extraordinarily susceptible to pressures such as blackmail and were therefore politically untrustworthy. For a brief account of this particular witch hunt see *Time*, Apr. 20, 1953.

In most instances, however, the sociopath has available some group composed of other sociopaths that he may join, although whether or not he will join such a group depends upon whether or not he defines himself as a permanent, or "professional," thief, homosexual, or whatever kind of sociopath he may be. Even the primitive who is driven from his tribe as punishment for some crime may find and join a band of renegades composed of the outcasts from many tribes; and in modern society there are a considerable number and variety of relatively durable outcast groups, some so extensive that they constitute a whole class apart, within which they are arranged into many more or less clearly defined status groupings. In many instances the rights that an individual may enjoy by gaining membership in a sociopathic grouping more than compensate for those he has lost in becoming a sociopath.

It was once generally believed by criminologists and other students of sociopathic behavior that most of the individuals who enter crime, prostitution, or other forms of antisocial life do so because they have been from infancy socialized into the values and sentiments of the particular way of life. Being a thief or prostitute or whatever would thus be entirely normal; for we should be dealing with subcultures which, while antisocial, would be in principle no different from regional, class, occupational, and other kinds of subcultures. Undoubtedly it does sometimes happen that the son of a thief or the daughter of a prostitute simply follows in the parental footsteps, as is shown by the detailed life histories of some criminals; and to this extent it might be said that crime begets crime, prostitution begets prostitution, etc.

There is, however, accumulating evidence that although professional criminals, prostitutes, homosexuals, and other sociopaths do have their own distinctive subcultures and do provide through various kinds of status groupings status of sorts for their members, the process by which members are recruited and inducted is usually quite different from that whereby the ranks of normal subcultural groups are replenished. On the whole, the evidence suggests that most of those who become sociopathic first become, through whatever circumstances, socially isolated; freed by that isolation from the normal controls, either they fall into bad company and are led into antisocial action, or else they rebelliously achieve some antisocial act, are apprehended, and are stigmatized as sociopathic and thereby encouraged to seek out the company of other outcasts. In this view, then, crime does not breed crime, prostitution breed prostitution, etc. Rather, social isolation produces personal instability that may, but need not, be resolved by the individual's identifying himself with a sociopathic group and submitting to its controls in order to secure in this alternative way the normal status that has for some reason been denied him. Thus it is, in this interpretation, the girl who cannot because of an inadequate or broken family background, subnormal mentality, or other circumstances gain gratifying status among her peers who may gravitate into the ways and in time into the company of prostitutes; it is the "mama's boy" who is repelled and perhaps rebuffed by his male peers who may find com-

patible company among the local homosexuals; and it is the discontented and perhaps incompetent worker who may by degrees progress from petty theft to grand theft and, after some years of schooling in a penitentiary, graduate to full status in a company of thieves. The end product in each such case is a more or less effective sociopathic mode of adjustment, involving subjection to and achievement of status in an established asocial segment of the society as a substitute for unsatisfactory status in socially acceptable groups.

Psychopathic Isolation. By far the most puzzling form of social isolation is that which involves a psychological, as distinct from organic, inability of the individual to maintain normal communication with those around him. A person who is deaf as a consequence of defective ears or blind because his eyes have been damaged by disease or accident is understandably handicapped in his efforts to know what is occurring about him; that such a person occasionally misunderstands—*i.e.*, falsely perceives—circumstances is quite comprehensible. Should a partially deaf person mistake the doorbell for the ring of the telephone, should an entirely deaf person fail to realize that any bell has rung, or should a blinded person mistake Mr. Jones for Mr. Smith or be found talking to some one who has actually departed, the explanation is not difficult to find.

When, on the other hand, a person who has, so far as can be ascertained, normal perceptive organs fails to see, to hear, to smell, and to feel what others do and, on the contrary, sees and hears and perhaps even smells and feels what no one else can perceive, the explanation is by no means apparent. In an earlier day such a person was thought to be possessed of the devil. Today his conduct is described as psychopathic; but even now so little is known about the origins of psychopathic behavior that the standard therapeutic practices are hardly more rational and possibly even less effective than were the spell-removing antics of the primitive witch doctor or the devil-dispelling tortures that were often used to cure (or kill) lunatics during the Middle Ages.

There is, however, a growing suspicion that the functional psychoses (those which cannot be traced to damage of organs or tissues) grow out of disorders in the life experience of the individual and constitute attempts made by the individual to resolve the consequences to him of those experiences. In the terms of the present analysis, a psychopath is, from this point of view, a person who has broken down psychologically under the stress of unfulfilled status needs or intolerable conflicting status demands, or both, and has resolved his difficulties by mentally isolating himself from those circumstances that he finds unbearable and replacing them with acceptable mental substitutes. Such psychopathic behavior is, thus, a twofold process; it involves a refusal to perceive what is and a replacement of it with what the individual is under psychological compulsion to secure. Usually, but not always, what the psychopath refuses to perceive is some aspect of his social status—*e.g.*, that he is married and has a wife and two children; and usually what he provides himself with is some needed aspect of status. The latter may be, as it often is with

the paranoid, a personally and socially acceptable explanation for his failure to accomplish what he, and perhaps others, expected of him. It may be, on the other hand, a totally new world in which, for all we can tell, the psychopath wanders at will and is lord and master of all that he has invented.

Psychopathic isolation may be quite fragmentary and may also be intermittent. The psychopath may behave normally in most respects all the time and in all respects most of the time. He may, for example, be isolated from his status obligations to his family or from his family itself upon occasions; thus the psychopathic drinker blots out with the aid of alcohol large chunks of his normal life when he is on a drunk. The psychopath may, however, isolate himself rather constantly from some very specific aspect of his social world; thus a paranoid may never admit to others, and presumably never to himself, that he has failed in some ambition and may constantly maintain his personal fiction that he was cheated of success by some mysterious evil force. In some instances psychopathy takes the form of rejection, in part or in whole and periodically or constantly, of the individual's prior self-role or roles and the adoption, sometimes on a historical or other model, of an entirely different self-role. And in still other instances the psychopathic individual withdraws completely, and often also permanently, from the world about him.

The status difficulties that lead to psychopathic isolation are presumably as varied as the forms such isolation takes. Moreover, the experiences and circumstances that appear to have driven one individual to isolate himself psychologically would seem to have far less drastic effects on another individual; evidently, then, the effects of any particular misadventure depend largely upon the intensity of the particular individual's status needs, his motivations, his values, his self-concepts, and his sensitivities.

It is no doubt possible that partial social isolation that has come about as the result of one or a combination of the factors discussed may prove so intolerable, in view of the personality attributes of the given individual, that he is psychologically constrained to complete his isolation and invent for himself the needed status, in which case imposed isolation would be the antecedent of psychologically forced isolation. It does not, however, seem to be those individuals who are circumstantially or otherwise denied social status who are most susceptible to psychopathic disturbances. The unattractive little waitress who lives alone in a dismal rooming house and who has few friends and no prospects of marriage is probably no more likely to resolve her troubles by resort to psychopathy than is the glittering actress who is showered with attentions and who can, it would seem, satisfy her every whim.

On the whole, psychopathic isolation appears to be the resolution of conflicting status roles or a frustrating status role rather than of actual lack of status. It would seem to be a means by which the individual escapes from the controls imposed by a group or groups to which he belongs, controls to which he can no longer submit either because they demand of him mutually antago-

nistic forms of conduct or because they preclude his achieving some personal value—wealth, fame, or perhaps just freedom to do as he pleases—that has become an inescapable compulsion. If this is so, it would follow that one of the major distinctions between the person who becomes a sociopath and the one who becomes a psychopath is that the latter has and values so highly his status in the conflicting groups or in the frustrating group that he cannot, like the former, simply violate the norms in an overt fashion and attach himself to a group that sanctions such conduct. In this view, the essential difference between the man who turns to theft as a way of life and the one who turns to drink as a life motif would be that the former has few strong attachments in the more normal segments of society, while the latter is so strongly attached to his family, his work associates, etc., that although he finds their demands on him intolerable, he must deceive himself into believing that these groups do not exist before he can fashion a world to his liking. In this view, too, the difference between the girl who breaks with her family and other associations to take up a life of prostitution and the one who just goes wild in the assumed role of a nymphomaniac is that the former has no great investment in remaining respectable, while the latter is so strongly attached to family and other groups that she cannot simply break away from their control but must invent for herself an excuse for ignoring them.

A person who is psychopathically isolated is self-controlled in that area of conduct wherein he is psychopathic and is to that extent “freed” from control by others. He does not, as has often been asserted, provide the material from which charismatic leaders build their social movements, religious, political, or otherwise. For once an individual has fashioned for himself a dreamworld of his own, he is beyond the control of others. The madhouse is therefore a very poor place in which to recruit supporters for any cause, however mad. It is not the psychopaths, the settled lunatics, who join deviant cults, follow messiahs, or provide support for would-be dictators; for each has his own dream and needs no other. It is, rather, the lunatic fringe, those acutely distressed and partially isolated members of the social population who have not escaped by a dream of their own devising.

ISOLATION AND INNOVATION

An individual who is in some respect freed from the normal social controls by one or another of the circumstances discussed above may work out for himself a deviant form of conduct expressive of his personal preferences and proclivities. He may, for example, beat his wife, swear at his children, make love to his secretary, squander his savings, be rude to his employer, or wear comfortable sport clothes to a formal dance. The decision to do as he pleases and the actions themselves may have profound significance for him; for others they may be petty irritations, major disasters, or amusing examples of the foibles of man. Deviant conduct of this sort produces much of the color and

variety of life in any society; and it provides the substance from which the tellers of tales and the modern writers of news, of fiction, and of drama compose their exciting and entertaining accounts of human adventure. The effects on others of such deviant conduct are, however, for the most part transitory and superficial, effects which rarely add up to significant and enduring changes in the standards of status groups or the culture of society at large. Over the years many men have broken the bonds of social control to beat their wives; but the beating of wives is still tabu and still a deviant form of conduct.

Nor does the person who, socially isolated and thereby freed from many of the normal controls, joins the ranks of some sociopathic group or the one who escapes intolerable controls by psychopathic means contribute much if anything to the structural or other characteristics of the society from which he has thereby become isolated. The criminal is notoriously conservative; the arts of prostitution have changed little through the centuries; and neither the techniques of murder nor the tabus against it have been much affected by the countless men who have murdered those with whom they could not get along. The psychopath sometimes displays great ingenuity, with the result that it is practically impossible to classify meaningfully the innumerable forms of psychotic conduct; and he frequently exercises strong and atypical control over those around him. Occasionally, as will be shown later, a psychopathic person induces others to accept his version of himself and society and is to that extent a factor in the making of social change. But for the most part the psychopath, like the sociopath, adjusts to society, however atypically, rather than changing society to accord with his idiosyncratic values, sentiments, or other personality attributes.

All societies and the various status groups and organizations of which they are constituted do, however, change through time and at times change with considerable rapidity. All such change is the work of men; and change that is marked or rapid, or both, is the work of men who have in some respect become so isolated, so freed from the normalizing effects of social life, that they are able not only to behave in a deviant way but to design a new way to behave. Such men, comparatively rare in any society, are the innovators, the men who fashion something new, even though it be only a new way to beat a wife or rob a bank. Although most of the innovations produced in any society no doubt die a-borning, it is to innovation as a process that one must first look in an effort to ascertain the causes of social change. Innovation is, on the whole, an unspectacular, even an insidious, process; and although the innovator is sometimes vilified and is almost always hampered in his creative efforts by those about him, he is seldom recognized for what he is—the prime mover of society, the agent without which no major social changes would come about.

Social scientists of one sort and another have devoted tremendous and occasionally even ingenious effort to the study of crime and criminals and psychopaths and their psychopathies. By comparison almost no attention has

been directed to the study of innovative endeavor.⁷ That endeavor is, however, by far the most significant way in which social control may be contravened; for it is the one way through which the conduct induced by social control may be modified.

Innovation: Inadvertent and Deliberate. An innovation may and generally does constitute but a very slight modification of some existing practice, as when an orchestra leader induces his orchestra to render a composition in a mildly unconventional fashion. Occasionally an innovation constitutes a gross modification of some aspect of social life, as when a successful religious messiah offers to lead his followers into earthly happiness and eternal salvation by a new version of some ancient gospel. Whether it be slight or gross, an innovation is a new arrangement, mentally arrived at, of existing cultural elements. The new design may be represented in external substance, as when the idea for a new kind of fishhook or other tool is the basis for the fabrication of such a tool; or the new design may be a plan or program for the improvement, however defined, of some group or organization.

Innovation by inadvertence is not, apparently, uncommon, although it would appear to be a relatively minor factor in the making of historic events and cultural changes. A simple illustration of inadvertent innovation is that of an individual who, weary of suffering under too much and too warm clothing, violates the relevant convention by removing his jacket and tie. Under the relatively systematic innovative procedures of modern science, it has sometimes happened that a man bent on one innovative endeavor has stumbled upon something that he was not striving to achieve. For the most part, however, innovation is the end product of a long and deliberate attempt to resolve a dissatisfaction on the part of the innovator with that particular aspect of his world or his understanding thereof that he succeeds in modifying. Such innovation presupposes two atypical circumstances: first, sufficient freedom from the cultural and status-group values, presuppositions, etc., to become dissatisfied with the *status quo*; second, sufficient freedom from social control to undertake and bring to completion the long and socially unsanctioned labors that are the usual prelude to success. Both these conditions require that the innovator be somewhat socially isolated; but it is seldom true that the innovator is, as the folk stereotype often pictures him, a queer and unsociable person who is almost, if not quite, mad. The freedom of the innovator is never general; and innovative endeavor is invariably directed toward something new in some one regard—in some special aspect of such special fields of social endeavor as public health, pictorial art, aircraft, efficient office operations, or soil conservation. In all other respects the innovator is likely to be conserva-

⁷ There have been a considerable number of historical studies of the invention of specific technological devices. See, for example, S. C. Gilfillan, *Inventing the Ship* (Follett, Chicago, 1945). H. G. Barnett's *Innovation* is, however, the one modern effort to develop a systematic, and hence universally applicable, theory of the innovative process. Its predecessor was G. Tarde's *Les Lois de l'imitation*, first published in 1890.

tive and conventional and unable as well as disinclined to evade the normal social controls.

There is apparently no such thing as "inventive genius," a specific innate capacity to do exceptional creative thinking and thereby put two and two together in such a way that they add up to more than the conventional four. At least in modern societies, recognized innovators have come in roughly equivalent proportions from various class, age, regional, and other groups of the social population, the notable exception being women, who as a group have been prevented by the base culture from full participation in the kinds of activities—scientific, technological, and organizational—in which most modern innovations have occurred. Necessity, in the simple economic sense, is clearly not a basic factor in innovation; men of established wealth are quite as likely, and perhaps more likely, to devise new means to wealth as are poor men; a well-run city is quite as likely, if not more likely, to generate plans for civic improvement than is a city run by venal politicians operating under antiquated governmental forms; a prospering business is quite as likely to give rise to innovative leadership as is a floundering concern; etc. Nor is there a consistent relationship between knowledge, formal or otherwise, of a given field of social life and inventiveness in that field. Priests almost never devise new religious interpretations or rituals; scholarly men of letters seldom write in an original vein; military technicians almost invariably adhere to the precedents of military history and believe in warfare according to established rules; political and other bureaucrats are, in the main, ingenious only in maintaining the *status quo*. In these and other fields of human endeavor it is often a rank outsider, one who knows so little that he does not know what cannot be done, who achieves an innovation. On the other hand, intimate and detailed knowledge is just as often a prerequisite to innovation. Modern technology—in medicine, mechanics, agriculture, etc.—is already so complex that it is unlikely that anything new can be added by raw trial-and-error experimentation; here the innovation must of necessity be a projection from the known into the unascertained. The same thing is more or less true of modern competitive business; the uninitiated might dream up a variety of ways to increase profits, but the actual achievement of larger profits is ordinarily a task for an ingenious man of business.

The Psychological Prerequisites to Innovation. If only because deliberate innovative endeavor is, even under the best of circumstances, laborious and fraught with recurrent disappointment, hypermotivation is a necessary prerequisite. With rare exceptions, inventions in any realm are the end product of a long series of experiments, all but the last of which failed. This is true whether experimenting is done mainly on the symbolic and covert level, as it would be with a mathematician seeking a new formula or a writer striving to formulate and express a new idea, or in part on the manual and overt level, as it would be with a mechanic trying to devise some new mechanical gadget. Trial and error, the process by which man learns to do new things or to do

old things in new ways, is mainly error; and each error is for the experimenter a disappointment that must be surmounted if he is to make a new trial. And unless he does make this new trial, and probably many successive ones, he is unlikely to achieve success.

The hypermotivation that is a prerequisite to deliberate innovation is presumably compounded of and associated with a variety of specific attributes. One unvarying constituent is discontent; a complaisant and well-adjusted individual is unlikely to attempt to change his world or his relations to it. On the other hand, the most casual observation indicates that discontent of itself does not lead to creative effort, that, rather, the most common form of discontent, that which stems from personal frustration and inadequacy and might well be designated "malcontent," leads only to random and unfruitful efforts or, at the most, to the adoption of some sociopathic or psychopathic mode of adjustment. Motivational discontent of the sort that drives an individual to creative effort would seem to be an acquired, *i.e.*, learned, attribute rather than a tensional by-product of frustrating life circumstances.⁸

Just what socializing circumstances induce hypermotivation is not clear. All that can be said at present is that while most of the children brought up in a given family, community, or society at large acquire a more or less normative stock of social motivations for their sex, age, class, etc., some few become in some respect or other markedly undermotivated and some few overmotivated. Other things being equal, the social performance of the former will be subnormal and that of the latter superior. From the ranks of these latter come those rare individuals whose deviant performance takes the direction of innovation.

Unless motivational discontent is rigidly canalized, it leads to a dispersion of efforts which is unlikely to produce any innovation of note. An individual who wants merely to be successful, rather than successful at some specific thing, is unlikely to stick to a given task in the face of repeated failure; he tends, rather, to shift his objective after each failure. For example, if his experimental new mousetrap is worse, rather than better, than the existing one, he may next try to devise a better way to make cheese; and, that failing also, he may go on to a one-trial attempt to design a better bridge. The ability to strive constantly and with fierce concentration toward one specific goal, normally essential for eventual inventive success, is a reflection of distinctly atypical motivations and values. It is everywhere and always the social normal to want and to value highly a variety of things; an individual who wants and values above all else some one thing (be it the self-satisfaction of having ac-

⁸ Radical political and religious leaders, who are usually advocates rather than innovators, may, however, be markedly psychotic; and it is no doubt possible that some successful innovators have been motivated by what amounted to delusions of grandeur. On the whole, however, the idea of the inventor as a fanatic obsessed by an *idée fixe* is a social stereotype which reflects the common social resistance to inventors and their innovations rather than indicating the personality constituents of actual inventors. Some psychotics do, of course, invent for themselves the role of inventor; but that is quite another matter.

complished something unique, the prestige of occupying a single and specific social role, or the powers that accrue to the possessor of unprecedented material wealth) is invariably an exception. Yet some degree of such preoccupation—motivational and valuational—is essential if an individual is to persist and thus perhaps succeed in creative endeavor.

Ability to surmount repeated failure, going on from each successive error to still another trial, presumes exceptional faith in one's ability to succeed eventually. Moreover, an innovator usually works in opposition to some established and socially sanctioned values; and unless he has unusual confidence in his own deviant values and his personal judgment, he may soon be converted to the prevailing view that what is right and proper and that anything new is undesirable, if not impossible. The normalizing pressures to which a would-be innovator is subject are many and insistent; to the discouragement of repeated failure is added the discouraging effects of unsympathetic treatment by his fellows and the weight of tradition and precedent. As a rule, an innovator works not only alone but against all odds—those that are inherent in the problem he strives to solve and those that stem from social resistance to the very idea that something new is possible.

The personality attributes that enable an individual to struggle upstream, as it were, include, in addition to canalized hypermotivation, exceptional self-confidence. Although a would-be innovator has various historical examples to draw upon, he must form for himself a personal-social role which is not only deviant but which is also contrasocial, a role which imposes heavy and constant obligations without compensating rights. The "rights" which accrue to an innovator come, if ever, only when he has succeeded and his innovation has gained acceptance. Most human beings, like all the lower animals, live for the most part on a day-to-day basis; an innovator must in the main live for the future, for that time, by no means certain, when he will finally succeed and, having succeeded in his trial-and-error efforts, perhaps be socially acclaimed for his accomplishment. It is no doubt true that for most innovators the real reward is in the doing, in the process of trying to solve the problem; but this is only a way of saying that even in the long run there is often little else rewarding to innovative effort.

Laboratory experiments have indicated that there is wide individual variation in the ability of individuals to persevere in a given routine task in spite of external distractions. Those with a high level of perseverance are, presumably for reasons of social training, more than normally capable of maintaining situational isolation. The perseverance necessary to achieve an innovation is, however, far more than situational; for innovative endeavor is a long-drawn-out process and demands almost constant preoccupation with the problem. The individual must therefore be capable of sustained, if limited, isolation from the normal demands of social participation; on the one hand, he must somehow be insensitive to or cut off from the discouragements and depreciations of those who disapprove of his labors, and on the other hand, he must

somehow evade and avoid those status-role obligations that may seriously interfere with his endeavors.

In sum, innovation requires an atypical degree and kind of social isolation, a condition which might well be described as social insulation, since it does not necessarily mean the lack of normal group membership.⁹ Unless the individual is adequately insulated from social controls, he will find himself, as most men do most of the time, preoccupied with and his time preempted by status-group activities, and he will be unable to persevere in the innovative quest. Society is for the most part geared to the maintenance of routine forms of conduct. Even in organizations, such as modern universities, which officially encourage and sponsor creative effort, such effort is often systematically if unintentionally discouraged by both official and unofficial demands on the scholar's time and energies.

Perseverance in innovative endeavor would seem to be a function of atypical values, especially those relating to group membership and status, and of limited sensitivity to sympathetic and other normal demands on the individual's time and energies. The individual must to a degree at least put aside the needs, as locally defined, of his wife and children, the demands of his occupation, and the interests of his friends and acquaintances, in favor of his inventive project. It would seem that in general successful innovators are characteristically somewhat rude and ruthless; but it does not follow that an unfeeling and self-centered egotist necessarily possesses the other attributes, motivational and otherwise, which are essential to innovation. Sociologists have observed that innovations appear most frequently in those societies that have a sufficiently high standard of living to provide their members with the leisure (freedom from immediate practical concerns) necessary to work out innovations; however, many societies have maintained in permanent leisure an entire class—e.g., the scholars of China and the priests of the Middle Ages—without profit. Apparently, therefore, it is not so much freedom from material want as freedom from group obligations which, other and equally essential factors being present, enables an individual so to concentrate on a given task that he may eventually succeed in producing something new. If, then, that something new is adopted by his society and incorporated into its culture, he has not only enjoyed an unusual freedom from social controls but has also exercised some small measure of countercontrol.

⁹ The foregoing analysis of the conditions necessary to innovative endeavor follows, at least in a general way, the theories advanced by Barnett (H. G. Barnett, *Innovation: The Basis for Cultural Change*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1953). It does not, on the other hand, accord with the position taken by K. Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* (L. Wirth and E. Shils, trans., Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1936), that inventiveness in social matters depends upon the existence and maintenance of a special social class—free-floating intellectuals—the members of which are not subordinated to the norms of society at large. The Chinese maintained just such a special class for nearly two thousand years (the scholars); but the members of this class devoted themselves to preserving rather than modifying the *status quo*. For an attempt to trace scientific achievements to the way of life of scientists as a class see J. R. Baker, *The Scientific Life* (Macmillan, New York, 1943).

SOCIAL ASCENDANCY

A successful innovator may have the satisfaction of seeing his creation adopted by others and, if it is that sort of innovation, put into practice and utilized by the members of his society. He may even, although this is less likely, be accorded some order of special recognition for it; in our society, he may secure a monetary reward, be promoted in the academic hierarchy, receive the Nobel Prize, etc. The adoption of his innovation by others gives the innovator a sort of impersonal ascendancy over them; what he has wrought brings a change in their conduct. Furthermore, to the extent that he is rewarded for his innovation, he is elevated in generic and probably also in specific status; and this, too, constitutes ascendancy, although of a rather special sort.

For the most part, ascendancy is neither impersonal nor, as is the honor accorded a great scientist, voluntarily granted. Ascendancy is, for the most part, both personal and achieved. One who has gained ascendancy is, typically, a person who has through his own direct efforts brought about a change in the conduct of one or more other individuals which violates the norms to which they are subject. He may do this in the satisfaction of personal, and possible idiosyncratic, interests; he may do it for what he considers to be the welfare of those over whom he gains ascendancy; he may act as the representative of a status group, of an organization, or of society as a whole; or he may become ascendant over a group or organization in order that it can be ascendant over some other group, organization, or society. Whatever it stems from and whatever form it takes, ascendancy is countercontrol, *i.e.*, an induced violation by those over whom ascendancy is secured of the social controls to which they are normally subject.

The distinction between social control and countercontrol through ascendancy is quantitative rather than qualitative and relativistic rather than moralistic. It matters not at all what kind of conduct is involved; it may be the preservation or destruction of life, the increase or decrease in productive efforts, or the incitement to war or the endeavor to preserve the peace. That conduct, whatever it may be, is the effect of social control when it represents the established norms of some status group or the rules and regulations of some organization, and it is the effect of ascendancy when it constitutes an induced violation of such norms or rules and regulations by members of the group or organization. A given pattern of activity may, therefore, be the result of social control at one time and place and of ascendancy at another; conversely, diametrically opposed forms of action may stem from either social control or ascendancy.

Thus in some primitive societies and under the Western feudal system during certain periods, the act of the tribal priest or the feudal lord in forcibly deflowering a maiden before she was given in marriage was the result of social control; it was an old traditional rite sanctioned by all; and the fact that the priest or the lord may have personally enjoyed it and the maiden been, presumably, a most reluctant participant is not relevant. But in contemporary Western society any somewhat comparable action on the part of an adult male, however high his station, would ordinarily be the result of ascendancy; such an action is not sanctioned by our society at large or by many groups therein. Even should the girl willingly participate, the man would be held socially responsible; he would be guilty, in the words of the law, of rape.

Ascendancy takes such widely varied forms as that of the thug who demands and receives the valuables of his victim, the parent who induces his children to conform to standards not sanctioned by the society in which they live, the trader who pawns off substandard goods at excessive prices on his customers, the business executive who brings about a change in the normal practices or productive procedures of his organization, the politician who uses the powers of his office to purchase his own reelection, the police chief who closes down the houses of prostitution in accordance with the letter of the law he is sworn to uphold but in violation of the wishes of almost everyone concerned, the primitive tribe that wrests land from another tribe, and the nation that subordinates another nation by military, diplomatic, ideological, or economic means. Cultural and other factors limit the forms of ascendancy that will be evident at any given time in any given place; but the ultimate limit to the forms of ascendancy is the ingenuity of man himself; and so far man has demonstrated a considerable genius for devising new versions of old forms of ascendancy and forms that are new either in degree or in kind.

Although the forms that ascendancy takes are varied, the process of ascendancy is undoubtedly one of the universals of social life. All men everywhere form into status groups and develop organizations, and these groups and organizations exercise social control over their individual members; ascendancy is, it would seem, the invariable concomitant of social control—the “other side of the coin,” as it was earlier described. The two cannot, therefore, be treated as categorically distinct. The existence of social control presupposes some efforts at ascendancy; otherwise there would be slight need for such control. At the same time the emergence of efforts at ascendancy usually invokes and intensifies the existing social control.

Interpersonal Ascendancy. The simplest and most common form of ascendancy is that in which one individual asserts his will over another individual to the end that the latter conforms to the standards imposed by the ascendant rather than to his normal social role or roles. Ascendancy of this sort is interpersonal, and it may have no more than personal significance. Thus a man who is induced by the nagging of a demanding and aggressive wife to subordinate himself in all domestic matters to her will may thereby violate

the cultural standards and the local group norms which apply to the relations between a man and his wife. His status in the community may, as a consequence, be somewhat lower than it otherwise would be; but unless he ultimately rebels and murders his wife, or something of the sort, his role in the household is largely a personal matter. He conforms to his wife's wishes and in so doing deviates from the conduct normal to husbands, but his deviant conduct does not significantly affect the conduct of others.

In any society there is always a great deal of striving for interpersonal ascendancy.¹ It is a consequence of the fact that the socializing processes never work perfectly and that social control can never completely compensate for failures in the socialization of the individual. The demanding and aggressive wife is a woman who, in terms of her culture and subcultures, wants more than a good wife should, expects more of her husband than any normal husband will provide, etc., and who is not sufficiently intimidated by the neighbors and other groups to repress these deviant attributes. Should she demand, even incessantly, that her husband conform to the cultural and group standards of the good husband, she would not be demanding and aggressive in the local definition. But if she strives to secure from him more than is her established social right, that effort is "demanding" or "aggressive" because it is an effort to achieve interpersonal ascendancy.

In some instances the efforts to gain interpersonal ascendancy follow traditional forms and satisfy generally acknowledged scarce values, as is the case when each of two pugilists, haggling traders, or other competitors for a prize strive in accordance with some set of rules to bring the other to surrender. More often, perhaps, interpersonal ascendancy stems from the unrepressed idiosyncratic attributes of the one or the other or both. Interpersonal ascendancy arising from this kind of circumstance takes innumerable forms: one person may so dominate a conversation that the other cannot "get a word in edgewise," the stronger of two men may overpower and rob the weaker, a husband may insist that his wife cook or dress to suit his idiosyncratic tastes, and a wife may shift some of her household burdens to him by feigning sickness and thereby winning his sympathy.

In some instances interpersonal ascendancy involves the enduring and rather inclusive subordination of the one to the idiosyncratic interests and values of the other. This is what happens when the elder and stronger of two boys determines the forms of their joint conduct; e.g., if he happens to want to go fishing, they go fishing. More complex but similar in character is the ascendancy of the domineering father over his wife and children and that of the de-

¹ M. Mead (*Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1937) has tried to demonstrate that in some primitive societies the members do not compete with one another. Her own evidence indicates only that they do not compete for the same goals as do the members of modern Western society. Thus while we might strive to win a race in competition with others, some primitives might strive with equal intensity to lose the race to others.

manding mother who enslaves her daughter that she may have an obedient servant and companion in her old age—a circumstance not too uncommon in our society.

Interpersonal ascendancy of the foregoing sort is almost always in violation of the local cultural and group standards; as a result, the ascendant is usually a somewhat socially isolated person or in time becomes one. The domineering father is not likely to be a member in full standing in neighborhood and other status groups; the boy who constantly rules his little brother will probably be ruled out of participation in the normal play groups; and the mother who permanently ties her daughter to her apron strings will probably thereby alienate most of her friends and relatives.

Interpersonal ascendancy of a different order does, however, appear in any durable and harmonious interpersonal relationship. Here the ascendancy of one over the other is both segmental and temporary; either each takes his turn at being ascendant—as in a friendly argument—or each is ascendant in some particular way. In either case the result is a more or less equable give-and-take of the satisfactions to be gained through being ascendant. Even the more violent manifestations of such give-and-take, such as a lovers' quarrel or a noisy domestic squabble, are usually looked upon with tolerance by friends and relatives of the participants; and involvement in ascendancy of this sort does not imply social estrangement of any kind.

"Ego Rehabilitation." The give-and-take in interpersonal relationships is a mechanism whereby each of two (or more) individuals with somewhat different interests, tastes, etc., can partially satisfy his needs. In the simplest case, two people who like to talk but are disinclined to listen can each enjoy talking half of the time if each listens the other half to the other person.

There is, however, another function of ascendancy in interpersonal relations—the provision to the ascendant of what is often designated "ego rehabilitation" or is described as the reestablishment of self-feelings or self-confidence. Social control achieves individual conformity to group norms by inducing the individual to repress those aspects of his personality which run counter to the norms and, often at the same time, to conduct himself in ways which are not truly representative of his personality. Such repression of personality imperatives and insistence on contrapersonal behavior may in any given instance do damage, slight or great, to the individual's ego. In conforming to group demands he is, in a sense, untrue to himself; or, to describe it otherwise, he has sold out one self, the one that wants to do otherwise, in favor of another, the one that wants to retain the approval of the group. Through the course of an ordinary day the ordinary individual sells out a variety of his selves; with an eye to the future he conforms to the demands made on him when his immediate impulse (the self aroused by the situation) is to do otherwise. One of the ways by which he may resolve any injury to his self-esteem is to assert himself—his repressed or frustrated selves—in an interpersonal relation that either has no great status value for him or else

is so highly structured that it will not be endangered by his ascendant conduct. Thus a man who has had a difficult day at the office, during which he has held his tongue and temper under strong provocation, may take out his frustrations on his wife and, by gaining ascendancy over her (*e.g.*, making her listen to his troubles, pettishly insisting that the dinner menu be adjusted to his momentary preference, etc.) reestablish in his own eyes his ability to be himself.

Although it may be doubted that all ascendancy in interpersonal relations has ego-rehabilitating significance or that such ascendancy is the only means whereby the frustrated individual can achieve psychological equilibrium, there are no doubt instances in which individual irritability, pettishness, and even systematic domination of one individual by another can be so interpreted. The human parallel to the simple pecking order that exists in every hen yard is, however, so complex and dynamic as to make comparison ridiculous. The employer who has reluctantly submitted to the dictates of his trade association, the requirements of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the demands of a large buyer of his products may occasionally reestablish his battered ego by being unreasonably dictatorial with an employee; but the idea that the employee in turn takes it out on his unresisting wife, she on her child, and the latter on the family cat is hardly in accord with the complex facts of social life.

THE DIMENSIONS OF ASCENDANCY

Interpersonal ascendancy often blends into intragroup and intraorganizational ascendancy, as when a domineering mother permits her enslaved daughter to marry and thereafter, by becoming in addition a domineering mother-in-law, extends her ascendancy to encompass a two-member group. But for purposes of analysis the distinction between ascendancy over one person and ascendancy over more than one will be kept clear, and attention will hereafter be devoted mainly to the latter. Ascendancy over more than one person is generally personal, at least in the sense that those who are controlled directly by the ascendant are known to him and in turn know him personally. Hypothetically, the number so controlled might range from two to the total number of people existent. Actually, it ranges from two upward; but, as will be demonstrated in detail later, the larger the number of persons involved, the less effect the ascendant has on the behavior of any one of them. A man may rule the four or five members of his family with an iron hand, subordinating them in many aspects of their conduct to his deviant desires. The rule of a willful Caesar might encompass millions of people, but the touch of his will on each of them would be so slight that they might hardly notice it. To a housewife, the tyranny of her husband is a thousandfold more disturbing than that of a political dictator; the beating threatened by a bully is far more intimidating than the threat of punishment embodied in a political edict.

The principle of diminishing effectiveness, as this aspect of ascendancy

may be termed, is not a rigid law; it merely designates a general tendency toward an inverse relationship between numbers and degree of ascendancy. There would appear to be a fixed upper limit to the personal power over others that any member of a given society can exercise, be he king or commoner; and the larger the number of people over whom he attempts to exercise power, the thinner that power will be. But in any specific instance this relationship may not exist; thus it may be about as difficult for a talkative bore to keep one victim within earshot as to keep an audience of tens or even hundreds listening; and a political dictator may be somewhat more effective with the mass of his people than with his council or cabinet. The general tendency, however, is for effectiveness to diminish as numbers increase, and the reasons for this will become apparent in succeeding chapters.

The effect that an ascendant has upon others has a second quantitative dimension, that of time. Irrespective of the form of ascendancy and the numbers involved, ascendancy varies widely in duration. The ascendant may secure conformity to his will for anything between a moment or two in time and the duration of his own life span. The domineering parent may have been a domineering child and may become in due course an equally domineering grandparent; in our society he may even force adherence to some personal whim after he is dead, through stipulations in his will. But as a rule the duration of ascendancy is limited by a variety of factors. As the bully ages, his threats of violence lose force; as with time the number of his victims grows, the probabilities of organized resistance to him grows; as through time he extends his range, the chances of his encountering an even bigger bully increase. In a similar way, age may dim the ardor of the sexually domineering male, the belligerence of the union leader or tribal chieftain, and even the voice of the demanding housewife. Commonly resentment toward the ascendant accumulates through time and is ultimately expressed in some form of revolt; thus the incessant and insistent talker may acquire the reputation of being a bore, and people may learn to avoid him; in time the autocratic father may succeed only in turning his children against him; in time the demanding housewife may teach her husband and children to close their ears against her (even as the blatant newspaper may dull its readers' sensibilities); and in time the political dictator may run out of political capital and, no longer able to purchase their support, lose the loyal followers who gave him power. When, however, ascendancy is successfully maintained over considerable time, it tends to become increasingly structured, *i.e.*, to be accepted by the ascendant and his subordinates as normal. To the extent that the control exercised by an ascendant becomes the new normal and is embodied in group norms and organizational rules, it ceases to be countercontrol and becomes social control; and to that extent the ascendant makes his personal contribution to social history and in so doing effects a more or less enduring and significant change in his society.

Ascendancy may range from the barely perceptible to the obvious and all-

inclusive. The latter might best be described as the greatest degree of control over others that is possible in the circumstances, a concept that is difficult to illustrate realistically. Actually, no individual has complete ascendancy over any considerable number of persons in many respects. But the phenomenon of a progressive gaining of control over others is real enough. As a bride a woman may, for example, pamper her husband's whims; but as the years pass, she may steadily gain greater ascendancy over him until in their later years "he does not," as friends may remark, "have a thought or wish of his own." The overindulged child may extend his ascendancy over his parents as he grows toward maturity, if only because as he grows up he may learn more things to demand of them and new ways to enforce those demands. Likewise, the ascendancy of the politician who uses his office to assert personal control over his subordinates can become qualitatively greater if and as he is promoted up the official hierarchy; and all other things being equal, a village priest (or other low functionary) has less power and can gain less ascendancy than a bishop, the latter less than an archbishop, etc.

Segmental Character. Total control over a number of others is only a theoretical possibility. Actually ascendancy over more than one person is invariably segmental, and an individual may have complete ascendancy in one specific regard without having any ascendancy at all in other respects. In our society, and no doubt in many others, a husband occasionally gains ascendancy over his wife in so many respects that she is in effect the agent of his will, and a wife occasionally achieves that power over her husband, a mother over her child, and a child over a parent. But ascendancy over any considerable number of persons is always limited to a few segments of their behavior. The local bully may secure the cringing homage of less belligerent boys or men and considerable obedience from them to his commands; but for the most part and for much of the time they are beyond his control. At school, perhaps, his whim is law so far as playground games are concerned; but should his whim extend to the classroom and elsewhere outside the playground, he may find himself impotent and in no respect ascendant. The excessively demanding employer may secure some conformity to his will from his employees during working hours, but what they do during the remainder of the day is largely beyond his power to determine. The political dictator may succeed in raising the tax rate by fiat, however he cannot by fiat increase the birth rate of his people.

The segmental character of ascendancy over more than one person stems from the fact that the ascendant must always and continuously strive to secure conformity to his will. Unlike normative status, ascendancy is not a grant; it must, therefore, be bought with some currency or other—with the threat of the loss of something valued more than what the ascendant demands or with the offer of something valued more highly than what is demanded. Aside, perhaps, from the threat of death and the promise of eternal life, no threat or offer can be inclusive, *i.e.*, involve a demand for total subjugation to another's

will, for such a demand would strip the individual of all values; hence a threat would have no compulsion, and nothing at all could be offered in return for conformity. Even the domestic tyrant offers surcease from her nagging in return for conformity to her wishes, and the commandant of a slave-labor camp offers some sort of reward to the girls who submit to his desires.

With limited exceptions ascendancy is, therefore, purchased through a generally covert, implicit kind of barter; and since the power to buy is just as segmental in noneconomic realms as in the market place, ascendancy is characteristically restricted to one or a few segments of the life and conduct of those who submit to the ascendant. For example, employees may endure the petty dictatorial demands of their employer because he is, in comparison with alternative employers, generous toward them in regard to sick leaves, overtime pay, and other things that they value more highly than freedom from whatever it is he periodically demands from them. A nagging housewife may be ascendant simply because her husband and children are temperamentally incapable of resisting her; submission to her nagging may, on the other hand, be accepted by them as a modest price to pay for comparative freedom in other respects (*i.e.*, they may comply verbally to her complaints and demands and then do as they please), for her excellent housekeeping, or for other services past, present, or future.

When ascendancy is achieved through the exploitation of timidity, apathy, or disinclination on the part of others to assume responsibility, the ascendant may give little for what he gets. Nevertheless, he will be ascendant in only a few specific regards; the timid person is timid about something or other rather than timid in general, the apathetic one is apathetic about something rather than everything, etc. Every man does have his price; but prices vary, and for some things the price is far beyond the power of anyone to pay.

Negative Ascendancy. Most ascendancy is positive in the sense that the ascendant secures conformity to his will: others do what he specifically desires of them. When, however, the individual with idiosyncratic interests and values cannot secure conformity of this order, he may endeavor to resolve his consequent maladjustment by some compensatory or escape device. The occasional retreat into daydreaming may have no implications for others; but most compensatory and escape mechanisms do affect others at least in a negative way.

A man who, piqued by his inability to get his way at home, takes a walk, either literally or figuratively, does not thereby get his way. But he will probably succeed in forcing others to make some sort of adjustment to his absence. At the very least, those concerned with his welfare will worry over his absence; more likely some person or persons will miss him because he is failing to fulfill a role obligation. Thus a man who has escaped the intolerable clamor of his home by taking a walk in the peaceful park or countryside (or by deserting his family permanently) has thereby affected the behavior of his wife and children; but since he has not, presumably, brought them into conformity with

his desires for a wife and children who are quiet, respectful, and considerate of his wishes, his ascendancy is negative rather than positive.

Negative ascendancy is by no means rare; and like the positive variety, it takes many forms. Its duration may range from a few moments to a lifetime. The man who goes off by himself for a walk has negative ascendancy only as long as he stays away; the incurable psychopath remains negatively ascendant until he dies.

Many commonplace actions, such as a worker's quitting his job because he is discontented, a wife's or husband's taking a holiday from his spouse, a parent's evading parental responsibilities for an hour or two, or a neurotic's being lost in a moody spell, are at once an escape from irritations and frustrations and a sort of victory, hollow though it may be, over the persons and conditions deemed responsible for the discontent. Sometimes, no doubt, the individual finds the act satisfying because he has thereby demonstrated his power—negative—over others. Thus the worker who quits can at least tell himself that he "showed the boss where to get off," and the wife on a holiday can enjoy the imagined plight of her husband trying to keep house for himself. Sometimes the satisfaction may come only through self-pity. Most often, perhaps, the act serves the function of simply removing the individual from the cause of his frustrations; it is not a cure, but it is a helpful palliative.

Whatever the function to the individual of a compensatory or escape action, it usually gives the individual some degree of negative ascendancy over other people. The general characteristics of ascendancy of this sort are most strikingly revealed in the case of the psychopath. Whatever the specific nature of the abnormality, the psychopath gets his way not through direct control of the conduct of others but by psychological escape from them. Incidental to this escape, however, are the effects, usually varied and complex, on the behavior of others. Since he is no longer responsible for his acts, he must be taken care of; others must serve him, if only to the extent accorded the madman in the lunatic asylum of a century ago. Moreover, others must in some way or other absorb some of his former role obligations; for example, his wife may need to become self-supporting, or public or private agencies may have to assume responsibility for his family.

Negative ascendancy, even that achieved by the psychopath, has slight sociological significance. It is a by-product, socially wasteful perhaps, and certainly disturbing to those directly involved, but with no implications for the social system. The individual who escapes, briefly or permanently, from his social context changes that context only in the way that one who dies changes the world he leaves behind him—by a ripple of disturbance, soon gone and of no lasting consequence.

ASCENDANCY AS A PROCESS

Most folklore and a great deal of what purports to be scientific thinking about ascendancy (usually lumped with a variety of unrelated phenomena

under the term "leadership") proceeds on the assumption that the control exercised by an ascendant (the "leader") is the result of some undefined imperative.² In this view, the expressed wishes of an ascendant constitute a mandate for those subordinate to him; they obey his commands in a will-less and uncalculating fashion. It is on this assumption that the dictatorial rule of an incompetent leader is held responsible for bringing a business to ruin, an army to disaster, or a nation to war. It is on the same assumption that the success of a business, the winning of a war, and the achievements of a nation are often credited to the genius of the head of the business, the general of the army, or the political leader of the nation.

The idea that ascendancy is a condition or state of affairs in which the ascendant wills whatever comes about is the core of the great-man theory of history. That theory holds that the cause of any social event is the willful effort of one man or a small number of men to bring social circumstances into conformity with their personal preferences, whether that effort be to cause the outbreak of war, to determine the conditions of a peace, or to found a new religion. The theory assumes, necessarily, that what many men do—if and how they till their fields, if and how they operate a factory, if and how they conduct a war, etc.—is subject to the will of one. Thus should it please the king (or dictator, president, tribal chieftain, or the like) to do so, he can of his own volition and in accordance with his own special motives, interests, values, and other personal attributes send his subjects into war or prevent them from entering into a war which they are collectively bent on waging. When applied to lesser events than those of state, the same assumption means that the modern factory manager can and does determine what, how, and how much his plant produces; that the military commander determines when, where, and how a battle shall be fought; that the president of a college or university determines how his institution shall be operated

² "Leadership" is an omnibus term, indiscriminately used to cover such varied activities as that of a cheerleader at a football game and the pronouncements of a newspaper editorial writer. In current folklore, anyone who occupies a special social role—classroom teacher, YMCA playground director, committee chairman, club president, successful businessman or politician—is a leader. While all sorts of roles and activities are classified as constituting leaders and leadership, it is commonly assumed that a leader determines the conduct of those under his jurisdiction and that certain specific personal qualities, such as exceptional energy, the ability to smile charmingly at will, or unflinching consideration for the feelings and sentiments of others, give him the power to do so. On this assumption, books and popular courses on leadership purport to prepare the reader or student for the general role of a leader of men. The actual relations of men one to another are infinitely varied and exceedingly complex, and nowhere does the possession of certain specific personality attributes bestow upon the individual the power to determine the conduct of his fellows; that power is always limited and is always the product of many interdependent factors, of which the personality attributes of the leader constitute only a fractional part.

Because the term "leadership" so often conveys an idea of relationships between one individual and a number of others that do not in fact exist, the term has for the most part been avoided in this analysis of social control.

and to what pedagogical ends; and that the father of a family can and should make certain that his children grow up to be solid citizens.

The great-man theory of history is an intellectualized version of the universal human tendency to think in terms of simple cause and effect, to personify causative forces, and to impute cause to some person or some symbolic construct. When social events involve an organization of human beings, as they usually do (*e.g.*, the nation that goes to war or the factory that shuts down), the recognized leader or leaders of that organization are generally considered to be personally responsible; he or they willed the good or evil that has come to pass.

Power Analysis. A generation or two ago, most European and American social scientists were of the democratic persuasion, and they sought to find the source of political and other leadership in the will of those who are led. Thus political scientists were much concerned with public opinion, the way it is formed, and the way it controls the conduct of politicians and public administrators. Economists attempted to trace the rise and fall of economic activities and the directions of those activities to the market place, in which the composite will of the people was registered as price—the price of goods, of labor, of capital, and of managerial skill.

A great many recent events and social developments have, however, seemed to cast doubt on the validity of the idea that in one way or another men collectively rule themselves. The rise of strong labor unions, for example, has weakened the economists' old concept of a free labor market; the consolidation of business enterprises into vast and industrially integrated quasi monopolies has wrecked their idea of the free market for goods; and the increasing control of all aspects of the economy by central government has made the very idea of economic freedom seem an illusion. Meanwhile, the extension of political functions, accelerated by wars and the threat of wars, into every phase and aspect of the individual's life has led the political scientists to doubt that government is now, if it ever was, a function of the "general will." They have come to assume that the majority of men do not want war or to pay for the costs of a war in prospect; and on that assumption it is difficult to explain in a democratic vein the advent of the wars that have recently occurred and the current preparation for future wars. And on the further assumption that individually men cherish freedom above all else, they have found it quite impossible to interpret the persistence of Communism in Russia and its spread elsewhere as in any way a manifestation of the will of the people.

The impossibility of reconciling much of what has been happening socially with the democratic ideal has led many students of contemporary life to redevelop and reapply the great-man theory of history. In this new version the term "power" has replaced that of "great man," probably as a concession to the fact that some of the more recent figures in political history, such as Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, are believed by many Western people to have accomplished great evil rather than great good. At any event, the cause or

source of historical events is attributed to "power," even as social causation was allocated to the "will of the people" by the democratic idealists. The power theorists have made many attempts, all highly speculative, to trace to this or that individual or small elite the power that moves a nation into war, a people into revolt against the political *status quo*, etc.³ This new version of the idea that some one or a few men cause the events of their times differs from the old "great-man" theory in but two respects: it does not assume that the socially recognized leaders (kings, presidents, dictators, or whatever) are necessarily the real leaders; and it explicitly accepts the proposition that not only are social events brought about by leaders, but that these leaders necessarily have the power—mainly, it would appear, economic and coercive in character—to enforce unflinching obedience to their commands. In effect, therefore, the power theorists have abandoned the democratic idealism of an earlier generation and have replaced it with autocratic "realism." They may hope that autocratic rule will prove benevolent; they may fear that it will be tyrannical. But of this much they would seem to feel certain: that in the current state of human affairs the vast majority of men are will-less puppets responding with passive obedience to the commands of those few among them who, possessing wills of their own, have somehow acquired the power to determine the conduct of tens, or millions, or hundreds of millions of abject followers.

Neither in modern societies nor, as far as can be ascertained, in any society past or present has ascendancy been a simple grasping of power or has an ascendant ever had unlimited power over those subservient to him. When conceived of as the ability freely to determine the conduct of others, power is an illusion. The illusion that the ascendant has power to determine conduct in accordance with his will may, however, like other social beliefs, serve important psychological functions. It fits into the universal folk concept of causation and thus enables people to blame those in positions of authority for the occurrence of untoward events—for the advent of war and failure in war, for failure to anticipate and thus prepare for natural catastrophe, and the like. It also may give entirely unjustified self-confidence to the designated leader, and self-confidence is essential if he is through constant endeavor to be and to remain in some slight measure and in some few respects ascendant.

But apparently the major function of the illusion is that of compensating those in positions of authority for their frustrations; for the granting of illusory power is apparently one of the most common devices through which groups and societies at large deceive their designated leaders. Or perhaps the process

³ The psychoanalytically oriented political scientist H. D. Lasswell has done much speculation in this vein. For him and his followers, "power" refers to a mystic social force which plays a role in the making of social events comparable to the role of the libido in the conduct of the individual. For an elaboration and obscuration of this doctrine see H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950). A corrective for the sociologically naïve power concepts of Lasswell and his followers is provided by R. Bierstedt in "An Analysis of Social Power" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 15, pp. 730-738, 1950).

should be described as diverting their leaders from the actual exercise of power by dangling the illusion of power before their eyes.

The process itself takes innumerable forms, some of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. An illustration or two at this point may, however, be helpful. There are a number of ways by which the members of any group may respond to the efforts of one of their number to gain ascendancy: they may yield to him in return for value received (or simply because yielding is, under the circumstances, less costly than any other alternative); they may resist his efforts, so strongly and constantly that he is brought back into outward conformity to the group norms; they may, finally, accord him what amounts to an empty office. This latter device may consist of election or appointment to a post within the group's structure which carries a variety of superficial honors but no real responsibilities; it may involve outward conformity to his wishes but covert violation of them; or it may be largely a matter of diverting his efforts into channels which are inherently futile. The mother who conspires with her children to circumvent the rules laid down by a strict and dictatorial father is utilizing the second of these devices; the group that appoints a disturbing member to a committee to inquire into something or other is usually diverting him into a harmless channel of activity.

As an Interactional Process. Much of the analysis attempted by the power theorists centers around the terminological distinction between leader and led, the leader by presumption being an individual who determines what shall be done, the led being those, few or many, who do what the leader designates. The underlying frame of reference used here is that of a simple, one-way, cause-and-effect relationship, a concept which has long since been abandoned as contrary to factual evidence in the physical and biological sciences and is in general disrepute in the more advanced of the fields of psychology and sociology. Criminologists, for example, no longer posit this or that condition as the cause of criminal behavior; rather, they bring to the study of crime the recognition that a criminal act, and also the personality of the one who commits the act, is the momentary product of a complex and continuous process, a process involving an interaction of a large number of interdependent and variable factors. In the analysis of the various factors, the concept of cause and effect is of little value, since each factor is at once a contributor (a "cause") to the process and a consequence (an "effect") of that process.

Earlier it was observed that social control and ascendancy are but different aspects of the same thing and that they must not, therefore, be treated as categorically distinct. This is, however, what is done when an ascendant (the leader) is presumed to be the cause of the conduct of those over whom he has gained ascendancy (the led); for in this interpretation both the ascendant and those whom he subordinates are treated as though they were not subject to social control. Actually, the ascendant seldom operates free from social controls, and those whom he subordinates never do.

It may sometimes happen that an individual strives to gain ascendancy over

others in order to impose highly personal, idiosyncratic, values and sentiments upon them. A business executive, for example, may attempt to restructure his organization in accordance with what he, and perhaps no one else, considers greater work efficiency; or he may endeavor to change organizational operations in such a way that he personally will gain in monetary ways. Sometimes, perhaps, a tribal chieftain, a modern politician, or an agitator for religious or other reforms strives for ascendancy in an effort to gain acceptance for atypical and entirely personal ideas or ideals of how others should behave. Sometimes, perhaps, an individual strives for ascendancy over some organization or other for the purely personal satisfaction he gets from being ascendant. Often, however, an individual strives for ascendancy, not in order to assert atypical or personal values on others, but to satisfy, in part if not in whole, some status need; and in this case his will is not really his but is the effect of the social control that is exercised by some group or other. Thus a man who endeavors to reorganize his business establishment may do so more because he desires the recognition of other "progressive" businessmen than because of the monetary profit that may accrue to him; a politician who drives through a political reform may do so not because he personally believes in its desirability or even for the votes it may win him in the next election, but because his ascendancy over his fellow legislators may be remarked and approved by his friends back home or by the unofficial but highly esteemed local smart set.

Moreover, in his endeavor to exercise control over the members of some group or organization, a would-be ascendant invariably encounters the fact that they are subject to social control; and, if he is to be at all successful, he must adjust himself to it. Those whom he would control are as individuals never entirely free to accept his proffered inducements or to give in to his threats of coercion. The very fact that they are members of some group or organization means that individually they are subject to social control that imposes upon them normative forms of conduct; to become ascendant over them, the individual must somehow induce them to behave contranormatively. The effort to do so invariably gives rise to an interaction between his endeavors and all the forces of cultural training and of social control to which those whom he would control are already subject. These latter forces are never passive, and the fact that he has overcome them at one point and time does not mean that he has dispelled them. As a consequence, the struggle to be ascendant is unending; for the moment the ascendant ceases his striving for ascendancy, he ceases to be a dynamic factor in the process and is overwhelmed. The struggle is, moreover, far less rewarding than the power theory and myth imply. The ascendant is, metaphorically, swimming upstream against the pull of a steady current; should he pause, he will be taken downstream; he must labor even to stay in his place; and to gain against the current, he must take many strokes to move upstream the distance of one.

For the led are seldom passive; actually they are never truly passive. Even the man who is being broken on the rack fights back until he is dead and is

no longer subject to control. The behavior of the led is determined primarily by their cultural training; the goals of the leader, in the sense that the term is here being used, necessarily require behavior that is counter to or at least in a direction away from the cultural. Through the persons of the led, therefore, the culture provides a constant and tenacious resistance to ascendancy. Thus, for example, the most energetic and skillful leadership cannot make obedient slaves of free men or make competent and self-reliant free men out of slaves. A leader with a personal preference for pork over beef might conceivably so arrange things that those subject to him could secure only pork for their diet; but their cultural preference for beef would manifest itself in a multitude of rebellious ways; ranging from simple refusal to eat pork to the development of black-market supplies of beef.

The cultural interests, values, sentiments, and the like of those over whom an individual would gain ascendancy constitute the first line of defense against his efforts at control. They induce each of the several individuals to ignore, or if that is impossible, to evade his efforts unless he can overbalance the cultural imperatives through imperatives of his own making. Even then, he invariably encounters a second line of defense against his efforts to gain ascendancy—the status-group norms and, in many instances, organizational rules and regulations to which the individuals are subject. As we have seen, both status-group and organizational controls operate mainly toward the maintenance of the *status quo*; and since ascendancy is a violation of the *status quo*, status-group and organizational control is almost invariably resistant to the efforts of any would-be ascendant. That resistance, like the resistance of the individual, can be and usually is anything but passive. With rare exceptions of a sort that will be analyzed later, almost any change proposed by a would-be ascendant sets social control into operation to keep each of the individuals involved conforming to their established group and organizational roles, whatever their personal inclinations may happen to be. Thus should a politician want to shift the diet of his subjects from beef to pork (if, say, he owned a pig farm), he would first come up against the fact that the people prefer beef. Some of them might not object to pork per se, and most of them might be willing individually to turn to pork provided that the price were low enough; but as members of status groups and, possibly, also of organizations in which beef-eating is sanctioned, they would not be able to act on an individual basis. Social control, if not their personal preferences and interests, would impose conformity to the established meat-eating norm; and should the politician persist in his endeavors, those groups and organizations might come to sanction and enforce various forms of individual and group resistance to the politician's threats or enticements.

The resistance to the efforts of a would-be ascendant that is set up by cultural factors and social control usually nullifies those efforts, and for the most part, the efforts of would-be ascendants simply come to nought. Were this not so, social life would everywhere be subject to constant and whimsical

change; there would be no social continuity, there would be no pattern to the social present or past or future, and there would be no laws of social life and social change for the social scientist to ascertain.

The resistance that may entirely nullify the efforts of a would-be ascendant takes many and widely varied forms; his commands may be ignored, they may be so distorted through willful misinterpretation that they become meaningless, they may be overtly obeyed but covertly sabotaged, or, in the final extremity, the would-be ascendant may himself be destroyed.⁴ The resistance is, moreover, highly dynamic; those who individually or collectively resist the efforts of a would-be ascendant to impose control over them may not be ingenious, but they usually have available a considerable stock of tactical devices from which to draw in a trial-and-error fashion. The would-be ascendant has in his marked and constant disfavor the fact that he is one and those whom he would control are many; although he may be superior to any one of them in motivation, in intellectual skill, or in animal craft, they are numerous and tend to pool their individually limited abilities and knowledge. He is one and can be in only one place at a time; they are many and can be, as it were, everywhere all the time. Moreover, in any large-scale attempt at gaining ascendancy there is always the possibility that some one among those whom the would-be ascendant is trying to bring under control may arise to compete with him—that a resistance leader may arise who offers to serve the interests and values that the would-be ascendant is endeavoring to overcome.

When, however, any considerable proportion of those over whom a would-be ascendant is endeavoring to exercise control are, for whatever reasons, socially isolated or even in the process of detachment from the groups which would otherwise prevent their submission to his control, the would-be ascendant may gain a following and thereby achieve some degree of ascendancy. Even under these most favorable conditions the ascendant does not dictate the conduct of his subjects; what his subjects do is invariably somewhat and usually very much less than he demands of them. For although they may be comparatively free from resistant social control, that freedom is never complete; and they are always under considerable compulsion to behave in accordance with their cultural training. What even the most successful ascendant secures is, therefore, only a fraction of what he strives for; and often what an

⁴ The effect of resistance to the demands of an ascendant may, however, be so long delayed that they do not actually affect the ascendant himself. This is what happens when political rebellion against a dictator breaks out after his death. The abandonment in 1953 by the University of Chicago of the Chicago Plan (a speed-up program for the A.B. involving, among other innovations, a considerable proportion of synthetic "survey" courses) that had been put into operation, against the wishes of practically the entire faculty, eleven years earlier by Robert Hutchins, was a delayed rebellion against his arbitrary actions. It did not, however, affect Hutchins himself, for by then he had moved on to greener pastures. For a news story of the abandonment of the program see *Time*, Mar. 23, 1953. For the rationale of the plan see R. M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936).

ascendant gets is not even a fraction of what he wishes, but the empty honor of having brought about something that he did not intend. Those over whom he has gained ascendancy may have endeavored to obey his will, but they have necessarily interpreted his will in terms of their own cultural and other pre-suppositions. Thus an attempt to change a people's diet from beef to pork might result in their learning in time to eat a little pork along with a lot of beef, or it might so operate that they would develop a preference for mutton over both beef and pork.

To say that most would-be ascendants fail and that even the successful exercise less control over others than they desire is not to deny the importance of ascendancy in the making of social events and the working of social changes. It is, rather, to deny the validity of the simple cause-and-effect interpretation of the process of ascendancy. Most of the events that occur in any society involve ascendancy on the part of some one or a number of persons; most of the changes that occur in any social system are worked by individuals striving for ascendancy. But ascendancy is a product of a complex interaction between the one who strives for and gains ascendancy and those over whom ascendancy is achieved. In this process the endeavors of the one to control the conduct of the many are in no sense the "cause" of the conduct of the many; they serve, rather, to influence the behavior of the many in some degree and in some way, the degree and the way depending upon a multitude of factors, none of which is subject to the direct control of the would-be ascendant. To the extent, necessarily considerable if he is to be at all successful, that the would-be ascendant shapes his efforts at control in terms of the factors—largely the cultural attributes and group norms of those whom he is endeavoring to control—that will affect those efforts, he is himself being controlled by those whom he would control. Out of such an interaction, always highly dynamic, may come as a product the influence of the one over the many that constitutes social ascendancy. No man, however "great" in conventional terms, changes the world about him to conform to his will; some few men, not always defined as great, by persistent and heroic effort do bend social circumstances somewhat in the direction that is favorable to their personal interests. Such men have achieved some degree of ascendancy over some of their fellow men.

ASCENDANCY AND ADVANCEMENT

The advancement of an individual up a hierarchy of roles within an organization, or from one class level to a higher one, may or may not involve ascendancy. The roles or offices through which an individual moves in advancing are more or less structured; at each step up in role or office he acquires some new rights and some new obligations. In so advancing he does not, however, automatically increase his personal power over others.

An advance in role or office normally means some increase in authority; but authority, as will be indicated shortly, is one aspect of social control rather

than a form of countercontrol, as is the case with ascendancy. Authority does not enable the individual to exercise control over others to the satisfaction of his idiosyncratic interests, values, etc. Although there are exceptions, advancement generally tends to reduce the individual's right to impose his will on others and even to act himself in whimsical ways; for as he advances up a hierarchy of offices, his obligations increase and are of concern to an increasing number of people. The workman may perhaps be able to ask a fellow worker to fill in for him on the job while he takes a smoke; but the business executive has role responsibilities too great and involving too many other people to permit him to turn them over to someone else when he happens to feel like taking a break in the daily routine. The worker can, normally, quit his job whenever his self-interest dictates; but the administrator who quits his job without forewarning and preparation for a replacement would be considered unjustifiably irresponsible and would thereby reduce his chances for employment in some other organization. And so it is within the membership of any grouping or organization; the higher the role or office, the greater the responsibilities, thus the more insistent the demand that the individual who occupies the role or office conform to its obligations.

There is, of course, a very practical basis for this demand for greater conformity to role obligations as the individual advances up a hierarchy. Some offices or roles have high prestige but no vital functions, and some offices or roles with low prestige nevertheless serve important functions. The office of Vice-President of the United States, for example, has few important functions, and that of President of the Republic of France even less. On the other hand, the oiler on a steamship, with a dirty, solitary, and lowly role, is essential to the operation of the ship; should the oiler fail his duty, delay and even disaster might follow. Ordinarily, however, the importance of role fulfillment to the group or organization as a whole is more or less directly related to the position of that role in the hierarchal system.

The success of a business enterprise, of a military campaign, or of any large or small group endeavor is not dependent upon the effectiveness with which the president, general, or other highest official performs his task; but the outcome of that endeavor is influenced more by the conduct of the highest official than by the conduct of any other single individual in the group. A battle may be won in spite of the bad planning of a military commander; a ship may be brought safely to port although its captain is drunk and incompetent; a business may make a profit although its president is irresponsibly preoccupied with golf or a new mistress. But it is obvious that the effects on a group of inadequate administrative direction are far greater than the effects of inadequate performance by the individual who occupies a low office. The general is not indispensable; if he fails his office, subordinates may perhaps take over for him; at any event a foolish order by him may be so diluted by the time it reaches the men with the guns that it may do no harm at all. The general

is, however, less dispensable than is the general's aide; and the latter is less dispensable than is any common soldier, of whom there are thousands to the one general, and who are supposed to be more or less interchangeable.

The higher the office, the less "right" the individual has to be socially irresponsible; at the same time, the higher the office, the greater are the opportunities for the individual to use the office for personal ends. Authoritative powers can be exploited; the policeman on the beat can close his eyes to minor infractions of the law and perhaps blackmail the merchant or householder who persistently violates some regulation; the police chief has both greater authority and greater opportunities to use that authority for personal gain. The same principle applies to most offices, the low versus the high.

On the whole, however, the system of advancement in most organizations tends, as was shown in the analysis of bureaucratization, to assure that those individuals who are advanced are the least likely of all eligibles to use their new authority for personal ends. Where advancement is systematized and the individual goes up the hierarchy of offices in accordance with one or more fixed criteria, there tends, in fact, to be an inverse relation between advancement and ascendancy. Even advancement by simple seniority functions in this way; for in an organization where length of service (as distinct from quality of the service rendered) is the determinant of advancement, the impatient and markedly ambitious individual ordinarily drops out before he has served his time; those who can stay on in an organization year after year performing routine tasks and are satisfied with the gradual advancements that come with the passing years are either conformists by temperament or become habituated to conforming long before they acquire any degree of authority. Seniority and personal integrity as defined by the organization are, in other words, closely related.

There are many variants on the straight seniority system; in primitive societies the tribal chieftain, the chief elder, or whatever he may be titled is often selected (automatically, in the case of the eldest son's inheriting his father's office of chieftain upon his father's death) or informally elected in terms of such criteria as age and length of apprenticeship for the office, procedures which tend to assure his exercising his authority in a responsible manner and his not using that authority for private ends. In most bureaucratic organizations, ancient and modern, military and civil, length of service has usually been less important in advancement than has the quality of service as evaluated by the individual's superiors. Ordinarily the criterion that is applied by superiors to service rendered is conformity to role demands, *i.e.*, the extent to which the individual has "lived by the book," with the result that promotion usually goes to those individuals who are temperamentally conformists and who are therefore least likely to deviate from the demands of the higher office. In such a system, the individual is "retested" in each of the successive offices to which he is advanced; thus only those individuals who

exhibit little initiative and express few other deviant attributes acquire the authority that might be used for personal ends.

The advancement of those least likely to exploit an office is an integral aspect of bureaucracy, and it is one of the factors responsible for the characteristic rigidity and integrity of the bureaucratic organization. There are, of course, exceptions; but on the whole, the more bureaucratic the structure of an organization, the less advancement is associated with ascendancy; the individual who advances up the organizational hierarchy does not thereby gain ascendancy, and he may in fact lose a variety of petty personal privileges. Thus a priest might use his humble office to force his deviant theological views upon his little flock; if he were to become a bishop, he would probably be much more conservative theologically; and should he be elevated to the College of Cardinals, that act would be at once proof that he had thoroughly demonstrated his subservience to the obligations of high religious office and assurance that he would never think critically of Papal edicts, or should he do so, that he would promptly pray for forgiveness.

Even where the system of advancement does not of itself assure conformity to the requirements of an office, as with many appointive positions, there is some tendency for the office itself to bring the individual into conformity with its requirements. A machine politician may become so much impressed with the high office to which he has been elected that he tends to take on the coloration of that office; the people around him expect him to conduct himself honorably, they are themselves more or less honorable, the physical trappings of the office are indicative of a man of honor, etc., all of which can lead the machine politician to redefine himself in terms of his new office. The election or appointment of a shyster lawyer to the bench may bring about a comparable adjustment of the man to the office; in a number of instances men of very bad repute have been appointed, for political reasons, no doubt, to the United States Supreme Court, only to become in time justices of unimpeachable integrity. Academicians have traditionally and with considerable cause feared the businessman as a college president because of his propensity to turn the educational institution into a profit-making plant. Occasionally, however, a businessman upon being appointed to the presidency of a college has taken over and made his own the values, interests, and rituals of academic life.

Ascendancy as a Means to Advancement. In highly integrated organizations, where advancement is normally systematic and a reward for length of service or exceptional conformity to group standards, an individual may skip a rank or gain promotion ahead of his normal expectancy. Occasionally, perhaps, such advancement may come without effort on the individual's part; particularly in very large organizations, bookkeeping errors, mix-ups in orders, and other mechanical failures of the system may lead to premature promotion of an individual; occasionally a man just happens (without effort on his part, that is) to catch the eye and approval of a superior and is picked out for a

special office. In such cases advancement ahead of normal expectancy does not involve ascendancy. In most instances, however, the individual who gains advancement prematurely has struggled in some atypical ways to gain special favor with his superiors.⁵ In doing so, he has exercised covert control over their conduct—itself a limited order of ascendancy; and his new office provides him with another sort of ascendancy over those subject to his administrative control, since they accept the office but not his occupation of it. A very simple parallel is the individual who crowds to the head of a queue and stays there, rather than waiting his turn.

Advancement in loosely integrated organizations, particularly those which are engaged in competitive activities, is likely to be unsystematic; advancement here may come by popular election or as a reward for exceptional (not just conforming) performance; in either case the individual competes for advancement with numbers of his peers—*e.g.*, with other candidates for political office—for a higher office within a political or business organization, and so on. Frequently the competition is channelized and systematized, as it is when advancement is a reward for exceptional prowess in the hunt, in games, or in other defined activities and as it is in the examination procedures so much relied upon in political, military, and academic organizations today. In any such competition for advancement the successful candidate usually becomes ascendant over those who failed only in the sense that they must concede his victory over them. If, however, he has won in the competition, not by superior performance, but through violation of the rules governing that competition, his advancement is the consequence of ascendancy over his competitors. Their concession of defeat is a consequence of his trickery, and his acceptance by his superiors as the successful candidate for advancement is likewise the result of control he has exercised over them.

There is, no doubt, some striving for ascendancy as a means to advancement among some of the members of any organization. The impecunious relatives of the aging rich man may, for example, each strive against the others to become the heir apparent; the junior executives in a business or political bureaucracy may each strive to displace the others in the favor of their superior; priests may gently trample on one another in the effort to gain special esteem in the eyes of their bishop. To the extent that ascendancy so secured leads only to advancement in the organization, it has, however, slight social significance. It makes for a rearrangement of persons in the organizational hierarchy (and, of course, much incidental bickering and jealousy); but it does not make for change in the organizational operations. The man who rises spectacularly in some organizational system—*e.g.*, the one who becomes the youngest university president in the nation or the youngest general in the army—has achieved advancement through ascendancy and has thereby demon-

⁵ For a study of the organizationally irrelevant personal qualities that may gain an individual ascendancy through advancement see M. Dalton, "Informal Factors in Career Achievement" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 56, pp. 407-415, 1951).

strated his exceptional motivations and his ability to get ahead personally. It does not necessarily follow, however, that he is also motivated to use, and capable of using, the authority of his new office as a means to ascendancy over the members of the organizational system.

ASCENDANCY AND AUTHORITY

Advancement characteristically gives the individual increased authority. The lowest rank in any hierarchal system has, at least in official terms, no authority. The role of the common workman in the factory, the clerk in the store, the private in the army, or the student in the college carries a variety of rights as well as obligations. But none of these rights gives to the individual who occupies the role authority over other members of the organization. Each of the several or many roles or offices above this base position does, however, carry with it some more or less specified and invariably delimited authority over some group—usually all those of lesser rank—within the organization. The rights granted to each such role to exercise authority are as a rule essential to the fulfillment of the obligations of that role. The empirical experience of the group or organization will have demonstrated that the duties of a given office cannot be fulfilled without such and such authority; for example, that the treasurer of the organization cannot collect dues unless he has the authority to dun the members and, that failing, to close out their membership, and that a police officer cannot reasonably be expected to apprehend law-breakers unless he has the authority to command anyone suspected of law-breaking to halt and, that failing, to shoot with intent to stop if not to kill.

The authority over others that goes with a given role or office may actually exceed requirements for the fulfillment of role obligations. Especially in very old and noncompetitive groups and organizations there is a tendency for offices to acquire new authority as obligations necessitate without their at the same time relinquishing old and functionally outworn authority. New authority is, however, usually granted with great reluctance and only after long adverse experience has worn down resistance to the granting of it; often the granting of new authority is a formal recognition of a *fait accompli*, the extension of authority having occurred gradually and covertly as a necessity for adequate fulfillment of the obligations of the office. Reluctance to extend authority is a normal consequence of the fact that any such extension reduces some of the established rights of the members of subordinate groups. Thus it is that legislative enactments tend to lag behind functional needs and are at best often no more than a compromise with expediency; thus it is, too, that the individual who exercises the authority of his office with too great zest—the “empire builder,” the dictatorial policeman, employer, or bureaucrat—characteristically meets with antagonism.

Vested Authority and the Power to Exercise It. The authority that is vested in an office differs only in degree from the rights that are granted to any status role. As in the case of any granted rights, whether or not the au-

thority of an office will be honored depends upon general acceptance. When, as has happened over and over historically, the bulk of a people has come finally to the view that they are no longer subject to the king's rule, then the office of king no longer has effective authority. Should the American people by some magic largely come to the view that the now highly respected and powerful Supreme Court has no authority over them, then the office of Supreme Court Justice would be stripped of its powers of control.

There is nothing in the nature of things physical, biological, or social that makes people respect or fear and hence obey authority. If and to the extent that they do so, it is because they individually value the functions represented by that authority and believe that those values cannot be otherwise secured. Authority always involves the right to enforce individual obedience, whether it be the right of the priest to invoke the wrath of God, of the policeman to cite the motorist who violates his orders or some fixed regulation, or of the employer to fire or fine the disobedient worker. But the right to enforce is not the power to enforce; that power exists only as a grant maintained by the social norms of status groups or organizations. Authoritative power is, therefore, a function of social control.

The authority that is vested in an office is invariably specific; only the messianic leader has general authority over his followers, and his power to exercise such general authority is usually tenuous. Established, organizationally granted authority is delimited in scope and defined in character. An employer may, perhaps, have the granted authority to fire the workman who, in his judgment, is not worthy of his hire; but it would be a transgression of his authority to designate what his employees should eat for lunch, how they should cut their hair, or the like. A king may have the authority to levy taxes, but only on certain things and to a maximum amount; the father of a family may have the authority to decide what is good for his children, but what is good for them is rigorously defined in advance.

The authority that is vested in an office is embodied in tradition and, in many instances, law. It evolves slowly and, once established, changes slowly if at all. Thus the authority of the captain of a modern ship is little different from that of the captain in the days of sailing ships; the Queen of England still retains in law many of the rights to rule that evolved in preindustrial times; and more than a century of strife was necessary to transfer even in part the traditional authority of a father to decide what is best for his children to such public agencies as the school and court.

The power to enforce authority, however, is relatively flexible; it can be withdrawn in part or in entirety at the will of the organizational members. The methods by which an office is deprived of its powers to enforce the authority vested in it are many and usually devious; they will be analyzed in the next chapter. It should be observed here, however, that the ability of a group or an organization to deprive any of its offices of the power of enforcement gives that group the power to control, within limits, the use to which authority is

put. In a vague, complex, but very real way, governing—the exercise of authority—is “by consent.”

Policy Making versus Ascendancy. In current academic theory, and in some few actual instances, the members of organizations fall into three functional categories: the majority are routine workers (or fighters, or whatever they may be) who simply adhere to the rules laid down for them from above; at the top of the organizational hierarchy are the policy makers, the administrative officers who determine the rules and judge adherence thereto; in between are the functionaries, the petty officers who apply the rules in a routine way. In this view, the right to pass judgment is concentrated in the few high offices at the apex of the organizational hierarchy; and only those who occupy such high offices can possibly use their authority for purposes of personal ascendancy.

Most of the authoritative rights vested in an office below the administrative level are routine in character, and the decisions of the officeholder are limited to the application to specific instances of the rules and regulations for which he is responsible. Thus a mail clerk weighs and classifies a piece of mail and ascertains from established rate regulations what fee must be paid before he can accept it; a navigator on the sea or in the air makes his sights (visually or by electronic means), ascertaining thereby the location of the ship and ordering whatever correction in course is necessary; a policeman tags the automobile which has parked contrary to regulations; a professor grades his students in accordance with an ancient formula; a sergeant drills his recruits and an officer commands his troops by the book. Moreover, as has been indicated elsewhere, bureaucratization tends to standardize and mechanize organizational procedures; and to that end it tends to reduce the authority of the bureaucrat to pure routine.

To the extent that the authority of an office is limited to the making of routine decisions, the person who occupies that office is precluded from using his authority for purposes of ascendancy. But since men and the circumstances in which they operate are never twice quite alike, total routinization is seldom possible. The authority to pass judgment, to make what are currently described as policy decisions, may be formally established in an administrative office or informally granted by status groups or status-group systems. (Courts, councils, and other decision-making groups are agencies which are designated either to relieve individual officials of the need to make major policy decisions or else to pass upon the validity of the decisions that officials do make.) But the inevitable variations in men and circumstances make it imperative that almost every officeholder upon occasion pass judgment regarding the applicability of rules and what constitutes acceptable conformity to them.

It is no doubt true that the higher the office, the greater the need and on the whole the larger the authority of the officeholder to take into account atypical circumstances and other problems not specifically covered by organizational rules and regulations. But most offices, even those far down the scale,

have of absolute necessity some such rights to exercise judgment and, as a consequence, provide some small opportunity for the use of authority for personal ends. Were this not so, there would be far less tolerance than there actually is among the members of an organization for the abuse of authority; when almost every member can, if he desires, get his share of graft or abuse his own authority in some way or other, he will be somewhat disinclined to object overtly to the liberties taken by those in higher offices. An army cook who slices off the best steak for himself will hardly inform on the mess sergeant who dabbles a bit in the local black market with military goods, and the latter will not call attention to the rules when his company officer orders a special dinner served to some select guests. An office manager who uses his authority to hire and fire to employ an incompetent relative may feel it the part of wisdom to forget that the department chief charged to official travel a trip that was clearly for his own pleasure.

The policy-making authority of an office, whether great or small, formal or informal, does inevitably open the way for ascendancy through that office. But policy making is not itself a means to ascendancy, and the policy decision is distinct in kind from the arbitrary decision through which ascendancy may be achieved. Policy making is the rendering of a judgment, minor or major, in terms of the values, interests, and other organizational criteria that are relevant to the problem. Such a decision, once rendered, may perhaps be final—a workman discards what he has judged to be a faulty part, with adverse effect, however slight, upon all those who contributed to the making of that part; an employer discharges, promotes, or hires a person, with some consequence to all his subordinates; a tax collector decides that further payment is due, with self-evident consequences to the taxpayer and his dependents. But such decisions are not arbitrary in the sense of being autocratic or idiosyncratic so long as they are based upon the values and interests of the organization. Only when the power to make such a decision is used to further or fulfill values and interests held by the officeholder but not by the organization is ascendancy involved.

For example, in most business organizations it is a matter of policy to promote the worker who is most efficient (as locally defined) and to discharge the one who is least efficient.⁶ Under such conditions, to decide that an exceptionally efficient man is due for promotion or that a very inefficient one deserves to be discharged is a minor act of policy making. Under the same cir-

⁶ The current stress upon operating efficiency in American business is by no means universal, even in business. European business establishments are, by comparison with our own, highly bureaucratic and inclined to value reliability in a worker above productive effectiveness. For material on the sentiments, values, and the like that tend to obtain among administrators in corporate business in America see W. Miller, ed., *Men in Business: Essays in the History of Entrepreneurship* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952); W. E. Henry, "The Business Executive: The Psychodynamics of a Social Role" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 54, pp. 286-291, 1949); and W. H. Whyte, Jr., *Is Anybody Listening?* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1952).

cumstances, to promote a worker simply because he is a needy relative, because he plays a good game of golf, or because he will cooperate with his superior are arbitrary decisions. The distinction is, of course, entirely relative. For a corporation executive to hire a beautiful girl to serve as his receptionist may be entirely within the rights of his office, whereas for him to hire the same girl as his secretary may be a petty act of ascendancy. In the former instance beauty may be functionally indicated; in the latter case it may satisfy only the esthetic tastes of the man himself, not the needs of his office or of the organization.

Prestige and Power. Earlier it was observed that there is often a distinction between the rights that are traditionally associated with a given office and those that are accorded the individual who occupies that office, *i.e.*, between the official status and the personal status of the officeholder. As a beloved or unusually respected man, the officeholder may be given authority beyond the traditional rights of the office; as a personally unpopular man, he may be denied the full powers of the office that he holds.

There is, however, some tendency for high offices to acquire prestige which transcends the role or function of the office itself and is irrespective of the person who occupies the office. The trappings which frequently grow up around a high office—ceremonial garb, rostrum, spacious and otherwise impressive physical setting, etc.—enhance this prestige by outwardly distinguishing the officeholder from lesser men and by lending to the office a mystic quality, a halo of power which is beyond the defined authority of the office itself.

The prestige accorded an office ranges in character from superstitious awe to reverence and from fear of the powers that might be exercised by the officeholder to respect for the services traditionally provided through the office. There are, moreover, wide cultural and other differences in the degree and character of the prestige which attaches to comparable offices in different societies. Such differences are no doubt of historical origin, *i.e.*, they reflect differences in historical experience. Both the American and the French people tend to accord relatively little prestige to police, military, religious, bureaucratic, and political offices. With both people the highest political office in the land—that of President—is frequently the butt of humor and disdain. On the other hand, the French tend to accord great prestige to scholarly offices—even the local schoolteacher occupies a respected position—while Americans do not. In America the most respected offices are probably economic: that of the industrial leader, the business administrator, the labor union executive, and the technician—men who “do things.” The British, by way of further contrast, have historically given far greater prestige to political, military, and scholarly offices than to those of business and industry. The respect in which the otherwise lowly office of policeman is held by the ordinary British citizen is, in fact, so great that the policeman does not, simply because he need not, carry firearms, whereas every American knows that a policeman without a gun is a man without authority.

It is possible, but by no means certain, that there is a rough relationship between the cultural and subcultural value systems of different peoples and groups and the prestige that is ascribed to the various offices which they maintain. Where great importance is attached to life after death, clerical offices have high prestige; where material wealth is more valued, those offices which have to do with the production, distribution, and maintenance of material things have higher prestige than clerical offices; where, as may be the case in Britain, physical security and order in human relationships is greatly valued, then it is the police, the military, and the political offices that carry high prestige. Just why some societies should tend, as do the Germanic and the Japanese peoples, to accord prestige rather indiscriminately to all established offices is difficult to explain. To say of these peoples that they are highly regimented, that they are not individualistic, and that they subscribe to mystic ideas of national or racial unity and destiny is only to describe further the fact that they seem to attach atypical importance to all kinds of offices.

The prestige that is associated with an office serves mainly to reinforce the authority vested in that office; because the British people generally respect the integrity, the wisdom, and the dogged persistence in the performance of duty of the policeman, his word is law, *i.e.*, his authority is seldom put to the test; motorists do not debate his right to call them to task, and even the professional criminal goes along peaceably when put under arrest. Because the French gendarme and the American policeman are held in far less esteem, they must frequently demonstrate—hence the firearms—that they do really represent the full majesty of the law. Because the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States are held in high esteem, not just because the law so requires, the decisions of that court are generally given social sanction; and it was in part for this same reason that the ill-fated attempt under President Roosevelt's administration to pervert the Court to New Deal goals (the so-called packing plan) brought discredit to the administration rather than to the Court itself.

All power is subject to abuse, *i.e.*, to use for ends other than those sanctioned by those who grant the power. This is especially evident in the case of the prestige powers of an office, which are more susceptible to being sold out as a means to ascendancy than are the vested authoritative powers of an office. In the first place, the prestige powers are not rigidly defined as are the vested authoritative powers. In the second place, they are granted out of emotional response to the office—from fear, sentimental regard, or respect—and are therefore less subject to critical evaluation than are the vested authoritative powers.

In the long run, no doubt, the prestige of any office depends upon the extent to which those who occupy the office function to fulfill social values. The tribal magic man who persistently uses his magic for personal gain in time brings not only discredit to himself as a magic man but also some doubt as to the validity of the authority vested in the office itself; the king who clearly

does much wrong, the policeman who plays favorites and accepts bribes, the general who lives too well and fights too poorly do likewise. The slow but marked decline in the prestige of churchmen during the period preceding the Reformation was directly traceable to the increasing exploitation for personal and carnal ends of the authority of religious offices; the sharp and marked, but mainly temporary, decline in the prestige of the office of businessman in America in the late 1920s was the result of a general assumption that businessmen had been using their authority to grasp political power as well as to make a monetary profit.

In the short run the individual who holds an office of high prestige can trade on that prestige for individual ends; *i.e.*, he can gain ascendancy through the abuse of authority. The procedure is not unlike that whereby the modern business may sell out an established brand name, debasing the product in the reasonable expectation that it will be some time before consumers discover that the brand name no longer assures them of high and uniform quality. Moton-picture executives do the same thing when they use the name prestige of an actor or actress to sell a poor story or a good story poorly told; and political parties sometimes resort to a similar procedure when they mortgage the party name, and its future, by running easily controlled stooges for high office. A more subtle variation of the same process can be seen in the occasional tendency of a renowned scholar to coast along on his reputation during his later years.

When an office is used in unsanctioned ways, *i.e.*, as a means to ascendancy, the prestige of that office may obscure the abuse of its authority. The greater the prestige, the more and longer those who hold the office can put their vested powers to individual ends without destroying the office itself. The prestige of the office will wane as those subject to its control find their own rights increasingly infringed upon, as they relate their loss in rights (or increase in obligations, or both) to the misuse of authority, and as they come to see in other offices, old or new, the authority that will reestablish what has been lost. In simple terms, faith in the justice and reasonableness of the exploited office declines, and faith that some other authority will provide what is desired grows.

The prestige that is accorded a given office is, therefore, a rough index of the extent to which that office has been and, in turn, can be used for purposes of ascendancy. The respect in which the British people tend to hold their police suggests that by and large the police have in the past used their vested authority in the socially sanctioned ways; it also means that the police could now heavily exploit their authority without being "found out" for a long time. By contrast, the low prestige of the modern priest reflects in part the long premodern use of religious authority for crass political, financial, and personal ends; and it currently means that the priest is always more or less suspect and subject to the loss of the little authority that is still vested in him by society.

ASCENDANCY AND ORGANIZATION

No man has ever become a "master of men" through the strength of his own right arm, the wealth in his personal treasury, the effects of his charming manner and beguiling voice, or the thunder of his oratory alone. Those who have gained any large-scale and durable ascendancy over others have had to do so through some sort of organization; either they have developed an organization or they have acquired high office in an established organization. This has meant, depending upon time, place, and circumstances, anything from the buying of slaves to man a galley to the hiring of workers to build and others to run a factory; from the achieving of promotion through an organizational hierarchy to the purchase or theft of high office therein.

Only through an organization have the puny powers of an individual ever been amplified sufficiently to give him control over large numbers and through time; and upon the size, the organizational efficiency, and the morale of the organization has depended in the first instance the power potential of the individual who has occupied high office in that organization. "How many divisions has the Pope?" Stalin is reputed cynically to have asked. How many divisions the military chieftain has, how well organized they are to fight a modern war, and how high their morale is determine the outer limits of his ability to exercise power of a military sort. How many employees the modern captain of industry has, how well organized and equipped they are, and how content they are in terms of the available alternatives for employment determine the farthest limits of his capacity to produce the goods he wants.

The organization necessary to the exercise of any great personal power is, however, itself a check to the exercise of that power. As was shown earlier, the more bureaucratic, hence the more efficient, an organization, the less flexible the operations of that organization. Increasing internal structuration, both formal and informal, makes for efficiency in operations; at the same time it places restraints of many sorts on the exercise of personal power—as distinct from organizationally sanctioned power—by the individual who occupies an administrative office in that organization. A militant horde may, perhaps, be swayed by the promise of loot or eternal salvation to attack first this and then that objective; but its attacks will be poorly organized and hence ineffectual. A highly organized military force, on the other hand, will be efficient under command but commandable only through channels and in terms of tradition-defined objectives. And so it is, in one way or another, with every kind of organization. The more efficient the organization and hence the larger the potential power provided by the organization, the more rigidly defined are the uses to which that power may be put.

No administrative office, even though it be the highest in the organizational structure, operates in a vacuum; it is a functional part, more or less effectively and durably integrated with a variety of other and usually differentiated offices. The captain of a ship at sea, for example, is traditionally and according to

maritime law in complete command of the activities of his subordinates and crew. But *de facto* he is entirely surrounded, or as he might see it, boxed in by both rules and regulations and persons occupying other offices within the total organization. Each of his several officers has a complex of rights as well as obligations; every man in the crew has his established rights as well as obligations; supplementing the system of formal rights and obligations is a subtle and elaborate structure of informal group norms; and beyond the sea, but present as controlling forces, are the owners of the ship, the owners of the goods in the ship, the various political and civil agencies that exercise jurisdiction over the conduct of ships and their captains, etc.

Because a ship at sea is often, even in these days, isolated from the land-bound organizations of which it is a part and to which it is variously responsible, the captain is traditionally empowered by all these organizations to serve as their representative while at sea. He can upon occasion even represent sacred authority, giving the dead decent burial and binding in marriage those of his passengers who are eligible and wish to be married. The captain of a ship has, thus, an extraordinary amount of authority. No other contemporary office, except perhaps that of pilot of an airplane, involves so many and such varied rights, and no other man has more encompassing authority over other men.

The fact that the captain of a ship at sea has great authority does not, however, mean that he also has freedom of action, *i.e.*, the power to make arbitrary decisions. On the contrary, in every order that he gives, every decision that he makes, he acts as an agent of some organization or other; and he is ultimately held accountable for his orders or decisions. To put it otherwise, he must protect the interests of his owners, the interests of those who have shipped goods or who are passengers on his ship, the interests of the various governmental bodies, including port authorities, the interests of the informal but tightly knit company of ship captains, the interests of his crew as a whole and as a number of distinct status groups, etc.

Many of the orders which he gives and to which he expects and usually obtains absolute obedience are routine, the standard operating procedures that have in the course of time become embodied in the tradition of good seamanship and are often formally designated by law. Should he fail to follow the practices so laid down and should disaster come to his ship, he will be held accountable by law (a court of inquiry will make the decision) and by his fellow seamen. Since ships and conditions that they encounter are infinitely varied, however, the captain of a ship is empowered to exercise considerable judgment, *i.e.*, to make policy decisions of considerable magnitude. But for these, too, he is ultimately held accountable, in the first instance by his junior officers and by the crew, upon whom his reputation as a captain ultimately rests.

The captain of a ship at sea must, in effect, endeavor to satisfy the values and views of a considerable number of groups, each with its somewhat distinct

direct conflict with members of the other organization, as it does in the case of modern warfare, initial success is determined by relative physical strength; but, as will be shown later, the ability of the military conqueror to remain ascendant depends upon a variety of other factors. The battle may go to the strong, but there is just enough truth in the Biblical statement that the meek will inherit the earth to lend support to the view that the ultimate victory often goes to the vanquished. In the terms of this analysis, ascendancy by means of physical force, personal or organizational, is always a temporary and precarious state of affairs; and in the long run the arrangements sanctioned and enforced by social control invariably prevail.

AUTOCRATIC CONTROL

The means by which an individual may gain ascendancy over one or more of his fellows are few and basically very simple. He may force others to conform to his will; he may induce them to do so with whatever he has to dispense or withhold; he may trick them into doing what he wants; he may convince them that they want to do what he wants them to do. These four methods of control encompass every specific procedure that man has yet devised for getting people to do what they would not normally do.

The ability of any individual to control the behavior of others through any one or a combination of these means invariably depends upon a variety of factors external to his desire to do so. Some of these factors are inherent in him as a person; his sex, age, physical attributes, and state of health and his mental and manual skills and other attributes of personality may foster or discourage his use of a given control device. It is obvious that neither a newborn infant nor a senile elder can coerce others to obedience; that sick men or frail women have slight physical ability to force others to their wills; that a poor man has little with which to hire his fellows; and that a woman who happens to be beautiful has more to offer than one who is ugly and misshapen. It is also obvious that, other things being equal, a man who is skilled with his fists—or in the use of knife, spear, or gun—is better qualified to control through coercion than is one who lacks such skills; that, given equal beauty, a woman skilled in coquetry can influence men more through her sex than can one who is timid and artless; that a verbally adroit person can convince with greater effect than can one who is verbally inept. Moreover, other things being equal, it is clear that one who is bold, ruthless, and physically courageous can control through coercion more effectively than can one who is cautious, considerate, and afraid; that one who is free from the restraints of conscience can promise more than can one who is hampered by strong regard for the literal truth; and that a woman with moral scruples is in some respects at a disadvantage over her sexually uninhibited sister. It does not follow, however, that strong men automatically rule the weak and that dishonest men invariably exploit the honest. What particular combination of personal characteristics will be favorable to ascendancy depends entirely upon the context in which the individual operates.

The context in which an individual strives for ascendancy not only determines what particular combination of personality attributes will be conducive to the gaining of ascendancy but also limits the scope and to a large measure

determines the kinds of ascendancy that can be achieved. Most limiting of the various factors invariably included within any context are the cultural, which determine what means of control are potentially effective and what specific devices may serve those means. Even the simplest, most "natural" method of control, brute force, does not have universal effectiveness. A man who can win in a free-for-all fight with any other man may in some societies, or in some groups within a society, thereby be qualified to intimidate the entire group. Usually, however, cultural and subcultural factors circumscribe both the permissible use of force and what can be gained by force. The fact that one man can physically dominate any other one of a group does not per se give him power over them all; they may, if their values, interests, etc., so dictate, unite against him. Even the possession of such a tool of coercion as a gun does not confer upon its possessor any fixed power. In a contemporary night club it may enable a man to subdue and rob the entire assemblage; among the gun-carrying cowboys in the "wild West" saloon, it gave him no special powers at all—a fact reflected in the descriptive term "equalizer" by which a pistol was often known in the frontier West.

Invariably a complex of cultural factors fixes the outside limits of individual ascendancy via a given means of control, prevents any effective use of some means, and sanctions the use of others. Only where and when gold is valued is the possession of gold a means to power; only where physical enslavement is culturally permitted can one be a slave master; only where there is the popular ballot can one gain political control by electioneering promises or by stuffing the ballot box. Some of the favored devices of ascendancy of a century or two ago are now beyond the pale; some that are currently successful were unknown and would have been ineffectual a century ago.

There would seem, moreover, to be no means by which an individual as an individual can exercise any considerable control over any considerable number of individuals for any significant length of time. The man with brutish strength or with a mechanical substitute therefor can actually coerce only those few who are in his immediate presence and, by and large, only as long as he can keep those few under direct surveillance. The magic man, primitive or modern, has somewhat wider power to coerce or convince; his curse is good whether he is present or not, and his promises of magical rewards are presumably inexhaustible. But the magic man can wield his power only over those who believe in his magic, and over them only as long as his use of his authority does not bring about a loss of their faith. Whatever the means used to achieve ascendancy, the endeavors of the individual must, as was indicated in the preceding chapter, be amplified through organization if he is to secure any considerable control over any considerable number of people. It is, therefore, to the exploitation of the administrative powers of organizational office that one must look for an explanation of any major form of ascendancy.

Autocratic Use of Authority. Whenever either the coercive or the pecuniary powers that are vested in an administrative office are used for ends

other than those sanctioned by the organization itself, the resulting control is autocratic in character. Such control is autocratic in that those subjected to it are invariably aware of the fact that they are being controlled by their superior and in that their submission to that control is reluctant. The consequences of such control may be the ultimate fulfillment of values held by those subjected to it, as would be the case were an administrator to demand extraordinary current sacrifices from his subordinates in order that they might in the long run enjoy exceptional monetary or other returns. On the other hand, the consequences of such control may be both currently and in the long run to the disadvantage of those subjected to it, as would be the case should the captain of a ship at sea arbitrarily—*i.e.*, in violation of the traditions of good seamanship—order full speed ahead in a heavy fog while near a rock-bound coast. But whatever the long-run consequences, any use of authority is autocratic which exceeds or violates the organizationally vested powers of an office and which secures only reluctant obedience from those who are subjected to it.

It is sometimes possible, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter, for administrative authority to be used for purposes of ascendancy in such a way that those subject to control are either unaware of the fact or else submit to it willingly. The means by which this can be done are, however, devious and of uncertain effectiveness, and they have inherent limitations. By comparison, the use of coercion and pecuniary means of controlling those subordinate to an organizational office are direct and, under favorable circumstances, almost mechanically effective. But conduct so secured is never in the full sense reliable, for it results from a choice on the part of those so controlled between two alternatives, neither of which is entirely acceptable.

The choice posed by an administrator who is using his coercive or pecuniary powers for purposes of ascendancy is that of continuing to adhere to the organizational rules and the supplementary norms of one or more status groups in violation of the administrator's demands, at the risk of being subjected to physical or pecuniary punishment, or of violating those rules and norms in order to escape such punishment or, alternately, secure some promised reward. Such a decision cannot be made without awareness of the fact that the administrator has imposed his will; and whatever the decision, it is certain to represent a choice of one of two "evils."

The coercive powers vested in any administrative office are always slight, and many otherwise powerful offices have none at all. For all his authority, the president of a college—or the President of the United States—cannot order corporal punishment administered to members of his staff or the student body (to do so is the right of the local police, the courts, etc.); and for all his great powers the manager of a giant business organization cannot in his official capacity threaten the most humble of his employees with physical punishment. Even those offices whose authority rests ultimately on coercion, as do those of a police chief, a military commander, and a gangster leader, have little

coercive power over the organization and rely primarily upon such less obvious means of control as pecuniary payment.

Whatever coercive power the authority of an office provides, no matter how slight and hedged about by regulatory and other restrictions, can, however, under some conditions be exploited by the individual who holds that office to give him considerable, if tenuous, ascendancy over large numbers of subordinates. Moreover, the pecuniary and related powers of an office, such as the authority to promote or demote subordinates, may be used at times to purchase from some subordinates further coercive powers over other subordinates. Thus through autocratic use of his pecuniary powers the administrator may enlarge whatever power to exercise coercion is vested in his office; and through effective use of this coercion, he may then in turn extend his vested powers to exert pecuniary pressures upon his subordinates. Such is, in principle, the process by which the modest coercive and pecuniary powers of an office are occasionally amplified to provide autocratic control of large numbers of people.

INTIMIDATION

Coercion is, it will be recalled, a negative sanction. One may punish, or threaten to punish, for failure to conform to what is required; coercion cannot, for evident reasons, be used as a reward for conformity to that requirement.¹ Pecuniary and related sanctions, on the other hand, may be used either negatively or positively; the slave may have his dinner taken away from him, or he may be promised more bread for dinner; the waged worker may be threatened with a loss of wages or of the job itself, or he may be promised a higher wage or a better job; etc.

Tyranny. The use or threat of coercion or negative pecuniary sanctions, or both, constitutes intimidation; and to the extent that an individual gains ascendancy by this means, the form of autocratic control that he exercises is tyranny. Intimidation is the most crass means of achieving autocratic control, and at basis the individual who relies on this means is simply a grown-up version of the common boy bully. The idea, developed in the effort to explain the excessive savagery of the tyrants who ruled the Nazi slave camps of war-time Germany and of such masters of tyranny as Hermann Goering, that intimidation is aggression induced by frustration is unnecessarily devious. Possibly a petty tyrant, such as the head bookkeeper who keeps his staff intimidated to no apparent end, is a henpecked husband or a disappointed worker

¹ The technique of parole, in which convicts are released from confinement as a reward for good conduct, is not a positive use of coercion, as it might seem at first glance. The inducement to good conduct is freedom from coercive restraints; the fact that it is the latter which gives value to the former does not mean that it was imprisonment that brought about the good conduct. For the same reasons, the autocrat who first terrorizes and then promises freedom from that terror in return for conformity to his demands (a device much favored by political dictatorships, past and present) is not using coercion as a positive sanction. What he is doing is demonstrating in advance his coercive powers, thereby sensitizing his subjects to the coercive penalty for not obeying his commands.

who takes out his frustrations by cowing those over whom he has administrative authority. But a grand tyrant, such as the man who makes a fortune by driving his workers harder than do his competitors, the captain of a hellship, the political dictator who actually, not just in theory, rules through his secret police, is more likely to be just an ambitious and brutish person. He is certain to be a man of limited social sensitivity; for those whom he intimidates may fear but will hardly admire him. And he is probably either unacquainted with or impatient with the arts of guile, the devices of indirection; for although intimidation is the most direct and obvious means to power, it is the most precarious.

Intimidation is a harsh means of control which never secures general social sanction. A society may sanction tyrannical rule over some small and disfranchised segment of the population, as premodern Europeans sanctioned the brutal intimidation of prisoners and of sailors at sea and as the German people sanctioned the brutal treatment and extermination of Jews during the Nazi reign. But no society sanctions general intimidation; for, from one point of view at least, the primary function of any society is to provide the members with security, which means at the minimum freedom from fear of physical harm and some assurance of continued physical maintenance. Intimidation gains social sanction only in those areas of life and at those times when it is the general consensus that autocratic control is essential to survival and that no means but intimidation will be effective. Where that definition obtains, times are hard; and hard men—*i.e.*, those who strive for ascendancy through intimidation—will have some opportunity to succeed.

Those who are subjected to intimidation never, of course, sanction it; but unless their intimidation is given some, if only passive, sanction by the larger society, they will be enabled in one way or another to escape the tyrant's threat of coercion or pecuniary punishment. When, for example, the people of the Northern states withdrew their passive support of Southern slavery, the coercive powers of slaveowners over the slaves were considerably lessened, if only because the escaped slave was then able to secure sanctuary in a Northern state. As the sailing ship, in which life was inevitably harsh and dangerous, gave way to the steamship, the social sanction of brutal treatment of sailors was gradually withdrawn; and with it passed the time of brutal sailing masters. Similarly, when the early petroleum industry began to gain status in the United States as a legitimate business—*i.e.*, as people became dependent upon the orderly and continuous supply of petroleum products—it became subject to the mores and laws governing legitimate businesses. The passive sanction by the society at large of the methods of intimidation by which John D. Rockefeller had been gaining ascendancy (the near monopoly of the Standard Oil Company) was therewith withdrawn, and legal means were soon invoked to prevent further consolidation through coercion and economic intimidation.²

² In the Standard Oil wars, as they were often called, the two stock devices of modern business tyranny were used. In the first of these, Standard employees threatened and

The members of a society that sanctions the intimidation of the members of a given business or other organization, of the people who belong to a special and disfranchised class, etc., usually disavow either the existence of that intimidation or their sanction of it. At the conclusion of World War II, for example, the German people (or at least those who were brought to trial by the Allies or into such trials as witnesses) first denied that slave-labor and extermination camps had existed and, when they were proved to have existed, then denied knowing that they had. Likewise, few contemporary Americans are likely to admit that in the United States the professional prostitute has *de facto* almost no rights before the law and can be and sometimes is ruled by the local vice lord by intimidation.

But the fact is that, on the whole, whatever intimidation exists is socially sanctioned. A tyrant must be supported, at least to the extent of not having his normal powers of office taken from him. And since those over whom he rules as tyrant are wholly and constantly opposed to his rule, they must be considerably less than the total population or he would have no support for his endeavors. (He must, moreover, be able to secure, through means other than intimidation, supporters who serve as his intimidating agents. He cannot, for reasons that will be discussed shortly, rule by intimidation those who extend his intimidating powers beyond his own person.)

Techniques of Intimidation. The authoritative rights of an administrative office in a political, business, religious, military, or other organization include, as has been indicated, some policy-making and policy-enforcing powers. Whatever the nature of the particular organization, an administrator can through policy decisions directly affect the welfare of his subordinates. If those upon whom he is dependent for retention of his office (his peers and his superiors) are either agreeable or sufficiently disinterested to remain aloof, he may violate the rules affecting policy to the end that his subordinates may be intimidated into conforming to his demands.

Every member of every organization has, it will be recalled, a variety of both formal and informal rights and obligations which have evolved historically and which he and his associates tend to consider the normal for the particular role within the organization. He cherishes his rights, however petty they may be, and fulfills his obligations as an understood condition for the preservation of those rights. Intimidation of a subordinate by an administrator is accomplished by jeopardizing the normal role rights of the subordinate, or placing or threatening to place excessive obligations on him, or both. The

sometimes actually attacked the persons of those employed by lesser firms and attacked and destroyed the wagons and other properties of those firms. When this tactic failed to bring local competitors to terms—or to bankruptcy—Standard would engage in a local price war that was ruinous to the local firm but could be financed by Standard from the monopoly profits obtained elsewhere. See A. Nevins, *Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller* (2 vols., Scribner, New York, 1953).

specific nature of the threat or threats will, of course, depend upon the organization, the subordinate's role therein, and the policy-making powers of the administrator.

In the modern business organization, for example, the individual has the right to employment for a certain number of hours per day or days per year, to a given hourly or annual wage, to some sort of prospect for promotion to more desirable roles or to some sort of seniority privileges, to a vacation period, sick leave, etc. He also has the expectation that his working conditions—*i.e.*, the physical circumstances under which he works, the tools he uses in accomplishing his work, and the like—will remain constant, if not actually be improved upon. All these rights can be somewhat and sometimes markedly affected by administrative decisions. If he can be discharged "for cause" by his superior, he can also be discharged "without cause"—*i.e.*, on trumped-up charges—for failure to adhere to the autocratic demands of his superior. And, such being the case, he can be threatened with such discharge, which is probably the simplest and most common form of intimidation in modern society. He may also, and possibly quite as effectively, be intimidated by the threat that his other rights will be violated if he does not subordinate himself to the will of his superior—*e.g.*, that he will not be promoted in due course, that his work will be reclassified at a lower pay rate, etc.

The obligations of a worker in modern business involve the fulfillment of some designated task or tasks at some more or less standardized level of performance. However simple the task and measurable the level of performance, administrative decisions can usually increase the worker's actual obligations. He may, for example, be given substandard tools or materials to work with, his product may be subjected to hypercritical inspection, or he may be assigned an unusually inept assistant and be blamed for the consequences.

The means of intimidating the ordinary worker in business or industry have their parallel in every sort of organization and with every level of membership. Tenure rules may prevent the discharge "without cause" of a college professor by his dean or president; but should one of the latter wish to play the tyrant, he could make the professor somewhat, and possibly very, miserable by depriving him of some of his traditional, and usually unofficial, rights, such as that of having an office to himself, and by encumbering him with new obligations, such as appointment to a number of time-consuming and fruitless committees. In religious, police, and military organizations a favorite device of intimidation is threatening to assign an individual to an especially undesirable post—*i.e.*, to give the priest a dull, difficult, and unrewarding parish, to transfer the policeman to a task or a district which he will dislike, and to see that an officer is assigned to a poor command. The individual so punished usually suffers adversity in the new post and at the same time is likely to lose his chances for normal advancement in rank. There is little opportunity for the man who is assigned to some dull and isolated post to distinguish himself

or to cultivate the acquaintance of superiors who might help him, and at the same time the conditions under which he operates are likely to earn for him the reputation of being a mediocre, if not incompetent, man.

Intimidation usually, but not always, depends for its effect in part at least upon the involvement of persons to whom the intimidated individual is attached by sentiment or other ties, such as his wife and children, elders for whom he is responsible, or friends. Other things being equal, a man with a family, for example, is more susceptible to intimidation than is one who need not consider the effects of a reduction in wages, discharge, or transfer to a poor post upon anyone but himself. Thus what may constitute effective intimidation with the cautious, responsible workers in an office may be ineffective with the typically mobile and unattached sailors, construction workers, or lumberjacks. As a consequence, intimidation of such men tends to be based much more on coercion than on negative pecuniary sanctions.

Usually the intimidating procedure is fairly direct. A tyrant cannot hope to be loved as well as obeyed; he does not, therefore, hesitate to make known his demands and the fact that failure to conform to them will be punished. If he does not have sanction from his superiors for his endeavor, he may attempt to keep his intimidation on an informal, unofficial level. In any event, if he meets resistance, he demonstrates his powers to punish by administering punishment to that person and in that place where it will do the most good.

In some instances, however, intimidation is quite indirect, an implication of the conditions under which the members of the organization operate. The practice, now largely in disrepute, of making the employees of a business enterprise dependent upon continued employment for their housing as well as their monetary income (*i.e.*, the "company town" system) tended to give the managers of such enterprises extraordinary powers over their subordinates. The latter knew, without explicit statement, that if they were discharged, with or without cause, they would have to pick up and move elsewhere. Moreover, under such circumstances the employee usually purchased his supplies from a company agency and was commonly in debt to it, which further increased his dependence upon his job and hence upon his retaining the good will of his superiors.

Company pension plans in which the employee acquires over the years an increasing, but untransferable, stake in an old-age pension operate in somewhat the same way. The employee knows that if he is discharged he loses not only his job but his future pension rights; and since as he gets older his job opportunities decline and his pension rights increase, he grows more susceptible to intimidation as the years pass. Labor unions have long been opposed to company pension plans on the grounds that they make the worker subservient to the company and hence open to intimidation; and while other motives may enter into their opposition, there is certainly some validity to this charge.

More devious than either the company-town system or the company pen-

sion plan is the system in which employment is contingent upon home ownership and other evidences of social stability. Banking establishments frequently require their employees to own their homes, purchase stock in the bank, etc.; but whether the policy stems from the hope that the employee so tied down will be less likely than otherwise to abscond with bank funds or from managerial desire to increase, if not to use, its powers of intimidation is not known. At any event, the policy does tend to give the employer a stronger hold on his employee.

Secret Police and Other Agencies of Intimidation. Those who are controlled through intimidation invariably resist as well as resent that control. Some of the forms of resistance will be analyzed shortly. The inevitability of resistance means that the intimidation of large numbers of people must be organized. The tyrant cannot himself watch over those whom he intimidates nor can he depend upon them for information regarding how well and fully his dictates are being fulfilled. To secure such information and to assure that his threats of punishment are carried out when he so orders, he relies upon some sort of organization of agents who are loyal to him; *e.g.*, hired spies, a secret police, a "goon squad." That organization, when effective, serves the tyrant as the agency which enforces his autocratic rule.

It is to be observed, however, that whatever the size and particular form of such an organization, it is an agency for intimidation but is not itself controlled through intimidation. Political tyrants have no doubt at times endeavored to control their spies, informers, and secret police by threatening them in the same way that they have attempted to threaten through them the general populace; but an intimidated spy is inevitably an unreliable one, a frightened informer is a source of misinformation, and a police force subject to tyranny is of small service to tyranny. This fact is illustrated by the way in which police and military forces often side openly at the outbreak of political revolts with the revolvers against the vested authorities. In such instances what happens is that the men in power, in their endeavor to keep the general population intimidated, come to rely upon intimidation to control their police and military, thus giving the police and military a cause in common with those whom they are required to intimidate.

To be at all effective, the agents of intimidation must be reasonably loyal to the autocratic power. That loyalty may in some instances be in part at least a consequence of ideological conviction; more commonly, however, it is purchased—*i.e.*, the tyrant rules his agents by one or more of the positive, nonintimidatory controls that will be discussed shortly. Thus a political tyrant may make his secret police an elite force, paying them well and giving them a variety of special privileges. The Nazi Party in this way secured the loyalty of the Storm Troopers, an organization of bullies who upon command intimidated sections of the general population. During his attempt to gain a monopoly of the petroleum industry in America, John D. Rockefeller reputedly used hired spies and hired saboteurs, who by wrecking the equipment and

beating up the employees of small, local competitors "demonstrated" the advisability of selling out to Standard Oil, and gave his business agents an incentive by providing them a financial and occupational stake in the success of his enterprise. It is claimed that when Henry Ford undertook to keep his employees nonunionized by systematically intimidating them, he developed a corps of well-paid and well-trained spies and thugs to detect and then beat up workers who had joined a union and, most especially, workers who had become agents of a union and were serving as its advocates within the plant.³

SEDUCTION

The positive use of the pecuniary and related powers of an office for purposes of ascendancy is a somewhat more subtle means of control than is the use of either coercion or negative pecuniary sanctions, if only because the promise of reward for conformity to autocratic demands is likely to be implicit rather than explicit. At any event, the individual who acts in terms of such a promise is seduced into doing so rather than intimidated; he is presented with an opportunity to secure, rather than lose, something that he values, provided that he violates the rules of the organization of which he is a member or the norms of the informal group or groups to which he belongs, or both. In actual practice an autocrat probably resorts to an admixture of intimidation and seduction, or else vacillates from major reliance on the one to major reliance on the other. Analytically, however, these means of autocratic control are quite distinct.

The promised rewards through which an autocrat may attempt to seduce his subordinates may be anything from money to prestige; whatever they are, they constitute an increase in the individual's organizational role rights, a

³ During the latter half of the last century many of the so-called detective agencies, such as Pinkerton's, were in fact suppliers to business enterprises of hiring spies, strikebreakers, and private police for use in the intimidation of workers. Labor unionizers likewise resorted to intimidation in the effort to bring reluctant or frightened workers into the union and to break down the resistance of company officials. At times it was difficult for the worker caught between agents of the company and those of the union to know just which side had set fire to his house, beaten him up, or threatened his wife with sudden death.

Until the strike under union auspices had become established as a systematic and more or less socially approved means whereby organized labor could apply economic sanctions against employers, unionization and striking constituted a sort of resistance movement—a subject that will be considered later as an aspect of military conquest.

For materials on the strike as a modern form of economic, as distinct from coercive, means of control see W. L. Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory. The Strike: A Social Analysis* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947); A. Lindsey, *The Pullman Strike* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942); and H. Kraus, *The Many and the Few* (Plantin Press, Los Angeles, 1947).

For materials on Henry Ford's use of a secret police to prevent Ford Motor Company employees from joining unions see K. Sward, *The Legend of Henry Ford* (Rinehart, New York, 1948). Other materials on secret police and their various uses are provided by J. Golomb, *Armies of Spies* (Macmillan, New York, 1939), and E. K. Bramstedt, *Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear* (Routledge, London, 1945).

decrease in his role obligations, or both. Thus the employer in industry who wants to install new and more efficient machinery or a new technical process or make some other innovation in his plant operations might bribe his workers into a grudging acceptance of the change by promising them a higher hourly wage or a shorter workday. Likewise, the police chief who has found a new source of graft (one not yet sanctioned by the informal norms of the force) might induce his staff to close their eyes to the indicated violation of the law by promising each his share of the take, by promising his key men rapid promotion, or by using his administrative powers to grant such special privileges as an extra day off with pay.

Whatever it is that is offered, it is a temptation to the individual to act in violation of other and prior controls. The individual who succumbs to seduction thus conforms to the dictates of the autocratic power reluctantly, for he is sacrificing something he values for something that, for the moment at least, he values more. Usually the seduced individual loses status in one or more of the groups to which he belongs, in one or more of the groups to which he aspires, in his own eyes, or in all three. Thus the man who has secured promotion by subordinating himself to the dictates of an autocratic superior may be looked upon as a traitor by his former associates, as a weakling by his new associates, and as dishonest or something equally reprehensible by himself.

Although seduction secures at most only reluctant conformity to the demands of the autocrat, such conformity is "willing" and hence is reliable to the extent that the seduced individual cannot, having struck his bargain, go back on it. This extent depends, among other things, upon the way in which and the degree to which the bargain has cost the individual social status. If most of the members of a work organization are seduced into accepting some new tool or work procedure, no one of them suffers much loss of status; each may feel a bit uncomfortable for a while, but in time they will together convert those who have held out, and new work norms will evolve to sanction the innovation. The professional thief who has been induced to turn police informer, on the other hand, thereby becomes in that role a pariah to all honorable thieves and does not at the same time gain satisfactory status in the company of policemen. Having sold out to the police, he can seldom return to his former profession and is likely to be dependent for his livelihood on maintaining his role as a police informer. In many instances, therefore, an individual who has been seduced by an autocrat becomes dependent upon and hence of necessity loyal to his seducer.

As was indicated above, the loyalty of the members of an effective agency of intimidation is ordinarily bought. If they are known to those whom they intimidate, they are hated. Thus if the police are an agency of political tyranny, they will have only negative status among the general population. A young man who joins such a force immediately loses his prior status; *e.g.*, his parents covertly disown him and his friends turn against him. Thereafter his status

is in and provided only by the police force. As an agency of intimidation, that force is dependent for its continued existence upon its sponsor, the political autocrat. Should he fall, the police as his agent will be dissolved, if not destroyed. Such being the case, the individual who has been seduced into joining the police force has a vested interest in the maintenance of the system of autocratic rule of which it is a part.

The members of a secret police force or comparable agency of covert intimidation, such as company spies, have equal if more devious reasons for being loyal to their master. They do not ordinarily lose status in the groups to which they have belonged prior to their seduction; indeed, that status is largely what gives them value to the seducer—they can inform because they are accepted by the workers in the factory, by the citizen in the street, etc. But they are *de facto* traitors to their associates and would be so treated were their cupidity known. The autocrat who uses them has it within his power to reveal their identity where it will do them the most harm, a possibility which must always haunt the members of any secret agency of intimidation and so further their resolve to serve their master well in order to preserve their value to him.

The Venal Organization. An employer who seduces his workmen into accepting a new and more efficient method of production is proceeding autocratically, and some among his organization may register their disgruntlement by labeling him tyrant. But if the innovation that he has thus promoted proves effective, it may in time win over the workers, who may then look upon him as a competent leader. Seduction is always a means of inducing people to violate rules, norms, values, etc. But if it leads ultimately to more rights and fewer obligations for those who are seduced, as is usually the case with innovations in technology and sometimes with innovations of an organizational nature, the means may be forgiven in view of the ends achieved.

When, however, the ultimate end—what is accomplished by the seduction—violates the value system of those who are seduced, their distaste for the means is augmented by disapproval of the result. Such is usually the consequence when the end is the personal glory, wealth, or the like of the autocrat rather than the greater advantage of the organization as a whole. An autocrat is not, in this case, a “competent” leader but a “corrupt” one. And it is the normal tendency for the corruption of an autocratic leader to spread progressively through his entire organization until it becomes in many, if not all, respects venal.

The fact that the members of an organization have been seduced into aiding and abetting the personal desires of their leader and in so doing have violated organizational and other standards and values makes them participants in his guilt; for they have themselves profited by his corruption. Some may resolve that, having sinned once, they will thereafter resist temptation; but as a rule, an individual who has profited from corruption and who has, moreover, before him the corrupt example of his superior is inclined to be more

rather than less corruptible thereafter. This is the sociopsychological basis for the observation that once an individual violates a standard or norm of conduct, it ceases to be a standard for him. What may happen in an organization is that the members become progressively more seducible and at some point begin to turn, as opportunity offers, to seducing their subordinates for personal ends. As the process runs its course, the organization becomes increasingly malfunctioning; and if the process is not reversed in time, the organization itself may wither away.

For example, it was the progressive seduction of the clergy for corrupt ends, presumably originating in the higher offices, that brought the medieval Church into such general disrepute that a religious revolution (Protestantism) ultimately occurred. Churchmen were, through this period, living in a way that princes would have liked; offices were sold, for gold or favors, to the highest bidder; the powers of each office were in turn sold to satisfy the personal whims of the officeholder; and so on down to the humble priest, who seduced the local maidens with promises of eternal salvation.

Organizations such as diplomatic, military, and similar agencies, whose services are for the most part unmeasurable, would seem to be especially inclined to become venal. In many instances a peacetime military force, when thrust into actual combat, has turned out to be an army of nonfighters with no ability to resist its military opponent. In such cases what has happened is that during the period of peace each of the many members of the service has evolved his own little autocratic sphere of influence and has pampered his personal desires at the expense of the organizational needs, with the consequence that the military force has become an army of generals, servants to generals, and servants to the servants, all fat and flabby and all engaged in the effort to extend the rights of their offices and avoid the obligations.

Venality should not be confused with bureaucratization, although in a given instance they may go hand in hand. Venality involves the selling out of the rights of an office for personal ends, whereas bureaucratization subordinates all offices to rule and regulation. Whatever inefficiency develops in highly bureaucratic organizations arises mainly from the inability of the organization to get things done promptly and with minimum cost in man-hours and materials. The inefficiency that arises from venality, on the other hand, consists of getting things done—perhaps with dispatch—which serve personal rather than organizational ends. Thus the social costs of building a dam or other public works may be about the same whether the work is done under the direction of an inefficient government bureau or a grafting private contractor; but the reasons for the excessive costs would be different, and so, too, would be the social consequences. The inefficiencies of the bureau would arise from adherence to antiquated procedures, duplication of organizational functions, wastage of materials, etc. From all this no one would profit personally, except in the sense that more men, including bureaucrats, would secure employment on the project. The venal contracting company might, however, build

the dam efficiently but at the same time draw off for the personal use of the contractor and various of his subordinates materials and manpower equivalent to that wasted under bureaucratic administration.

Probably the maximum social inefficiency is achieved by a bureaucratic organization that has become venal, as when a military organization inefficiently satisfies the autocratic demands of its commanding officer for special quarters, those of his lieutenants for an especially luxurious officers' club, and so on down the ranks to those of its mess sergeant for tenderloin steaks.

CONTROL THROUGH AUTOCRATIC FIAT

The third and, in the modern world at least, most common means of autocratic control is through fiat, *i.e.*, the simple command "Let *this* be done." Every administrative office carries with it, as has been said, some right to make policy decisions and some power to enforce them. Enforcement is normally achieved through administrative fiat. Having decided that this man should be discharged and that one hired to replace him, the administrator so orders; having concluded that a storm should be avoided by a change of course, the captain of a ship so orders; and so on.

An administrative order becomes an autocratic fiat when what it requires to be done exceeds the policy-making authority that is vested in the administrative office. Petty autocratic fiat is no doubt a commonplace. An administrator who has the right to discharge an employee in the interests of organizational efficiency may rather easily use that right to discharge a given employee for personal whim or the like. But the use of autocratic fiat to achieve any major change in established organizational procedures, whether to the ultimate benefit of the organization or for personal gain, is always contingent upon the existence of favorable conditions.

The Habit of Uncritical Obedience. On the whole, an office in which are vested considerable policy-making rights and powers, such as that of officer in a military force or captain of a ship, provides a favorable condition for ascendancy through autocratic fiat. Those who are subordinate to such an office are accustomed to taking and obeying orders without question. Their interest in the purpose of new orders, if they ever had any, becomes dulled through time, with the result that they tend to obey any command, routine or otherwise, uncritically and from force of habit. A young helmsman may wonder why he is ordered to change course; but eventually he is likely to change course as ordered without reflection, without, as it were, inquiring whether this particular order represents a decision which has been made in accordance with the rules governing good navigation, the interests of the ship and its personnel, and the wishes of the shipowners.

When those subordinate to a given office are habituated to uncritical obedience to administrative fiat, they are susceptible to rule by autocratic fiat. The autocratic control thus exercised is often absolute; *i.e.*, the command of the autocrat is carried out faithfully and without reluctance. But the dura-

tion of such control depends upon the nature of the consequences and how soon the consequences become apparent to those involved. If through autocratic fiat the captain of a ship brings his ship to disaster, all his powers, administrative and autocratic, tend to dissolve. Likewise, a military officer who wantonly expends his troops in combat for his own greater glory is likely to come in short order to an end to his powers, either because he runs out of men to command, because their habit of uncritical obedience breaks down under adverse experience, or because he is found out by his superiors and relieved of his command. On the other hand, an administrator who uses autocratic fiat to achieve ends which are valued by his organization will, like the one who uses seduction in the same way, usually be forgiven for the means he uses and may even be honored for the ends he accomplishes. It is to this possibility that administrators refer when they say that it is quite all right to break a rule or violate an order from above provided, of course, that one is quite certain that one is right.

The *Fait Accompli*. An order or decree issued by an administrator as a person but not sanctioned by the office he occupies is the simplest form of autocratic fiat. More complex, but probably quite as common, is the *fait accompli*. In this procedure, an administrator makes an atypical commitment to some higher authority which involves his subordinates without their knowledge.

As has been indicated, the functions of an administrative office normally include responsibility for the welfare, as organizationally defined, of subordinates. On the one hand the administrator is expected by his superiors to see that the members of his organization fulfill their role obligations; on the other hand, he is expected by those members to see that their rights are fulfilled—to “protect them,” as they might describe it, “from exploitation.” His position is, therefore, that of a go-between: he represents his superiors and to some extent the organization as a whole in his relations with his subordinates, and he represents those subordinates in his relations with his superiors. There tends to be a dynamic balance, of which he is a sort of fulcrum, between the forces pressing him from below and those pressing him from above.

Many of the normal policy decisions of an administrator involve the task of resolving disequilibriums, specifically, of warding off demands from above that cannot be fulfilled without jeopardizing the established rights or increasing the normal obligations of his subordinates, and vice versa. Thus, should the captain of a ship be required by the owners to sail without a full crew, he would be expected and might by law be required to resist that demand; conversely, should the crew slack off in the fulfillment of their normal duties, he would be expected by the owners to discipline them. Likewise, should the Board of Trustees or Regents of a university require the president to put into effect a regulation which violates established academic practices, he would be expected by his faculty to rise in their defense; and should they make demands on him which, if satisfied, would in his judgment jeopardize the wel-

fare of the institution as a whole, he would be expected by the trustees and others to refuse such demands.

An administrator may, however, for reasons of his own, favor his superiors or his subordinates; usually it is the former. The procedure is then that of committing his subordinates, without consulting them, to some new obligation, to the loss of some old right, or to both. Since the agreement is final and irrevocable, his subordinates have no alternative but to comply.

Used skillfully and with moderation, the device of the *fait accompli* may enable the administrator to exercise autocratic powers covertly, *i.e.*, without his subordinates becoming aware of the fact. He may, for example, tell them in effect, "I know that this is contrary to rules and does not make sense, but by agreeing to this I have avoided that." Since he makes certain that the "this" is preferable to the "that," their normal tendency is to give his autocratic demand their grudging support in the belief that, if they do not do so, a higher authority will exact even greater sacrifices from them. When successful, the strategy binds the subordinates to the autocrat in an alliance against a higher authority, an authority which the autocrat has cast in the role of tyrant.

A variant on the above procedure is the administrator's creating among his subordinates the impression that the organization is in jeopardy, arousing in them apprehension for their individual and collective future, and then demanding of them considerably less than they have been led to fear would be required. As a preparation for the introduction of some new laborsaving device, an employer might, for example, let it become known that the enterprise is in danger of being bankrupted by more efficient competitors, changes in market demands, etc. When his employees are thoroughly demoralized, he can then "save" the business and their jobs by the decision to install new equipment. It is to be observed that such strategy is a small-scale application of the false crisis which is used so often by political leaders to gain public sanction for what is *de facto* an autocratic fiat. Involved in this strategy is conversion of the people involved, largely through verbal manipulation, to a belief in the reality of the purported crisis. In the following chapter the nature of and limits to control by conversion will be analyzed. It is to be noted, further, that gaining sanction for a *fait accompli* by first creating a false crisis is a covert form of intimidation. The sanction thus secured is therefore given with great reluctance and will promptly be withdrawn should the reality of the crisis become suspect.

The "Honeymoon." Demoralization that is produced by real, as distinct from simulated, crisis constitutes an exceptionally favorable climate for the rise or exercise of autocratic control. The larger aspects of this phenomenon will be considered in the concluding chapter of this work. Related to it is a condition of affairs which might be termed "slow" or "creeping" organizational crisis, which under certain circumstances offers limited opportunity for control through autocratic fiat.

When, for whatever reasons, the members of an organization or subdivision thereof have experienced a gradual loss, however slight, of role rights, an increase of role obligations, or both, they may become discontented but not necessarily demoralized. The distinction arises from the fact that discontent is with things as they are, whereas demoralization, as has been shown, normally involves discouragement over future prospects as well. Often, but not invariably, the discontented members of an organization attribute their difficulties to one or another or all of their superiors; that is, they consider that the cause of the crisis is faulty leadership and that, such being the case, new leadership might restore the old and valued normality.

The replacement of a superior who is held responsible for unsatisfactory conditions is always welcomed by his subordinates; if at the same time the replacement is a person of their own choosing, or one whom for other reasons they regard with favor, they will be inclined to grant the new superior the right to use his administrative powers autocratically. As they may see it, radical measures are necessary to correct for his predecessor's ineptitude or cupidity. Such being the case, whatever the new superior requires of them will be sanctioned, however much it may seem for the moment to aggravate rather than correct the conditions which they dislike.

The granting of autocratic powers to a new and welcomed administrator is normally of very short duration. Unless his use of such powers quickly produces the results desired by his subordinates, they ordinarily withdraw the powers they have granted to him. On the other hand, if the changes that he inaugurates do produce the desired results, the crisis passes; and with the end of the crisis the reasons for sanctioning autocratic procedures disappear. Because it is, through either failure or success, inherently short-lived, the period during which subordinates grant autocratic powers to a new leader is usually described as the "honeymoon."

The Interstices of Organizational Structure. When organizational development is incomplete or when the rise of new external circumstances produces an organizational need that is not provided for in the established system, there may be a gap or interstice between the fields occupied by the various departments of the organization. Any such interstice offers an excellent opportunity for ascendancy to that official of the organization who perceives its existence; he can more or less autocratically preempt the field. An ambitious administrator thrives on unoccupied organizational territory. Just as a revivalist may feed on the unsatisfied longing of depressed minorities, an aggressive administrator may enlarge his office by "discovering" and then absorbing functions that do not belong to any other office. Sometimes, no doubt, the discovered interstice is real; often it is an invention of the ascendant individual, who, having "discovered" the need, then convinces his superiors that it should be satisfied—by, of course, his own office. In setting up the procedures for fulfilling this need he can then proceed autocratically, "writing his own ticket," as it is often termed. By a succession of such expansions, a

minor office is sometimes built up into a major one and a minor official is thereby made into an important executive.

The rise of Hitler to political eminence in Germany during the late 1920s is a large-scale illustration of this source of autocratic powers.⁴ The pseudo-democratic form of government forced upon the Germans by the victorious Allies was not providing the rigorous political control to which the German people were accustomed; many areas of social life were, therefore, either unoccupied or had been preempted by nonpolitical persons and agencies that did not have full social sanction. Progressive monetary inflation was but one of the symptoms of the instability that made the German people of the time somewhat demoralized and considerably discouraged; they needed the reassuring feel of firm political control. Hitler offered them a return to strong and efficient government and was granted by his supporters, and also by the industrialists and others who hoped to use him for their own purposes, considerable autocratic powers. In a quite different way, Franklin D. Roosevelt also filled in a social vacuum, one that was created by economic disaster and the failure of business leaders and of the Republican political leaders to take quick, vigorous action. In both these instances crisis occasioned the organizational interstice; but it was that interstice which first enabled both these men to exercise tremendous, though short-lived, autocratic control over a host of political and other functionaries.

Ordinarily the organizational need, if it is a real one, is something that has existed for long but is not recognized as such until someone calls it to attention. Thus the need for efficiency in industry is a normal and constant outcome of the profit motive; but attempts to fulfill that need have occurred only sporadically and then very segmentally. During the early 1920s, for example, it was discovered that the placing and arrangement of machines and tools to suit the convenience of the workers rather than the ideas of the plant designer often increased production considerably. On this discovery, a whole new class of industrial offices evolved; and for a time at least the plant efficiency engineer was more or less master of all he surveyed. Subsequently it was discovered that the physical welfare of the worker was an important determinant of productivity; and a new class of offices developed—personnel managers who often rather autocratically determined washroom policy, lighting needs, rest periods, etc. Still later the discovery was made that the psychological welfare of the worker is even more important than his physical state; and of recent years personnel officials have extended their sphere out from the plant itself to compete with established welfare agencies for the right to make the worker content in his family and recreational groupings.

The normal condition of a competitive organization is a state of dynamic equilibrium, a state in which each of the several departments and other group-

⁴ For one of the more recent of many efforts to analyze the procedures by which Hitler and his Nazi Party rose to power see K. Heiden, *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1944).

ings within the organization struggles constantly and more or less effectively to hold its own and thereby to prevent any one of the others from encroaching on its preserves. Equilibrium can, upon occasion, become static, as when a once-competitive organization has so gone to seed that everything is done in a routine fashion and no one or no group is in any significant measure striving for ascendancy. Under such conditions morale is fairly low; individual participation in the organization's activities is lethargic and uninterested, and an air of somnolence hangs over the whole enterprise. The various members no doubt in a sense enjoy things as they are, otherwise things would not remain that way. But when someone with a zest for action and a hatful of new ideas ("new blood," is the usual term) is introduced into such an organization, he is often welcomed for the very clamor and conflict that he induces. The welcome is usually qualified, but it may provide the newcomer with "honeymoon" autocratic powers, which, if used effectively, may even lead to a general revitalization of the organization.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO AUTOCRATIC CONTROL

Other things being equal, the extent to which the authority of an office can be used autocratically depends upon the alternatives available to those affected by the office. Those in a position superior to the office will tolerate a good deal of autocratic behavior on the part of an incumbent if he is deemed irreplaceable, *i.e.*, the best man, even discounting his autocratic demands, available for the position. Thus General MacArthur's military and political superiors endured his "grandstanding" and yielded to many of the dictatorial demands he imposed upon them for years in the belief that he was the best available man for the Far Eastern Command. Similarly, a college board that has had great difficulty in securing a prominent educator to serve as president will probably be rather indulgent with the one whom they secure and may give in to his peremptory demands for a free hand in the running of the college rather than face the task of obtaining an acceptable substitute for him.

To the subordinates of an autocratic man, it is less his irreplaceability that determines the outer limits of their tolerance than the availability to them of acceptable alternative positions. When jobs are scarce, industrial workers generally submit to a good deal more "abuse," as they view it, from supervisors and others over them than they do when there are many job opportunities. Under the latter circumstance, industrial workers are likely to be very sensitive to their rights and quick to resent and resist anything that smacks of exploitation. In similar but usually more complex ways, the factor of alternatives influences the willingness of the members of any organization to accept passively autocratic demands made on them.

Since the alternatives available to various segments of an organization may differ, it is sometimes possible for an official to purchase the support of one or more segments at the expense of one or more others. He can successfully demand sacrifices from those groups whose members have no alternative but

to submit; with what is thus gained he may perhaps buy the support of those members and groups which have alternatives available. For example, in the years immediately following World War II the colleges and universities of America experienced a rapid increase in registrations, often a twofold increase. At the same time, student interests tended markedly toward the sciences, and the demand for academic personnel was, for a variety of reasons, very high in the physical sciences and very low in the humanities. Under these circumstances, college and university presidents, faced with relatively fixed budgets and with intense competition for scientific personnel, frequently violated the established rights of the humanists; to secure scientists, they often gave the scientists the best of available facilities and the major part of the funds secured from the increased enrollments and required the humanists to carry heavier teaching loads and to work with substandard facilities at little or no increase in salaries.

With the occasional and always partial exceptions discussed above, the autocratic demands made by an officeholder either reduce the established rights or increase the established obligations, or both, of some or many members of the organization. Those so affected invariably resent the demands made upon them; to them the demands are unjust, inexpedient, and contrary to reason or nature or the will of God. At the very least, such resentment is expressed as job or other role dissatisfaction, *i.e.*, as antagonism toward the official who has made the demands and as irritability and quarrelsomeness. Such resentment tends to be cumulative; a series of trivial disgruntlements may, therefore, become the operational equivalent to one major occasion for dissatisfaction.

Many factors influence the rates at which resentment toward autocratic demands grows, the capacity to accumulate resentments, the ability to discharge such resentments outside the organizational sphere, and the form which resistance to autocratic control takes, if and when it comes. Cultural and subcultural factors seem to play a major part in determining not only what will occasion resentment but the intensity of that resentment and the expressions that it takes. The French industrial worker seems to be much more jealous of his rights than does the German worker; the academician seems to be generally more sensitive to violations of what he would call the democratic process than does the governmental bureaucrat; etc. Aroused to action, the French industrial worker tends toward violence, especially the sabotaging of machines and materials, something that apparently does not occur to the English worker under similar provocation. Although academicians are quick to resist autocratic demands, they rebel in peculiarly academic ways, such as forming protest committees. Within a given cultural context, there may be wide individual and status-group differences in all these respects. Some men seem to be temperamentally hypersensitive to violation of what they consider their rights; some seem by comparison slow to anger and patient with their superiors. An autocratic administrator may himself influence the resentment

which his rule occasions; on the one hand, he may by the very manner in which he imposes his wishes on his subordinates induce rebellion against him as a person; on the other hand, he may skillfully provide them with some acceptable scapegoat for their resentments, with a revelous outlet (the bread-and-circus technique of the Roman politicians), or with a false crisis to justify his autocratic rule.

Demoralization as Resistance. The most effective weapon that the members of an organization can use against autocratic rule by their superiors is also the most universal one, demoralization. It is a weapon that is used without calculation and that is a threat to the welfare of any individual who holds administrative office, since it tends to lower the efficiency of the department or other agency for which he is responsible.⁵

The nature of demoralization was discussed in an earlier chapter. It will be recalled that a decline in the morale of any group involves a lowering of the average individual willingness to make sacrifices (in terms of the indi-

⁵ It is generally assumed by students of modern industry that morale and productivity are positively correlated, and many studies seem to support this view. For rather obvious reasons, no empirical studies have been made of the effect of autocratic leadership on morale in industry. The following experimental studies of the differential performance of children under "autocratic" and "democratic" leadership do at least suggest that the former kind of control commonly has adverse effects upon the level of activity in contemporary America. J. R. P. French, "Organized and Unorganized Groups under Fear and Frustration" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, vol. 20, pp. 229-308, 1944); J. R. P. French, "Retraining and Autocratic Leadership" (*J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 39, pp. 224-237, 1944); K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates" (*J. Soc. Psychol.*, vol. 10, pp. 271-299, 1939); R. Lippitt, "An Experimental Study of the Effect of Democratic and Authoritarian Group Atmospheres" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, vol. 16, pp. 43-195, 1940); and R. Lippitt and R. K. White, "An Experimental Study of Leadership and Group Life" (in *Readings in Social Psychology*, T. M. Newcomb *et al.*, eds, Holt, New York, 1947).

A demonstration of the fact that even a small change in the established organizational procedures may induce some decline in morale is provided by E. Jaques in *The Changing Culture of a Factory* (Dryden, New York, 1952, Chap. 4, "Methods of Payment and Morale"). The thesis that the effectiveness of an organization, in this case an army, depends upon the morale of the informal groups of which it is composed is developed by E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz in "Cohesion and Disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, vol. 12, pp. 280-315, 1948).

Two studies that seem to indicate no consistent relations between morale and productivity in business organizations are reported in the following: D. Katz, N. Maccoby, and N. C. North, *Productivity, Supervision, and Morale in an Office Situation* (Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1950); and D. Katz *et al.*, *Productivity, Supervision, and Morale among Railroad Workers* (Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951). In both studies the measured differences in productivity are perhaps too small to yield significant indications of the relation between productivity and morale. W. J. Goode and I. Fowler ("Incentive Factors in a Low Morale Plant," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 14, pp. 618-624, 1949) and N. Babchuck and W. J. Goode ("Work Incentives in a Self-determined Group," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 679-687, 1951) have, however, advanced other evidence in support of the view that morale and productivity are at least not invariably related.

vidual's established rights and obligations) in order to remain a member of the group. Many factors determine the current level of the morale of a given group, the quality of its leadership being but one of these. All other things being equal, any autocratic demands made by an administrator will lower group morale.

When the members of an organization, or segment thereof, have some more or less acceptable alternatives, the maintenance of high morale within that organization or department becomes a major consideration of its administrators. For the level of morale will then be an important factor in determining the quality of the personnel of the organization and hence the success of its administrators. The more highly skilled workers in business, industry, government, education, science, religion, etc., are especially concerned with the working conditions, including the prestige, provided by the organizations to which they belong. Since there is usually something of a scarcity of first-rate men in the professions, in technology, and the like, organizations are ordinarily in constant competition with one another for the best men; college vies with college, university with university, industrial plant with industrial plant. Moreover, there is a long-run competition between the various professions and technologies for men of promise. In both aspects of this competition, the morale of an organization or of an occupation is often a determining factor. Thus a university president who autocratically introduces some new plan or procedure or who autocratically brings to his faculty or promotes some personal favorite risks the loss of valued men and of the ability to draw equally good men to replace them. His autocratic rule may so lower faculty morale that some men will leave for happier institutions even at a loss of salary; and the fact that morale is low may become generally known within the academic world, with the result that men invited to join the staff will find the offer less than tempting.

In one way or another, much the same thing can result from autocratic rule within a segment of a college or university and within any kind of organization that utilizes the services of highly trained men. In business, for example, those personal qualities that give value to a man in junior administrative or supervisory capacity—high motivation, intense interest in his special field of endeavor, etc.—make him hypersensitive to any violation of the rights of his office by a superior; for such a man not only strives to enlarge his rights but is also confident that he is the personal equal of his official superiors. The employer who is persistently autocratic therefore gathers as his subordinates not men of enterprise but fawning sycophants who serve his personal interests but not the organization itself. The old saw to the effect that people get the kind of leaders they deserve is reversible; leaders draw to them the kinds of subordinates they deserve. And an autocratic administrator needs, hence deserves, subordinates who will obey his every whim and fancy—"yes men," as they are sometimes termed.

The relation between the kind of authority exercised by an administrator

and the kind of subordinates he tends to accumulate is not, of course, simple or direct. A university president who insists, contrary to the general norms, that his faculty devote themselves wholeheartedly to teaching and not use their time for research may not acquire a staff of fine teachers; but he will certainly discourage all those who are interested in research. A businessman who places his major stress on sales promotion (*e.g.*, by hiring the finest available talent in advertising, sales management, etc., and giving them *carte blanche*) may not increase the company profits; but he will most likely discourage and gradually lose his best production, purchasing, and other administrators and technicians. The general who uses his command as a means to personal eminence may not lose his military campaigns and certainly will not, the military bureaucracy being what it is, lack for subordinates; but the bright young men of the service will not trample over one another to get on his staff, and the bright ones who are already on it will work all the angles to secure assignment elsewhere.

In the long run the quality of the men who enter into the various existing professions depends in considerable part on the relative morale of each of those professions. A hundred years ago the Protestant ministry was a profession of high prestige and equally high morale; it then drew to it young men of intellectual vigor and strong ambition. Today the ministry is a profession as low in prestige as in income, and the general level of morale among ministers is lower still; today, therefore, the university training centers for the ministry get the culls of the academic crop. A comparable shift has occurred within the various academic disciplines (philosophy and letters going down, the sciences going up); within various phases of business, industry, and technology; and even within the various military services. In the latter instance, new elite or prestige services have evolved—the rise of the Air Force being the most striking example—with the consequence that older services have been somewhat demoralized; in each such change the more energetic and ambitious of young officers have tended to aspire to the new service.

Demoralization and Efficiency. Where the demoralized members of an organization have no alternative or for any of many possible reasons (such as exceptionally high salaries or nontransferability of skills) do not leave the organization, their productive efficiency (as measured, of course, by organizational criteria) declines. Even in our highly mechanized industrial production, the so-called human factor remains an important variable in the determination of output. As has been shown, every work group, manual or professional, develops and then maintains its own norms of productivity. These norms will seldom be exceeded; but they are subject to marked and “inexplicable” decline. Among the things that may bring a decline is demoralization; and one of the most demoralizing conditions is autocratic treatment by superiors.

The man who occupies an office is invariably dependent upon the good will of his subordinates for effective endeavor on the part of the unit for which he is responsible. He simply cannot watch over them individually and per-

sonally; he cannot possibly evaluate by any mechanical means the extent to which they are doing their tasks efficiently. It matters little what the work of the organization is or what status the worker has within that organization. There are, in the words of an old cliché, tricks in every trade. In every worker's bag of tricks are a large number which enable him to do ineffectually what he could more easily do effectively. Some of these tricks he will utilize whenever he feels discouraged with his job; some of them will be individual tricks, and some will require and secure the collaboration of his peers.

A mere enumeration of the various tricks by which the soldier, sailor, priest, scholar, teacher, salesman, bookkeeper, clerk, machinist, administrator, or whatever can reduce his work efficiency without much danger of detection would be both impossible and unprofitable.⁶ The following are given simply as examples of the general fact that every worker—in fact, every member of every kind of organization—can, if he feels so inclined, reduce his value to the organization without immediate risk to his position therein. One of the measures of the efficiency of soldiers in combat is their firepower; but quite obviously only the man holding the gun can possibly tell whether he has expended his ammunition to the best of his ability. Soldiers with low morale may expend vast quantities of munitions; it does not follow that they have killed the maximum possible number of the enemy. In every industrial process, however much standardized, there is a normal range of error or proportion of errors to successes; *e.g.*, standard, machine-made parts will vary one from another by as much, say, as one ten-thousandth of an inch, and one out of, say, ten runs of an open-hearth furnace will be substandard. But these are statistical norms; the actual variations will range from zero toward one hundred, just as the actual runs of luck on a roulette wheel may be quite different from day to day. Many factors, perhaps known but nonetheless uncontrollable, make for such production errors; and of these factors, the intangible "human factor" is the most important. Even a so-called automatic machine reflects the physical and psychological condition of its operator. When machine operators are psychologically depressed, as may be the case under demoralization, there is likely to occur a long run of production bad luck; *e.g.*, an abnormally high proportion of parts may deviate one from another to the maximum, or three out of ten rather than the normal one out of ten runs of an open-hearth furnace may go bad. Finding the cause is usually impossible; more than one worker may be involved; and whether it is the workers or something else that is at fault—perhaps substandard materials, peculiarities in humidity, temperature, etc., which may very well adversely affect machine operation—is probably unascertainable.

⁶ Some excellent descriptive material on the various ways that factory workers individually and quite informally cut down production as resistance to autocratic rule is provided by G. May in "Close-up of a 'Worker's Paradise'" (*Harper's Mag.*, July, 1953, pp 62-67). May describes the way Hungarian workers fought back against the speed-up and other exploitative endeavors under Communistic rule.

In occupations in which the service rendered is itself intangible, deliberate or unconscious sabotage is even easier to achieve and more difficult to ascertain. There is, for example, no general agreement as to what constitutes effective teaching and no known method of assessing how effective a teacher has been. If any criteria of measurement are set up—e.g., grade achievements in the class, student ratings of the teacher—a teacher can readily produce what is required of him. University and college presidents usually recognize this fact, so what is called for is the best effort of which the individual teacher is capable. Since there is no known way to measure such effort, reliance must be placed upon the willingness of the teacher to do his best. If, as may be the case when he and his associates are discouraged with the administration under which they operate, he does not want to do his best or does not feel up to doing his best, he will not. And no one aside from himself is able to judge. In one way or another, the same thing holds true for all workers who are expected to display initiative—salesmen, administrators, research workers, etc.

Since the individual who holds an office is often, if not always, dependent upon the willing cooperation of his subordinates, he is thereby discouraged, at least to some extent, from doing anything that will lower their morale. This means, above all else, avoiding those forms of autocratic rule which endanger, or may seem to endanger, the established rights of his subordinates. Even in his routine decisions the question of the effect of this or that alternative on his subordinates' morale may be a determining factor. Promotions of men within the organizational ranks are often, for example, as much a matter of maintaining morale as of rewarding those who have served best; the selection of new personnel is sometimes more a question of obtaining men who will be acceptable to the groups with and within which they will have to operate than of securing men best qualified technically for the positions that are open; and it frequently happens that an incompetent man must be endured simply because he is well liked by his coworkers.⁷ The man who uses his power to hire and fire exclusively in terms of the relative professional or technical proficiency of those who are available is, therefore, acting autocratically, since his subordinates have other and more subtle values; and he thereby risks a loss of organizational efficiency in his effort to increase that efficiency.

The Conspiracy of Silence. Demoralization with its specific consequences to organizational efficiency is a negative sort of control over superiors. It may be described as passive resistance to autocratic rule. Active resistance, which may arise at the same time, operates to reduce or even entirely to nullify the autocratic demands of a superior. In this endeavor, too, every worker and every work group has a considerable bag of tricks.

Perhaps the simplest yet at times most effective method of nullifying the autocratic rule of a superior is that of closing or distorting his lines of communication with his subordinates. An officeholder is invariably somewhat iso-

⁷ See in this connection the study by O. Collins, "Ethnic Behavior in Industry: Sponsorship and Rejection in a New England Factory" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 51, pp. 293-298, 1946).

lated from both his superiors and his organizational inferiors. Only with his equals, with whom he forms more or less integrated status groups, is he able to maintain any considerable degree of rapport. His superiors, whose interests and understandings are somewhat different from his own, do not confide wholly in him. Should he, for example, ask them how well in their judgment he is fulfilling his office, what his chances for promotion to a higher office are, etc., he will be told what they consider is good for him, whether true or not. He must, therefore, feel his way with them. The president of a college, for example, must test his status with his board in much the same way that the individual tests his status in his status groupings. Since such testing is always subject to considerable error, a college president may not perhaps discover that he has been losing status with his board until, suddenly, they refuse to renew his appointment. Similarly, the lowly instructor may not really know how well he is doing in the eyes of his superiors until he is or is not promoted.

An officeholder is usually even less capable of knowing his personal status among his subordinates; they, too, show him the kind of respectful attentions that they consider good, not for him, but for themselves. An autocratic demand on his part may somewhat demoralize them, with the sort of results indicated above. It may, however, simply be ignored. When a work or other group finds it expedient to ignore a considerable proportion of the dictates of a superior, he is thereby isolated by them; his position becomes increasingly nominal, his knowledge of what is actually happening in the office, shop, or whatever over which he has official jurisdiction becomes less and less valid. In the end there evolves among his subordinates what might be called a conspiracy of silence. All the evidence that comes his way may indicate that his orders are being obeyed and that the results are satisfactory; *e.g.*, his every request may be met with agreement, both formal and informal reports from his immediate subordinates may conform to his ideas of how matters should be going, on personal inspection everything may seem to be in accord with his demands. Actually, however, his organization may be running not according to his requirements but according to the views and values of those who actually conduct its operations. The gap between what he thinks is happening and what is actually happening may be the distance between his autocratic demands and the true authority granted to him by his office.

Telling an autocratic superior what he presumably wants to know is a trick practiced when necessary in all levels of all organizations; a college president may be assured by his deans that the new liberal arts program he has instituted is working perfectly, whereas it is actually being effectively sabotaged by deans, department heads, and instructing staff; and he may in turn assure his board that he has, as they requested, increased the faculty teaching load from ten to fifteen hours, whereas in fact the faculty have, as he well knows, simply stretched their standard ten hours to look like fifteen on paper.

It is probable, although hardly provable, that limited and distorted communication between the working members of an organization and the high-

level administrators is responsible for the loss of elections, battles, wars, and revolutions, for business failures, etc., which simply could not, in terms of the data available to the administrators, have happened. Political and military leaders are frequently embarrassed by making announcements about what has been happening that soon prove false or by making predictions that future events do not support. Often, no doubt, these announcements and predictions are in effect a telling the public what it is presumed to want to know; but the embarrassment of high officials is perhaps quite as often a result of their ignorance—deliberately maintained by their subordinates—of the actual state of affairs within and related to the organization over which they hold office.

The Progressive Dilution of Autocratic Demands. Closely related to the technique of ignoring an autocratic order is the procedure, especially common in large organizations with an elaborate chain of command, of diluting such an order with each successive interpretation of it. The orders of a high office must of necessity be interpreted at each lower level in the chain of command. For example, the commanding officer of a military force may order an attack and provide a general plan of operations; but the commanders of each of the several services in his force must determine their respective spheres of responsibility and action; the subordinates of each must make their assignments; and so on down to the common soldiers, who must or at least will make their interpretations of the orders given them. When there is general opposition to an order from above, the effectiveness of that order is diluted at each successive stage, with the final result that the actions actually taken in accordance with the order are either so feeble as to be ineffectual or so distorted that the failure of the plan is demonstrated to (or for) the one who has ordered it.⁸

"Proving" that what an autocratic leader demands is impossible or at least inexpedient is one of the common results of the progressive dilution of his order. A teacher who against his will is assigned a textbook to use in a course will have no difficulty at all in proving that the book is not an effective pedagogical device, that the students dislike it and find it incomprehensible, etc. Perhaps all he need do to provide such proof is to fail an unusually high proportion of the class; perhaps he may ask his students to report their experience with the book, making sure that they sense his distaste for it. In one way or another an industrial plant that is ordered by the home office to do something can, if consensus is against that something, so dilute the actual application of the order that the project is demonstrated to be a failure; in comparable ways, a military service that is forced to adopt an unwanted weapon can prove it inferior to the old one; and so on.

⁸ For research data on the way this process operates in industry see M. Dalton, "Conflicts between Staff and Line Managerial Officers" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 15, pp. 342-351, 1951); M. Oman and R. F. Tommasson, "Disparities in Visualizing Social Norms" (*Social Forces*, vol. 30, pp. 328-333, 1952); and D. E. Wray, "Marginal Men of Industry: The Foremen" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 54, pp. 298-301, 1949).

The progressive dilution of autocratic demands may thus be a form of sabotage. Governmental bureaucrats are especially skilled in the art of so subdividing responsibility for putting new programs into action that the failure of a program is at once assured and the cause of the failure is undetectable.⁹

Attrition. Organizations, like the status groups of which they are composed, often eliminate an individual who cannot be made to conform to the organizational norms, including an administrator who persists, in spite of the resistance of his subordinates, in making autocratic demands on them. The status group, it will be recalled, has as its device of last resort that of expulsion or of extermination, depending upon the nature of the group itself. Since the subordinates of an administrator do not have the right to deprive him of his office, and since they will seldom resort to murder to dispose of him, the procedures by which they endeavor to eliminate him from office are covert and devious. In some instances the effects of their decline in morale may be sufficient to lead to his being removed from office by his superiors. In others his subordinates may be forced to produce in various ways, including outright falsifying, evidence which demonstrates his incompetence to his superiors. That this procedure is always possible, no alert administrator can doubt; and his knowing that it is likely to occur under sufficient provocation constitutes latent intimidation of administrators by their subordinates.

When, as is sometimes the case, the subordinates of an autocratic official are unable to discredit him in the eyes of his superiors, they may undertake a campaign of attrition against him personally. Such a campaign is more likely to be spontaneous, the effect of the unplanned parallel actions of many individuals and groups, than systematic.¹⁰ It may, moreover, develop slowly as

⁹ In 1953, for example, a controversy broke out between certain critical Senators and members of the American military high command over a reported shortage of ammunition in Korea. Senate investigating committees came finally to the conclusion that such a shortage had actually existed, although the Army did not lack funds with which to purchase ample ammunition. Efforts to allocate responsibility for the shortage were entirely unsuccessful, but they did finally uncover the fact that some forty-two different departments within the Pentagon were involved in the purchase of ammunition and that an order went through some two hundred operations before contracts for its manufacture could be placed. For a brief account of the Pentagon system of so subdividing responsibility that no one and no one agency can be held accountable see *Time*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 25.

Scientific studies of the process are provided by A. Brecht, "Bureaucratic Sabotage" (*Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.*, January, 1937, pp. 5-13); S. M. Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Reform" (*Res. Stud. State Coll. Wash.*, vol. 17, pp. 11-17, 1949); and G. D. Spindler, "The Doolittle Board and Coöptation in the Army" (*Social Forces*, vol. 29, pp. 305-310, 1951). Coöptation, the absorption into their company of individuals or groups that constitute a threat to the *status quo*, seems to be a common device of military and other bureaucracies.

¹⁰ The case of W. Goslin, the Superintendent of Pasadena Public Schools, who resigned under widespread public pressure in 1950, illustrates this process. He had instigated changes in school procedures that were offensive to many residents of the city, who formed into a variety of "citizen action groups" and demanded his removal from office. Although highly respected among professional educators and guilty of nothing that could possibly be con-

more and more of the subordinates come through experience to the conclusion that the usual forms of resistance to autocratic rule are ineffective. When there is a general consensus among them to this effect, the subordinates individually and in status groups undertake to make the life of the autocrat miserable. Since they are many and devote themselves to the task with grim determination and considerable ingenuity, he is usually unable to determine in any given instance who is responsible for his troubles and thus to retaliate.

The devices of attrition that may be used against the person of an autocrat will depend upon the nature of the organization, the ingenuity of his subordinates, and their estimate of the points at which he is vulnerable. Most of the actions his subordinates will take to make his life miserable will be minor and subtle, but the cumulative effect of all such actions may be so great a degree of frustration that he is in time mentally and physically exhausted by the effort to maintain his ascendancy. A successful campaign of attrition may result in the voluntary withdrawal—possibly for reasons of health—of the autocratic administrator from his position, his conceding defeat and relinquishing his personal ambitions, or even his premature death through some psychosomatic disability induced by prolonged frustration. Few men can long endure the mental torture to which they can be subjected by thoroughly antagonistic subordinates; in time most men will break, mentally or physically or both, from the strain of trying to override social control by autocratic methods.

sidered dishonest, he was forced out of office; and a more conservative and socially sensitive man was appointed in his place. For a detailed description of this incident see D. Hulsburd, *This Happened in Pasadena* (Macmillan, New York, 1951).

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

In the preceding chapter intimidation and seduction were considered as autocratic means by which an individual might gain ascendancy over an organization or segment thereof. Every office in every form of organization offers some opportunity for ascendancy via autocratic means, but at the same time no office in any kind of organization provides large and continuing power to rule autocratically. In this chapter the use of persuasion and conversion as means to ascendancy over an organization or segment thereof will be considered. The techniques and devices of persuasion are quite different from those of conversion, and the circumstances in which the one may work are not necessarily also conducive to effective use of the other. Each has its special qualities and its specific limitations. But they may be analyzed jointly, since they are in principle, though not in practice, similar.

As a means to ascendancy, persuasion and conversion are the antithesis to autocratic means. They consist exclusively of the manipulation of symbols, *i.e.*, of words and gestures, and they depend entirely on symbolic suggestion, rather than on coercive or pecuniary sanctions. Thus while the individual who uses autocratic means may threaten physical harm or promise material reward, the one who resorts to persuasion or conversion can only appeal to sentiments and attitudes and beliefs. In the simplest possible terms, persuasion is the process of inducing people to want to do what is wanted of them, and conversion is the process of convincing people that by doing what is wanted of them they will secure what they want or avoid what they do not want.

Those who are successfully controlled through persuasion or conversion are not aware of the fact that they are behaving in accordance with the wishes of the one who is ascendant over them. From their point of view, their conduct is voluntary rather than imposed, determined by their own self-interests rather than those of the one who is actually ascendant. Persuasion and conversion may thus be described as "democratic" means to ascendancy, a sophisticated usage of the term that is nevertheless in accord with conventional usage.

"Democratic" is currently a label of approval applied to forms of control that are sanctioned by those who are thereby controlled. In strict application it should be, but seldom is, used to characterize all social control; it is commonly more narrowly used to designate those actions of a person who occupies an administrative office that are or that seem to be sanctioned by the organization—*i.e.*, actions which are or seem to be in fulfillment of the obligations of the office. In the usage that will be followed here, "democratic" control will

refer specifically to those actions of an officeholder that seem to be but are in accord with the sanctioned powers of his office. To restate the matter, democratic control is ascendancy gained by persuasion or conversion, or both, the result that those controlled by the ascendant are not aware of the fact, are, rather, under the illusion that what they do is self-determined.

Democracy a Process Rather Than a Structure. In current political ideology, systems of political organization fall into one or the other of antithetical categories: the autocratic, or totalitarian, and the democratic-republican. Political scientists generally recognize that this categorical distinction is not realistic, but they often use these two types as concepts at the extremes of a continuum, somewhere along which a given political system falls. Thus the system of government at present obtaining in Spain is, in view, more autocratic than democratic, while that in France is more democratic than autocratic. The criteria used in determining the degree to which a government is autocratic or democratic are many, varied, and contradictory. One such criterion is the extent to which those who govern are responsible to the will of the governed—that is, whether those who govern are elected by popular vote and hence subject to popular recall, appointed by some higher authority, and achieve office through some fixed procedure as seniority or inheritance, or acquire office by force. Another criterion often used is the extent to which the powers of a government (*i.e.*, the rights of office of those who govern) are constitutional, legislative, or dictatorial.

All such distinctions have reference to organizational form, rather than to the control processes that actually occur within or in spite of the form. In the absence of form, and applying the criteria mentioned above, the most democratic government in the world today is undoubtedly that of Communist Russia, which in these terms has the most enlightened and liberal constitution, while the most autocratic government would probably be one or another of the Bantu tribes of equatorial Africa, where political rule is in theory absolute and the office of ruler is a matter of inheritance. But in terms of the actual controls that are exercised, a Bantu tribe is probably far more democratic than are any of the Western democracies and Russia is certainly far more autocratic.

The attempt to classify governments in terms of form has bemused political philosophers for more than two thousand years, but it has hardly been more fruitful than the efforts of racial theorists to classify men into four, forty, or four hundred racial types. Governments, like men, refuse to fit into categories of form, however complex and many-factored the categories may be. Moreover, the attempt to analyze governments in terms of form, like the effort to see men as members of races, distracts attention from what is significant to what is only obvious. What matters to men is not the form of the governmental organization under which they live but the kind of governing that they receive.

"Democratic," as the term is here used, refers to a process of governing, political or otherwise, rather than to the form of organization under which that process operates. And in the present usage, the term "democratic" is not

synonymous with "good" or with what is currently described in child psychology as "permissive." Whether the results of control by democratic means are good or bad is a matter of personal-social judgment. Such control can result, and no doubt has done so, in just as many sudden deaths as has autocratic control; it can bring a business enterprise to bankruptcy or it can aid in saving such an enterprise from bankruptcy; it can be an important factor in reducing the death rate of a population or in reducing the birth rate, and it can be an equally important factor in bringing about a general famine. The idea that democratic control has some inherent and general value is a folk belief, significant as such, but of no scientific merit.

The so-called "permissive" technique of control that is so strongly advocated by many modern child psychologists and the progressive educators is a contradiction in terms that reflects a confusion of understandings. To let people do as they will, even to aid and abet them in doing so, is not to control them. Even in the crudest of definitions, control is the provision of direction to the actions of others. Control that is effected by democratic means is, as will be demonstrated, disguised; but it is not permissive. It provides direction to those subject to it, and the fact that they imagine that they are being aided to do what they want to do attests only to its success.

Although there is nothing inherently good or bad about control by democratic means, there are, from the point of view of an ascendant, some special advantages as well as disadvantages inherent in these means. The captain of a ship who tried by persuasion or conversion to save his ship from sinking would only assure its loss; on the other hand, a university president who endeavored by such means to bring about a change in the institution's requirements for graduation might in the end succeed in doing so, whereas were he autocratically to command that change, he would assure that it would never become effective.

The effectiveness of control by democratic means depends in the first instance upon the organizational and cultural context in which it appears and in the second instance upon what sort of conduct is required of others. The latter factor is not a matter of "ends" in the moralistic sense; it is not a question of whether a would-be ascendant wants his subordinates to kill or save, or to produce or destroy. It is, rather, a question of the extent to which the actions that constitute conformity to the will of the ascendant can be verified. Some actions can be verified; many cannot. A holdup man can promptly determine whether his victim has handed over his wallet, as required, or just a packet of worthless correspondence; a farmer can ascertain whether the plowing contractor has plowed the fields and to the depth specified; even a taxgatherer can, through careful investigation, find out whether a given taxpayer has paid what is required of him by law, although a taxgatherer has always had his difficulties and always will have and is considerably less successful than the law requires.

The many ways through which efforts at autocratic control may be thwarted,

some of which were discussed in the preceding chapter, reflect the many kinds of actions that cannot be verified by observation. It is to secure actions of this kind that democratic means of control are most often and most successfully employed.¹

WILLING OBEDIENCE

Obedience to the authority vested in an organizational office is, on the whole, willing in the sense that the members of the organization who are subject to that authority have been trained to accept it; and where the training of an individual is inadequate to assure willing obedience, social controls tend to provide the necessary correctives. A qualified sailor attends to his duties without need of supervision and obeys the routine commands of his superior without question; a good policeman enforces the laws for which he is responsible; a competent teacher conducts the classes for which he is responsible; etc. There are always some organizational procedures for verifying individual conformity to standing rules and to the requirements of those in positions of authority. For there is always some margin of error, some individual deviation from the requirements of the organization, either as the result of peculiarities of personality or the character of the circumstances in which conduct occurs. There is also some systematic violation of the rules and established procedures of an organization—that is, by the informal, covert organization by which bureaucratic inadequacies are circumvented. Nevertheless, the majority of the members of any going organization fulfill their various duties with reasonable faithfulness and in the belief that what they are doing should be done and is worth doing. Were this not so, there could be no effective organizational life; because it is so, an individual who endeavors to gain ascendancy within an organization by autocratic means usually encounters strong resistance. It is, in sum, because they are willingly obedient to the established rules and administrative authority that those subordinate to a given office resist what they recognize as violation of those rules by autocratic perversion of administrative powers.

¹ It is, perhaps, in the field of industrial relations that the limitations of autocratic and the potential effectiveness of democratic means of control have been most fully recognized. The following works are representative of current thinking on this subject: E. W. Bakke, *Bonds of Organization: An Appraisal of Corporate Human Relations* (Harper, New York, 1950); B. B. Gardner, *Human Relations in Industry* (Irwin, Chicago, 1945); and B. M. Selekman, *Labor Relations and Human Relations* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1947).

The necessity for, or at least advantages of, democratic procedures in the governing of other than business organizations is discussed from varied points of view in the following: A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures* (The Principia Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1950); D. E. Lilienthal, *TVA—Democracy on the March* (Harper, New York, 1944); and A. H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1945).

Discussions of the democratic process per se, some of them rather suggestive, are presented in *Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action* (A. W. Gouldner, ed., Harper, New York, 1950).

The use of democratic means, on the other hand, may meet with no resistance and may secure for a would-be ascendant the same willing obedience that is ordinarily given to administrative authority. Under many conditions, of which the following are most typical, ascendancy depends upon the achievement of this willing obedience and thus upon the successful use of democratic means of control.

Even when the actions required by a would-be ascendant are simple and subject to standardization, conformity to them cannot be easily obtained by autocratic means if the individuals involved are either isolated or dispersed. A company of soldiers firing at fixed targets can be kept under scrutiny, and each man can be rewarded or punished in terms of his performance. In the frequently isolated and usually dispersed circumstances of actual battle, however, individual firing performance is *de facto* uncheckable; unless the individual soldier wants to kill his military opponents (if only in self-defense), he will not because he need not do so. In a business office, industrial plant, or other similar work situation the presence of workers at their assigned tasks can at least be checked. But whether a door-to-door salesman is actually out pushing doorbells, whether a motor patrolman is out on the highway, and whether a tribal hunter is really out stalking game ordinarily cannot be checked and depends much more on whether he desires to do so than upon the organizational requirement that he do so. The use by an autocratic ascendant of informants or of even a private and secret police force is an attempt, only partially successful at best, to enforce unwilling obedience under such conditions.

Although many organizational activities are massed, many others involve the isolation of individual members or the dispersal of members in small groups. Such individuals and groups cannot ordinarily be successfully coerced into doing what they consider to be contrary to right or reason, and even if they can be seduced by the promise of rewards, their performance is likely to be minimal. Only by being led into believing that they wish to do what is required of them will they conform adequately to ascendant demands. For only then will an isolated individual or a small, detached group give loyal and hence effective support.

The resistance of an isolated individual or group to autocratic demands tends to be negative—simply not doing what is required. The resistance of an individual whose organizational role requires that he exercise judgment, however routine in nature, may be, on the other hand, and usually is, positive—he exercises bad judgment, as it were. This is what the machinist does when he spoils an excessive number of the parts he is working on, what the truck driver does when he overloads and mistreats his truck, what the clerk does when he misfiles important documents, what the gunner does when an excessive proportion of his shells are over and under, etc.

As was shown in the preceding chapter, there are few organizational tasks, industrial, military, political, religious, academic, or whatever, that do not

demand some routine judgment for effective performance. And wherever there is a need for judgment, there is the certainty of some error and the possibility that an individual can willfully increase the proportion and range of errors. Usually sabotage of this sort cannot be detected or, if detected, cannot be traced to the responsible individual. Only if those who must exercise some judgment are willing to do what is required of them can such sabotage be lessened or eliminated, and only by democratic means can a would-be ascendant elicit such willing obedience.

Initiative. The need for willing obedience, and hence the need for relying on democratic means of control, is even more apparent when the endeavor of a would-be ascendant is to put into effect some innovation, technological or organizational. An innovation, such as a new process for the production of a synthetic substance, a new weapon or tool, or a new form of municipal government, may be complete in terms of itself; but its application or utilization inevitably poses a variety of specific problems which must be solved by those who put the new device into actual operation.

The solving of any problem requires individual initiative; and initiative, it should be evident, cannot be elicited by autocratic means. Coercion in any form is certain to discourage initiative, if not actually to destroy the complex of personality and circumstantial factors which together make for initiative. A man may perhaps be induced by coercion to act outwardly as though he were endeavoring to solve a problem; for example, he may busy himself at the drafting table, scurry about the office or shop moving this and that, or sit at his desk with an air of fierce concentration. But there is no way of knowing whether these signs of initiative are real or spurious.

In the first place, a superior cannot determine by results whether his subordinate has actually attempted to solve the problem set him and thus reward or punish him accordingly. Whether a satisfactory solution to a problem can be achieved cannot possibly be determined in advance; if it could, it would not be a problem. An individual who actually undertakes to solve a problem does so in faith and with hope, but whether he or anyone can achieve a satisfactory solution is not known; and how long it will take and by what means a solution will be obtained, if in the end one is, are entirely unpredictable. Under penalty of death for failure, an individual may be induced to try to solve a set problem; but his dominant motivation under such circumstances would be the avoidance of death rather than the solving of the problem. His best efforts might well, therefore, go into planning an escape from death; and even though he were to succeed in keeping his mind on the assigned task, his persistence therein would be greatly weakened by the fact that each successive failure in the problem-solving process would become doubly discouraging because of the fact that it would bring death one step nearer. Furthermore, since there would be no way of ascertaining how hard he would be trying to solve the problem, whether he was getting nearer to a solution, or whether any solution was possible, administration of the death penalty could only be a matter of whim-

sey. For all that an exasperated superior could tell, he might be executing his subordinate just on the eve of the solution of the assigned problem.

Pecuniary rewards may foster and even stimulate preexisting initiative; a subsidized artist may paint, compose, write, or whatever better when he is freed from economic worries; a scientist or technician will probably discover and invent more when he is provided with laboratory and other facilities and a decent income; an administrative "genius" may apply himself to the solution of administrative problems with greater zest when the prospect of promotion is held out to him; and so on. But pecuniary rewards cannot of themselves induce the enthusiasm to attempt a given problem; initiative in a specific area can be so encouraged, but it cannot be bought. An artist, scientist, technician, or administrator who is employed to work creatively at a task which he finds uninteresting may attempt to do his best with it, but he will not be capable of doing his best. If he is not interested in the problem per se, his initiative in attempting to solve it is spurious. His real interest is securing monetary reward; his interest in the problem is secondary and, being secondary, does not secure his whole attention. Incidental to his desire for money he may solve the assigned problem; but if the problem is difficult as well as dull, he will most likely become discouraged, and his chances of solving it will there-upon rapidly diminish.

The impossibility of hiring men to solve specified problems has led to the general practice in industry and elsewhere of employing scientists, technicians, or other potential innovators who seem to have interests closely akin to those of the employing agency and then turning them loose to follow their own inclinations. Pharmaceutical companies, for example, employ biochemists and other scientists to experiment in the synthesis of possibly useful drugs, in the production and testing of biologicals, etc. On the whole, they do not attempt to designate what a given man shall work on; rather they hope that, encouraged and aided by all the laboratory facilities that money can buy, he will cultivate one of his existing interests or become interested in one of the many problems that are always lying about in any laboratory. Experience indicates that, although the giving of rather free rein to a scientist may lead to the solution of many commercially irrelevant problems, the assignment of specific commercial problems to specific individuals seldom brings the desired solutions.

Espirit de Corps. Freeing individuals from normal organizational restraints to follow their individual interests may elicit the maximum individual initiative and perhaps lead to some successful innovation. It will not, however, assure the implementation of a predetermined plan or program of change in the organizational structure or operations. To achieve this end, the initiative of the various individuals charged with putting the new program into action must be so channelized that their efforts are coordinated.

Effective coordination of the efforts of a number of individuals, each of whom is to exercise initiative, depends in large measure upon the establishment and maintenance of an *esprit de corps* among them; and such *esprit de corps*

in turn depends upon the enthusiasm of each of the various members of the group for the new plan or program. When an individual values the venture of the group so highly that its achievement takes precedence over his normal personal ambitions, concern with his office rights, and the like, he will be willing, and perhaps even anxious, to make personal sacrifices in order that the plan or program can be realized. When all or most of those upon whom such a plan or program devolves feel this way, the group venture (as distinct from the group itself) is the primary value, and each individual will be willing to coordinate his efforts with those of the others.

Coordination of the efforts of those members of an organization whose functional operations are more or less routine does not require an *esprit de corps* of this sort. A worker at a screw machine or on an assembly line need not, perhaps, feel any special enthusiasm for the new model of automobile or radio that his company is producing; what is mainly important to his effective functioning is morale for the work group itself. A soldier may be able to perform his assigned task effectively although he knows little and cares less about an over-all military campaign of which his assignment is one small part. A department-store clerk can probably turn in an adequate performance on the occasion of the annual store-wide sale without generating any special excitement for the event itself.

Any organizational activity that deviates from proved routine, however—a new mechanical design, a new sales campaign, a new drive for church membership, a new set of course requirements for the A.B. degree, a military venture—poses a host of new and generally unanticipatable problems, all of which must be effectively solved before the program as a whole can be successful. These problems normally devolve upon a number of individuals, usually a considerable number. Even such a relatively minor matter as a stylistic change in automobile design may in the end pose one or more problems for every department in the plant and in the distributive organization; the purchasing department may have to find sources of some new material, the body-parts department may have to develop or acquire new machine tools, adjustments may have to be made in assembly-line procedure, the advertising department will certainly have to work up new literature and new advertising copy on the new model, the sales department will have to convince the distributors that the change is an improvement, and so on. The developing and putting into production of any complex modern device, such as a new type of aircraft, may pose so many specific problems—many of which will have to be solved in the shop and out on the test field rather than on the designer's drawing board—that their solution will require the separate but coordinated efforts of hundreds of technicians over a number of years; and each such problem must be solved in terms of the over-all project rather than in terms of each individual technician's personal preferences in aircraft design and production.

Research scientists, creative artists, technicians, military tacticians, progressive or aggressive business administrators, etc., with any initiative have an

atypical degree of independence, atypical confidence in their own abilities, and what can best be described as "one-track" minds. If they did not, they would be incapable of thinking in original directions, of persevering in the face of the successive errors which are inevitable in problem solving of any sort, and of ignoring the many distractions and attractions of daily life. All these personal qualities are, of course, segmental and may be possessed in minor or major degree. But to the extent that they have initiative in their special fields of endeavor, such men are of necessity independent, egoistic, and preoccupied; and to that extent and in that area they are also "uncooperative."

Characteristically such men hold their offices, the departments or other agencies over which they have responsibility, or some personal values in greater esteem than either the organization they serve as a whole or any new program of that organization. Each tends to think in terms of his own special area of responsibility, with the result that he is prone to give priority to his own problems rather than relegate them to their particular position in the organizational context. That he does so is, in a sense, essential to the effective fulfillment of his special office. A scientist who is trying to ascertain the chemical composition and structure of a certain substance must feel, for the moment, that his task is of paramount importance, or he will soon weary of the effort; a professor who teaches ancient history must believe the subject one of tremendous importance, not only to him but to others as well, or he will soon become a dull teacher; and each of the several department heads in a business or industry must consider his own department the keystone of the whole organization, or he will of necessity soon be replaced by a more zealous man. Thus the very qualities that make the individual valuable in his office make him difficult from the point of view of the organization as a whole. If his initiative is to be exploited to the fullest, he must be given, or at least feel that he is being given, free rein. But if what he devises is to be integrated with what his associates devise, he must somehow be led to consider his special problems in terms of the related problems of those others.

Organizations which are still in the process of developing and those which, however old chronologically, operate in a competitive field and must therefore remain adaptable in order to survive tend to reward and otherwise cherish those with initiative. A modern competitive business—*i.e.*, one that has not yet through monopoly or cartel arrangements freed itself from the need to adapt to changing market demands, the need to reduce costs, etc.—ordinarily attempts to attract into administrative offices young men of promise and mature men of proved initiative; a modern American university ordinarily shows some preference for productive scholars; and a military force engaged in warfare may draw on the civilian population for the creative endeavor that the military system itself discourages. Pecuniary and other organizational encouragements may thus operate to attract into administrative offices men of initiative. But neither pecuniary nor coercive means can induce those with initiative to coordinate their efforts.

The development of *esprit de corps* for a joint project among a number of independent, self-centered individuals, to the end that they apply their initiative in a coordinated way in putting the project into effect, can be achieved only by democratic means. It can neither be forced nor purchased. Any attempt to secure it by coercion would only destroy the initiative that is required of the several individuals, and any attempt to purchase it would certainly intensify the competition among them rather than produce their willing cooperation.

Persuasion is the primary means by which a number of men may be induced to place the success of a plan or program above other and more normal considerations and, thus, by which the coordination of their individual efforts is achieved. Conversion, the other democratic means of control, is a secondary method and is most effective when large numbers of individuals are involved and the amount of initiative required of each is relatively little.

PERSUASION

As indicated earlier, persuasion is the process of inducing individuals to want to do what is wanted of them—to do willingly what they otherwise would not do at all. It consists of maneuvering an individual into believing that a proposed course of action is of his own devising, or at least of his own selection from the available alternatives. If an individual can be persuaded to adopt a course of action as his own, he is disposed to devote himself wholeheartedly to its realization and accept with equanimity such personal sacrifices as may be necessary to achieve its success. For if it is in his mind "his baby," he tends to assume a paternalistic attitude toward it.

Paternalism. Whether the biological father of a child feels responsible for the child's welfare depends upon the particular culture. In most cultures biological paternity is associated with social paternity; in some it is not. But in every culture it seems generally true that the individual values most what are by social definition his personal possessions. Properties, whether tangible or otherwise, which are held communally may be cherished and taken care of by each of the several individuals. Thus the members of a household may greatly value their home and its special attributes, including its special subcultural patterns of member relationships; the village garden may be carefully and efficiently tended, although it belongs equally to all and its products are shared by all. In all societies there are some communal sentiments, ideas, and values that have to do with "our" rather than "my." But in all societies there are also some "things" which belong to the individual alone; and to what is his alone he normally is most intensely and durably attached. A child may cherish as "ours" his home, the particular kinds of food prepared and served therein, etc. But he normally reserves for what is his alone—be it only a rag doll—his most intense devotion, his fiercest pride, and his most lavish care. A primitive may cherish as "ours" the village meetinghouse, but his hut is his, and he alone can say who shall enter there; he may be proud of the fishing boat in

which he is only one of many owners, but he is ordinarily more proud of the spear that he fashioned with his own hands and that is his alone to use; he may be fond of and kindly disposed to all the children of the village, but the child who is his special responsibility normally stands highest in his affections.

Private property is a matter of definition; but the sentiments, values, and attitudes that attach to whatever is defined as private property seem everywhere to be much the same; and the behavioral set of any individual toward what he regards as his private property is quite distinct from his behavioral set toward what is not his. How a man treats his child may be quite different from how he treats his wife, his automobile, or his dog. But toward each "thing" that is his he acts in ways that are, by comparison with how he treats similar objects not his alone, paternalistic.

A parent, as socially defined, may mistreat his child, even as an owner may abuse his automobile and let his house fall into disrepair. But in general a parent reserves for his child his greatest affection, however little that may happen to be, his most intense pride, and his best care. And however badly an individual owner may treat his automobile or house, he usually treats it better than he does one which belongs to someone else or which he holds jointly with others. It is a common observation in our own society that public properties are abused, relatively, by everyone; that a rental house deteriorates far more rapidly than does one which is owner-occupied; that a woman, a child, or a dog who "belongs" to no one fares far worse than one who has a husband, a parent, or a master.

The paternalism that attaches to an individual's tangible possessions—his child, house, etc.—extends to such intangible possessions as beliefs, opinions, plans for the future, and the like. Small children characteristically display greater enthusiasm for a game they choose for themselves than for one some adult chooses for them. And a child will prize a pup he has chosen for himself, even though it be the runt of the litter, more highly than one not of his own choosing. In making the choice he identifies himself with the pup; it is his, not alone by right, but by personal commitment.

Similarly an individual who is persuaded to think and feel that a designated course of action is his own, that it is his "personal" property, has a paternalistic set toward that course of action. He then has a strong vested interest in its success and tends on the one hand to give to it his fullest attention—to devote to its achievement his skills, innovative and otherwise—and on the other hand to make sacrifices on behalf of that course of action that he would not otherwise make. In sum, he tends to treat the proposed course of action as he tends to treat his child, with the greatest consideration of which he is capable, and to be willing to sacrifice for its welfare. A child who is allowed to choose his own pup and selects for his own the runt of the litter will cherish it above all others. But if a man wants his child to have, not the runt, but the most promising pup in the litter and wants him to love this pup to his fullest capacity, the child must somehow be persuaded that the choice of pups has been his, even

though his father has made it for him. The purposes and problems of a would-be ascendant who wants to put into operation some new organizational program but needs the wholehearted cooperation of a number of subordinates, each of whom must exercise initiative in fulfilling his special part of the total program, differs only in complexity from that of a father who wants his son to have the best pup in the litter and to love it with childish possessiveness.

The Confidence Game. Although, as will be shown shortly, there are a number of currently popular devices, *e.g.*, the conference, that are used in business, governmental, and other organizations for presumably persuasive means, persuasion occurs mainly through interpersonal relations with each of the several individuals upon whom the success of a program is dependent. To be in any measure successful, a would-be ascendant must know and take account of the particular prides and prejudices of each of the several individuals with whom he is dealing. Thus persuasion cannot be accomplished by rule-of-thumb procedures; and while it may be described in terms of the principles involved, in practice it is an art so subtle and variable that it defies any attempt at scientific analysis.

The principles involved in persuasion are perhaps most simply exemplified in the relatively standardized and exceedingly crass "art" practiced by that special kind of swindler known as the confidence man.² The goal of the confidence man is to extract money; but in principle his operations are, except for their simplicity, not unlike those of an administrator who seeks to gain ascendancy over his subordinates and, through them, over the organization as a whole by inducing them to want to do what he wants them to do. The confidence game thus provides a simple illustration of the principles involved in the devious art of persuasion.

The confidence game, or as it is sometimes termed, "badger game," consists of a set of maneuvers, each almost as formalized as the moves in chess, whereby a person is led into offering to contribute his money to the support of a financial project which he imagines that he has himself conceived. Whatever the particular game being used—and there are basically only a few in general usage—the individual is made a victim of his own avarice. The confidence man operates on the conviction that every person has some larceny in his soul; and when the circumstances are seemingly perfect, he will be tempted by the opportunity to commit the undetectable crime.

The confidence man and his associates single out some individual with fluid wealth and then create for him, largely by enactment, a fictitious financial tangle. At the core of this fictitious financial tangle is some "lost" property (money or a gold mine or whatever), which has been discovered or found by one of the confederates of the confidence man, the owner of which is either unaware of his ownership or unaware of the true value of the property. Whatever the details, the little drama is designed to appear to the victim as a

² J. C. R. MacDonald, *Crime Is a Business* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1939).

perfect opportunity for him to appropriate the money or whatever the property is that is involved. The victim must, however, make or seem to make the suggestion of an illegal disposition of that property himself; for he is shortly called upon to make a financial sacrifice, presumably temporary, in the fulfillment of the project. He is teased—badgered—into making this suggestion by the confidence man, who by proposing a variety of clearly unworkable methods of honestly restoring the property to its rightful owner makes dishonest retention of the property seem the most sensible disposition of it. Thus the “logic” of the circumstance tends to produce the desired suggestion; and once the victim is thus hooked, the game can proceed. Since the victim has proposed what amounts to theft of the bait, it is up to him to post a bond of good faith with his fellow conspirator, or in another version of the game to advance the cash necessary to gain full possession of the bait. In either event, the victim is left holding what turns out to be an empty bag.

The comparative ease with which ancient and much publicized confidence games can be worked not only on the ignorant and unsophisticated but on men and women who seem otherwise shrewd and informed indicates how susceptible people are to persuasive means of control. Market-place cheating, concealing or exaggerating the real value of what is sold, is a commonplace procedure in most societies, our own included. Selling or trading something for more than it is worth is the basis for the glorified “arts” of modern salesmanship and advertising, as well as for the ancient dictate, *caveat emptor*—“let the buyer beware.” The confidence game differs, however, in two important ways from such ordinary market-place cheating. What is “sold” has no value at all; and the victim of the game is made to feel and think that he initiated the transaction himself—a transaction from which he expects to get much for nothing.

Pride in Innovative Ability. In the use of persuasion by a would-be ascendant as a means of developing an *esprit de corps* among his subordinates, the basis for the appeal is not latent larceny but the pride that each has in his own ability, specifically, in his ability to solve problems that are presented to him. The fact that the individual’s role in the organization is one that requires initiative of him means that, generally, he will have some initiative; and the fact that he has some initiative means, as has been shown, that he has faith in his innovative ability and is proud to display it. That ability is in a sense a highly valued kind of personal possession; and the individual tends to feel paternalistic toward any program of action that he believes is in whole or in significant part a product of his own innovative ability.

When a new plan or program of action requires the cooperation of one or more subordinates, each of whom must display initiative, but in terms of the program as a whole, the problem of the would-be ascendant is to maneuver each one into believing that the program is in some measure of his own devising so that he will assume paternalistic interest in its achievement. The actual persuasive procedure utilized will depend upon the skill of the would-be ascendant,

the particular circumstances, and the varied personalities of those who must be persuaded.

With a subordinate who in view of his interests and of the projected program is expected to be especially difficult, the would-be ascendant may, perhaps, proceed slowly to build up in that subordinate's mind the idea that he has had a special role in the development of the program. Incidental to other matters, casually in the course of general shoptalk during otherwise social relations, he may raise with his subordinate questions related or seemingly related to the problem long before that problem is ever mentioned. With perhaps an air of confidence he may from time to time indicate that he is troubled about something vaguely referred to as "long-range policy." In some such ways, the subordinate may be given to understand that he is in a position of special favor with his superior and may at the same time be provoked into expressing views on a variety of matters. Later, when he has more or less forgotten what he did say and is prepared to accept as being his own suggestion almost anything that is looked upon with official favor, his superior may impute to him some aspect of the program, or perhaps the whole of it, that he, the superior, wishes to have put into effect.

It matters little what the subordinate's view would have been had the program been presented to him in an autocratic fashion; it probably matters little whether what he has actually said conforms or does not conform to the program. The temptation to take credit for what is officially approved may be difficult to resist; or the wish to believe that he has provided his superior with a satisfactory solution to a baffling problem may be sufficient to father the illusion that he has done so. As he thinks back over his many and random conversations with his superior, his memory of what he has said may serve him well—it may assure him that he did, at one time or another, provide the various suggestions which together constitute the program.

What is said in group conferences during which a problem is explored "in a preliminary way," or what the members can later be led to think that they said, may provide a short form of the foregoing procedure. After a number of such conferences in which, inevitably, a great deal is said on a wide variety of unrelated matters, the would-be ascendant may call in one member and proceed to "explore" further with him a suggestion which he is supposed to have made and which in due course he may come to accept as his own. The same general procedure may be used with a number of the members of the conference series. Occasionally, however, a would-be ascendant can covertly delegate to an already persuaded subordinate the responsibility for persuading another. Thus, having maneuvered A into accepting authorship of a program, in whole or in part, he may proceed to point out that it is an excellent plan but that B is likely to object to it. A may then offer, since he has a paternalistic interest in the success of the program, to talk B into accepting it as his own. And he may then use on B persuasive means much like those which induced him to accept paternalistic responsibility for the program in the first place.

Such procedures are, of course, merely illustrative of the devious nature of persuasion and suggest the impossibility of reducing persuasive maneuvering to formal rules and the difficulties of gaining ascendancy by persuasive means.

Ascendancy through Conference. One of the conventional beliefs of contemporary society, and probably also of other social systems, is that policy decisions are best made in a "democratic" fashion. By this is meant that all those who are to be directly responsible for the fulfillment of an organizational policy should contribute to the making of that policy; and to this end businessmen, bureaucrats, technicians, and countless other classes of people hold conferences, form committees, and engage in endless discussions of matters of common interest. These rituals are the modern counterparts to the tribal war and other councils, the town meetings of old, etc.³

On the ideological level, policy-making conferences are supposed to produce a collective wisdom that is greater than the sum of the wisdom of the individuals involved. "Two heads," it used to be said, "are better than one." In this age of science, the same idea is expressed more ponderously, with frequent reference to the "interaction" that takes place around the conference table and the "synthesis" of ideas which constitutes something new and unique, even as oxygen and hydrogen interact and synthesize to make an entirely different substance, water. More realistic, perhaps, would be an analogous comparison of the conference process and its products to the mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide which, when excited by heat, produce the well-known phenomenon of hot air.

Although there is general obeisance to the idea that numbers of men may jointly work out a better solution to a common problem than can any one of them, it may be doubted that men with any considerable amount of initiative actually believe in the validity of the conference method of arriving at policy decisions. On the contrary, such men are, as has been indicated, self-centered individualists and are more likely to regard the conference and its many variants as a control device and to find in a given conference an opportunity to exert some sort of control over one or more members of the group. The idealists who take the conference method at its face value—*i.e.*, who labor over conference reports, serve on committees with faithful regard for the stated aims thereof, or occasionally write books on the conference method—may provide a gloss of authenticity to conferences, but they do not contribute to the actual making of organizational policy decisions.

In any given instance, participation in a conference, convention, committee meeting, or other ostensibly policy-making collective endeavor may be no more

³ For an analysis of the tribal council as a device whereby the tribal leaders gain support for a program of action see C. Kluckhohn and D. Leighton, *The Navaho* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1946, pp. 69-73). The ideology of collective invention is presented by N. Cantor, a believer in it, in *Learning through Discussion* (Human Relations for Industry, New York, 1951).

than a ritualistic observance. Even the one who calls the group together may have no other purpose than to show homage to the "democratic" process. And frequently conferences and conventions are simply respectable excuses for recreational or revelous activities, as are, for example, the annual American Legion antics.

As a means to ascendancy, the conference may serve as many separate functions as there are participants. For a junior member of the group, the meeting may provide an opportunity to demonstrate to his seniors that he is alert to the needs and interests of the organization. He may be able to display his talents or, if such seems desirable, humbly kowtow to his superiors and thereby gain some ascendancy over those of his peers with whom he is competing for promotion. To a superior a conference may provide a means of testing the ability of his juniors to perform in the presence of their superiors. Many of the members of the group may regard the meeting as an opportunity to register complaints against fellow officeholders, to protest an irksome rule or regulation and perhaps endeavor to replace it with one of their own devising, to shift blame for something adverse that has happened from their segment of the organization to some other; or otherwise to impress their wills on the assemblage. To an administrator who is using his office to gain ascendancy, one of the major values of the meeting may be its providing the members with an opportunity to express their petty irritations and personal whimsey, as a tension-reducing device. When the tensions discharged in this way have been generated through resistance to some unpalatable administrative action, the conference may serve the would-be ascendant as a relatively harmless way of forestalling other forms of resistance to his rule.

A group conference is, perhaps, most useful to an administrator who is using his office to gain ascendancy as a means of assessing the problem that he faces, of demonstrating that he proposes to proceed in the democratic manner, and of laying the groundwork for his persuasive maneuverings. Through conferring on a specific problem, a number of individuals, each with his special information and interests, can and perhaps occasionally do pool their various knowledges. As discussion of the problem proceeds, each may bring up from his particular experiences with special aspects of similar problems some opinions or facts relevant to the solution of the problem in hand. Usually, but not always, the result is a gradual elimination of the more erroneous ways to approach the problem. General discussion of this sort may aid a would-be ascendant in the development or at least refinement of a program; he may profit from the pooled experiences of the others and thus avoid some of the errors that are inevitable in thinking out a solution to any problem. More likely he may learn through the discussion the nature of those prides and prejudices of the various members which will have to be taken into account and somehow circumvented in putting into effect any program of action. A group conference may thus indicate to a would-be ascendant some of the problems in persuasion

that must be solved. Or, as has been indicated, it may serve as the setting for his maneuvering one or more of the members into accepting paternalistic responsibility for a policy that is ultimately decided upon.

The Limits of Persuasion. Persuasion would seem to be the only means by which a would-be ascendant can, in instituting a new program of organizational action, secure willing cooperation from a number of subordinates who must each contribute innovatively to that program. But persuasion is as delicate a process as the *esprit de corps* which is its goal. The slightest blunder, some small unforeseen factor, or an otherwise trivial incident may destroy the complex and devious structure of attitudes, values, interests, etc., that the would-be ascendant has erected. Should, for example, one of those who has been persuaded into accepting paternalistic responsibility for a program boast of that fact to another or others who have also been so persuaded, the carefully nurtured *esprit de corps* may turn into bitter animosity of each for the would-be ascendant and of each for all the others. It is hardly true that "truth will out" or that honesty is the best policy; but persuasion is a fragile method of control and, as with illusion in any form, is often self-defeating.

Moreover, as a means of controlling the behavior of others, persuasion has a number of inherent limitations. The universal limitation is that it can be used successfully only by those who are highly skilled in adjudging and utilizing the motivations and the prides and prejudices of others. A persuasive maneuver either succeeds or fails; it cannot be partially effective, since the slightest suspicion on the part of the one being persuaded that all is not what it seems to be will destroy entirely the illusion that the would-be ascendant is trying to create. Persuasion on an organizational level cannot be practiced by the mediocre, which is no doubt one reason why, in contemporary society at least, so few men in high organizational office receive the full approval of their subordinates and why the supply of aggressive administrators is constantly short of the demand for them.

When circumstances demand or seem to demand prompt enactment of a program, persuasion is more or less automatically ruled out. Persuasive maneuvering requires considerable time as well as the patience to take infinite pains. Days, weeks, or even months may be necessary to maneuver each of several individuals into adopting a paternalistic attitude toward a program of action. As a consequence an administrator who is using his office as a means to ascendancy ordinarily has a number of persuasive projects going at the same time, each at a different stage of development; *i.e.*, he is constantly engaged in the persuasive process, although many of his current efforts may be directed toward distant goals. Not all administrators have either the patience or the time to gain ascendancy by persuasive means, which is no doubt why so many would-be ascendants resort to more direct, and perhaps less effective, methods of subordinating others to their will.

The persuading of subordinates to assume paternalistic responsibility for a program of action not only takes time, but the process itself depends upon

and makes use of personal attributes that can become known only through relatively long and intimate association. A confidence man victimizes total strangers, and the game may be run through in hours or at most a few days; but the confidence game is played in terms of simple assumptions concerning human nature, primarily that all men are more greedy than honest; and if a prospective victim does not fit the assumptions, he can be discarded in favor of some more likely person. A would-be ascendant over an organization, on the other hand, has a fixed personnel to deal with and must, therefore, appeal to their specific rather than to some generalized personal attributes. Moreover, the successful appeal will be to complex and subtle matters of personal pride in innovative and related abilities rather than to simple desire for easy wealth.

Since the kinds of persuasion under consideration here depend upon intimate knowledge of the individuals to be persuaded and recurrent and relatively intimate association with each of those individuals, the number of persons who can be subjected to persuasion is small. The president of a business enterprise may be able to persuade his ten or so department heads to assume responsibility for a new program; but he must depend upon them to persuade, if that be necessary, their own subordinates. The president of a college may be able to persuade his deans that a change in the curriculum is desirable; he cannot possibly—although some attempt it—himself persuade all the members of the faculty whose cooperation must eventually be secured in order to effect the change.

Efforts at large-scale persuasion have often been made in contemporary society. Huge conferences of technicians, scientists, politicians, and industrial, labor, and other leaders have frequently been held for the avowed purpose of working out a solution to some problem of common interest which is supposed to be pressing. Whatever such conferences actually accomplish, none has to date either produced a generally acceptable and workable solution to a designated problem or secured, through persuasion, *esprit de corps* for a prearranged program of action. Formal speeches, splinter-group informal but brief and terminal discussions, and the other devices of mass conferences have on a large and superficial scale aped persuasive procedures; but they have only made a mockery of the persuasive process itself.

Nor can the persuasive process be used, on small or large scale, to reconcile strong and marked divergences of interests, values, etc.⁴ There is, however, currently the assumption that if only people can be brought together to discuss such divergences in "a calm and tranquil" atmosphere, the democratic

⁴ For a detailed study of a rather unusual attempt to bring about administrative changes in a factory through consultation with the workers at all levels see E. Jaques, *The Changing Culture of a Factory* (Dryden, New York, 1952).

In this experiment an Internal Development Committee was set up by management to propose, receive, and institute changes in the organization and operation of a very old and distinctly tradition-bound English engineering plant. Such elaborate reliance on democratic procedures did not prevent dissension, declines in morale, or active resistance to changes effected. But it did, perhaps, minimize these disturbances.

process will produce a miracle—*i.e.*, it will establish a common ground of understanding and generate willing cooperation in the effort to compromise what differences still remain. But in fact a conference of employers and labor leaders, of representatives of different and differing sovereign states, of business competitors, or of military opponents does not resolve preexisting conflicts of interests and values. At best it constitutes a market place in which values of various sorts can be traded, usually at the expense of some unrepresented group, such as the unorganized consumer, the voiceless undeveloped peoples of the world, or the like. At worst it provides each of the participants with a good excuse for having accomplished nothing.

Failure to secure *esprit de corps* for a program of organizational action does not necessarily preclude that program's being put into effect; if it did, battles would seldom be won, new models would seldom come off the assembly line, and most efforts to change the course of organizational operations would result in more chaos than is actually the case. If the desired change is a minor one, or if it is a major change that is inherently acceptable to most of those who will be responsible for its enactment, a project can often be autocratically instituted by a determined and persistent administrator. Moreover, pecuniary means can often be used to secure minimal compliance to a new program. In either case the loss in efficiency may be great, for few of those involved will really have their hearts in it. But inasmuch as the operational efficiency of many kinds of organizations is inherently low and the margin of permissible error inherently large, further loss of efficiency may not be of vital concern. A military commander who is charged with the task of planning a campaign involving a number of different services may, for example, consider it expedient to proceed autocratically; *i.e.*, he may make his plans, drawing on his subordinates only for necessary information, and then by fiat assign to each of the various services its special task. He cannot secure the initiative and the coordinated endeavor from the leaders of the different services that might be procured through persuasive means; in the absence of willing obedience, his orders will be diluted in transmission and fulfilled with reluctance. But military organizations are notoriously inefficient, and military operations are invariably confused, and a bit more confusion will probably not change the outcome. Moreover, the enemy forces may be equally inefficient and their various services equally confused. So, at least in the traditional view of the military mind, it matters little whether subordinates like and approve of the tasks they are expected to fulfill.

CONVERSION

Conversion, like persuasion, is a democratic means of control in that it is an effort to secure willing behavior; when it is successful, those who are converted are under the impression that they are behaving in accordance with their own desires. Conversion is, however, an extensive rather than intensive means of control; it is cheap and inefficient rather than costly and efficient;

and the willingness to conform that it may induce is of a secondary rather than primary order.

In premodern societies conversion has been mainly a device for socialization, *i.e.*, for inducting the individual into the ideological context of the group. It has, however, also been used by individuals attempting to gain ascendancy, especially during periods of social change and at times of decision, over the tribal or other organization and by those competing with each other for ascendancy. In primitive and peasant barter, for example, it is not uncommon for each of the participants to a transaction to endeavor to convert the other; upstart magic men, warriors, etc., have in many instances used conversional means in their efforts to secure the authority of traditional offices; and when a tribe, a peasant village, or other organization has encountered a problem for which no cultural provision has been made, the proponents of different solutions have often attempted to gain support for their proposals by conversional means. In the modern world conversional efforts at control are exemplified by the political campaign speech, the argumentative newspaper editorial, the hell-fire-and-damnation type of religious sermon, the documentary motion picture, and the commercial advertisement.

Conversion does not operate to develop paternalistic interest in a program of action. The willingness to do what is wanted that is secured by conversional means is, like that which is induced through coercion or economic sanctions, secondary to the desire to avoid a disutility or obtain a utility. Thus the converted individual obeys, not because he values the doing, but because he has been led to believe that he must do so if he is to avoid some personal disutility or achieve some personal utility. His participation in the actions desired of him never, therefore, stems from enthusiasm for the actions themselves; and he will continue his participation only as long as his belief in the consequences remains firm and as long as other values—*e.g.*, desire for release from the activity, as when induced by acute fatigue—do not intervene.

It is conventional to think of willingness to make personal sacrifices as an outstanding characteristic of those who have been converted to a faith—as, for example, the faith of the medical missionary in the desirability of saving human lives, the faith of the religious missionary in the necessity of saving souls for God, and the faith of the political missionary in the ultimate perfection of Communism. Unquestionably, some men do at times evidence a distinctly atypical fervor for ways of life which, to the outsider, seem both personally unrewarding and exceptionally demanding. That they will to lead such a life cannot be doubted; *i.e.*, they are not coerced into doing so; there is often little if any pecuniary reward for doing so; and they do have, as a rule, more socially attractive alternatives open to them. It is not possible to generalize as to what extent ideological factors play a role in the actions of such self-sacrificing men, to what extent their self-sacrifice is an illusion bred of the fact that they have and behave in accord with atypical values (for all one can know, they enjoy physical discomfort and danger), or to what extent

their conduct as individuals simply represents the norms of atypical groups to which they belong. Probably there is some admixture of all three factors in each individual case, the character and proportion of each varying widely between cases.

At any event, conversion does not of itself induce the will "to do or die." The kinds of actions that may be effectively obtained—other factors being favorable—by conversion are illustrated by an individual's going to vote at the polls, contributing a sum of money to some organized project, enlisting in a military service, trying out some new brand of soap or cigaret, or participating in a drive for increased production or sales. The common characteristic of these and all actions that may be enlisted by conversional means is that they are critical or decisive rather than sustained actions. The will to act which has been conversionally induced is invariably tenuous. Through conversional means it may be possible to build up worker enthusiasm for increased production; but the production increase will be of short duration, and a following letdown in the production rate will probably cancel out the gains. Through conversion it may be possible to secure volunteers for a Red Cross drive or a new military venture; but once caught, the volunteers must be held together and directed into their tasks by more substantial means of control.

Conversional Dramatization. The process of conversion is at basis one of inducing people by symbolic means to assume a dramatic role and act upon it. As a means of control it has in its favor the fact that men tend to think in a stylized, dramatic fashion. In its disfavor is the fact that what men think has a very uncertain relationship to how they act.

Most people, however sophisticated their thinking, see their personal relationships to the world about them in dramatic terms. Whatever his society and his place therein, life is for the individual a series of more or less dramatic episodes. In each such episode he wants something, if only to get to sleep or to open a door, and encounters resistance, however momentary. And in each such episode the adjustment problem, minor or major, is reduced to symbolic constituents and is structured in such a way that it is comprehensible.

In the standard dramatic pattern all the complex and mainly impersonal circumstances or forces involved in an adjustment problem are personified—*e.g.*, the door which is stuck is symbolized as a willfully antagonistic person, drought is interpreted as divine punishment for man's sins, and war is blamed on the evil intent of the enemy's leaders—and reduced to three stock characters: the heroine, who represents what is desired; the villain, who represents the obstacles that interfere with the achievement of the desired; and the hero, who represents the struggle to achieve the desired. Storytelling, the use of this dramatic pattern for purposes of recreation rather than for the solving of adjustment problems, simply utilizes stereotyped representations of the desirable, the evil, and the good and describes their conflict and its resolution.

In the individual's self-dramas—his personal dramatizations of his problems

—he himself often plays the heroic role; *i.e.*, he is the force which opens the door against the pressure of a violent wind, which wins the beautiful girl in spite of the trickery of his unworthy opponent for her hand, etc. In many of his predicaments, however, he sees himself not as the embodiment of good but rather as the object of good that should be brought about. Thus if his fields grow parched, if he falls ill, or if war threatens his security, he sees himself as a heroine beset by the evil of a villain and in need of saving by a hero. An ideology or a discrete belief about cause and effect is, operationally, the provision of a stock cast of characters to be applied to the interpretation of some such predicament. Thus a religious peasant who prays for rain to save his dying crops is assuming a role in accordance with a religious belief concerning the causes of rain that is identical to that of the fictional heroine who cries to the hero to save her from the villain who is trying to push her over the precipice into the abyss of, presumably, sin. And a modern farmer who employs a rain maker to seed the clouds with silver iodide is assuming the same sort of role in terms of a modern, scientific belief concerning the causes of rain.

In every society stories of some sort or other are told, and every individual is accustomed to making tenuous identifications with the dramatic personages of such stories. Normally, he learns to identify himself positively—*i.e.*, sympathetically—with the hero and, simultaneously or alternately, with the heroine and to identify himself negatively—*i.e.*, antipathetically—with the villain. Such is the cultural standard, whatever the culture; for the hero invariably personifies one or more culturally indicated active values, the heroine one or more inactive values, and the villain one or more active unvalues or evils. In his vicarious participation in the story action, the individual therefore experiences to some slight degree the joys and distresses of the hero and the pleasure or anguish of the heroine; at the same time he is mildly distressed by the villain's successes and gratified by the villain's ultimate defeat.

That the story drama, whatever the medium of its telling, can play upon the emotions of the listener is beyond question. The universality of story-telling is evidence of the fact. But that a story, whether it be that of Daniel in the lion's den or the latest glamorized adventure of Two-gun Harry, can otherwise influence human conduct is far from certain, although there is much folk belief to this effect. If a drama is to affect conduct above the level of mood tone, the individual must do more than make a sympathetic or antipathetic identification with story characters; he must actively assume the role, in part or in whole, of one such character. And the fact that an individual can and does participate vicariously in the activities of story characters in no way predisposes him to assume the role, and hence act in the manner, of any one of those characters. If it did, most of the spectators at a wrestling match would soon be engaged in battle, most of the readers of romantic fiction would promptly set out on romantic conquests, most of the viewers of television dramas would abandon their watching in favor of one or another of the activities portrayed by the television actors.

The individual can likewise participate vicariously in the dramatic representation provided by an ideology—*i.e.*, he can accept it as valid on verbal and emotional levels—without adopting as his own and enacting one of the roles thus indicated. As was indicated earlier, the indoctrination of an individual into an ideology, such as the teaching of a child to memorize and perhaps even have strong emotional attachment to the Ten Commandments, the Constitution of the United States, or any other statement of abstract principles, does not ordinarily affect that individual's conduct. If an ideological conviction is to be acted upon—*i.e.*, if the individual is to learn to assume, when circumstances warrant, the role of hero or heroine in the given ideological drama—it must be validated and interpreted by a status group and thereby supplemented, ramified, and recurrently demonstrated in action by members of that group. It is, however, through dramatic role taking thus brought about that the pious peasant comes to pray for rain, that a sick man is led to bring his troubles to a physician, that an unhappy child is induced to turn for comfort to his mother, etc.; it is through dramatic role taking that a primitive fisherman comes to propitiate the god of good fishing or to use some ritual in an attempt to circumvent the evil intent of the god of bad fishing; and it is through playing the role of a hero or heroine that the modern voter elects to political office the candidate of his party and does many of the things which, in his innocence, he imagines to be a function of his own thinking.

Conversion as a Means to Ascendancy. A would-be ascendant who endeavors to secure acceptance of a proposed new course of action via conversional means begins by restructuring one of the dramatic interpretations of their universe and their relations thereto that is normally made by those whom he wishes to control. He rearranges the dramatic personages, assigning to himself or what he represents the role of hero or, alternately, heroine. He may in this way induce others to think in a way which is logically—the logic being, of course, his own brand—favorable to actions of the kind he desires; but the induced change in their mode of thinking may have no effect whatever on their actions; or as often happens, their status-group definitions of the kind of action that is logically consequent on the new mode of thought may be quite different from his own.

A very simple illustration of conversional redramatization is provided by the endeavors of many soap manufacturers a few years ago to get soap buyers to use detergents. (If the problem had been to get nonsoap buyers to use either soap or detergents, the problem would have been one of conquest, *i.e.*, of breaking down old values, sentiments, and practices and establishing new, and could not possibly have been accomplished by conversional means alone.) In the soap users' drama, dirt has been an evil, cleanliness a good, and soap a means to the defeat of evil and achievement of good; personified, as it has often been in soap advertisements, dirt has been the villain (Mr. Tattletale Gray) and soap the hero who fights the villain and achieves the heroine. In the restructuring of the drama to the advantage of detergents, soap became

portrayed as a villain and the detergents as heroic. And to this end the detergent manufacturers repeatedly and over the years represented soap as an ally of dirt (it left clothes dingy and gray, it left a disagreeable ring around the tub, etc.) and claimed for their detergents certain and complete power to defeat the evil, dirt.

Conversional redramatization of the foregoing order can, under the most favorable circumstances, be effective. The persistent advertising of detergents between 1940 and 1950 gradually developed a large consumer market for them, at the expense, mainly, of the conventional soaps. Even so, the change in buying habits came slowly, although the detergents had many things in their favor: the period was one of rising soap costs and declining soap quality, and for many uses detergents have a demonstrable superiority over soap, especially when used with hard water. The same sort of conversional effort could not possibly have secured a market for sand or some other cleansing agent that was inferior to the customary soap.

Under the most favorable of circumstances, it may be possible for an employer to convince his employees that the adoption of a new productive procedure will ultimately improve their lot, that a reduction in their current wages will assure them higher wages in the not-too-distant future, or that the elevation of his pampered son to a newly created vice-presidency is not nepotism. Under the most favorable conditions, a political aspirant may be able to convince the voters of his party that he is certain to win the forthcoming election and that when elected he will serve them faithfully. Under exceptionally favorable circumstances, a university president may be able to convince his faculty that a proposed change in the curriculum or in course requirements will redound to their personal advantage. In each such instance the convincing would constitute a more or less skillful redramatization of an existent belief or ideological system. The symbols, the personifications, would be different; but the process itself would be in each case much like that by which the detergent manufacturers endeavored to convert housewives from the use of soap to the use of detergents. There is, however, this essential difference between the latter type of conversional problem and those of the former kind: whereas detergents have a demonstrable superiority over soap and an only partially converted housewife could complete the process by simply giving the detergent a trial, the values claimed for a new industrial process, a current lowering of wages, the favored son in the office of vice-president, the elevation to candidacy of the aspirant, etc., must be accepted entirely on faith. Their value cannot be tested out, and the value of what they are to displace has been proved empirically over time.

The favorable conditions mentioned above are, however, rarely encountered.⁵

⁵ The fact that rabble rousers—religious, political, and other evangelists—may succeed in arousing large numbers of people to action is often taken as proof of the power of conversional means of control. The behavior so induced is, however, revelous rather than revolutionary, transitory rather than enduring. For a technical analysis of this distinction see

What makes for conditions favorable to conversional efforts will be analyzed in detail in a later chapter, but their general nature can be indicated by saying that effective conversional redramatization is possible only when and where (*i.e.*, in that specific area of conduct) the normative social controls have for some reason been severely weakened, with a consequent weakening of faith in the associated belief or ideology. Only an individual who has for other reasons begun to lose faith can be induced to accept a new or divergent faith.

Counterpropaganda: Reinforcement of Established Ideology. By far the most common use to which conversional means of control are put, whatever the society, is in the endeavor to maintain in the face of adverse evidence adherence to established forms of action. The process here consists of the reiteration of the ideological basis for the action and the minimizing by denial and censorship of the effects of counterevidence or conversional redramatization.

Tribal leaders, primitive magic men, the landlords and priests of a peasant society, and their modern counterparts—*e.g.*, the political party in power, industrialists, churchmen, and members of the legal, medical, and other professions—derive their status in the larger society in part from the general acceptance of an ideology which makes them the priestly practitioners of value-fulfilling rituals. Modern elected politicians are dependent for the maintenance of their offices upon acceptance of the idea, among many others which together constitute the democratic ideology, that individuals elected to political office by popular ballot will serve society better than would those who happened to be born sons of officials, whereas acceptance of the reverse idea is essential to the maintenance of a hereditary tribal or monarchical rule. Primitive magic men and modern scientific practitioners of weather forecasting, stock-market prognostication, and the art of healing depend for a market for their respective services upon the acceptance of the idea that they have special knowledge or powers which enable them to do what others cannot.

The maintenance of the ideology upon which their special status within the society is based is one of the conditions essential to the survival of any special-interest group. To this end each such group or organization tends, as was indicated earlier, to hide from external view anything, such as incompetence or duplicity of individual members, which might cast doubt on its ideological pretensions. Conversely, each such group more or less systematically assumes credit

R. T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1938, Part IV). A rabble rouser utilizes the conversional technique, but he uses it to mobilize and overtize already existing tensions in his rabble. He does not convert them to some new belief or ideology and to act thereon; rather, he presents as though it were new and revolutionary a dramatic interpretation that is familiar to and already accepted by the rabble. By so doing he may succeed in arousing them to immediate, usually transitory, adoption of one of the roles thus represented—the role of the penitent sinner, of the aroused patriot, of the Negro-lynching defender of white womanhood, etc. An individual who has been thus aroused to action is not a true convert; he is merely enjoying for the moment the dubious pleasure of acting overtly in terms of an established belief.

for those events, whatever their "cause," which are deemed socially desirable. Thus even a modern medical man is prone to ascribe to nature the death of a patient but to impute to his therapy the recovery of the sick. The oracle of old, like his many modern counterparts, made his predictions in convenient double talk, *i.e.*, in such a way that he could claim success whatever the course of events.

Systematic reinforcement of an ideology by members of an ideological priesthood is usually termed "counterpropaganda." It is an effort to offset the propaganda, *i.e.*, the conversional efforts, of some opposed group or organization. Contemporary examples of counterpropaganda are the institutional advertising of associations representing privately owned public utilities and other commercial and industrial interests, the slanted reporting of political news by party-affiliated newspapers, the "white papers" by which our State Department and its opposite number in other nations endeavor to justify their mistakes, and the news releases of the American Medical Society and of the various bureaus, including the armed services, of government.

Counterpropaganda is part of the ideological aspect of conflict between established organizations or of conflict between an established organization and a new one which is in ascendancy. The political party that is out of power propagandizes on its own behalf; the party in power endeavors to cancel out such propaganda by its own program of counterpropaganda. Likewise, the American Medical Society, which represents a majority position in American medical practice, continually decries the charges and claims of such unscientific medical cults as chiropractic; and American industrialists continually strive to redemonstrate to the American people through the National Association of Manufacturers and other agencies that private industry can produce more and more cheaply than can governmentally controlled organizations.

Even under conditions of comparative social equilibrium, the ideological bases of established institutions and organizations are subject to attack by ambitious and disgruntled individuals. Talk is cheap, and a favored means to ascendancy is verbal assault on the symbolic justification for some aspect of the social *status quo*. No priesthood is ever entirely free of criticism from without, completely safe from scandal, or wholly secure in its ideological acceptance. Moreover, no social agency operates so efficiently and serves the society at large so effectively that it automatically demonstrates the validity of its ideological base. To talk down its detractors and to cover up its failings, each established agency of a society therefore resorts to some kind of counterpropaganda. In that it is directed toward the maintenance of established ideology and practices, the use of conversional means is not an effort to gain ascendancy, individual or organizational, but is, rather, an effort to prevent ascendancy on the part of others.

The devices of counterpropaganda, particularly in the modern world, are often devious and complex. But the basic procedures are, like those of propaganda itself, both few and simple. On the positive side, the spokesmen for an

established ideology reaffirm both in part and in whole the validity of the ideology and adduce evidence to demonstrate the benevolent powers of the priesthood. An unusual but suggestive illustration of this procedure was the "witnessing" by Pope Pius XII of various "miracles" during the 1950-1951 celebration of the Catholic Church.⁶ The whole history of classical economic doctrine illustrates the century-long reaffirmation and demonstration of capitalistic ideology, the ideological basis for private property, and economic *laissez faire*. On the negative side, ideological spokesmen endeavor by censorship of the channels of communication and other means to hide from outsiders whatever evidence there is that the priesthood is somewhat less than saintly, that it is failing as a whole to fulfill its acknowledged functions, or that individual members are incompetent or corrupt.

Counterpropaganda is no doubt an effective means of control up to a point, that point being the place and time when "facts"—*i.e.*, the empirical experience of the individual members of society—begin to break down acceptance of an established ideology. As was indicated earlier, an ideology, or even a simple belief, affects overt human conduct only when it is reified by some status group and then only in the way in which it is reified. Validation and interpretation are status-group rather than individual operations; and in the long run the empirical experience of a group determines its acceptance and interpretation of the ideologies in its social context. Counterpropaganda on behalf of a given ideology may encourage the members of a given status group to interpret their experiences in a way favorable to that ideology; it may delay discovery that the functionaries of that ideology—churchmen, medicos, politicians, etc.—are incompetent or corrupt in terms of the ideology itself. But it does not of itself perpetuate indefinitely either the ideological base or the functionaries of a critically malfunctioning organization. The medieval Church had an almost complete monopoly on the intellectual life of Western Europe, and it could and did quickly dispose of anyone who raised an opposing voice; yet its progressive corruption became in time known experientially to every Christian; and group by group, village by village, men lost faith in the Church and turned to religious radicals for guidance; when that time came, a religious revolution was in the making. A similar, although less extensive and dramatic, illustration of the limitations of counterpropaganda is provided by every shift in the political administration of a modern nation. The continued and at times frenzied efforts in the United States between 1933 and 1952 of administration spokesmen, bureaucratic public-relations directors, and the like to hide incompetence and venality, to take credit for everything desirable that happened, and to blame others for every misadventure no doubt aided in keeping the Democratic Party in power until that time; but when events turned against it, that "aid" was of no avail. Likewise, the vigorous counterpropaganda of the American Army against the early advocates of a strong air force (*e.g.*, the Billy Mitchell affair) may have delayed by half a decade the development

⁶ For a news report on the validation of one of these miracles see *Time*, July 3, 1950.

of air power; but it could not forever hide the fact that the airplane was a new and useful instrument of warfare.

In a relatively integrated social system, where the major ideologies are highly traditional and reasonably compatible one with the others, the distinction between the propaganda of a would-be ascendant and the counterpropaganda of the established priesthood is both clear and categorical. The ideological confusions and contradictions of contemporary society often blur the line, however, between those efforts which are directed toward bringing about some change and those which are intended only to prevent some change from coming about. Frequently, in fact, the modern political speech, the newspaper editorial, the slanted news item, and even the commercial advertisement would appear to be at once an effort to secure converts and to cancel out the equally mixed endeavors of competitors. The ultimate result must often be the immunization of the object of these conflicting endeavors to control by verbal dramatization; for, other things being equal, the effectiveness of conversional efforts is undoubtedly inverse to the frequency with which this means of control is utilized.

The Morale Function of Conversion. There is always some ideological justification for the distinction between the members of any organization and nonmembers. This organizational ideology may or may not be the same as that which gives the organization status in the society. Modern medical men tend to have much the same view of themselves as society at large has of them. Professional politicians, on the other hand, are more likely to be "realists" who use but evidently do not believe in the political ideologies of their times. Certainly the practicing politicians of America show a marked preference for boss rule rather than constitutional government, and those of Russia seem to believe that Communist ideology is for export only.

Earlier it was shown that there is little reason to think that the morale of the members of large organizations, such as an army or a religious hierarchy, depends upon the acceptance of some official ideology. On the contrary, such evidence as is available suggests that the ideological motifs of organizations (as, for example, that the mail must go through, that the captain must go down with his ship, that the good soldier willingly lays down his life to save his country, etc.) are so much verbal rubbish. But there can be no doubt that acts of those in positions of authority can and often do affect member morale for good or ill. As indicated earlier, one of the checks on ascendancy through organizational office is the lowering of morale that may be thereby induced. In an attempt to bolster a declining morale, to minimize the demoralizing effects of autocratic actions, or to counteract the possible consequences to morale of the complaints and charges of dissident members, those in positions of authority frequently rely on conversional means. Thus the titular heads of a defeated political party may issue announcements to the effect that they have actually won a moral victory over their opponents and that next time they will harvest their just reward; every modern military force maintains a

variety of devices, ranging from indoctrination courses to the award of medals for special achievement, which are supposed to raise or at least maintain military morale; business and industrial establishments and political and other bureaucracies often have house organs and hold conventions, picnics, banquets, Christmas and other parties, and the like, which are supposed to demonstrate to the members that they are all just one happy family and that their superiors have only their best interests at heart.

The effectiveness of such devices may be doubted; but their cost is low in comparison with the cost to those in positions of authority of competent and equable administration. It is, for example, much easier for an administrator to claim that he is distributing rewards and obligations equably (in terms of group standards) than for him actually to do so; and often, no doubt, it is expedient for him as a would-be ascendant to act inequally—*e.g.*, to promote a personally loyal henchman rather than the individual who has earned that promotion—and then try to cover up by more or less adroit protestations of innocence. But here as elsewhere a verbal claim is seldom if ever sufficient to maintain morale in the face of demoralizing official actions. A would-be ascendant may through his promises lull the suspicions of subordinates and thereby gain some measure of tolerance toward his actions. But if those actions are persistently autocratic in character, the truth will in time become self-evident.

In effect, then, conversional efforts may supplement other means of organizational control and may even temper for a time the demoralizing effects of autocratic control; but they are never sufficient in themselves either to gain any major amount of ascendancy or to prevent the disintegration of a malfunctioning organization. Any considerable reliance on conversional efforts, however clever, to maintain the morale of an organization is, in fact, likely to backfire. The business enterprise with an exploitative labor policy, with nepotism in its ranks, or with an antiquated plant and dying market cannot save the day by lavish resort to conversional devices. Its glossy house organ, filled with good-fellowship and pep talks, will only become a butt for the ill humor of the working staff; the company picnic may amuse them, especially if the bosses democratically join in on the games and antics, but will hardly elevate their opinion of the company or its officials; and the annual banquet may provide good food but little spiritual reassurance. The reception that will be accorded any such device depends upon the preexisting status of the organization in the eyes of the members; if it is high, they will find much to approve of in the house organ, the picnic, and the banquet; if it is low, they will find in these same events ample cause for their low opinion of the organization and its officers.

CONQUEST: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC

The ascendancy of an individual over the members of an organization or segment thereof may involve nothing more than the enforcement of his will over his subordinates—his rearranging the office furniture, as it were, to suit his personal tastes. Frequently, however, such ascendancy is a means to, or inevitably necessitates, ascendancy of the organization or segment thereof over individuals outside the organization (as when a business enterprise gains buyers in the market place), over some other agency within the organization (as when the sales department dominates the production department of a manufacturing enterprise), or over some other organization (as when a public utility controls the state legislature in its own interest). A businessman who endeavors to expand or change the operation of his establishment often does so in order to enlarge the market for his products; and his organization secures a larger market either by weaning buyers from other kinds of goods or taking them from his competitors, or both. A department head who wants to enlarge or modify the functions of his department within the larger organization usually does so at the expense of one or more other departments; a religious missionary can win new souls for the glory of the Christian God only at the expense of lesser gods; a medical missionary can save bodies in the scientific manner only at the expense of primitive witchcraft or empirical medicine; a political candidate can win an election only by defeating the candidates of competing parties; and a nation can expand its territory only by subduing or exterminating the citizens of other nations, tribes, or social units.

There are some significant exceptions—some new products that do not displace old ones, some new social services that supplement rather than replace existing services, some new and unoccupied lands that may be settled without disturbance to other human beings. But on the whole, enlargement or change in the activities of any organization necessitates changes in the behavior of some or many people outside that organization. Man, like nature, abhors a vacuum, spatial or cultural, and has to the best of his ability populated the surface of the earth and developed self-sufficient, inclusive, cultural systems. The relations of system to system, of group to group, and of organization to organization are not and probably never have been stable; but at any given moment in time there is a sort of precarious equilibrium between the various peoples of the world, between the various organizations and groups within each cultural system, and between the various technologies and organizational devices of that system. As a consequence, almost any change, quantitative or

qualitative, that is achieved by a people or by one of its constituent organizations or groups necessitates change of some sort and degree in the conduct of outsiders.

The change which others must make when the members of a group or organization enlarge or modify their operations is sometimes brought about inadvertently. A primitive tribe, for example, in increasing its ability to kill migratory game by improving its tools or organization might thereby inadvertently deprive another and distant tribe of its normal supply of game; the invention and development of a synthetic substitute for a natural product may inadvertently destroy the market for the natural product; the building of a new house on a vacant lot in town may, quite without intent, close off a long-used short cut.

In most instances, however, enlargement or modification of established group or organizational activities involves a recognized and deliberate violation of the vested interests of other individuals or groups; *i.e.*, the change involves conquest. As it is here used, the term "conquest" refers to an order of social phenomena rather than to a specific kind of social action. It is the organizational parallel to individual ascendancy and, like the latter, may be achieved by coercion, by the use of economic sanctions, by persuasion, by conversion, or by a combination of two or more of these means.

It is an act of conquest when one military force achieves victory over another, when a modern people dispossesses or exterminates the primitives who occupy desired lands, when a political party wins an election and thereby dispossesses the opponent who was in power. It is also conquest when Christian missionaries win converts from the native gods, when an aggressive business entices customers away from its competitors, when one military arm enlarges its functions at the expense of another, etc. In sum, conquest is the ascendancy of an organization over nonmember individuals or over other organizations, to whatever end and by whatever means.

MILITARY CONQUEST

The recorded history of mankind is heavily weighted with the efforts and the occasional successes of one cultural variety of human beings to conquer another variety. Men have continually formed small, integrated groups, each with something of its special cultural characteristics. But even as they have been in the process of so differentiating themselves, other forces have been perpetually at work bringing groups into association and usually conflict with other groups, to the end that, as new forms of differentiation have evolved, old and antecedent forms have been broken down. A major factor in the destruction of old forms of differentiation—tribal, village, class, regional, religious, national, etc.—has always been and presumably will continue to be forceful conquest of one group by another.

Physical combat between organized groups has sometimes been so completely formalized, so much encumbered with military rituals, and so devoid of socially

significant consequences that it has been only a violent and somewhat deadly form of sport. The intertribal warfare of some primitives has frequently partaken of this quality; the gains of battle were prestige—to the victors went scalps or heads to shrink or other symbols of success. Among so-called civilized peoples, warfare has also at times been a sporting event. During one period of the Middle Ages, feudal armies fought at prearranged places and times and according to rules almost as rigid as those of the modern Olympic games, and the social consequences were hardly more significant. The armies of feudal Japan and the “private” and provincial armies of old China seem often to have entered into battle in similar spirit and with comparable results.

Fighting, with groups as with individuals, has in fact often been engaged in for the joy of battle. And perhaps all warfare has had as a factor in its causation the joy of battle and the personal and group prestige that may be derived from it. Certainly no people has for long prepared for war, however defensive their original intentions, without developing a drive to engage in war. The very existence of a professional military class predisposes a society to warfare; men cannot make a satisfying career of preparing for a war that never comes, nor can they perfect the tools and strategies of combat without being tempted to try them out in actual combat. Although all military organizations rapidly evolve bureaucratic qualities and thus tend to adjust themselves to stable peacetime routine, the existence of a military organization, however somnolent, offers an opportunity for individual ascendancy and, hence, the possibility of a “war at any price.”

Although warfare has often been an end in itself, much of the warfare of human history, and much of the many lesser forms of physical conflict between groups, has been an effort by one people to conquer another. Christian ideology, with its stress on the brotherhood of man, has required that Western peoples disguise the conquest goals of their military operations under pious or benevolent verbiage; thus recent wars have generally been justified on religious or humanitarian grounds or as a defense against unjustifiable attack by would-be conquerors. As a consequence, most of the recent historical discussions of war have an Alice-in-Wonderland quality that makes them useless as data for the study of warfare.

The Causes of War. It is the current assumption that war, like plague, is an unwanted condition of affairs; and there has been much speculation about what causes this most costly and, by assumption, unprofitable activity of men. It is no doubt as meaningless to ask what is the cause of war as to raise the antithetical question, what is the cause of peace. But the assumption that war is unwanted takes the search outside the relevant field of forces.¹ For it overlooks the crucial fact that men deliberately make war and that war is just as normal a social phenomenon as peace. Why men make war with one

¹ It is undoubtedly for this reason that the major attempt to study war scientifically produced nothing of significance regarding the causes of war. See Q Wright, *A Study of War* (2 vols., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942)

another is a complex and varied matter, even as is why men make peace with one another, why they develop this kind of social organization rather than that, or why workers sometimes, but not continually, go on strike against employers.

The simplest of the social motivations for making war is culturally determined economic necessity. In many instances military conquest has been—and for some no doubt it still is—the core of a culturally indicated way of life. Whereas most peoples have historically learned to maintain themselves by productive endeavor, supplemented usually by trading with others their surplus goods for goods they do not or cannot produce, some peoples have historically learned to live by forceful expropriation of the goods—and sometimes the persons, as in slave trade—of other societies. Such societies are, from the point of view of productive peoples, parasitic; but parasitism violates no “law,” social or natural. Parasitism is, in fact, fully as normal to men as to the lower organisms.

Within the framework of a given social system, certain groups or classes of individuals may live parasitically as a matter of social right, as does, for example, a leisure class. They presumably serve the larger society in some intangible way; at any event, they do not need to resort to force to get the productive segments of the society to maintain them. Within all societies, moreover, there are occasional individuals who discover that it is easier, or at least more enjoyable, forcibly to appropriate what they need than to earn it by productive endeavor. They are individual ascendants comparable to the kind of military conquerors here under consideration. Finally, within the framework of a given society and in the interstices between different productive social systems there often exist groups, large and small, whose culture requires that they live by theft; and since those from whom they steal are resistant, their means of livelihood is necessarily that of military conquest. In times past they swept down from the hills or out from a well-defended home port to rob villagers, the caravans of traders, the ships of a mercantile people, and so on. In the modern world, the old forms of banditry have tended to give way to urban gangsterism, but the operation is essentially the same. Historically many peoples have lived, often well and over long periods of time, by banditry, as this type of military conquest will hereafter be called. For nearly a thousand years, the inhabitants of Sicily supplemented the products of their rocky island by systematically preying on merchant shipping; and their cultural sanctioning of this mode of securing a livelihood was so deeply ingrained that even today much of modern American gangsterism has historical roots in Sicily. The Cariban tribes who gave their name to the Caribbean area were, at the time of Columbus and for long after, warlike peoples who lived almost exclusively by robbing and plundering the less militant tribes of the region. The Chinese accepted banditry as a normal condition of social affairs, and our legend of Robin Hood and his merry men is a romanticized reflection of the fact that premodern England did not make

a clear and consistent distinction between bandits and the presumably socially sanctioned use of force by the king's men. Even in modern America it is sometimes difficult to tell whether public sentiment favors the officially unlawful bandits or the lawful agents of government.

Over the past century and a half, industrialization and the development of a degree of productive specialization on a national basis have brought such economic interdependence between the various peoples of the modern world that recent wars have proved materially unprofitable to the victor. After both World War I and World War II, in fact, the victors—notably the United States—not only bore the costs of war but undertook the economic and, to some extent, social rehabilitation of the vanquished. At least in the case of Germany after World War I, this procedure was comparable to setting up in business again a gang of captured gangsters on the theory that if they are able to earn a livelihood, they will not be tempted to rob the rich. In the years immediately following World War II it was blithely assumed that this time the Germans, and along with them the Japanese, could be reeducated as well as economically rehabilitated and thus brought into the community of peaceful nations. It is still too early to assess the eventual outcome of this policy, but that either the Germans or the Japanese as a people can in a generation or less be weaned away from the cultural imperatives which drove them into war in the first place is highly improbable. Our long and discouraging experience with the effort to reform the individual professional criminal confirms the evidence of social history; once a society has learned to live by banditry, the cultural values, sentiments, and organizations of military conquest cannot be rescinded by purchase, *i.e.*, economic rehabilitation, or exorcised by verbal magic, *i.e.*, by reeducation in the superficial sense. Those values, sentiments, and organizational forms were centuries in the making; and they will be, if not centuries, at least generations in the unmaking.

This is not to say that a society which has evolved parasitic dependence, in whole or in part, upon the productive labors of other societies cannot in time become self-maintaining; some have, and some have not. The Romans were historically unable to make the transition from a largely parasitic people, dependent for their economic maintenance and that of their legions upon tribute exacted from conquered provinces, to that of a productive people. Nearly two thousand years later the people of Italy are culturally incapable, for both technological and more particularly organizational reasons, of exploiting their domestic resources in the modern manner. The Swiss, on the other hand, who were for a time the most efficient and greedy bandits of Western Europe, have long since learned to be economically self-maintaining; and they are one of the few peoples of the Western world who have avoided involvement in war over the past two centuries. The Spanish, now even less productive than the Italians, who for nearly two centuries pillaged the peoples of South and Central America and were during that time the world's most successful thieves, eventually became so corrupt with riches that they were super-

seded by the British (and, to a lesser extent, by the Dutch, the Belgians, and the French).² The British, in turn, evolved a new system of conquest—one more like that of ancient Rome than the grab-and-run procedure of the Swiss and Spanish—which enabled them for a century and more to monopolize vast sources of raw material in return for which they provided manufactured goods and policing services. Whether the British, now that they have ceased to be the center of a great politico-economic empire, can become self-maintaining remains to be seen.

That the time is past when one nation can conquer and in any significant degree live off the production of another nation or people seems certain. But that military conquest motivated by cultural parasitism is also a thing of the past is unlikely. Twice in the memory of living men the German people have armed themselves and set out, under a variety of irrelevant pretenses, to subjugate their neighbors; twice they have failed militarily, and their latest failure was shared by the peoples of Italy and Japan. But that the hope of living parasitically on the productive labors of others has been dislodged from the cultures of these and all other societies is improbable. It is no more possible to "prove" to a people by defeating them in war that war does not pay than it is to prove to an individual by catching and punishing him that crime does not pay. For historically military conquest for material gain has paid and paid well indeed. And it may do so again.

Recent efforts at military conquest, excluding perhaps the German, have involved some element of what is often termed "land hunger." The professional bandit takes from his victim what can be carted away; he robs the householder, plunders the village, or extorts liquid wealth or raw materials from the conquered people. The antithetical form of military conquest is that in which a conqueror takes over as his own, to use and operate for himself, the lands and other possessions of another people. Somewhere between these two extremes is the kind of conquest evolved by the ancient Romans and the modern British, a system in which the conqueror leaves the subjugated people largely in possession of its lands and other productive properties but rules politically to the end that he can exact tribute, always in terms of the kinds of goods or services he finds desirable, from the subjugated people.

In its purest form, "land hunger" may arise from one or a number of cultural or other circumstances. It has been assumed that many of the great mass migrations of premodern times, which invariably involved military conquest of the inhabitants of the regions into which migration occurred, were occasioned by prolonged drought or other natural catastrophe in the home region. There is no real evidence for this assumption; and in some instances at least—as, for example, the infiltration of barbarians into Greece and, centuries later, into Rome—migrations would seem to have been a matter of being drawn into a social vacuum rather than of being forced out of a de-

² For a comparison of the British, French, and Belgian methods of ruling colonial peoples see W. Russell, *On Governing Colonies* (G. Allen, London, 1947).

teriorating physical habitat. At any event, none of the mass migrations of recent history, such as the conquest by Western peoples of the North American continent, can be traced to geographic changes; their causes have all been social.

Demographers incline to the view that the conquest and settlement of new lands is caused by overpopulation in the homeland; and the Japanese ideologists attempted to justify the conquest of Manchuria, and subsequently of other parts of China, on the grounds that Japan was overpopulated while Manchuria was underpopulated. Overpopulation and underpopulation are, however, social evaluations; unless a people feel the need for new lands and see in the acquisition of new lands an easy way to satisfy felt wants, they will not be tempted to migrate. History is replete with instances in which a people have lived for centuries at the subsistence level, in a land overpopulated in our own terms, without casting covetous eyes on nearby fertile lands inhabited by comparatively few and technologically inferior people. Normally, it would seem, the cultural bondage to place and way of life is stronger than the "hunger" drive; that is, for the most part, men prefer to die in the place of their birth rather than to try to live in some other region.

Apparently it is only when internal changes have shattered the cultural equilibrium of a social system that men can and do develop the initiative, both individual and group, necessary to undertake to improve their economic welfare through migration to new lands. This is what happened, clearly, in Western Europe toward the close of the fifteenth century. The Americas had been discovered, quite inadvertently, in the search for a quick route to the Orient. The settlement, as distinct from the pillage, of the Americas did not begin in earnest until political and religious, as well as economic, changes in European society made the prospect of settlement in a new land attractive to numbers of malcontents. It was not the pressure of numbers, but rather, the changes in social organization, which drove people to seek a "better" life—and in the main this seems to have meant the way of life that had existed prior to those changes—on the North American continent. Later, during the nineteenth century, some waves of immigrants did come as an escape from poverty; but by then the continent had been settled and the native Americans well-nigh exterminated. There is a significant difference between migrating into a hostile land and coming to supply needed labor; the social drive must be much greater in the former case.

Some of the initial, and indeed some of the subsequent, migrations from Europe to North America did not involve immediate military conquest of the native populations; but almost invariably the migrants soon wore out their welcome and had forcibly to subdue or exterminate the Indians (in the latter phases by a form of banishment—confinement to the Indian reservations). It is probable that military subjugation or extermination is ultimately inevitable whenever members of a technologically more advanced society settle upon lands occupied by technological inferiors. Acculturation of the natives

is theoretically possible, but it seems to have occurred rarely, if ever.³ The gradual appropriation by Westerners of the Hawaiian Islands did not, it is true, involve much military action; but it brought the virtual extermination of the natives by diseases introduced by Westerners and by malnutrition induced by Western dietary habits. Elsewhere in the Pacific, as in South America and much of Africa, Europeans have settled only to the extent necessary to maintain political and economic ascendancy over the native populations; *i.e.*, they have for the most part "occupied" rather than settled in these regions.

Within the framework of a given social system, migration and settlement is interregional and is usually accomplished without force, pecuniary rather than coercive sanctions being involved. But even here there are exceptions. The cattlemen of the early West often forcibly resisted the settlement of range lands by nesters—agriculturalists who wished to fence off plots of land and put them to the plow. The northward migration of Negroes has in some instances involved violence; and on many recent occasions criminal gangs have appropriated new territories by intimidating the local police and either buying out or driving out the local criminal gangs. Perhaps one of the oddest examples within a society of migration that led to coercion is provided by the carpet-baggers' invasion of the Southern states after the Civil War. Unwanted and bitterly but ineffectually opposed by the dispossessed elite of the old South, a wave of ingenious and aggressive men from the North settled upon the ruins of the old society and, with the sanction of Federally dominated local governments (in which recently liberated and enfranchised Negroes were often used as agents), proceeded forcibly to take over and run the economy.⁴

THE PREREQUISITES TO MILITARY CONQUEST

It has been said that individual crimes against property, such as theft, burglary, and the like, are based on an unequal distribution of wealth and a difference of opinion as to who should have the most. Military conquest, which is really only a large-scale, collective parallel to individual crimes against persons and property, has a similar basis. There must be a people to conquer and a desire to conquer them; but there must also be a good deal more than this before actual conquest can and will be undertaken. Many a man has coveted, contrary to Biblical injunction, the possessions of another and has

³ See, for example, the following reports on the cultural consequences of specific conquests: S. F. Cook, *The Conflict between the California Indians and White Civilization* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1944); H. I. Hogben, *Experiments in Civilization: The Effects of European Culture on a Native Community of the Solomon Islands* (Routledge, London, 1939); S. Tax *et al.*, *Heritage of Conquest: The Ethnology of Middle America* (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1950); M. E. Tounsend, *European Colonial Expansion since 1771* (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1942); and A. Vandenbosch, "The Effect of Dutch Rule on the Civilization of the East Indies" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 498-502, 1943).

⁴ For a historical analysis of Southern resistance to this invasion see S. F. Horn, *Invisible Empire: The Story of the Ku Klux Klan, 1866-1881* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1939).

done nothing about it; many a society, or group therein, has no doubt wanted more than its current share of the world's wealth yet has not taken up arms to secure it.

Predatory Leadership. Routine forms of military conquest, such as the regular raids of bandits on merchant caravans or the systematic and continuous pillage of water-front warehouses by modern gangs of thieves, require only administrative leadership. Sporadic banditry, piracy, the military conquest of one people (a tribe, a nation, etc.) by another, the taking over of new territories by gangsters, and the like are, however, forms of group ascendancy that normally require what may be characterized as predatory leadership. It is through such leadership that an organization, bandit gang or military force, may be induced to undertake a new enterprise and assume the risks thereof; such leadership provides the organization with an incentive, with a program or plan of action, and with constant guidance in the execution of that plan.

Ideally, a predatory leader possesses in complex human form all the personality attributes normally associated with such predators of the lower-animal world as the hawk, the tiger, and the shark. In addition to the supermotivation, initiative, and other attributes necessary for individual ascendancy of any sort, a predatory leader is required to have exceptional courage of a physical sort, unusual skill in the use of coercion and a preference for it over other means of control, combined with the ability to use these other means in gaining and maintaining ascendancy over the men who are led in conquest, and a value system which makes theft, however arduous and costly of human life, preferable to productive labor.

It is no doubt possible that a Captain Kidd or a modern gang leader may possess the personal attributes that are essential to the provision of the many kinds of leadership involved in even small-scale conquest. Ordinarily, however, leadership of a conquest is provided by a considerable number of individuals, each functioning in a special field—*e.g.*, organizational, tactical, technological, financial, etc. It is clear, at any event, that in Germany's recent attempt to conquer Western Europe, Hitler served mainly to provide the incentive and gain public support for the enterprise, while others, including the traditional German General Staff, such flamboyant individuals as Goering and Goebbels, and industrialists such as Krupps and Borzig, provided specialized leadership of various sorts. It is equally certain, although obscured by the myths of history, that such great conquerors as Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, and Stalin did not provide *in toto*, or even in any large measure, leadership for the conquests with which their names are associated. At the most they provided leadership of the leaders of those conquests. No one man could, obviously, direct in any detail the mobilization of a modern nation for war, the planning of military campaigns, the occupation of conquered territories, etc. A prerequisite for successful military conquest is, thus, the presence of men within the group or the society capable of

providing the various sorts of leadership required and willing to do so. Few groups in any society and few societies as such at any given time are able to satisfy this requirement.

Predatory Values and the Militant Society. The presence of men capable of providing leadership in military conquest does not of itself, however, assure that the group or the society will embark on conquest. The support for such an endeavor cannot be secured coercively; it can be obtained only by persuasion and conversion, heavily supplemented by pecuniary appeals. And, as has been shown, the effectiveness of these methods of control depends upon the values, sentiments, etc., of those subjected to them. Unless the members of a group or society have predatory values and sentiments, they cannot be induced by predatory leadership to support a predatory venture. Actually, it is the existence in the group or society at large of such values and sentiments which gives rise to men capable of providing predatory leadership.

The professional criminal is one who believes that theft is more honorable, or at least more profitable, than productive labor; and so believing, he considers what he steals to be his, rightfully come by. Likewise, a militant group or society is one in which the members are inclined to consider the forceful appropriation of property and, perhaps, persons a desirable and justifiable means of enlarging their own wealth and power. Such predatory values and sentiments may be dominant, as they are with professional brigands, or latent, as they are with those modern nations, such as Germany, that have recurrently sought through military conquest an increase in national wealth and an enlargement of political power. The cultural values and sentiments that permit and in turn foster such endeavor are as different from those of a peaceful and productive people as the personal values and sentiments of a professional criminal are from those of an honest and hard-working citizen.

The essential difference between the values and sentiments of the professional criminal and of the militant society is that the former exist and operate in violation of the normal social sanctions while the latter are given social sanction. From the point of view of the society in which the criminal functions, his predatory activities are deviant. On the other hand, to engage in organized predatory endeavor is normal for the individual members of the militant society, with the result that social controls here operate to force the less-than-predatory individual to participate in, or at the very least give passive sanction to, conquest. The latter fact was entirely ignored by the "war crimes" trials held in Germany and Japan after World War II, during which it was held that only those individuals who had contributed directly to the making of wartime policy (*i.e.*, the acknowledged political and military leaders) were responsible for such crimes against mankind as the extermination of the Jews and the rape of Nanking.⁵

⁵ The idea that leaders, rather than peoples, are responsible for wartime atrocities has been elaborated into something of a doctrine by S. Glueck in *War Criminals: Their Prosecu-*

All peoples are of necessity more or less ethnocentric; they consider themselves and, most especially, their cultural ways superior to others. When those cultural ways are self-maintaining—*i.e.*, productive—ethnocentrism is a barrier to, rather than a stimulus for, conquest. A normally peaceful and self-maintaining people may under constant provocation be aroused to violent defensive action, although they may perhaps just as probably be destroyed or enslaved before they have developed the values, sentiments, and skills necessary for effective resistance. But even though they may be aroused by circumstances to resist conquest through militant action, a people who have the cultural attributes, including the organizational systems, of self-maintenance are not culturally prepared to initiate and undertake military conquest.

Something of the difference between predatory values and sentiments and those of self-maintenance is indicated by the difference in the way in which the Germans, and later the Russians, treated occupied peoples and the way in which the Allies in general and the United States in particular treated conquered Germany and Japan. Under the Nazi Party rule, something like five million German and Polish citizens who were legally classified as Jews were systematically destroyed; under the German occupation, tens of thousands of French, Belgian, Dutch, and other Western European citizens were deprived of their property, their freedom, or their lives. The official and systematic attempt to starve the Dutch people during the last year of the occupation as retribution for their stubborn resistance to occupation demands is but one of many examples of the predatory characteristics that the German people have shown. They—and by “they” is here meant not alone the political and military leaders who ordered such treatment, but the members of the society that sanctioned and carried out that treatment—proceeded on the assumption and in the belief that the inferior, *i.e.*, non-Germanic, peoples of the world, were put here for the express purpose of serving the interests of their masters, a view which Americans and many other peoples currently take toward pigs and cows but find abhorrent when applied to human beings of any category. Evidently the Russians take this view toward the peoples whom they conquered, with Allied permission, toward the end of World War II.

By contrast, American military leaders encountered strong opposition from the American public when, after American entry into the war, they acted—or, as in the Hawaiian Islands, attempted to act—on the assumption that persons of Japanese ancestry were per se enemies of the nation. They did succeed in evacuating the Japanese from the West Coast and incarcerating the majority of them in prison camps; but in accordance with traditional American values and sentiments, the *évacués* were well fed, reasonably well housed, and

tion and Punishment (Knopf, New York, 1944). For evidence that the German people were quite aware of, and hence sanctioned passively if not actively, the extermination of the Jews see M. Janowitz, “German Reaction to Nazi Atrocities” (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 52, pp. 141–146, 1946)

required to do no work. After their release, they were eventually more or less reimbursed for their property losses.⁶ The traditionally nonpredatory character of American values and sentiments is even more strikingly reflected in the postwar treatment of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The American people (and, with somewhat more reluctance, the peoples of Britain, France, and other Allied nations) sanctioned a policy of dealing with the defeated as though they were juvenile delinquents rather than criminals—*i.e.*, of attempting to reform and rehabilitate these predatory nations rather than exacting retribution from them.

Many factors, no doubt, contributed to the making of that policy: economic motives, including the desire of American farmers and industrialists to dump surplus production in these countries; some genuine and a great deal of spurious apprehension that from the ashes of defeat might arise Communist or other potentially dangerous—to Americans—political movements; and, perhaps, the fact that these defeated peoples possessed nothing that Americans considered worth expropriating. But the basic reason for the policy lay in that complex of sentiments, values, and prides which, in conjunction with vast natural resources and atypically efficient systems of organization, makes the United States at once the most productive society in the world and the least covetous of its neighbor's possessions.

Specific reasons why one people or one group within the larger society come to have the values, sentiments, and other cultural attributes that permit, and at times perhaps require, their being led into a war of conquest while others do not can seldom be found. The causes of such differences lie in the history of such peoples and not, as is so often assumed, in the tangible circumstances of the moment, such as, for example, their poverty, wealth, or system of political organization. Historical experience may gradually make a militant society into a peaceable and self-maintaining people, and vice versa. But the process of such cultural change is far too slow and too complex to be subject to exact analysis. About all that can be said in this respect is that deliberate efforts to reform unsuccessful conquerors, as the United States undertook to do, are certain to have limited effects.

The Military Culture. Success in military conquest, as distinct from the desire to secure the rewards of such conquest, depends upon many factors. The external factors, which are entirely beyond the control of the militant society, include the proximity of relatively weak and rich people to conquer.

⁶ See L. Bloom and R. Riemer, *Removal and Return* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1949). A detailed account of the way in which the Japanese *evacués* were treated in one relocation camp is given in A. H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1945). Although Leighton concludes that the governing of this prison camp was considerably short of perfect, the treatment accorded the Japanese reflects attitudes and sentiments entirely different from those operative in the German extermination camps. For an account of the latter see E. Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System behind Them* (N. Norden, trans., Farrar, Straus, New York, 1950).

Brigandage thrives in times and places where there is considerable liquid capital—e.g., during gold, diamond, and other rushes and wherever there is much trade by land or by sea in goods—but is comparatively rare among an agricultural peasantry who, while characteristically weak in a physical sense, have little that is worth stealing. The relative strength of another society depends, of course, upon the strength of the one; and this strength depends, in turn, upon the culturally provided weapons, the size and physical fitness of the population, the character of its organizational system, and the relevance of its values, sentiments, etc., for warfare.

Contrary to the Rousseauian idea of natural man and inimical to the hopes of modern world-peace advocates is the fact that most societies, primitive and civilized, ancient and modern, have been military, if not militant, by either inclination or necessity. But the extent to which a culture centers around the tools and organizations of warfare and the extent to which a society is attitudinally and otherwise capable of engaging in vigorous and prolonged war vary considerably, both between societies at any given time and from time to time within a given society. The range in this respect between societies is perhaps as wide as that between a professional thug and a peaceful citizen; but constant provocation can often induce a relatively peaceful society, even as it can a peaceful individual, to acquire military attributes; and prolonged inactivity can reduce a militant society, even as it can a thug, to military incompetence.

It is exceedingly difficult, however, to trace the military attributes of a given society to their specific historical roots. The feudal type of social organization, which has evolved at quite different times in widely separated parts of the world, has placed a high group-survival value on military force and therefore has given rise to weapon-centered and defense-centered technologies, to military forms of organization, and to professional fighters. The virulent militarism of the Prussians, which has undoubtedly served as the core of recent German military endeavors, is often thought to be a postfeudal hang-over; and it is certain that Japanese national Shinto was built upon the remnants of premodern Japanese feudalism. The lack of a strong military tradition is sometimes explained, as in the case of the Chinese, in terms of historical distance from a feudal type of social organization. But such explanations do not account for the intense militarism of many tribal peoples who have never known feudalism or the many relatively short-time shifts in military potential that have occurred in given societies. A century and a half ago, for example, France under Napoleon was a society geared mainly to the making of war; for the past century France has been militarily incompetent. Less than a century ago, Britain ruled the seas and much of the land bordering thereon; today Britain is a second-class power rapidly sinking toward the military level of France, Italy, and other relatively peaceable peoples. Conversely, the United States, which less than a century ago was so inept at warfare that it made an *opéra bouffe* of its clash with decadent Spain and in the end won that en-

counter only by default, is beginning to develop through participation in two world wars a strong vested interest in the making of war.

Whatever the historical origins of militarism, the qualities thereof are fairly evident. Perhaps the simplest and most reliable criterion of the degree to which a society is militaristic is the place in the class scale that is accorded professional military men. In the Greek city-states they were, according to Plato, second in importance only to philosophers, the political administrators of the state. In a feudal society their position is preeminent; *i.e.*, the feudal lord is first of all a military man, and all the other activities of the feudal manor are subordinated to the maintenance of the military machine. Among warlike primitives, war chiefs and warriors have generally been accorded the highest status. In all such societies, producers of food and other consumers' goods have a class position which is lower than that of craftsmen skilled in the making of weapons—the armorers. By contrast, in militarily inept societies professional fighting men tend to be placed, as they were by the Chinese, near or at the bottom of the class scale, and producers of consumers' goods to be placed well above the weaponmaker.

LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY CONQUEST

Success in military conquest is possible only to the extent that the would-be ascendant group or society is stronger in the military terms of the times, more persistent, and more ruthless than those whom they would conquer. In some historical instances a conquest has been completely successful; *i.e.*, the conquerors have ultimately subdued or destroyed the native population and secured as their own the conquered territory. In this sense Europeans entirely conquered the North American continent. Even so, the natives resisted displacement and extermination with such skill and stubbornness that the history of this conquest spans three centuries, during at least two of which those on the frontier of settlement lived of necessity with a rifle in easy reach. Yet few large-scale conquests have been half so successful. Most of the major efforts at conquest have ended, as did that of Rome, of Genghis Khan, of the Spanish in Central and South America, and of the British in India, in eventual failure. And in the short run, *i.e.*, during the period of effective occupation, these and many other great conquests have been almost as costly to the conquerors as to those whom they conquered.

Military conquest is often portrayed, even as is autocratic control of an organization, in the framework of one-way cause and effect—as though by exercising coercion, the conquerors could cause the conquered to behave in ways demanded of them. In reality, however, conquest is a dynamic process of interaction between groups with diametrically opposed interests—a clash of wills—in which the actions of the conquerors are almost as much a result as a cause of the actions of the conquered. Even in the course of exterminating an inferior people, the conquerors must adapt to the evasive tactics taken by their victims, who rarely, if ever, face the prospect of violent death pas-

sively. In comparison with their eventual conquerors, the American Indians were markedly inferior at the outset in terms of both weapons and organization. Broken into innumerable, largely antagonistic tribes, often warlike but unaccustomed to organized and systematic warfare (they typically depended upon individual hand-to-hand forms of fighting and the sporadic mass raid), and equipped with nothing more formidable than the stone-tipped spear and the bow and arrow, they nevertheless harrassed the settlers for two centuries, during which they learned new arts of warfare and acquired the white man's weapons. In the last great battle between the American Indians and their conquerors—i.e., between the forces of General Custer and Sitting Bull—the Indians proved themselves the better fighters.

Ascendancy through military conquest is possible only to the extent that and for as long as the social controls that operate among the conquerors are favorable to coercive nullification of the social controls that operate among the conquered. Any weakening or distortion of the former will mean a strengthening of the latter; for military conquest is necessarily a state of precarious disequilibrium. The structure of this precarious disequilibrium may be described in abstract terms as involving three different and interrelated fields of forces: within the organization of the conquerors there must be a state of equilibrium between the various individual interests, the many and varied group norms, and the over-all structure and procedures of the organization itself; within the membership of the conquered there must be a condition of acute disequilibrium, in which the coercion exercised by the conquerors more than offsets the antagonistic social controls operative among the conquered; and between the conqueror and the conquered there must be a continuing state of disequilibrium, in which the former press coercively against the resistance of the latter. Such a condition of forces is difficult to achieve and still more difficult to maintain.⁷

Dissension. It often happens that in conquest as in other forms of human

⁷ Some appreciation of the tremendous complexity of military conquest, including the uneasy status of the conquerors themselves, can be gleaned from the following descriptive reports: C. van der Grift and E. H. Lansing, *Escape from Java* (Crowell, New York, 1943); H. L. Leonhardt, *Nazi Conquest of Danzig* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942); E. G. Mead, *American Military Government in Korea* (King's Crown Press, New York, 1951); and J. W. Riley, Jr., *The Reds Take a City* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1951).

Much of the existing literature, particularly that which is autobiographical, on life under military control portrays the conqueror as one who exercises absolute powers. The following are among the least overdramatized current descriptions of politicomilitary terrorism: R. R. Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1941), an account of the reign of terror during the French Revolution, 1793–1794; L. Paul, *The Age of Terror* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1951), which is an attempt to evaluate terror as an instrument of political control; L. Stowe, *Conquest by Terror* (Random House, New York, 1951); E. Taylor, *The Strategy of Terror* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1942); and A. Weissberg, *The Accused* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1951), which is an effort to make some sense of the, to Western minds, weird Russian public trials.

endeavor success breeds failure. The greed that drives a band of thieves to work together in robbing the rich may be replaced by individual greed when success brings full purses; and when thieves fall out among themselves, they lose the strength that comes through organization. And so it may be with any conquering group; their initial successes may weaken their ability to hold their organization together and thus their ability to maintain control of those whom they have conquered.

The unity and hence the military strength of conquerors may be weakened by one or a number of processes. Dissension arising from individual and group strivings for ascendancy within the total organization is perhaps the most characteristic of these processes. The members of a group engaged in conquest are often highly motivated and are always predisposed to the use of force. As long as such a group is actively engaged in an attempt to overcome and subjugate the members of another group, their drive and their preference for force as the means to gain their ends are more or less channelized. But the motivations and regard for force which lead them into and enable them to succeed in conquest do not atrophy when the ship is plundered, the town is sacked, or the territory of the enemy is occupied. When conquest is followed by settlement of captured lands, the energies of the conquerors may be fully absorbed in the task of bringing those lands under cultivation, etc. But brigands returned to their hide-out with booty and forces occupying, as distinct from settling, a conquered territory usually find themselves with time and excess energies on their hands. They may then turn, individually or in cliques, to striving for ascendancy over one another—to attempting to get the lion's share of the booty, to attempting to gain control of the occupation forces or a favored position within those forces, and so on. And since they are both highly motivated and prone to the use of force to secure their ends, the struggle between individuals and cliques tends to be violent.

Disruption of criminal gangs in modern societies often results from internal dissension rather than attack from without. Apparently one of the major problems of gang leadership is that of keeping some semblance of peace among the members, who are of necessity both highly ambitious and resentful of restraints. A gang leader must keep them from fighting with one another and from forming into antagonistic cliques, and he must identify and dispose of any individual who has become acutely dissatisfied with his status within the gang and who may therefore "sell out" to the police as a means of retaliation. There is, of course, a rough sort of honor among thieves; and the individual thief is subject to the norms of the group. But evidently there is an irresolvable opposition between the personal qualities that make for a good thief and those essential to harmonious and effective organization of thieves; for in the main, professional thieves do not maintain long-lived and continuing operational organizations. Rather, they tend to form a coalition for the specific purpose of doing a given job, with each member going his separate way once that job is done and the proceeds divided. Gangsterism, particularly the kind

that evolved in the United States during Prohibition, like the brigandage of an earlier day, does involve relatively durable organization among a closed membership. The high death rate of modern gangsters suggests, however, that their organizations frequently split into opposing camps (which, in the manner of gangsters, shoot it out) and that attempts at palace revolts are a normal hazard of leadership.

Military conquerors, such as the German army of World War II, the French army under Napoleon, and the British navy and army during the early stages of the development of the British Empire, are not necessarily organizations of highly motivated individuals as are ordinary brigands. They may be for the most part simple conscripts or professional soldiers. But they do of necessity acquire a considerable contempt for human life and a predisposition toward coercion as a means of control. And both the hazards of military action and the monotony of routine military life generate psychological tensions which may upon occasion serve as atypical drives to action, that is, which may be expressed in ascendant efforts, such as bickering violently with one another, trying to grasp an excessive share of goods or services taken from the enemy, or endeavoring to acquire power in excess of that indicated by the organizational system or the program of conquest.

One of the problems of a military commander is to keep his forces fighting aggressively up to the moment that victory is won and then to reduce them to passive puppets who will obediently and contentedly follow a routine occupational function. It is a problem that is inherently unsolvable. If his forces are composed of aggressive fighters, they will continue to behave aggressively in some direction or other after the victory has been won. A period of revelous drinking, pillage, rape, and other excesses may serve to reduce tensions and momentarily exhaust initiative. But once this rather traditional victory celebration is over and a semblance of military order has been restored, the men become restive. How they will then expend their energies and satisfy their desire to be doing something depends upon many things, including their cultural values and interests and the opportunities provided by the circumstances in which they find themselves. After both world wars, a considerable proportion of American troops abroad either did everything in their very limited power to get themselves home and back into civilian life or else set up little business enterprises—black-market, of necessity—in army goods. German occupation troops, on the other hand, were inclined to devote their energies to gaining ascendancy within the organization by the development and multiplication of bureaucratic structures and, to a significant extent, to achieving and maintaining rather petty forms of individual ascendancy over individual members of the conquered society—to behaving in ways that were, from the point of view of the occupied, arrogant.

Perhaps it is less a consideration of efficient use of manpower than the recognition that an aggressive military force tends to act aggressively in the role of occupation troops that has led armies to make a distinction between fighting

and occupation troops. The former are often withdrawn from a conquered area for retraining and reassignment and replaced by the latter, usually composed of older and, by assumption, less highly motivated and violent men to serve through the dull reaches of the occupation itself. While this practice no doubt has a functional basis, reducing to some degree the danger that the occupation forces will become dissentious, it may also mean that the occupiers will administer and enforce occupational policy in a routine and legalistic, and hence ineffectual, manner. For there is nothing so easy for a willfully disobedient people to circumvent as the letter of the law (in this case the law of the conqueror) when it is administered by a letter-perfect but otherwise incompetent bureaucrat.

Inertia. A military force that has conquered and is occupying the territory of an enemy is in somewhat the predicament of a gang of kidnapers who are holding a victim for ransom. The task is inherently dull and confining; but success in the task demands constant watchfulness and anticipation of every attempt by the conquered to evade control. Just as the guards in a lonely mountain cabin may through boredom and frustration get to quarreling among themselves over who gets what and who does what, etc., so occupying troops may become more concerned with gaining ascendancy over one another than with maintaining their joint ascendancy over the conquered. Or, at the other extreme, they may become so routinized in their relations to one another and to the conquered that their control is easily circumvented.

It will be recalled that all organizations, small or large, tend in time to acquire the characteristics of bureaucracy. Where the circumstances under which an organization operates are relatively stable, the growth of bureaucratic attributes may mean an increase in organizational efficiency; but it also means a decline in the ability of the organization to make dynamic adaptations should external circumstances change. The conditions under which an occupying force operates are usually subject to rapid and unpredictable changes; for a conquered people are stimulated by their predicament to random efforts to evade the controls exercised by their conquerors. In these efforts they are comparatively free from the hampering effects of bureaucratic organization. If an occupying force becomes more and more concerned with and pre-occupied by the maintenance of an elaborate system of paper controls, the occupied peoples may devise more and more ways to nullify and circumvent this official system; *i.e.*, the gap widens between the official conduct of the occupied peoples and their actual conduct. Thus, officially peasants may plant according to plan and turn out their quota of manufactured goods for the use of the conqueror; but what the conqueror actually gets may not be in accordance with the official plan at all. It may be, in fact, only a small fraction of what the official plan calls for.

Evidently the Romans were for long able to exact from their conquered provinces much of the tribute that they demanded. Clearly the British, and perhaps the Dutch and Belgians, were able by fairly rapid rotation of per-

sonnel and other devices to maintain for a century or so some adaptability to changing conditions in the regions that they occupied, in India and elsewhere. But the tendency toward the development of bureaucracy is everywhere present; and the consequences of such development are particularly disadvantageous, from the conqueror's point of view, in an occupying force. There is some evidence that during their relatively short occupation of Western Europe the Germans lost greatly through the multiplicity and overlapping character of the occupational agencies they set up and that American occupation of both its sector of conquered Germany and of Japan was similarly hampered.

Demoralization and Fraternization. In the long run, the major hazard for any occupying force is demoralization. Most of the great conquests of the past have, in fact, ended ultimately in the demoralization of the conquerors. Such demoralization may take a century or two; but in many instances it has occurred within the lifetime of a single generation.

To maintain a conqueror-conquered relationship it is essential that the conquerors—*i.e.*, the occupying forces—remain individually and collectively distinct from and unsympathetic toward the conquered. There has been much criticism of the long-standing British policy of aloofness toward colonial peoples; but in so far as the British were successful in extracting tribute from their colonial peoples, their success was in considerable part traceable to the strictly maintained policy of treating colonial peoples as categorically inferior and refusing to fraternize with them. Under this policy the colonial administrators and their functionaries, both civil and military, traditionally were and remained agents of Britain; and for a Briton to go out to one of the colonies was, from his point of view, a temporary exile, during which he maintained as best he could the forms of British life and insulated himself from the life of the people over whom he ruled. By contrast, the French colonial administrators tended to adopt many native forms of life, to intermarry with natives, and to become attached to and to a degree identified with native groups. The result was not necessarily less despotic rule; but it was certainly less efficient in terms of getting the most for France out of the native peoples.

The temptation to fraternize with an occupied people is probably directly related to the degree of cultural similarity. Language and other differences provide something of a barrier between the occupiers and the occupied; most important, perhaps, is the extent to which the occupiers consider the native way of life inferior to their own. But a wide cultural gap can be partially nullified by circumstantial encouragements to fraternization. Among these encouragements or motivations is distance and detachment from the homeland, the absence of women of the home society, and a lengthy period of occupational duty. The British colonial administrators, like the Spanish conquistadors before them, tended to offset the great distance from home and their long periods in the conquered lands by taking their families with them and establishing colonies in which many aspects of homeland life could be reproduced.

Where something of the sort has not been done, the occupying forces have either had to lead a barren and unsatisfying barracks type of life or to fraternize with the natives.

Under the barracks type of occupational life, exemplified by the Germans in France and elsewhere during World War II, the individual has what is for him, and would be for almost any human being, a limited and abnormal status. He is more or less accepted by his fellows; he has a role in the occupational system and personal status of some sort with his peers. But he and his kind are few, and their activities are restricted and personally unrewarding. His status in the larger society—among the villagers or townspeople or in the sector of the city in which he is stationed—is that of hated and despised conqueror. All doors are closed to him, to be opened only on official command, and then unwillingly. The conquered may be impoverished and unhappy; life may be as hard for them as the conquerors can make it. But they live, walk, and work among friends; each has the comfort and satisfaction of "belonging," a comfort that the conquerors lack and most acutely need.

To satisfy this need the conquerors may, contrary to regulations, individually make tentative steps toward fraternization. In occupied territories American soldiers, who are perhaps the most friendly and ineffectual conquerors that the world has ever known, have generally progressed in a matter of days from sharing food with the local children to sharing beds with the local women.

Because the greatest need of occupying forces is for friendly companionship, especially but not exclusively from women, the ability of an occupied people to extend such companionship for a price is one of their most effective means of resistance.⁸ Fraternization invariably leads in time to demoralization. The individual who, however slowly, gains status in the eyes of the occupied population does so by participating in their group life. Such participation is necessarily in their terms; *i.e.*, the individual becomes subject to and must conform to their group norms. As a result he becomes increasingly subject to the social controls of the conquered and, to that extent, less subject to the controls, social and official, of the conquerors. As his regard for what the natives think of him—his achieved status among them—increases, he becomes progressively detached from his prior status groups and increasingly indifferent to their norms. From the conqueror's point of view, he is thus becoming progressively demoralized. When any considerable proportion of those charged with the maintenance of occupation policy are thus demoralized, effective administra-

⁸ Such evidence as is available indicates, however, that professional prostitutes do not ordinarily aid in this respect; they seem generally to be willing collaborators, perhaps because their status in the local society is always unsatisfactory, perhaps because it is the role of the prostitute to give her loyalty and affections superficially to the currently highest bidder and to be truly loyal to no one but her pimp. At any event, conquerors seem always able to secure the services of the conquered's prostitutes; and such adverse effects to the occupation as may follow are indirect and incidental—*i.e.*, through a lowering of the health level of occupying forces

tion of that policy is impossible; in fact, at such a time the conquered have become the conquerors.

The British occupied India for over a century without being absorbed into Indian society. On the other hand, all the many conquerors of old China established new dynasties but soon otherwise lost their identity. Perhaps the typical outcome of the conquest and occupation of a people lies somewhere between these two extremes. At any event, the temptation to fraternize with a conquered people is always present and always great; it strains the morale of the occupying forces, and it has sometimes led to such demoralization that in the end the conquerors have been absorbed, and hence culturally conquered, by the people whom they had initially subjected to military conquest.

RESISTANCE TO MILITARY CONQUEST

Nominally at least, thieves, gangsters, bandits, and other predators who live by forcibly extracting the wealth produced by others are enemies of society and as such live in constant jeopardy. Every society is against crime, as locally defined, and has some sort of protective machinery; *i.e.*, every society resists in some way or other and to some degree or other conquest from within and from without.⁹ But in complex and rather random ways, a society makes a sort of cost accounting in this regard; if the costs of effective resistance seem greater than the tribute demanded by conquerors, that tribute may be paid. If, on the other hand, the tribute demanded seems greater than the costs of effective resistance, measures of resistance will usually be undertaken. Hence it behooves the conquerors to hold their demands to a level just below the estimated social cost of canceling their force with counterforce. Some have, and they have thrived as a consequence; most have not, and these have in the end often failed to maintain their ascendancy.

The values that enter into the social calculation of whether to resist or to pay are of course different from society to society and from instance to in-

⁹ The following are representative of the very large, and mainly journalistic, literature on resistance, both formal and informal, to military conquerors: T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army* (Macmillan, New York, 1951); M. Buber, *Under Two Dictators* (Harper, New York, 1951); E. da Cunha, *Rebellion in the Backlands* (S. Putnam, trans., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943); G. Herling, *A World Apart* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1951); J. B. Jansen and S. Weyl, *The Silent War: The Underground Movement in Germany* (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1943); A. J. Obrdlik, "Gallows Humor"—A Sociological Phenomenon" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 47, pp. 709-716, 1942); and J. S. Roucek, "Methods of Meeting Domination: The Czechoslovaks" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 6, pp. 670-673, 1941).

Apparently the only really scientific, on-the-spot study of resistance to military conquerors is that of a more or less spontaneous general strike that occurred in occupied Holland in 1943. The study is reported by P. J. Bouman in *De April-Mei Stakingen van 1943* (Martinus Nijhoff, 'S-Gravenhage, 1950). Perhaps this is the appropriate place for the present author to express his gratitude to Professor Bouman for the information, based upon his personal participation in the Dutch underground movement, which was so helpful in formulating the generalizations that are presented in this chapter.

stance; and in each such calculation many values and many imponderables are necessarily involved. One factor does, however, appear to be rather constant: a people ordinarily will passively endure far more costly conquest from within—*i.e.*, crime, in the usual sense—than from without. This tendency may be an expression of the universal distrust of and distaste for the stranger; it is more probably a consequence of the fact that a criminal, being in most respects a member of the society, is superficially indistinguishable from an honest citizen, is aware of and knows intimately the ways of the society, and is therefore more difficult and hence more costly to resist.

Crime and Punishment. Whatever the reason, all societies evidence a considerable tolerance for the criminal, a far greater tolerance than is ever accorded the conqueror from without. A primitive tribe, a peasant village, and even a modern community may for long passively submit to the occasional demands of the local bully or endure the thefts perpetrated by a gang of local ruffians. In the cities of the Middle Ages, protection of private property from thieves was largely the responsibility of the individual owner; and thieves, like beggars, were everywhere. Even in recent times gangs of toughs have been allowed to roam city streets and steal whatever caught their fancy. Today most American communities accept with passive resignation the vandalism and petty thievery of juvenile gangs; and for all our many agencies of law enforcement—police, Federal officers, criminal courts, jails, and other penal establishments—organized adult crime is still a passively sanctioned big business. Modern counterparts of the old highwaymen exact a heavy tribute from those who ship goods by rail or road; thieves rob banks or other stores of liquid wealth; etc. The annual cost to American society of crimes of this order is tremendous, and it is in a sense all loss; for unlike the racketeer who runs a black-market operation or controls illegal gambling, prostitution, and the like, a thief gives no service in return for what he steals. Nevertheless, most such crime could be prevented—but at a social cost which is evidently adjudged too high to be paid. As a result, shippers of valuable goods and owners of precious gems, the major potential victims of the thieves who live and thrive among us, purchase insurance against loss rather than attempt to protect their goods from theft. And it is one of the more curious facts of modern life that bonding and insurance companies are far more zealous in the protection of private property, specifically that which they have insured against theft, than are the official representatives of the law.

A community that may passively submit to some criminal demands will, however, resist with great vigor when those demands become in local terms excessive. In most societies there are some criminal acts which are per se intolerable; that is, they must be prevented or at least punished, whatever the cost. Murder, in most instances, is one of these; rape, as locally defined, is another. In the old West there was no greater crime than horse stealing, probably because stealing a horse was often tantamount to murdering its owner;

in the mining camps of the California gold-rush period, claim jumping quickly became a crime punishable by death; and so on.

Theft of material wealth is usually tolerated up to some point at which the community or the society as a whole deems the loss greater than the cost of preventing it. In modern societies many extraneous factors may enter into the determination of that point; on the one hand, the police may have a vested interest in organized crime and therefore be loath to undertake a vigorous repressive program; on the other hand, journalists of one sort or another and opposition politicians may have a vested interest in arousing the public to demanding such a program. But in the long run the point at which a society, modern or otherwise, takes effective action against the thieves in its midst is that at which the social cost of their crimes becomes greater than the probable social cost of preventing them. Currently it is often argued that crime cannot be prevented because it is social circumstances that breed criminals; the fact is, however, that the more obvious and costly forms of theft are sharply reduced, if not entirely eliminated, whenever a society deems that end worth the effort. Our present practice of trying to rehabilitate criminals simply reflects the fact that at present and in Western societies a higher value is placed on human life than on the goods that thieves may steal. It is no doubt true that retributive justice (the eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth sort of punishment for crime) does not deter criminals; but death does. After Western nations finally made death the penalty for piracy and undertook a vigorous program of capturing pirates, the seas soon became safe for merchant ships.

In many instances, both historical and current, local communities or societies as a whole have looked upon their government or some agency thereof as a conqueror. The Chinese, for example, traditionally considered, and no doubt still do so, the magistrates and other officials of the central government as a burden to be borne with resignation as long as the tribute exacted was not excessive. Whenever the demands made by the central government became, in local judgment, excessive, they resisted; and one of their more effective means of resistance was support of banditry. One of the tasks of the officials was to repress bandits, not for the good of the people, but for the protection of governmental wealth. When, however, the officials were locally deemed less desirable than the bandits, the population gave its support to the latter, with the usual result that bandits took over for a time the governing function along with the plunder from the magistrate's Yuan. Something of the same sort evidently accounts for the legend of Robin Hood as a bandit allied with the people against the king's officials; and during the era of Prohibition in America there was a distinct tendency for the people to favor the bootlegger against the Federal agents who were officially responsible for enforcing the laws against the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages.

As indicated in a previous chapter, law enforcement is invariably in large part a function of the local community norms. A law which violates local

sanctions is difficult, and often impossible, to enforce locally; the officials who endeavor to enforce such a law are in a limited but significant sense regarded and treated as criminals. If the tribute that they demand is greater than the cost of resistance, they are resisted; and the means of resistance is often a local alignment with local criminals. In this and many other circumstances a society may pit criminal against vested legal authority in the effort to free itself from exploitation by either or both of them.

Resistance by Evasion. The most devious and effective of the various means by which an occupied populace may resist the demands of their conquerors is evasion. Just as the members of a business or other organization may dilute, distort, and otherwise minimize the effects of autocratic control, the members of a community may so dull the effectiveness of a conqueror's demands that the net proceed is hardly worth the effort expended in securing it. The tactics used are many and varied. One of the simplest, and one that can no doubt exasperate an occupying force almost beyond endurance, is constant purported misunderstanding of regulations and orders. This is especially difficult to counteract when the occupiers and the occupied speak different languages.¹⁰ Interpreters may be used; but if they are drawn from the local population, they are untrustworthy; and if they are members of the occupying force, their limited skill in the local language permits innumerable deceptions on the part of the occupied; for example, the occupied may hold to a literal interpretation of figurative speech or use a local dialect and profess to understand no other.

Linguistic differences multiply enormously the difficulties of communication even when both parties are honestly striving to achieve understanding. When, as under military occupation, the local population is opposed to practically everything that is required of them, there is a persistently negative relation between what is conveyed through speech and gesture and what is done, between what is understood and what actually happens, between the intent of an order and the response to it, and between what the conquered say they have done and what they actually have done. Caught in a lie, the conquered can always plead innocence—misunderstanding; and although the conquerors may know full well that they are being deceived on every hand, the fact that honest misunderstanding is always possible means that they can never be sure whether punishment for error is in a given instance justified. Since to lie, mislead, and deliberately misunderstand the conqueror is socially sanc-

¹⁰ When, during the course of World War II, the Germans occupied Holland, they found that practically no one in the country could—*i.e.*, would—speak German. During the years of the occupation the Dutch people were, in fact, very proud of their inability to understand the German language; and on the whole the Germans were forced to use the native tongue of the conquered. Actually, a considerable proportion of the Dutch people do speak German; the refusal to do so was a resistance device which, along with others resorted to by the Dutch, seems to have been exceedingly hampering and frustrating to the occupying forces, since before their withdrawal they entered upon a wholly irrational campaign of vengeance.

tioned among the conquered, *i.e.*, it is defined as honorable and honest conduct, each individual is strongly encouraged to exercise his ingenuity in this direction; to deceive becomes a game, grim but exhilarating, in which most indulge and in which each is supported by the others.

Against such persistent, and at times systematic, distortion of their controls, the conquerors have few weapons. The police often use undercover agents who endeavor to gain acceptance in criminal society, they sometimes buy information from disloyal members of the criminal fraternity, and they resort at times to physical torture or psychological strategy (*e.g.*, the so-called lie detector) in the effort to extract the truth from an individual criminal. Such devices are no doubt a considerable aid in bridging the hiatus that normally exists between the criminal and the police worlds; but captured professional criminals often maintain a discreet silence to the end, since to "squeal" to the "cops" is a major crime in the eyes of criminal society.

The devices that are available to an occupying force are the same as those that are traditional with the police but are far less effective. Because of the marked cultural difference that usually exists between the occupiers, such as the Germans in France during World War II and the Americans in Japan after its defeat, and the conquered, undercover agents must usually be drawn from the conquered population. Their loyalty is always in doubt; they may be, for all their employers can know initially, plants from the other side, *i.e.*, men or women who have deliberately cultivated a reputation for disloyalty to their own people in order to become trusted informers who can then provide misinformation for the misguidance of the conquerors. In the game of "double cross," an occupied population becomes skilled at the "double double cross." This is not to say that the spies and informers used by an occupying force are invariably unreliable; the point is that some are so and that it is difficult, and in the short run impossible, to distinguish between the reliable and the unreliable. Moreover, since the reliable spies and informers are under the constant and knowing scrutiny of their fellow countrymen, the fact that they are working for the occupying forces is likely to be discovered by the occupied, who may turn that discovery to profit by feeding them with misinformation which they subsequently convey as truth to the occupying force.

The use of torture, solitary confinement, and of recent years "truth drugs" to extract information from individual members of a conquered people is no doubt at times successful. In occupied France, Holland, and other countries, the Germans made much use of hostages and of the threat of punishment against parents, wives, and children to extract from individuals needed information; and no doubt the Russians and many others have in similar and other ways played upon family and other sentiments to force the truth from conquered peoples. All such procedures certainly have their value; even so, the Germans, who endeavored to make a science of conquest and who were evidently little hampered by considerations of a humane nature, were constantly deceived on major as well as minor matters by the French, the Dutch,

and others. Thus, for example, a surprisingly large number of men wanted by the Germans managed to hide their identity through the years of the occupation; and to do so they had to be aided on every side by numbers of friends and acquaintances.

Conquerors necessarily operate in a milieu of distrust: at no point can the conquerors trust the occupied people; as fraternization develops, they become unable to rely upon the intent and integrity of one another; and as the strains of being occupied increase, the conquered come to suspect one another of collaboration with the enemy. As a result, both the conquered and the conquerors devote much of their time to mistrusting matters that under the conditions of normal social life are taken on faith—the soundness of the food served in a restaurant, the validity of the currency used to pay for the meal, the true meaning of a smile given by the waitress, the import of a glance exchanged between proprietor and patron, and so on. For this reason alone social efficiency is lowered, with a consequent reduction in the goods and services which the conquerors can extract from the conquered. Although he may not be deliberately engaging in sabotage, a worker who spends his nights in worry and his days looking over his shoulder in fear and doubt is a poor worker; his fields will produce less than they otherwise would, his machines will run slower and less well, and his products will be fewer and of poorer quality. Which is to say that both conquerors and conquered become demoralized in respect to those forms of activity that are profitable to the conquerors.

Sabotage. The usual objective of an occupying force is to induce major changes in the conduct of those who have been conquered; otherwise there would be no point in conquest. At the same time the goal of the conquered is to resume as far as possible their normal forms of life—economic, religious, political, etc. To be successful, ordinary thieves or bandit gangs need control their victims only long enough to appropriate what has been already produced; but an occupying force, like a taxgatherer or a racketeer, is in the main dependent for a profit upon the maintenance of productive activities on the part of its victims. The occupying force must somehow succeed in keeping alive and at work the goose that lays the golden egg.

The taxgatherer and the racketeer, at least in modern societies, are generally presumed to provide services in return for the tribute that they exact: taxes collected by an established government ordinarily go to provide services, at least some of which the individual taxpayer desires and enjoys; and the protection from the police or from cutthroat competition that a racketeer may provide those who are engaged in illegal activities is a service to them.¹¹ As long as the tribute exacted does not seem confiscatory, the demands of tax-

¹¹ Thus much of the racketeering in America during World War II consisted of providing business establishments, and to a lesser extent individuals, with raw materials or finished goods that they were precluded by wartime regulations from securing legally. See H. Lever and J. Young, *Wartime Racketeers* (Putnam, New York, 1945).

gatherer or racketeer do not, as a rule, discourage the productivity which makes possible the payment of such tribute.

An occupying force, on the other hand, is from the point of view of the occupied people an unmitigated disutility. With exceptions to be noted later, the "services" provided by the occupying force are unwanted and intolerable. Economic self-interest runs directly counter to the coercive efforts of the conquerors. As a result, a conqueror cannot rely on the motivations which normally lead to productive enterprise and must attempt by coercion to thwart what is normal and induce what is atypical—*e.g.*, to get peasants who are accustomed to a relatively self-sufficient farm economy to produce more wheat (or other exportable foods) and less milk, vegetables, etc.; to get a factory to produce designated goods and at a monetary loss rather than a profit; and so on.

Even when they have firm military control of an occupied people, conquerors can seldom take over and operate as their own many of the productive properties of the conquered. Short of deporting or exterminating the natives and replacing them with their own nationals, conquerors are ordinarily dependent upon the knowledge, skill, and productive efforts of the natives. During World War II, for example, the Germans were short of both industrial and agricultural manpower at home and had to rely on the manpower of the occupied territories. The most they could do was to take over from the top—put Germans in managerial positions in industry, levy grain and other assessments on peasants, etc. Occupation troops were stationed at strategic points, such as market towns; and farms, factories, and the like were inspected at irregular intervals; but it was simply impossible for the Germans to keep an eye on every worker all the time.

Fear of being caught in violation of occupational rules will, under a ruthless and efficient occupational system, induce some conformity to the productive demands of the occupiers; but even at best, productivity will be far below the normal capacity of land and factory, in part because of the low worker morale, the reasons for which were indicated earlier, and in still larger part because of deliberate sabotage. It will be recalled that under normal conditions industrial production can be sharply reduced by the willful and largely undetectable sabotage of discontented workers; they can achieve this without, as it were, half trying. When they are required, as they usually are under military occupation, to produce goods that they do not want to produce, at lower than their accustomed wages and under adverse conditions (inept plant management, forced economies in operation, etc.), sabotage may become their major interest.

Slave labor—for that is what it amounts to—may under some limited conditions be fairly productive. No doubt the slaves who are reputed to have been used in building the pyramids of Egypt and the Great Wall of China were effective workers; unquestionably the institutionalized slavery that for two centuries

or so obtained on the plantations of our South and elsewhere was fairly productive; and perhaps the slave-labor camps established by the Germans during World War II and by the Russians before and since that time have produced more than they have consumed.¹² As long as work tasks are relatively simple and the work situation one which permits one guard to watch over a large group of laborers, forced labor may be economic.

But wherever the productive process is complex, as it is on the diversified farm or in the modern factory, and workers are both specialists and spatially scattered (or alternatively, mobile), the cost of forcing desired labor from them may approach and even exceed the value of their product. For unless there is one trustworthy guard for each individual worker, they will have numerous opportunities to sabotage the materials they work on and the tools they work with, and they will devise countless ways to do so. It may be possible to build a road or a dike by slave labor, using simple hand tools; it would be extremely difficult to secure, by force alone, the construction of such a road or dike by a crew equipped with modern earth-moving machinery; and it would be simply impossible to get slave labor to produce, in a modern aircraft plant, an airworthy plane.

The efficient production of rice or some other single field crop has been accomplished under primitive techniques by slave labor. But as the Germans and the Russians before them discovered, it is exceedingly difficult to force a peasant proprietor to produce a specified food crop; he will plant the required crop if he is closely supervised during the planting season, but his day-by-day efforts will go mainly into the production of those foods and fibers that he and his family can use and which are not desired by his conquerors. The Irish peasants employed this technique more than a century and a half ago; upon the introduction of the potato to Ireland, they put their efforts to growing potatoes, unwanted by their English landlords, and deliberately neglected the sheep and pigs their landlords wanted. The peasants of the Ukraine, normally a great wheat-exporting region, were under the Communists so successful in failing to grow grain that Communist leaders were eventually forced to inaugurate a program of "cooperative" farming—i.e., a land-use system over which some measure of effective control could be exercised; and in order to get this system into even halfhearted operation, they found it necessary to exterminate a large proportion of the peasant landowners, thereby losing a considerable part of the existing skilled manpower. The available evidence indicates that it has taken nearly a generation and a great deal of machinery and fertilizer to get the agricultural production of this region back toward its pre-Revolution normal. How successful the Germans were in squeezing food supplies out of the French peasants is not known; but it is certain that over-all

¹² For an analysis of the uses made of slave labor by the Germans see *The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany* by the International Labour Office (Inland Press Limited, Montreal, Que., 1945). More suggestive to the student of social control is the autobiographical account of E. Lipper, *11 Years in Soviet Prison Camps* (Regnery, Chicago, 1951).

productivity fell sharply in France during the occupation; and France is at best just barely self-sufficient in grains and other basic foods.

In sum, under the rule of an occupying force everything goes wrong. The problems of normal industrial management are multiplied and ramified; the problems of normal police and other control of an urban community become greatly magnified; the physical plant of the society—trains, factories, telephones, etc.—work badly and often not at all; and the farmer in his isolated fields and in his tight little village conspires with nature to produce all the wrong things. Some of the fat of the conquered land—the existing productive machinery, the stored foods, and the liquid wealth—can rather easily be skimmed off; but to maintain maximum productivity and to divert it wholly into the channels desired by the conqueror is another matter. The conquerors either must content themselves with a little secured at a considerable cost (the cost in manpower, if nothing else, of the occupation) or, as is usually the case, must attempt to entice the conquered into working for them by other than coercive means. It is, perhaps, the inherent limitations to the profitable exploitation of a conquered population by coercion that have led most conquerors gradually to soften their occupation policies and to rely more and more on economic and other means of control and less and less on their military might.

Revenge and Retaliation. Although there have been some exceptions, instances in which a culturally passive people have yielded to coercion without retaliation in kind, force as a rule invokes counter use of force. This seems to be true on all levels of military conquest. The English police, for example, do not carry firearms, since English criminals seldom resort to such weapons; the American police have in recent years equipped their patrol and other cars with machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, weapons introduced for domestic use by American gangsters during the 1920s.

Ruthless and systematic use of force in all its varied forms, the killing of hostages, torturing to extract information, and the like, certainly secures, all other things being equal, more outward compliance to occupational demands than does a policy of temperance in the use of coercion. A gloved-fist policy, such as that followed by the United States during its occupation of part of postwar Germany and of Japan, might conceivably win friends; but it hardly produces a material profit for the conquerors. The laws of the land must have teeth or they have no effectiveness; the laws, the edicts, of a conqueror must have fangs to be even half as effective.

On the other hand, the more ruthless and systematic the use of coercion by a conqueror, the more violence the conqueror encounters. At best, an occupying force can coercively control only small sections of the occupied territory or narrow corridors through it. Roaming patrols can supplement fixed strong points and garrisons; but a conqueror cannot possibly maintain a full and constant monopoly on the use of force. As the full import of the occupation becomes apparent to the occupied and as they recover from their unreasoned initial terror of the conquerors, there will arise here and there individuals who

rebel against the occupation, or at least against the authority exercised by some member of the occupation force. A man whose wife has been raped by soldiers, whose son has been dragged off to slave labor, whose factory has been taken over by the conquerors, or who has himself been beaten, tortured, or too long forced to perform intolerable services for the new masters may come finally to that decision which was so effectively expressed by Patrick Henry, "Give me liberty or give me death!"

As individual members of the conquered population, here and there and at a rate dependent in part upon the intensity and effectiveness of the demands of the occupying force, come to the view that they have nothing more to lose, they begin to take direct action against members of the occupying force. The opportunities to do so are many and varied; and a determined man can usually kill or maim a number of the members of the occupying force before he is himself detected or caught in the act. The occupiers are, in the first place, a minority with high visibility and little intimate knowledge of their surroundings. The individual who sets out to attack a member of the occupying force, on the other hand, has at least the latent support of the majority of the population; he knows the setting in which he operates well (the streets and alleys of the city, the paths of the countryside); and as a person he blends into the rest of the population. He can stalk his human prey, awaiting the most favorable circumstance for inflicting death, whereas the intended victim has little if any chance of detecting the one who stalks him or even of knowing until it is too late that he is being stalked.

Initially, no doubt, the killing of members of the occupation force is motivated largely by desire for personal revenge or else is incidental to escaping detection or capture. Such acts do not in themselves have any direct effect upon the occupation; but they may initiate a series of progressive interactions between conquered and conquerors that breaks most of the preexisting controls and culminates in general terrorism. The nature of this process is rather simply illustrated by what sometimes happens when a police officer is killed by a common criminal.

One of the tabus of the professional criminal, even in America, is that against wantonly killing or maiming police or other law officers. Such actions may jeopardize the uneasy peace which is normal in the relations of police and criminals, since to kill any police officer is a threat to the physical welfare of every other such officer. Ordinarily, the group norms that obtain among police and law officers and the bureaucratic structures under which they operate restrain initiative. The policeman, like the worker in industry, has his "production" norms; and the organization in which he works places a premium on routine obedience to orders. The injury or death of a policeman by a member of the criminal opposition may, however, arouse the police to intensive and enterprising action; it may become a point of honor to avenge the death of one of their number, and the normally complaisant police organization may abruptly demand of each member vigorous and even ingenious endeavor. The

reasons are fairly clear: an ordinary crime, even a murder, is simply a job of work; but the murder of a policeman is an overt challenge to the superiority of the police as a whole over criminals as a whole, and it is a challenge which jeopardizes in a variety of ways the occupational and the physical security of every member of the force. The situation constitutes for them a crisis in which each member, and the force as a whole, engages in the quest for the murderer with exceptional zest. The intense activity of the police in turn constitutes a crisis for criminal society; the response of criminals to their crisis is similar to that of the police to theirs; and the upshot may be a general and unprecedented slaughter.

Occupation forces are, from one point of view, in much the same relation to the conquered as police are to criminals. When numbers of the occupied people resort to violence, an occupation force usually responds by resort to retaliatory measures. Such measures are presumed to discourage further attacks from the conquered, and perhaps at times they do; but often they only provoke new resorts to violence.

In terms of Western legal concepts, the reasonable and only permissible means of dealing with murderers is to apprehend and punish them. Since an occupying force is seldom able, for reasons indicated above, to do so, they often resort to punishing the whole of the occupied population or some selected element of it. The Germans followed this procedure rather systematically in occupied France and elsewhere. In retaliation for the murder of an occupation soldier, the Germans sometimes held a local political figure (the town mayor, perhaps) socially responsible and executed him.¹³ In other instances they selected one local citizen at random (in a few cases they took one out of every ten) as the proxy murderer and held him responsible. The execution of proxy murderers was often supplemented by the levying of a special fine on the entire community.

Retaliatory measures that fall on a community as a whole, on its leaders, or on randomly selected individuals may not be in accord with abstract principles of justice, but they are based upon sociopsychological realities. All other things being equal, a community that is held jointly responsible for the acts of any one of its members tends to develop restraining social controls; the danger to each member that he will be punished for a murder committed by any other member tends to discourage community sanctioning of such murder and may actually encourage the community to bring sanctions against such murder. Thus retaliation taken against a conquered people may reverse

¹³ In a number of instances the Germans resorted to total extermination in retaliation for suspected resistance to the occupying forces. In October, 1944, a company of the SS division *Das Reich* descended on the little French town of Oradour-sur-Glane, near Limoges. The commander charged the inhabitants with hiding arms for the resistance and demanded of the mayor thirty hostages. The mayor denied the charge and refused to designate hostages. The townspeople to the number of 245 women, 207 children, and 190 men were thereupon assembled and shot down, and the town was reduced to ruins. For a belated news story of this action see *Time*, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 33.

the direction of the social controls that operate among them, bringing such controls to the support of the conquerors. Ordinary police strive to obtain a similar reversal when they round up and imprison a wholly irrational number of so-called suspects, including some of the leaders of the local criminal community, in the hope that criminal sentiment will turn against the individual whose acts provoked the police to action. If it does, he will be delivered into the hands of the police, either dead or alive.

Retaliation is undoubtedly an effective repressive measure under some circumstances, and it is often the only one that the police or an occupying force can use. But like every control device, it may actually operate to foster what it is intended to suppress; what is accomplished depends, presumably, upon the specific way in which retaliation is used and the unique combination of circumstances in which retaliation is one of the many interdependent factors. The execution of, say, the mayor of a village in which one member of the occupying force has been killed will certainly tend to intimidate most of the villagers. But that execution is, in their terms, unjust; and it further demonstrates the evil character of the conquerors. To some the sense of outraged justice may more than offset the apprehension induced by the retaliatory measure. Intimate friends and relatives of the mayor certainly will be more impressed by the injustice of his execution than by the threat to them as individuals which is implied in that act. One or more of them may, therefore, come to feel, as did the murderer before him, that revenge is more to be desired than continued life. Perhaps, since the hated and unjust enemy has taken the innocent life of a notable, he strikes at the local commanding officer. Should he succeed, the occupying force will have no other course than to retaliate, this time perhaps taking two or ten lives for one. And thus a series of progressively intensified acts of violence may get under way. When this happens, individual acts of revenge against the occupying force tend to be replaced, or at least supplemented, by organized resistance—i.e., by the growth of a true resistance movement. Then nothing short of "total" occupation of the community may succeed in reestablishing the coercive ascendancy of the conquerors.

The Resistance Movement. Every military conquest, like every revolution, produces in time some organized counteraction. When response, which often serves as a corrective, is to the excesses and blunders of a revolution, it is usually termed a "counterrevolution"; when it is to military conquest, it is usually, and with good reason, designated a "resistance movement." A resistance movement consists of more or less organized and systematic sabotage of goods and productive plant and the killing of members of the occupation force. It is a social movement in that the actions of the many who engage therein are guided and coordinated by leaders who give personalized representation to a rebellious ideology, in this case an ideology of liberation, which is itself a product of the occupation. The normative characteristics of social movements and the roles in such movements of ideology and leaders will be

analyzed in a subsequent chapter. As a special kind of social movement, the resistance movement is distinguished by the fact that conquest is the cause of the despair that induces it and of the ideological fervor of those who engage in it.

A conquered people have little cause for hope. Their organized defenses against attack from without, whatever they may have been, have first been proved inadequate and have then been destroyed. With each passing day the military hold of the conquerors grows stronger and the organized power of the conquered grows weaker; the conquerors progressively take over control of military fortifications, arms plants, local police forces, etc. Unless an occupied people have reason to hope for aid from without, they have no tangible reason to be hopeful.

Sabotage and the killing of individual members of the occupied population are, as has been indicated, largely acts of revenge; and revenge may be gratifying in itself and worth the cost, even though the cost be death. Moreover, acts of revenge are costly to an occupying force; and when the number of such acts grows large, their cost may take the profit out of the occupation. But however many they may be, individual acts of revenge are not likely to end the occupation. Historical evidence indicates, at any event, that conquerors withdraw, if at all, only in the face of organized resistance. What individual acts of revenge seem to do is to worsen the plight of the occupied population, both by reducing total productivity and hence the population's share of it and by provoking retaliatory measures. As conditions go progressively from bad to worse, an increasing proportion of the conquered population is pressed down by circumstances to that marginal predicament in which the value of continuing to live under those circumstances hardly offsets the disutility of death. People in this state of mind are susceptible to conversion to an ideology which offers them a hope worth fighting for.

Usually, it seems, the ideology which provides the hope around which a resistance movement develops originates with, or at least is associated with, some individual who has been exceptionally successful as a *saboteur* or as a murderer of occupation forces; and as like-minded men join him, his fame as a leader spreads. Gandhi and his doctrine of passive resistance offer a prosaic but completely valid example of the rise of a resistance leader and of an ideological hope that resistance of some form or other will eventually drive the hated oppressors from the land.

The passive form of resistance advocated by Gandhi for India was perhaps appropriate for a people who are for cultural reasons both unmilitaristic and generally apathetic. Basically it was a negative form of sabotage, which resulted in a lowering of social productivity. How important this movement was to the eventual liberation of India is impossible to determine. But at the very least, Gandhi for nearly half a century symbolized and in this sense aided in maintaining the faint hope of many of the peoples of India that their oppressors would be driven out. As a rule, resistance movements are by nature

undercover warfare. The participants in the movement in time become organized in a military manner, trained to various techniques of violence, equipped with whatever instruments of destruction they can make or steal from the occupying forces, who in time become their major source of supply.

Among primitives, such as the American Indians, and peasant peoples, resistance has largely consisted of assault upon the persons of the occupying force.¹⁴ Under modern conditions attacks upon persons seem to be mainly incidental to efforts to injure the conquerors economically, that is, so to hamper the productive and distributive system that there is no net social product for the conquerors to take for their own. To the extent that such efforts are successful, the result of unproductivity inevitably falls in considerable part upon the occupied population. The train that is wrecked may be carrying some military goods or some supplies on their way to the homeland of the conquerors; but it will also be carrying produce to local markets, the destruction of which imposes new hardships on the conquered.

Often, then, the resistance movement aggravates the very circumstances that gave rise to it—economic exploitation is increased, with consequent progressive impoverishment and further retaliatory measures on the part of the occupying force.¹⁵ There is evidently no normal or "logical" outcome to this particular chain of social developments. In some historical instances the conquered population has been eventually pacified, in the sense that they have come to accept as normal a position of subordination to their conquerors; in other instances, the resistance movement has gained steady momentum, its own effectiveness aggravating the unhappy conditions that encouraged

¹⁴ Such is currently the case with the Mau Mau, a violent native resistance movement of Kenya, in East Africa. The British have been in political control of Kenya for so long, in a status which is in part that of occupiers and in part that of settlers, that the Mau Mau movement has some of the characteristics of a revolution, especially the fact that the attack is directed fully as much to natives who collaborate with the British as to the British themselves. But the goal of the movement is to drive out the British, who are looked upon as occupiers, and return conditions to what they were before the British conquest; so ideologically the movement is one of resistance. For a journalistic analysis of the Mau Mau as the villains of the piece see R. Llewellyn, "The Mau Mau: Death in the Dark" (*Saturday Evening Post*, May 23, 1953, p. 32).

Even the American slaves frequently turned against their masters, as has been shown by H. Aptheker in *American Negro Slave Revolts* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1943).

¹⁵ On the other hand, resistance can under some circumstances lead to a change in occupation policy that is advantageous to both conqueror and conquered. This is what happened when the farmers of Mexico rebelled against the destruction of their infected cattle by agents of a United States-Mexican commission that was set up in 1946 to eradicate hoof-and-mouth disease. Although owners were financially reimbursed for destroyed cattle, they rebelled against the procedure to the extent of killing twenty-three of the commission's agents during the 1947-1948 period. That resistance led the commission to a change in policy, substituting quarantine and inoculation as controls in place of extermination. In two years' time the epidemic was stamped out by this less costly procedure. See *Time*, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 30.

men to join the movement, until the conquerors, weakened by or wearied of the task of occupation, withdrew or were driven off. Recent large-scale conquests, such as that of Western European peoples by the Germans, of Eastern Europeans by the Russians, and of the Chinese by conquerors posing as revolutionists, have been immeasurably complicated by outside aid or interference. But up to the time of liberation by the Allies, the resistance movements of France, Holland, and other countries seem to have played a multi-functional role. On the one hand, they hampered the occupation forces in every conceivable way; on the other hand, they often competed, propagandistically and otherwise, with the Germans to exercise control over the conquered population. As a bid for control over local populations, the resistance organizations could often offer individuals and even communities some protection from the Germans; thus they maintained underground systems for the smuggling of individuals and contraband goods, they had informational services and could sometimes warn individuals or communities of German intent, and they frequently made limited areas of the country into islands of comparative security from the Germans, in which hunted individuals could take refuge. By these and other means they no doubt helped to keep alive, on an individual as well as group basis, hope for deliverance and a spirit of defiance. In the end, however, their major function was to aid the Allied forces both in the military conquest of the Germans and in the initial political rehabilitation of the liberated peoples.

Collaboration and Collaborators. Every conquering force, even one that is embarked on a policy of exterminating the natives, relies to some extent upon information and other aid provided by members of the society that is being conquered. Thus during the settlement of North America, the colonists were often dependent upon Indians as guides and informers; and sometimes they used one tribe to blunt the resistance of another. Aid of this sort was largely purchased, and the fact that the native population was broken into a large variety of mutually antagonistic tribal units contributed heavily to the success of the colonists. In their plunder of Central and South America, the Spanish likewise used natives as guides and informers, and in a few instances they bought or otherwise secured the services of local political and military leaders. The British in India made considerable use of native princes and in the course of time developed an elaborate system of training natives, usually in England, to serve as underlings in the colonial agencies. In France and elsewhere the conquering Germans relied heavily on the collaboration of local politicians, industrial leaders, and bullies or racketeers to aid them in the control and exploitation of occupied countries. The Russians carried to its logical extreme the use of collaborators in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe by nominally vesting political and even military authority in the persons, and often in the traditional offices, of the conquered society.

With rare exceptions, conquerors are dependent upon the aid of individual members of the conquered society. As indicated earlier, military conquest does

not often yield an immediate profit for the conquerors. They must permit and enable the conquered people to resume the production of the necessities of life in order that the people can produce what is to be exacted as tribute. This requires the reestablishment, once the initial disorders incidental to the military defeat of the conquered are past, of most of the society's social functions and functionaries. A primitive tribe must have its magic men and chieftains; a modern society must have its police, its political and other administrators, etc. These functionaries cannot ordinarily be supplied by the occupying force; for, on the one hand, only a native will have the intimate and detailed knowledge that is necessary for reasonably effective administration of local political, economic, and other organizations, and, on the other hand, the presence of a foreigner in any such office would automatically reduce respect for the authority of the office itself. Ideally, then, an occupying force leaves undisturbed the local *status quo*, including the personnel of all existing organizations, and secures its ends via those who hold political and other offices in the occupied society; for example, it levies tribute on the tribal leader and lets him extract the requisite goods or services from his subjects, or it leaves the management of a factory intact and requires of it (rather than of the workers directly) the production of the desired goods.

In practice, however, conquerors seldom can achieve the ideal arrangement. Collaboration of the sort implied in the ideal arrangement is, from the point of view of the conquered people, traitorous. Even though a man is willing for reasons of self-interest to collaborate with the new masters, he will be under great pressure to serve the interests of his own kind. His position of authority in the occupied society is, after all, a grant made by his society; the powers of his office (as mayor, tribal chieftain, industrialist, or whatever) can and will be withdrawn as it becomes known that he has sold out to the enemy. The authority that he derives officially from the conquerors gives him some coercive powers over his fellows, but it does not replace the administrative and related powers which once went with his office. In the end, therefore, what the conquerors secure from a willing collaborator is mainly his intimate knowledge and his special political or other skills.

A willing collaborator is one who has come to identify his own interests with those of the conquerors and who is, therefore, opposed to the society and the community to which he is historically attached. An individual who occupies a position of authority may make this identification calculatingly if he wants to gain ascendancy and believes that the conquerors have come to stay. Modern gangsters and crooked politicians are temperamentally inclined toward making such a calculated shift in identification; for they have, as their achieved positions in the occupied society indicate, put personal ascendancy above such abstract principles as loyalty to the society into which they were born and by which they were trained and presumably will continue to do so. Most of those in positions of authority, on the other hand, such as hereditary tribal chiefs, landlords, and a hereditary political elite, seem to

be much less inclined to attach themselves willingly to an occupying force and more inclined to value the organizational system which they represent than personal power.

A contemporary conqueror can no doubt recruit numbers of willing and useful collaborators from among the local racketeers, gangsters, and professional politicians. They may serve the conqueror well as long as it can be made to their personal interests to do so, although their value will tend to diminish as they lose status in the local community. But they will be in all respects untrustworthy, fair-weather friends, who are no more disposed to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the conqueror than they were for the conquered. Their support of the conqueror will be given only at a high, and probably continually rising, price; with the emergence of a strong resistance movement, such collaborators are likely to engage in lucrative trading with the enemy; and at the first sign that the occupation may fail, they may desert entirely.

The majority of the willing collaborators whom a conqueror secures come not from the ranks of those in positions of authority but from the psychologically unstable and socially isolated members of the occupied population. Every society has among its members some individuals who are psychologically and socially marginal—the perpetual malcontents and discontents. Under the crisis of conquest, such individuals can easily be encouraged by conversion and persuasion and, perhaps most effectively, by being offered membership in conqueror-controlled status groupings to identify themselves with the occupying force. Their identification is uncalculated; it is a consequence of the fact that the unstable individual can achieve needed status, if only in his own eyes, by working for the glorious conquerors. The Germans made much use of this kind of collaborator, both before and during their occupation of Central and Western European countries. The Russians likewise relied heavily on this kind of collaborator in the countries they occupied and also in their efforts to Communize unoccupied territories. Both seem to have found especially useful that particular type of unstable person who is locally characterized as a rowdy or, collectively, as the riffraff. It is from such sources that their strong-arm gangs, the local Nazi or Communist hoodlums, have been recruited. The value of such gangs is largely in the intimidation of the more stable elements of the local community, a task which their knowledge of and membership in the community enables them to fulfill better than can actual occupation troops.

Since the majority of the members of an occupied society do not become willing collaborators but, rather, resist the demands of the conquerors, the conquerors need spies and informers to obtain any knowledge of what is actually happening. As indicated earlier, spies and informers must be recruited from the native population for rather obvious reasons; and if they are to be useful, they must be both members in reasonably good standing, at whatever level, in the community and clever enough to operate without being detected. Since

most of the men who fulfill both these qualifications will ordinarily have risen to positions of relatively high status prior to the occupation and will thus be automatically disqualified for the role of spy or informer, or else will have values and sentiments that make them incorruptible, the numbers that can be brought into the service of the occupying force—the competent and ambitious individuals who have through accident or some defect of personality failed to achieve high status—are never very large. For the most part, an occupying force must be content with the purchased services of spies and informers who either are badly equipped by training or mentality to gather valid and useful information or else are, as with the petty crooks to be found in every community, shrewd enough to be useful but without the social status necessary for access to the inner life of the community.

The scarcity and typical unreliability of willing collaborators usually drives a conqueror to attempt to secure much of the aid needed by coercive means. As previously indicated, information may at times be extracted from members of the occupied population by torture, by threats to loved ones, and possibly by drugs which lower the individual's self-control. Such forced collaboration is not, however, a wholly satisfactory substitute for competent spies and informers. In the first place, the individual from whom information is extracted is thereafter useless, since he will not again be made the confidant of his friends and acquaintances. In the second place, his removal from the community for purposes of questioning reveals the fact that he is being used as an informant, and the community can immediately take action which more or less nullifies the value of the information he may give to the conquerors. For example, if a certain house in the village is being used as local headquarters by the resistance movement, the disappearance from the village of one of its members will arouse suspicions, the headquarters will be moved, etc.

The forcing of collaboration from a person in a position of authority may be accomplished by such varied devices as taking his wife and children as hostages and making their welfare dependent upon his good behavior or promising special concessions to his workers or the community over which he exercises authority in return for his aid. He is, in some way or other, placed in a predicament in which he must choose between personal integrity and the immediate welfare of those for whom he considers himself responsible. Under such conditions only fanatics hold out for principles. The man who is in major regards honorable and responsible ordinarily feels that collaboration with the enemy, at least up to some point or other, is the lesser of the two evils. He will probably, however, console himself with the thought that he can do more, both for those immediately under his jurisdiction and for the society at large, by retaining his office than he can do as a corpse, a prisoner, or a forced laborer under the occupation, which may very well be his personal alternatives to collaborating. As a collaborator charged with responsibility for the maintenance and direction of some organization, he will therefore endeavor to serve two masters—to concede to and obey the occupying force in all minor

and superficially evident ways, and to strive meanwhile to use his official powers in covert support of the major interests of the members of his organization and in covert sabotage of the major goals of the occupying force. His position is inevitably an unenviable one. His subordinates may misunderstand him, resenting his concessions to the conquerors; his masters may in time discover his duplicity and, since he will then have lost his value to them, administer the maximum punishment. But in that position he can no doubt do as much as any other individual and more by far than most to hamper the occupying force and to protect his fellows from the worst consequences of the occupation.

ECONOMIC CONQUEST

To the extent that a military conqueror buys information from members of the occupied population and makes concessions to those in a position of authority in return for their collaboration, the means of control is pecuniary rather than coercive; *i.e.*, it is accomplished through the exchange of goods or services. This is true even though what is given in return for the service may have been stolen from the occupied people.

As indicated in a previous chapter, exchanges of goods and services between individuals and groups may under favorable circumstances be used as a mechanism for individual ascendancy—for gaining control over an organization or election to a political office. Such exchanges occur within the framework of local customs and in accordance with the culturally indicated value systems of the participants and are by assumption “free,” *i.e.*, uncoerced. The idea of a completely free market, which entranced economists of a generation ago, is, however, an abstraction, an ideal which is seldom encountered in real life. The exchanges that occur in a primitive or a village market place may be relatively free, and the trading of marbles, knives, etc., by modern children may be almost entirely free; but the freedom of the market place, like other sorts of freedom, is usually a matter of degree.

In modern societies freedom in exchanges is in most instances conditioned by some element of coercion—by the interjection, on one side or the other, of force or the threat thereof. At the very least, economic transactions involve the payment, directly or indirectly, of some kind or kinds of taxes. And the exacting of tribute, whether in the form of taxes or otherwise, is the goal of conquest. It is the way that the military conqueror makes his profit; it is the way that the gangster or racketeer makes his.

In many instances military conquest and occupation of a people is precluded by the social sentiments, the institutional structures, or the other cultural characteristics either of that people or of those who might otherwise profit by making such a conquest, or of both. Thus no Western nation has embarked upon a military conquest of the oil-rich regions of the Near East, although they have all desired the oil of these regions and any one of them could have made an easy military conquest of any one or all of these regions. Instead, business organizations—the semiprivate oil companies of Britain and America

—have purchased exclusive rights to the oil of various countries, dealing with local governments, which in turn have undertaken to uphold by force the rights so purchased. Where this procedure has been successful, the result has been ascendancy achieved by economic, or pecuniary, means. Over the past century Western peoples have generally renounced direct military means of conquest in favor of segmental economic means of conquest—*i.e.*, purchase of exclusive rights, enforced coercively by the local government acting as agent, to buy or to sell goods or raw materials in a given region.

Whether the historic trend toward economic means of conquest reflects the adverse experience that Western peoples have had with military conquest, or the rise of business and the decline of military forms of organization in Western societies, or simply a change (“softening” is the way it might be described) in the values and sentiments of Western peoples is not evident. It is to be observed that the Russians, who not long ago began to industrialize their economy, have recently been engaged in much the same sort of military conquests that would seem to be going out of fashion in Western nations; that the Germans have twice within this century endeavored to build an empire by military conquest; and that the Japanese have made a heroic effort and the Italians a feeble gesture in this direction. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that large-scale, nationalistic military conquest and occupation is necessarily a thing of the past.

The experiences of the British in India and elsewhere, of the French in Indo-China, etc., do however indicate that even the successful military occupation of a people tends to give way in time to economic conquest, in which coercion is used mainly to preserve for the conquerors an economic monopoly of the local market. Such a tendency presumably reflects an adaptation on the part of the conquerors to the resistance of the conquered; to overcome that resistance, successive concessions are made to the conquered peoples, and pecuniary rewards are offered to induce them to conform to the desires of the occupying force. As the concessions made and the rewards offered mount in number and variety, the conquerors give more and more, in goods procured from the homeland and elsewhere and in services, in return for what they get, until, perhaps, their only advantage is that they monopolize the foreign markets of the conquered and do not have to compete in the open market with other nations either for the products of the conquered people or in the sale of their own goods and services to the conquered people.

Monopoly as a Form of Conquest. Monopoly, *i.e.*, the exclusive right to buy or sell in a given trade area or in a certain goods or service, is the normal goal of economic conquest.¹⁶ A monopoly may be held by one group or or-

¹⁶ For materials and views, usually quite partisan, on the monopoly tendencies of private business see W. Berge, *Cartels: Challenge to a Free World* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1946); H. Levy, *Retail Trade Associations* (Oxford, New York, 1944); D. Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1946); A. Nevins, *Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller* (2 vols., Scribners, New York, 1953);

ganization within a given social system over others in that system or by one society, currently a national unit, over another. What is monopolized may be a source of desired natural materials or a productive process (e.g., the right to fish given waters or the right to make and sell a certain kind of goods); a kind of social service (lawyers and physicians enjoy this sort of monopoly in modern societies); religious, political, or other powers; or, in fact, anything which men desire but which is inherently scarce.

The advantages of holding a monopoly are many and varied; but the typical advantage is that a monopoly frees those who hold it from having to make the adaptations, organizational and otherwise, that are necessary to survival under competitive conditions. The drive to gain a monopoly stems in part from the general tendency of man to stabilize his modes of social life, a tendency evidenced in the process of bureaucratization. The bureaucratic type of organization can survive, however, only under relatively stable external conditions. Monopoly provides that stability for such an organization. Thus as long as the Catholic Church maintained its monopoly over the religious life of Western Europeans, churchmen could go their way in peace and the Church could operate as a sluggish and unenterprising bureaucracy. But when new religious creeds and organizations began to appear and the monopoly of the Church began to be broken, churchmen had to compete with dissenters for the faithful; and the Church had to shake off the lethargy of the centuries. Similarly, as long as the guild system of craft and trade monopolies obtained in Western Europe, there was no need for and hence no stimulus to a change in productive techniques or in productive or distributive organizational procedures; but with the beginnings of the industrial revolution these old monopolies were broken, and in the two centuries since, craftsmen have known no peace.

Theft, brigandage, and large-scale military conquest are some of the means by which an existing monopoly may be broken. A thief challenges the right of an individual to the exclusive use of the property which in law and custom is his; a brigand breaks the monopoly of goods held by traders or villagers; a conquering army appropriates what has formerly been held in monopoly by individuals and by organizations, including the government; most particularly, a conquering army takes over the monopoly—always less than perfect—on the use of coercion that has been held by the defeated government.

Since any monopoly, however deeply embedded in tradition, is subject to forceful challenge from within or without, force is everywhere to some extent and in some way used to protect existing monopolies. Such use of force is, in fact, the major function of government; that is, government maintains the peace by force in order that the citizens may continue to enjoy their various individual and collective "rights"—a term which is a common euphemism for monopoly. Where such protection is not provided by government or where

governmental protection has become inadequate, individuals or organizations usually take up arms in self-defense. Thus when thieves get out of hand, the local citizens will usually arm themselves, forcefully protecting their rights to their own properties. When the Catholic Church began to lose its traditional hold on the peoples of Western Europe, churchmen turned to coercion (the Inquisition, the various religious wars, etc.) in the attempt to hold their monopoly over the spiritual and, more important, the economic and political life of Western peoples. When, toward the close of the last century, industrial and other workers began to form into militant organizations, threatening the monopoly long held by employers over the labor market, employers promptly turned to forceful means to protect their "right" to hire and fire as they pleased and to pay only that wage necessary to secure individual workers. And, as has been shown in the preceding pages, when their monopoly of a region is challenged by military conquerors, the natives fight back by every available means, including force.

The goal of military conquest is invariably to usurp an existing monopoly or replace it with a new one—to take from the one who owns and make one's own, or to subjugate a people and put them and their resources to work for one's own people. Coercion is, of necessity, the major means by which a conqueror attempts to break an established monopoly and take it over as his own. To the extent that he succeeds, pecuniary means of control replace coercion within the monopoly system—*i.e.*, the occupying force become buyers and sellers of goods and services rather than soldiers—and the role of coercion is only that of maintaining the monopoly held by the conqueror over the markets provided by the conquered.

The tendency eventually to substitute pecuniary for coercive controls is everywhere evident. The early labor unions were formed by force; workers were frequently coerced into joining, and they used force to break the long-standing employer monopoly over the labor market. But as this conquest succeeded and as labor unions gained at least a quasi monopoly over labor markets, the use of terrorism, sabotage, and violent strikes receded. Today the unions rely mainly on government to protect their monopolies, and they themselves normally resort to force only when upstart labor leaders attempt to take over an existing monopoly. In the early days of the oil industry in America, a number of efforts were made to secure a monopoly of the market for oil, that of the Standard Oil Company being the most famous and most nearly successful. In these efforts coercion, although illegal, played a large role; for example, if Standard could not buy out a competitor, it first tried to undersell him and, if that failed, employed strong-arm squads to wreck his equipment and intimidate his employees. Ultimately, legal means were used to check these conquests of the oil market, and in time the various oil companies evolved a system of pecuniary controls whereby each one is induced to respect the quasi monopoly of a segment of the market held by each of the others. Something of the same sort occurred during the development of the

railroads and many other new industrial and business enterprises. Many of the trade associations, particularly those which are local rather than national, through which such normally competitive business enterprises as laundries, cleaning establishments, and milk distributors have become so self-regulative that competitive endeavor among them is restricted to quality of service, are outgrowths of forceful conquests by organizers. What often happened was that free competition between such establishments took the form of price wars, to the advantage of the consumer but to the acute disadvantage of all those dependent upon the particular kind of enterprise. The destructiveness of the competition offered an opportunity for men of enterprise and no scruples to gain ascendancy over the industry: such men came forward with guns in hand and hired toughs to back them up and offered each business establishment protection for a price. The protection that such a racketeer sold was initially protection from the beatings and destruction of property that his toughs would otherwise administer. But in order that each of his several clients could pay tribute to him, he had to make sure that they made a profit; and so in due course the protector was dictating prices and protecting each establishment from competition. Soon, then, the belligerent racketeer metamorphosed into the suave president of a respectable trade association, in which pecuniary rather than coercive controls became the major means of maintaining the quasi monopoly held by each member of the association.

The fact that military conquest everywhere tends either to go down in defeat or else to evolve into a monopoly system of pecuniary controls does not, however, mean that resort to force will ultimately disappear and that the affairs of mankind will thereafter be determined by pecuniary and other less brutish means of control. For the very existence of any kind of monopoly—private property, nationalized property, or whatever it may be—is a standing invitation to military conquest: to the petty thief, to the criminal gang, to the people of a nation who have less than they want and prefer war to work as a means to wealth.

CONQUEST: CULTURAL

The ascendancy of one individual over another, it will be recalled, takes many forms and may be accomplished by one or another of a considerable number of means. In some forms, such as those illustrated by a thug who robs his victim at gun point, a salesman who overcharges a customer, and a wife who nags her husband into taking her out to dinner, the ascendancy involves an obvious transfer of values: one receives and the other gives a value, one gains and the other loses. In many forms of interpersonal ascendancy, however, there is no evident transfer of values to the ascendant. Rather, the ascendancy consists of one individual's imposing in one of several ways his own values, sentiments, interests, etc., upon another, as when a wife induces her husband to eat vegetables because she likes vegetables and believes that they are good for him, or when a physician prescribes exercise for a patient on the grounds that exercise will do the patient good. Ascendancy of this order is invariably justified on "good for you" grounds. Whether or not submission to the demands of the ascendant is also good for the ascendant, *i.e.*, whether or not the ascendant gains direct satisfaction from his ascendancy, is another matter.

Military and economic conquest are, of course, forms of interorganizational ascendancy that involve a transfer of values. To the extent that they are successful, military or economic conquerors profit in obvious ways. There are, however, many instances in which the ascendancy of one group or society over another takes forms comparable to that of a wife who induces her husband to eat what is in her opinion good for him; that is, conquest consists of inducing others to adopt cultural practices that the group or society advocates and does not bring any obvious profit to the ascendant. It is conquest of this order that sociologists and anthropologists designate "cultural diffusion" when attention is on the ascendant society and "borrowing" or "acculturation" when the process is seen from the point of view of the recipient society.

Although it is often attempted by mass means, cultural conquest is ordinarily accomplished by individual representatives of the group or society who act as apostolic agents for the particular culture or subculture that the group or society represents. Such is the case, for example, when modern medical and hygienic practices are brought to a rural hamlet by a crusading physician or public-health officer, when the word of the Christian God or the curative powers of Western science are brought to pagan primitives by missionaries, or when an appreciation of the finer things in life is brought to the common

people by a society for the advancement of the arts. In these and all comparable instances the means to ascendancy are largely peaceful and the avowed end is improvement in the welfare of those over whom ascendancy is sought.

APOSTOLICISM

Military and economic conquerors, especially those engaged in modern national conquests, have often attempted to justify their efforts by appeal to abstract principles. Thus the "white man's burden" argument was used to justify the economic exploitation of primitive and Asiatic peoples, the "master race" claim was made by the German Nazi, and interest in the economic and social welfare of the downtrodden masses of capitalistic societies was professed by the Russian Communists. But however disguised, the self-interest motives of military and economic conquerors show through; and the conquest of territories, peoples, and markets is everywhere and always quite obviously motivated by the desire for gain, usually material in character. Motivationally, there is little but complexity to distinguish the common thief from the pirates of old or thieving brigands from an occupying military force. Similarly, there is little but complexity to distinguish a horse trader from a corporation that trades monetary royalties and other things for the right to exploit the oil or ore resources of an undeveloped land. On the other hand, the motivations of cultural conquerors, of those individuals and the group or society that they represent who do such things as induce a primitive people to cover their nakedness and thus avoid sin, to worship the Christian God and thus inherit the kingdom of heaven, or to use the devices of modern medical science and public health and thus avoid premature death are varied, often mixed, and always difficult to analyze.

When, as is frequently the case, the endeavor to induce the members of another society to adopt practices sanctioned by one's own group or society is an organized activity, it may be no more than a means of livelihood for the various individuals who engage in it.¹ To a professional missionary the Christianization of heathens may be just a job of work, distinguishable from other kinds of employment only in that it takes the worker to a foreign land and makes no tangible profit for the employing organization. Religious mis-

¹ As is most clearly the case with professional advertising people, political propagandists, and others who sell their conversional skills to any person or organization that wants and can afford to employ their services. Such people are not really apostolic agents of their employers or in any real sense representatives of the cultural devices or social interests which at any given moment they are advocating. Spokesmen for the occupation have developed elaborate social justifications for advertising and other forms of modern mass conversional endeavors; but the fact is that such efforts stem from the pecuniary self-interest of those who make them and reflect neither faith in the value of what they are advocating or concern for the welfare of those they are attempting to convert. The trappings of the modern advertising agency may be impressive and certainly reflect the economic value of the services it provides; functionally, however, the modern advertising copy writer, account executive, etc., differ not at all from the hucksters who, in an earlier day, roamed the streets crying out the virtues of whatever goods it was they had to sell.

sionaries, Christian or otherwise, have been for the most part functionaries of large bureaucratic organizations dedicated, ostensibly at least, to the religious conquest of unbelievers. In such organizations, the motives of individual missionaries may not be difficult to discern. They may speak of their dedication to the work of God, of the inherent desirability of saving souls for God, etc. But even a casual examination of their status and way of life may reveal that, as is said of the missionaries to early Hawaii, they may have gone to do good, but they actually did very well.

In some instances, indeed, religious conquest has been but a guise for and supplement to economic exploitation. The seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries to China sought and found there a lucrative outlet for Church capital; at that time the going interest rate in China was in excess of twelve per cent, whereas in Europe it had been brought down to about half this by the Jewish moneylenders. The Protestant missions that were established during the nineteenth century in the Pacific islands and in the Near East were generally supported by monetary and other contributions from the homeland. But their support was often contingent upon the "cooperation" of the missionaries with homeland political and economic interests; and the missionary who served his nation, as well as his church, was usually rewarded by a standard of living far above that which he could possibly have achieved in or out of church service at home.

It was "on behalf of the Holy Roman Empire" that Charlemagne, the first of the early medieval crusaders, endeavored forcibly to unify the feudal peoples of Western Europe. How important the religious motif was in this and the many subsequent religious crusades and religious wars cannot, of course, be ascertained from this distance. Aside from that motif, they were, however, indistinguishable from ordinary military conquests, wars of political unification, and civil wars. The claim that he fought for "the glory of God" was made by many a local ruler in resisting conquest from without, by many a conqueror endeavoring to consolidate Christian but otherwise discrete political and economic units, and in some instances, as in the case of the Spanish conquest of Central and South America, by nations engaged in the building of an empire at the expense of primitive or premodern peoples. Through the Middle Ages and later, sacred and secular interests and values were, in fact, so interwoven and interdependent that it is impossible to separate them, even conceptually.

Over the past two centuries the confusion has been confounded, for the expansion of Western societies and the diffusion of Western culture have been both erratic and segmental. Conquests have taken many separate, varied, and often conflicting forms—religious, political, economic, technological, etc.—and have often involved competition and at times conflict between various religious or other interests. Thus in China various Protestant missions competed with one another and jointly with the Roman Catholic missions to secure converts to the same kingdom of God, even as, simultaneously, British, Ger-

man, American, and other business interests competed with one another for markets for the same goods. Such competition between conquerors precluded the achievement of a monopoly over the Chinese by any one of them and enabled the Chinese to pick and choose from among the religious and other offerings and then to haggle over terms. In the confusion following World War II, occupied Japan and West Germany were in the favorable position of being the objects of so many, such varied, and such conflicting interests that they could bargain with their conquerors and play off one against the others.

Reform and Uplift. Personal self-interest, not always economic, seems to underlie much of the effort made by "do-gooders" to impress upon others their own standards, values, etc. When such effort is made by the members of a social elite on behalf of members of a lower class, it is usually called "charity." When such effort is made by one section, usually regional, of a society on behalf of another section—as, for example, the effort of Northern states to change the traditional status of the Negro in Southern states via Federal legislation—it is usually termed "welfare legislation" or something equally suggestive of inherent virtue.

Within the past two centuries, the idea has gradually developed in Western societies that the welfare of each individual, class, and other grouping within a society is ultimately dependent upon the conduct of every other individual, class, and grouping. Old-fashioned charity, in which the rich or some agency thereof, such as the Church, simply give food or other material values to the poor, has little if any effect on the conduct of the recipients; they take, eat, and are more or less grateful for what they are given. Such charity may bring temporary aid and comfort to the poor, but it is palliative rather than corrective; it does not affect the causes of poverty, and it is to the interests of the superior individuals and classes to correct those causes. Such, in brief, is the rationale which evolved along with an entirely new form of charitable endeavor. The rationale has of recent years been given theoretical support by the development of the functional approach in sociology and has been elaborated and documented by criminologists, penologists, and other social technicians. The new form of charitable endeavor has been applied to every conceivable aspect of social inadequacy, from haphazard child care and training to the chronic impoverishment of the peoples of India, and has been the excuse for the development of a wide variety of charitable agencies, both private and public.

The goal of all such modern charitable endeavors, unlike that of old-fashioned charity, is reform—*i.e.*, a changing of the conduct of the recipients to make them conform more nearly to the conduct norms, the values, etc., of the class, regional, or other grouping that the charitable endeavor represents. Reform is the object; and by reform is meant uplift, the bringing of those who are defined as inferior up toward the level of the reformers. To the extent that such efforts are effective, the process is one of cultural conquest.

Currently there are in America a multitude of organizations, some private but mostly public, which are engaged in cultural conquest to abolish poverty, delinquency, racial, religious, and other forms of discrimination, vulgar tastes in art, political indifference, marital and other forms of interpersonal discord, etc. Of recent years the United States has, as mentioned earlier, extended this kind of cultural conquest to include all the "undeveloped" peoples of the world, thus generalizing and making official the uplift efforts of religious, medical, and other missionaries.² If recent American aspirations in this direction are to be taken at their face value, the American people will not be content until all the peoples of the world have been enabled and induced—by force if necessary—to live like and in the manner of Americans.

Ethnocentrism and Ethnoexpansionism. It is clear that it was economic self-interest that led the Standard Oil Company to induce the peoples of China to adopt the Western kerosene lamp, the British forcibly to open China as a market for Indian opium, and each of the Western powers to want a political and military foothold in China. It is also fairly evident that personal self-interest accounts for the Christianizing efforts of many of the missionaries in China and elsewhere and for the endeavors of many professional welfare workers to uplift delinquent children, casual and incompetent parents, impoverished elders, etc. Even the welfare and reformist activities of volunteer workers—e.g., women who contribute time and labor to the local Red Cross, women who serve their term in the local Junior League, and businessmen who take on some responsibility for local, national, or international good works—can often be explained in terms of individual self-interest. For some persons such activities may be a form of occupational therapy; the activities give them something interesting to do besides worrying about themselves. For others, such as the lonely woman and the girl entering "society," the activities may be a means to status; and for still others, such as businessmen, they are often a way to win the commercially valuable approval of the community.

There are, however, many instances in which attempts at cultural conquest, both individual and organizational, seem to have had little if any self-interest motivation. Some Christian missionaries do seem to have labored in the spirit of self-sacrifice and idealism with which all are supposed to enter the mission field; and certainly some of the organized support accorded religious missions can have provided the supporters with nothing more gratifying than the feeling of having contributed to a good work. Moreover, the efforts

² R. McMurry and M. Lee have justified this world-wide uplift program on the grounds that it is the one certain way to an enduring peace between nations. See their *The Cultural Approach: Another Way in International Relations* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1947). Implicit in an otherwise excellent collection of case histories of cultural conquests, some of which were partially successful and many of which were total failures, is the assumption that American efforts to bring the benefits of Western technology to pre-modern peoples are per se justifiable: *Human Problems in Technological Change* (E. H. Spicer, ed., Russell Sage, New York, 1952).

of many men of medicine and public health—as, for example, the medical missionary in the foreign field,³ the doctor who unlike most of his colleagues has devoted himself to treating the poor rather than the rich, and the public-health man who has struggled against great odds to introduce modern sanitary methods to primitive or peasant peoples—do seem to have been largely motivated by sincere concern for the welfare of those whom they were endeavoring to aid.

The effort to bring to others the benefits of the cultural devices of one's own group, organization, or society would seem to be a sociological anomaly. Ethnocentrism is well-nigh universal and may therefore be considered a normal characteristic of man. Among the various expressions of ethnocentrism are the desire to maintain a group monopoly over the use of the group's cultural devices, over the conditions of life that they support, and most particularly over membership in the group itself. Group and organizational identity (political and otherwise), the social necessity for which has been analyzed at length in earlier chapters, depends upon the monopolizing of some and often many distinguishing social attributes.

Any idealistically motivated endeavor to conquer culturally the members of other groups and societies is thus sharply at variance with the monopolizing aspect of ethnocentrism. Ethnoexpansionism, as this anomalous phenomenon may be termed, is like ethnocentrism in that it involves the assumption that one's own ways are per se superior to all other ways of life and that the circumstances one enjoys should be desired by all men. This assumption is the common core of all ethnocentric and ethnoexpansionistic behavior. But whereas the former leads to preserving the in-group's monopoly on their distinctive cultural and other social attributes, the latter leads to efforts to induce members of out-groups to adopt the valued modes of conduct and, presumably, thereby achieve something of the status enjoyed by the in-group.

There is, for example, an almost universal ethnocentric tendency for work and other status groups, for military and other large-scale organizations, and for societies as a whole to wear some distinctive form of clothing and to discourage or at least deprecate the wearing of that clothing by nonmembers. Bankers would consider it an absurd affectation should the common workingman get himself up in banker's garb; Americans are amused by the African primitive who wears a Western-type jacket and little else; and women everywhere deprecate the male who dresses to any extent in the way locally reserved for women. Yet the wives of the Protestant missionaries who went out

³ For the account of a man who devoted most of his life to medical missionary work among primitives see A. Gilbert, *Eskimo Doctor* (Norton, New York, 1948). *Miracle in the Hills* (M. T. Sloop and L. Blythe, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952) is a semiautobiographical account of a forty-year crusade by Dr. Sloop to bring the benefits of medical science to the hill people of North Carolina. These and many other reports of medical missionary work indicate not only how difficult it is to induce people to adopt modern medical practices but the great personal sacrifice that is involved in attempting to get them to do so.

to the Pacific islands violated the normal ethnocentric desire to remain distinctive in dress and strove against considerable odds to cover the naked heathens with an approximation of their own garb "in the interests of virtue." It may be argued that they did so through self-interest—*i.e.*, to protect their husbands from temptation; ⁴ but the evidence strongly suggests that on the whole they acted here, if not elsewhere, in what they considered to be the best interests of the natives.

Ethnoexpansionism appears to be peculiarly modern. Men have always and everywhere given aid and comfort—*i.e.*, treated sympathetically—members of their in-groups and endeavored to bring individual members into conformity with the group norms. But for the members of one clearly defined group to strive, without any possibility of personal gain, to induce out-group members to adopt for their own benefit in-group practices seems to have little historical precedent. It presupposes not only unshakeable confidence in the superiority of one's own ways (*e.g.*, the inherent value of modern medicine as a means of curing illness and prolonging life and the inherent desirability of being physically free from disease and of living long) but also some degree of generalized sympathy—*i.e.*, a tendency to feel toward any human being the "identification with" that is normally reserved for one's own kind.⁵

Ethnoexpansionism seems to have been the motivation for a considerable part of the recent and current effort of Western peoples to bring what they would call the benefits of Western civilization to primitive and peasant peoples. The origins of this particular social motivation are not evident. It might be that ethnoexpansionism is a normal by-product of marked social disequilibrium,

⁴ There are other possibilities. It might, for example, be argued that these women were simply trying to gain personal ascendancy over the natives and were so lacking in ingenuity that they could think of no other means than to induce the natives to wear the functionally unnecessary clothing that they themselves were culturally compelled to wear. Psychoanalysts, on the other hand, might prefer an explanation based upon the idea of projection. In this explanation the cultural conqueror would be motivated by the desire to bring others into conformity with his own practices because he identified himself with them and was emotionally displeased by their deviation from himself and gratified by their similarities to him, much as the parent is supposed to project himself into the child and evaluate himself somewhat in terms of what the child is. This particular interpretation could be further complicated by the addition of the idea that the cultural conqueror wants others to conform to his own image because, in his mind, he has himself been made in God's image, hence is somewhat Godlike and, like God, looks upon all people as his children.

Whatever their motivation, it does seem that the religious missionaries were largely concerned with inducing natives to adopt the more trivial aspects of Western culture, such as dress. See G. G. Brown, "Missions and Cultural Diffusion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 50, pp. 214-219, 1944).

⁵ P. Sorokin (*Altruistic Love: A Study of American Good Neighbors and Christian-Catholic Saints*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1950) has recently revived the long-discarded idea that, contrary to most of the evidence of social history, men do basically, and presumably for reasons inherent in the nature of man himself, love one another and that this love extends to include all of mankind. In his view, all efforts at cultural conquest stem from altruistic love for those who are being subjected to conquest.

that it is simply one of the channels by which any highly aggressive and culturally dynamic people dissipate their energies. However, there is slight reason to believe that the Spanish were so idealistically motivated during the time when they were the dominant people of Europe or that the British engaged in many unprofitable "good works" while they ruled the seas and were unquestionably the cultural center of the Western world. The ancient Romans did, it is true, take their advanced agricultural techniques, their baths, the culture of cities, and their highly developed law to the provinces that they first conquered by military might. It is impossible, however, to ascertain whether there was in their subsequent cultural conquest of the provincials anything more than calculated self-interest. There is, at any event, some reason to think that the ethnoexpansionism which has of late developed among Western peoples is the "something new in human affairs" which social idealists have sought over the ages without avail, the something new which, replacing ethnocentrism and all that flows therefrom, might ultimately bring about some slight semblance of that brotherhood of man which is so pleasant to contemplate but so contrary to human experience.

THE CONDITIONS OF CULTURAL CONQUEST

In the past, cultural conquests seem to have occurred far less often than military and economic conquests. As indicated above, the Romans did introduce and gain acceptance for some of their cultural devices in the provinces under their military occupation; and the Chinese of old China in time inducted a succession of military conquerors into Chinese culture and incorporated them within Chinese society. Within a given society, changes in the class system have sometimes led to a diffusion of upper-class manners and morals downward or vice versa. The middle classes that evolved in early modern European societies adopted many of the values, sentiments, and modes of conduct formerly reserved for aristocrats;⁶ and the vulgar plays of Shakespeare were ultimately accorded recognition by the socially elite of England. In the latter Middle Ages the Catholic Church, thwarted in its struggle to gain political and economic domination of Europeans, directed its surplus energies and personnel into the religious conquest of heathens—a practice which, some centuries later, Protestant sects also followed. But apart from these, there are few historical examples of deliberate efforts at cultural conquest. On the contrary, the evidences of history indicate that for the most part a group or society, when it did not endeavor to exterminate or exploit or resist those adjacent to it, remained aloof, content to go its way and let the others go their way.

⁶ But to a considerable extent it was, apparently, the more trivial aspects of upper-class morals and manners that were taken over by the rising middle class. For historical materials on this downward spread of upper-class manners in Europe and the changes that occurred to them between the twelfth and the twentieth centuries see N. Elias, *Ueber den Progress der Zivilisation* (Schulze, Berlin, 1936, Vol. I).

Proximity does not of itself foster conquest, cultural or otherwise. Peoples with quite different cultures and even quite different standards of material well-being have often lived side by side over long periods of time without either affecting the other. Such subcultural differences as caste and even class have often persisted century after century, although the members of each caste or class could hardly avoid knowing a good deal about how the others lived. Under a rigid class system the elite have protected themselves from direct exposure to the ways of life of their social inferiors, and they have of course been under no temptation to adopt those ways; but members of an inferior class or caste have always been used by the elite as domestic servants, and in that capacity they have been able to observe intimately and over long periods of time the practices of their social superiors. Even so, the class from which servants have been drawn has often maintained its own subculture intact. Perhaps the most striking example of the persistence of cultural differences in the face of constant and intimate association with individuals representing another subculture is that of the sexes.⁷ In every society men and women have somewhat different subcultures; these differences usually have persisted, although the men and women of a given household have necessarily shared many other things in common, including their status as family members.

Intensity of Apostolic Motivation. The fact that proximity and even intimacy do not of themselves break down ethnocentrism and lead to a diffusion or a fusion of cultures suggests, in a gross way, how difficult it usually is to induce the members of one culture or subculture to adopt the cultural attributes of another. Even under favorable conditions much effort and ingenuity must be expended, generally over a considerable period of time, to gain acceptance for simple technological devices; to do the same for complex procedures, such as measures of public sanitation, is a tedious and discouraging enterprise; and to induce a people to adopt a new organizational form is so difficult as to make the endeavor well-nigh hopeless at the outset.

The difficulties that are certain to be encountered in any cultural conquest may not be obvious and may not, therefore, discourage individuals and organizations from undertaking such conquests. But those difficulties soon become apparent, and only those individuals who are strongly motivated and

⁷ The feminist movements which arose in Western societies some seventy-five years ago provide a minor but interesting example of the cultural conquest of one sex by the other. Those movements were led mainly by men, who apparently believed that it would be to the direct advantage of women and indirect advantage of society at large if women were enabled and induced to share certain limited aspects of men's subculture; e.g., education, the franchise, and some occupational status and attributes. Over the years women, especially those of America, have won a variety of new "freedoms"—which is to say that they have been enabled and induced to adopt many modes of conduct, many sentiments and values, formerly the exclusive prerogative of men. Today they may even wear pants upon occasion. Nevertheless, they have adopted so little from masculine society and retained so much that is distinctly feminine that the modern American woman is still distinguishable at first glance from the male—and not alone because her body structure is different from his.

who have no acceptable alternative will long persist in such endeavor. Thus a young doctor who, for reasons of personal self-interest or idealism, decides to bring the benefits of modern medicine to a primitive people, to the unmodernized Indians on a reservation, or to the "poor white trash" of the South will soon find that his services are not wanted, that his advice is seldom taken, that he is blamed for the death of patients under his care but is not credited with helping those who do recover, etc. If he proceeds with skill (social as well as medical) and persists, he may eventually win status as a person among the people he has chosen to serve and some slight acceptance for the medical practices which he represents. But the day-to-day progress in his conquest will be imperceptible; and the degree of his ascendancy at any given moment will be slight and unrewarding. And so it is, in one way or another, with any individual or organization engaged in cultural conquest. On the whole, therefore, it would seem that those who strive for ascendancy via cultural conquest are not only strongly motivated but are unable, through limitation of social opportunities or peculiarities of personality, to follow the normal channels of ascendancy within their society.

The American Protestant efforts to Christianize the peoples of the Pacific and of Asia illustrates how a paucity of local opportunities for ascendancy may drive men beyond the confines of their own society, with the result that they become in one way or another cultural conquerors. During the latter half of the last century most of the many small colleges that had sprung up in the United States were denominational, and their curriculum was for the most part religious and classical, thus of slight relevance to any career except that of clergyman. These colleges fed the existing graduate schools of religion with a heavy stream of young men who were ambitious to become pastors, and the graduate schools in turn produced far more young ministers than could possibly find berths in American communities. It would seem that the oversupply of ministers was the primary motivating force for the establishment and enlargement of foreign missions; it was, in effect, to the interest of the ministers, to the interest of the schools of religion, and to the interest of the denominational colleges to gain new converts. Only under somewhat comparable internal stresses do men individually or in organizations "seek new worlds to conquer."

Cultural conquests of any magnitude presuppose, therefore, that the society or the class, region, or other cultural subdivision from which the conquerors come is in such a condition of disequilibrium that some individuals are highly motivated to seek ascendancy in atypical ways.

Social Disequilibrium and Conquest. Cultural conquest, like military and economic conquest, is, however, impossible unless those to be conquered are weaker than those bent on conquest. In the case of cultural conquest, "weakness" consists of inability of the recipient society in its entirety to resist and reject the inducements offered by the conquerors. Such inability is usually the consequence of disequilibriums within the social system which,

by rendering some individuals discontented and frustrated, make them less than normally ethnocentric and atypically freed from social controls.

In any cultural grouping there are, presumably, always some members who are marginal in respect to some one or more items of their culture and who in one way or another strive to break away from one or more of the group norms. As indicated earlier, such individuals can normally be restrained by social controls if they do not have any acceptable status alternatives to that afforded by the group exercising those controls. Within the confines of a well-integrated and isolated social system the status alternatives are usually few and unattractive; a malcontent can at the most desert his home community and join an outlaw band.

The new cultural devices that the would-be cultural conqueror brings to his chosen field of action may be attractive to those members of the community who are marginal in respect to that aspect of their own culture which the new would replace, as modern medicine would replace prescientific folk medicine, the Christian God whatever the local gods may be, or the flush toilet the outhouse. Occasionally the new can be adopted without replacing or displacing something old, as could, for example, shoes brought to a people who have no form of footcovering. Even so, adoption of the new will always require the abandonment of some existing sentiments, values, etc., and will usually mean some more or less disturbing changes in conduct. Thus unless a barefooted people are going to use shoes simply as household ornaments, even as some South Pacific natives used the sewing machines they had been induced to purchase, they must learn to wear, to take care of, and upon going to bed to remove those shoes; they must also learn to get along without their toes as supplements to their fingers.

It is because the adoption of anything new demands some learning and the abandonment of some familiar device, or at least established attitudes and values, that only those individuals who are already discontented with what exists will be tempted by the new. For them to adopt the new usually means, however, that they run counter to the norms of some, if not all, of their status groups. Moreover, if they persist in so violating the norms, they may be excluded from those groups. The would-be cultural conqueror cannot at the outset provide these marginal individuals with a new status alternative. He says, in effect, "I can heal your wound, assure you a place in heaven, protect your feet from sharp stones, or teach you how to live a longer and more fruitful life." But he cannot offer them what they, like every other individual, want most—status among their own kind.

Conquest and Status. No effort at cultural conquest can succeed unless the conqueror is able to gain status value for what he represents. The fact that a new item is demonstrably superior, even in terms of the value systems of the recipients, is thus seldom of itself sufficient to gain general acceptance for that item. Its adoption must somehow become, as it were, locally fashion-

able and thus be made a means to new status as well as a means to better health, the kingdom of heaven, or whatever the new item promises to provide.

The dissatisfaction of the occasional malcontents or culturally marginal individuals who are to be found in every social grouping is not primarily with some aspect of their culture but with the status that adherence to that culture has brought them. There are, of course, exceptions. A man who has become disillusioned regarding the healing powers of the local medicine men wants good health above all else, and a starving peasant wants food to eat. For the moment neither is much concerned with matters of social status. Such persons may, therefore, accept the services of the medical missionaries and the food of the religious missionaries; but their conversion is as temporary as is their need.

A cultural conqueror who draws to him the social malcontents of a comparatively stable community may, in fact, thereby wall himself off from the rest of that community. Such was the case, for example, with the Protestant missionaries in China. These missionaries brought a new religious faith to a people who had not the slightest need for it. The disequilibriums then existing in Chinese society were basically economic, political, and military; a new secular ideology might have had some real appeal; but the Chinese were already surfeited with religions. (Moreover, Christian ideology was exceedingly difficult to adapt to the functional requirements of the prevailing forms of social organization.) What tended to happen, therefore, was an economic and, under the Western-enforced policy of extraterritoriality, political exploitation of the missionaries by those few among the Chinese who found their lot improved by attaching themselves to the missions. Inevitably, these few were largely social incompetents and weaklings (the so-called "rice Christians") or outlaws taking refuge from Chinese justice under the protective wing of the missionaries. From the Chinese point of view it was mainly the riffraff who became converts—in a nominal way—to Christianity; hence to become a Christian was to identify oneself with a *déclassé* group. In the main, therefore, only those with no status to lose could afford to become Christians. Something of the same sort has happened wherever attempts have been made to convert the members of a relatively integrated group, including members of class groups, to some new cultural practice. The converts tend to be submarginal members of the group, for they are the only ones who can gain by being converted; and they form a submarginal status grouping which makes conversion of socially respectable members doubly difficult.

On the whole it would appear that only when the would-be cultural conqueror is able to gain the support of respected members of the local community for what he represents will what he has to offer acquire generally desirable status value. Ideally, he should gain the support, by bribery if necessary, of those in positions of authority. At the very least he must gain the support of members in good standing of status groups which, as groups, have prestige

in the local social context. And such individuals will find the adopting of a new cultural device to their personal advantage—*i.e.*, a means to the preservation of an ascendant position or a means to ascendancy which is otherwise precluded—only when the status system itself is unstable, as is typically the case under conditions of social disequilibrium.

It is generally assumed that disequilibrium within a society or a class or other segment thereof is brought about by the introduction of new cultural elements from without, *i.e.*, that such disequilibrium is caused by cultural conquest. Military and economic means of conquest can certainly disturb the *status quo*, even that of a highly integrated social system. It is also clear that cultural conquests invariably produce disturbances to the social system, disturbances which are often unanticipatable and far-reaching, and that conquest in one specific aspect of culture may induce disequilibriums in other aspects of that culture and thereby predispose the recipients to subsequent conquest in other spheres.

The would-be cultural conqueror is, however, initially in a position somewhat analogous to that of a disease germ that attacks a human body. If the body is in reasonably good health and has immunity to the particular disease, the germ finds no welcome. Only if the body lacks immunity will the germ be welcomed at all; and if the body is otherwise healthy, its welcome will be brief. But if the body lacks immunity and is already malfunctioning, then the new germ can thrive and further the ill health which favors its existence. Similarly, if a society is functionally integrated and strongly ethnocentric, the cultural conqueror may be tolerated as a person, but the changes that he proposes will be firmly rejected; if, on the other hand, the society is already malfunctioning and undergoing some change, what he proposes will at least be examined and may even be given some trial.

Historically, the social disequilibrium favorable to cultural conquest has in many instances been induced by military or economic conquest. In other instances the decimation wrought by the introduction of European diseases has disturbed the equilibrium of primitive societies and in that way opened the doors to cultural conquest. Since at least the advent of the industrial revolution, the class and other organizational systems of all Western societies have been in a more or less chronic state of disequilibrium, with the result that the way has constantly been open for interclass, interregional, and other forms of cultural conquest. As a consequence, many of the more superficial aspects of the class, regional, rural-urban, and even sex differences that obtained in Western societies fifty years ago have largely disappeared. In this leveling process, the deliberate efforts of uplifters who attempted to bring the benefits of middle-class values and practices to the lower classes, of urban to rural, of Northern to Southern, etc., have undoubtedly played a considerable part. Here as elsewhere, however, cultural conquests have often been fostered by and perhaps incidental to efforts at economic conquest; and it is usually im-

possible in any given instance to ascertain whether it was the salesman or the proselytizer who was the actual conqueror.⁸

The Conqueror and the Conquered. Cultural conquest, like military and economic conquest, is an interactional process. Although the way may be open for such conquest, those who take over the new must be induced to adopt it, which at the very least means that the conqueror must treat them in their terms rather than in his; in order to treat them in their own terms, he must learn to make rather close sympathetic identification with them; and to the extent that he achieves such identification, he becomes emotionally, if not outwardly, like them. In the end, therefore, a man who comes to conquer may himself be conquered. Few religious missionaries have gone native, and there is little evidence that social workers and social reformers are prone to become, respectively, socially submarginal and sinners. Nonetheless, some Christian missionaries or their foreign-born sons have returned to their homeland to convert Christians to the support of heathenish peoples and their culture. Many social workers have either become embittered and antagonistic toward the class of people that they are supposed to serve, and hence ineffectual, or else in time the advocates for those people in many major respects. A medical missionary or medical social worker is unlikely to adopt the medical practices of the people he serves; but in the process of inducing them to accept modern medical techniques, he is likely to become enamored of some of the things that they represent—of their pragmatic attitude toward life and death, perhaps, of their simple and tasty foods, or of something else which is theirs. There can be no doubt that American urban society has largely conquered American rural society both economically and culturally. In the process, however, many urban people have become convinced of the desirability of living in the rural hinterland and of including in their value systems such rural cultural items as seed catalogues, cow manure, and insecticides.

Would-be cultural conquerors, like military and economic conquerors, may protect themselves from insidious counterconquest by congregating together, forming a cultural island within the society or class that they are trying to conquer, and isolating themselves from intimate contact with members of that society or class. The temptation to do so is always strong, for at the outset would-be conquerors necessarily consider their own way of life desir-

⁸ In *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* (Harper, New York, 1952) R. B. Fosdick describes some of the early successes of this organization in stamping out some of the endemic diseases, such as hookworm in the southern part of the United States. When, however, the Foundation expanded into the social field and attempted to bring about changes in social practices, it encountered great resistance and its achievements were few. And even in medicine, the effects of Foundation endeavors are difficult to evaluate. Thus the reduction of hookworm in the South may have been as much the result of economic, rather than medical, conquest by the mechanized shoe industry (the disease is acquired through the soles of the feet) as of The Rockefeller Foundation.

able and that of the people whom they are bent on conquering undesirable. To preserve the desirable they may need to maintain an aloofness from the native population, to get their food from home, perhaps, to institute sanitary and other measures unknown to the natives but considered imperative for health and comfort, etc., and to live apart from the local population. Often, therefore, would-be cultural conquerors reproduce for themselves the physical environment of their homeland and engage in a way of life which is isolated from that of the natives.

As indicated earlier, military and economic conquerors may profit in some respects, as did the British in India, by remaining aloof from those they have conquered. But, as will be shown presently, cultural conquest is a peculiarly intimate process; it requires not only that the conqueror understand and adjust to the values and sentiments of those whom he would conquer, but also that he participate in many of their activities on a level as near as possible to equality. If he does not do so, he cannot possibly gain for what he represents the status value without which success is impossible. There have been many apparent exceptions to this generalization. For example, the European emissaries of "culture" who came to the United States in large numbers during the latter part of the last century to lecture on art, music, and the like remained studiously aloof from the barbaric natives; yet their depreciation of American life and glorification of European culture was welcomed by the middle-class Americans who flocked to hear them. Their conquests were, however, exceedingly superficial. What the conquerors represented was socially trivial and was adopted by two very small and nonrepresentative segments of the American population—the rich, who had money to spend on European art treasures, and those otherwise unengaged, middle-class, middle-aged housewives who found in new cultural cults something to talk about. And in both segments, it is to be observed, the aloof conquerors provided their converts with some new bid to social status. Most of what would seem to be exceptions to the rule likewise turn out, upon analysis, to be more apparent than real.

The necessity for considerable intimate participation in the daily life of a people in order to gain their acceptance of a new cultural device will become understandable when the means of cultural conquest are subjected to analysis. At this point it may be observed that the common ethnocentric assumption of Western peoples that their cultural superiority is everywhere self-evident and that the devices of Western culture automatically prove their own worth whenever they become available to non-Westerners is simply not true. Currently the United States is in many major respects the dominant cultural, as well as financial and military, center of the West and, perhaps, of the the world; and Americans have lately come to assume that their special versions of Western culture have self-evident superiority over European versions. In the years following World War II, a number of political and semi-military efforts were made to bring the presumed self-evident benefits of

American culture to various peoples of the world. In some of these efforts the idea that what is by local assumption superior will gain acceptance elsewhere *on its merits* was very apparent. An example of the fallacy of this idea may help to prepare the way for the examination of the actual means by which, under most favorable conditions, cultural conquest is possible.

The Failure of Democratization. At the close of World War II, the United States embarked, through the State Department and various military agencies, upon a program intended to democratize the people of Japan, those of Western Germany, and, less intently, those of Italy. The program of democratization was to be carried out under a military occupation and concurrently with a program of economic rehabilitation. The marked ethnoexpansionism of the American people, usually described as "internationalism," provided a vague but necessary basis for both programs—it made them politically feasible—although national self-interest was the professed rationale. The rationalizers of the programs contended, among other things, that the non-democratic political systems traditional in these countries had enabled their aggressive military leaders to precipitate World War II, and that it would be cheaper to bring these countries into the company of honorable and peaceful nations than to defend ourselves from the aggression which they would otherwise in due course again undertake. To this end, the argument ran, it was necessary to make them as far as possible like ourselves, *i.e.*, economically prosperous and politically democratic. A secondary and presumably dependent contention was that unless the Japanese and Germans were rehabilitated and democratized, they would fall into the orbit of the aggressive Russians.

The program of democratization became, inevitably perhaps, an avenue of ascendancy for many American individuals and organizations. Lawyers, educators, propagandists, and self-seeking politicians, agencies of the State Department and of the various military forces, etc., found in the program profitable occupation and an opportunity for unusually rapid advancement. Lawyers and jurists, for example, fostered and engaged in the so-called "war crimes" trials, which were supposed to demonstrate to the occupied peoples that war does not pay—an application to international affairs of a procedure that has been largely abandoned in respect to the prevention of crime within nations. American educators urged and to some extent secured reestablishment "on the democratic pattern" of Japanese and German universities. From their own myopic version of what controls human conduct, journalists attacked the problem of reviving the Japanese and German newspapers and of assuring that they would be "organs of democracy" rather than, as previously, agencies representing an autocratic and militant elite. With few and unimportant exceptions, the various projects for democratization were designed to work from the top down. As a means of democratizing the newspapers, for example, men of professed democratic faith were put in as editors. Here, as elsewhere, it was the working assumption that the character of their administrative officers determines the conduct of a people, an assumption that has limited validity

at best and is entirely false when the personnel of public and other offices is determined by an external agency, as it was in this particular case. The purging and "purification" of the ranks of schoolteachers, university professors, journalists, labor leaders, politicians, etc., all proceeded on the basis of this assumption. The result was that in many instances the official structure of organizations became "democratic," while the real interests, values, and sentiments of the Japanese and German peoples secured representation through informal and largely covert power structures which were, from the point of view of the Americans, anything but democratic. In effect, then, democracy (actually, the trappings thereof) was a showpiece maintained for the benefit of the conquerors.

Meanwhile, Americans did very little to give adherence to even the outward forms of democratic procedures any status value for the mass of the people. Through the various rehabilitation projects some effort was made to buy loyalty and admiration for the American system of production; but as the missionaries to China had long since demonstrated, "rice converts" are converted only to the new means of securing food, not to the social system from which that food comes. Meanwhile, too, the American emissaries of democracy put on a major demonstration of how not to be democratic. In a great variety of ways they walled themselves off from the local population; both military and civilian personnel lived apart from the natives, taking for their use the best of available facilities and living in ways which the natives might envy but could never hope to enjoy. For example, the commissaries, filled with made-in-America foods and other goods, were no doubt necessary for maintaining morale among the occupying forces; but as a social device they provided an excellent illustration of how not to win the respect and affection of an occupied people. In sum, the Americans placed themselves, at great expense to the American people, in the role of military conqueror; and so far as the psychological effects on the native populations were concerned, they might just as well have been exploiting those populations as trying to induce them to adopt and adhere to the ideals of American democracy.

Unofficially—that is, quite apart from the calculated programs of democratization—the truly democratic tendency of the American soldier to fraternize may have done a little to temper the antagonism, the envy, and the dissatisfaction which were the inevitable consequences of official programs and policies. If Americans did win some converts to democracy through the early post-war years, it was by informal means, by casual acts of individual kindness and generosity, and as a consequence of those characteristics of the American which, expressed in extreme form, led to intermarriage with the natives. Whether such intermarriage was itself a means of inducing Japanese and Germans, other than the brides, to accept the things that Americans represent is not known. Intermarriage must certainly have served as a demonstration that the American conquerors did not hold themselves as a caste apart; on the other hand, the brides may have represented and been generally looked

upon as collaborators, as individuals who had sold out to the enemy for personal gain.

The postwar occupation of Germany and Japan by Americans had, of course, many effects. It undoubtedly fostered the development of new desires or intensified old desires for some of the material aspects of American culture. But it did not have the effect of achieving the utterly unrealistic official goal of democratization. By no means, least of all those used, could the peoples of Japan and West Germany be induced to live in the ways Americans define as democratic.⁹ Democracy is not a thing, like a bottle of Coca-Cola, but a vast complex of processes which have little relation to the formal aspects of political and other organizations. What we think of as the democratic way of life consists of or springs from modes of thinking, systems of values, patterns of sentiment, etc., which have been several centuries in the making and which cannot be imposed upon a people with other personal-social attributes or even be communicated to them should they desire to acquire these characteristics.

The Dimensions of Cultural Conquest. There are no means by which a people can be induced to live in accordance with such a vast and variable complex of intangible and always dynamic relationships as are covered by the term "democracy." Other things being equal, cultural conquerors have their greatest success with cultural trivia, cultural items which cater to segmental tastes and have slight functional dependence upon one another or upon another aspect of the culture.¹⁰ Body and other ornaments fall into this category. Music and the simple devices for making it also have considerable independence of the other elements of a culture and may be adopted quite readily, as is evidenced by the extent to which various peoples of the world have recently taken over American popular music. The early Protestant missionaries to Africa did not succeed in Christianizing tribal peoples; but they did induce many of them to adopt (and, incidentally, adapt) the hymn as a musical form. Games and other recreational forms of activity pass rather freely from society to society, although in some instances a given form, such as Western-type ballroom dancing, cannot be taken over until and unless the sex mores are favorable. The rapid historic spread of the tobacco complex

⁹ For evaluations of the attempt to "reeducate" the German people see D. Rodnick, *Post-war Germans: An Anthropologist's Account* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948); and D. Schaffner, *Father Land: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1948).

¹⁰ So far, scientific study of cultural conquest has been mainly anthropological and therefore has dealt with the conquest by Western peoples of primitives. The following are representative of such anthropological studies: R. Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority in West Africa* (Oxford, New York, 1950); M. J. Herskovits, "Education and Cultural Dynamics" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 737-749, 1942); H. Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Conflict on the Pondo of South Africa* (Oxford, New York, 1936); A. Locke and B. J. Stern, eds., *When Peoples Meet* (Progressive Education Association, New York, 1942); B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Cultural Change* (P. M. Karberry, ed., Yale University Press, New Haven, 1945); and E. H. Spicer, ed., *Human Problems in Technological Change* (Russell Sage, New York, 1952).

and the distilled-liquor complex, the one originating in America and the other in Europe, lends some support to the theory that there is a physiological predisposition for men to adopt from other cultures stimulants and depressants; the rapidity with which spices, tea, coffee, and the vegetable narcotics spread about the world during the early modern period and the rapidity with which Coca-Cola is currently enlarging its market contribute to this impression.

Not all matters of taste, though, are subject to change. The food tastes and cooking procedures of a people are, as a rule, amazingly tenacious. Most attempts to modify in the direction of better nutrition the food habits of primitives, peasants, or an economically submarginal class have failed entirely. The assumption, once popular with some anthropologists, that the food tastes of a people lead them "naturally" to eat a balanced and, economic circumstances permitting, adequate diet is quite untenable. The people of Puerto Rico persist in their preference for salt fish imported from New England, although they cannot afford it and although there are available in local waters many kinds of fish. Americans have developed a preference, which the advocates of full-grain breads can do nothing to diminish, for machine-made bread composed of devitalized wheat flour and various inorganic chemicals. Over the past century and more, countless French chefs have attempted to conquer the English diet; and in the opinion of most non-English peoples, the French cuisine has much to commend it and that of England little or nothing at all. Yet the diet of England has changed over the years only to the extent and in the ways forced upon the English by wars and economic impoverishment.

Language, which could easily be changed piecemeal, word by word, is also extremely resistant to change from without. Cultural conquerors have generally been forced to reconcile themselves to the fact that to be at all successful in some dimensions they must accept the local diet and adopt the local language. A physician ministering to a lower-class clientele may induce his patients to take the medicines he prescribes; but he will probably have to do this in their language or dialect; and should he wish to teach them to prepare their foods in more hygienic and nourishing fashions, he faces a lifelong task. Likewise, a man bent on improving the sanitation or the productive techniques of a primitive or peasant people (*e.g.*, those of India) must do so in their terms, most particularly in terms of their language and its peculiar symbols. In this connection it may be observed that competence in the use of the local language is probably the greatest single asset to a cultural conqueror. The phrase "he speaks my language" has strong literal as well as common figurative significance.

A people may adopt the name for a foreign artifact along with the thing itself, and in some instances they may take over a term more or less independently of the thing that it represents. American restaurants, for example, often use French and other foreign terms on their menus; but the foods so described often have no recognizable relation to their foreign counterparts.

Rarely, if ever, however, has a people been induced to take over a new language en bloc or even to modify the local linguistic usages in the direction of conformity to upper-class or national norms. The efforts to gain converts to such proposed international languages as Esperanto have met with slight success; the many attempts that have been made to eliminate class and regional dialects and occupational and other patois have had slight, if any, consequence. The American public-school system has for more than a century promoted the use of a common and idealized version of spoken English, and for a quarter of a century the radio and motion picture have on the whole supplemented this effort; but the American people continue to speak a great variety of dialects. For the fact is that, as was indicated in detail earlier, linguistic differentiation is one of the more important ways by which human beings maintain their group distinctiveness.

On the whole, it would appear to be considerably less difficult to induce a people to take over productive and other tools and technologies than either dietary or linguistic practices. All work and other groups cherish their traditional tools and techniques, and the manual and other skills involved in their use constitute a strong vested interest in preserving them. Here, as elsewhere, social controls operate toward the maintenance of the *status quo*. But cultural conquerors, all other things being equal, are likely to encounter somewhat less resistance and to be somewhat more successful in this area of human conduct than in any others except those of ornamentation and recreation.

In the first place, tools and techniques can sometimes be adopted piecemeal. Thus a plowman of India might take over and use the simple Western base-board plow without changing any other of his traditional tools or procedures; a rural housewife might replace her wood stove with a butane-fueled gas range without major disturbance to her other kitchen arrangements or procedures; and an entire community might adopt modern means of insect control without adopting such other modern devices as public water supply and sewerage. It does not, of course, follow that such complex devices as the automobile or airplane can be taken over as independent items of culture, although in many instances premodern peoples have shown willingness to utilize such complex devices when they are provided and maintained by others. In the second place, people are usually capable of making some distinction between form and function, between means and ends, in respect to their tools and productive techniques. A certain kind of tool may be given magic value and treated with ritualistic awe, as a certain kind of fly may be by contemporary devotees to the sport of fly-casting. But in so far as a tool is used to catch fish, to chop wood, to plow land, or whatnot rather than as a plaything, it is at least possible to demonstrate the functional value of a new and, presumably, superior device.

This is not true, however, of forms of social organization. As was shown in an earlier chapter, the distinction between organizational form and function is seldom perceived, organization is usually evaluated in terms of form and

irrespective of function, and traditional forms of organization frequently outlive their functional effectiveness. For these reasons, would-be cultural conquerors have historically been least successful when their endeavor has been to gain acceptance for new forms of social organization. Ruthless and persistent coercion has in a few instances brought about some desired change in the local social order. Thus the Spanish eventually succeeded in establishing a new system of landlord peonage in Central and South America; the Russian Communist government apparently managed to force upon the peasants of the Ukraine and elsewhere a reluctant acceptance and partial adoption of the "planned" collective system of land usage; and the United States government finally conquered the Mormons and forced them to give up polygamy. Such instances are, however, exceedingly rare; and the peaceable conversion of a people to some new form of organization is even more exceptional. Perhaps the nearest to an authenticated instance of peaceable conquest is provided by the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority; and here the goal was less to secure the adoption by the people of a new form of organization than their passive sanction of its existence—that is, the people were not asked to become bureaucrats but rather to accept the electric power and other services that were offered by the Authority.

Social Reform and Social Planning. All attempts from without to change the organizational structures by which and in which a people live are efforts at cultural conquest. Historically most such attempts either have had no effect on the existing modes of organization or else have had effects quite different from those that were intended. Through a variety of agencies and means, including the religious missionaries, Western peoples fostered reform of the old Chinese examination system and induced the Chinese to replace it with somewhat Western-type public schools. For a time these schools tended to serve Western ends—*i.e.*, to introduce modern science and technology, Western ideas concerning family and political life, etc. But all these Western cultural elements ran counter to the basic sentiments, values, and interests of the majority of the Chinese people; and in time the colleges and universities became centers, not of Westernism, but of a new-day version of Chinaism, which currently takes the name of Chinese Communism. The history of the American public-school system is quite similar. Its development was largely forced upon the American people by the more "cultured" classes in the American population, in the hope that universal compulsory education would elevate the literary and other tastes of the people as a whole, would eliminate the improvidence which was then thought to be the cause of poverty and other undesirable conditions, and would make all the members of society honest and loyal citizens. As a form of organization the school has thrived and spread, but the uses to which it has been put are hardly those contemplated by its early promoters.

This is not the place to examine in detail the many disappointments suf-

ferred by social reformers and social planners.¹¹ It will suffice for present purposes to point out that any form of social organization, even the relatively simple children's gang, is so complex, so intimately interwoven with the context in which it operates, and so stanchly maintained by social controls that it is seldom possible to institute calculated organizational changes without resort to coercion. The establishment by school authorities of student councils and other organizational devices may at times do something—although it has seldom done much—to temper the rowdiness, sexual and other license, etc., of high-school students. But it is hardly possible by any peaceable means to induce a primitive people to discontinue their traditional practice of wife purchasing and adopt Western courtship procedures or to induce a modern nation to disarm and disband its military organizations and depend for national security upon some new form of international organization, such as the United Nations.

THE MEANS OF CULTURAL CONQUEST

Unless a people already want, or can somehow be led to want, what cultural conquerors represent, efforts at conquest will be unsuccessful. Simple exposure of a people to foreign devices and procedures is not of itself effective; as was indicated earlier, peoples with quite different cultures or subcultures have often lived side by side, or even intermingled, without disturbance to the culture of either. Nor has simple presentation to a people of a new device often led to their incorporating the new device functionally into their social life. Public, low-cost housing projects in England, for example, often included an attempt to improve laboring-class standards of personal hygiene; and to this end running water and bathtubs were incorporated in the cottages. But the sheer presence of a bathtub did not, it developed, encourage the taking of baths; and for long a stock joke among English municipal engineers had as its point the ingenuity of the English laboring-class family in finding some use for the bathtub other than that which had been intended.

Where the intent is to gain acceptance for some simple device or for some segmental practice, such as the use of a modern drug rather than a folk remedy, the necessary motivation can sometimes be developed either by direct demonstration of the utility of the new device or procedure or by verbal conversion. But, as indicated earlier, it is usually necessary to give what is offered status value as well as utilitarian value—to get acceptance of it embedded in the norms of the groups to which the various individuals belong. A peasant might be personally convinced by demonstration or a sales argument that a modern

¹¹ The failure of a government program of agricultural cooperatives is reported by E. C. Banfield in *Government Project: An Account of Big Government in Action* (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1951). Some of the disappointments experienced by the Russian social planners are described by B. Moore, Jr., in *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

steel plow is more efficient than his traditional wooden one; he may to that extent be motivated to adopt the modern plow. But unless the members of his family and, most especially, the members of his peer group, *i.e.*, his fellow farmers, approve of using the new plow, his desire for it will be far outweighed by his desire to maintain status. Conversely, if by some means one or more of his status groups can be induced to place a high value on the ownership and use of the new plow, the individual peasant will be encouraged to want one, whether he is motivated specifically in that direction or not.

In effect, then, the basic problem of cultural conquerors is to gain group sanction for what they wish to have adopted. Group sanction puts social controls to work for them, whereas without such sanction, the conquerors will be resisted by social controls in their efforts to establish the desired individual motivations, except in those instances, already noted, where the individual is socially marginal or is an actual isolate.

Persuasion. The adoption of a foreign ornament or other trivial cultural item requires little effort and slight learning. It is even possible to adopt a new type of fly in fly-casting or to become verbally converted to some foreign religion without much endeavor. But to take over and put into use a new kind of tool or a radically new procedure, to say nothing of a new kind of organizational system, usually demands much effort, much new learning, and considerable experimentation to achieve a satisfactory adaptation of the new to the existing social context. Only individuals with initiative will have enough persistence and energy to succeed in such an endeavor; and, as indicated in an earlier chapter, initiative cannot be bought or forced into being. At the very most, what initiative exists may through persuasive efforts be elicited on behalf of the device or procedure which a cultural conqueror wants adopted.

As a rule, socially marginal or unattached members of a society—*i.e.*, the malcontents—who are the most easily induced to accept a foreign cultural item, are also the least likely to possess the requisite initiative. Thus their acceptance of that item may not only give it negative status value but may discredit the device or procedure itself. A lazy, ineffectual farmer, for example, may be the first to proclaim the virtues of a new type of plow, some new method of tillage, or the like. He is likely to be, on the one hand, discouraged with the labor involved in earning a livelihood by the traditional techniques and, on the other, anxious to discover some magic means of producing a crop without labor. But such a man is almost certain to bring discredit to the new device or procedure; his use of it will tend to be casual and uningenious, and his poor results will serve only to confirm the prejudices of his more competent fellows against the new device or procedure.

Since the persuasive process and the various persuasive devices used by business and other executives have already been analyzed in connection with intraorganizational ascendancy, attention will here be directed toward the special problems that confront would-be cultural conquerors in trying to per-

suade members of the native population to adopt and utilize a device or procedure which is foreign to their culture.

Persuasion is, it will be recalled, a slow process at best. It is also one that depends upon intimate knowledge of the particular personal attributes of each of those who are to be persuaded—their petty vanities, little prides, etc. A would-be cultural conqueror, unlike an organizational administrator, must, moreover, pick out as those to be persuaded the particular individuals in the total population who not only have established prestige but who at the same time have sufficient initiative. To acquire the intimate knowledge of the local organization, both formal and informal, necessary to the latter is a major task in itself; having accomplished this, he must then come to know intimately the individuals whom he has selected as the objects of his persuasive endeavors.

In most instances, cultural conquerors are at the outset accorded some sort of "on trial" personal status by the natives.¹² As outsiders in a precarious position, they must of necessity proceed slowly and with caution. Moreover, until they become intimately acquainted with the community they cannot afford to welcome the advances of anyone and thereby run the risk of being sponsored by a marginal, socially incompetent member. If, as is often the case, they must depend in whole or in part upon interpreters, the problems are vastly magnified. But even under the most favorable circumstances—e.g., where they are working with a subcultural group rather than a different culture—it may take months, years, or even decades for them to gain the knowledge and the status they need before they can even begin persuading members of the community to try out the new device or procedure.¹³ Consequently, only those with exceptional patience as well as exceptional initiative can possibly select and then persuade the competent members of a community to adopt the new cultural item, give it the necessary status value, and put it into use effectively.

It is no doubt difficult enough to select and persuade a number of individual members of a group to try out a new cultural device. The difficulties are immeasurably increased when it is necessary, because the utilization of the new device requires the coordinated initiative of a number of individuals, to develop a high group morale for the project. And such is often the case. An individual farmer may be able to adopt and use a new type of plow or some new variety of seed without aid from his neighbors. If, however, a new mechanical harvester, say, is to be owned jointly and used cooperatively, its adoption requires not only that each of those involved have initiative but that the

¹² A status which seems to be generally less favorable to the individual than the status of stranger. See P. C. P. Siu, "The Sojourner" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 58, pp. 34-44, 1952).

¹³ Dr. M. Sloop remarks that for many years her effort to get the hill people of North Carolina to adopt even simplified versions of modern medical practices and to accept her services as a physician was "like rowing up stream with a straw for a paddle" (M. T. Sloop and L. Blythe, *Miracle in the Hills*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952, p. 118).

initiative be coordinated. Where the new device or procedure is inherently a collective matter—as, for example, the installation of running water or sewerage in a village or the elimination from a whole locality of weeds that harbor some plant disease—the need for *esprit de corps* is imperative.

The actual forms of persuasion used must be those of the local society, and these may not be the forms familiar to the cultural conqueror. Persuasion is practiced to some extent in every society; but although the basic process may everywhere be the same, the forms that the process takes are cultural and hence variable. American businessmen and others are quite accustomed to conferences called by a superior to discuss this or that; they are also accustomed to being called in individually by a superior to talk things over; and they perhaps take it for granted that there will be shoptalk with cocktails or dinner. Any one or all of these procedures might, however, affront, arouse the suspicions of, or otherwise disturb the members of an American rural community, of a primitive tribe, or of an Asiatic society. In each culture and subculture there is a time, a place, and an occasion as well as a special language for flattery, for appeal to personal pride, etc. The use of any procedure that violates the local customs is certain to offend rather than persuade.

Apparently there are few men who have or can develop the intimate knowledge of an out-group, the appropriate persuasive skills, and the infinite patience necessary to win over a foreign people to what is for them a strange device or procedure.¹⁴ There are few enough who can be persuasive with their own kind. At any event, most of those who have attempted to induce another people to adopt something new have resorted to some time-and-effort-saving device. Coercion and economic “persuasion” are often attempted; they are, however, far less effective as short-cut devices than is the use of members of the local community as persuasive agents or advocates of the would-be cultural conqueror.

The Use of Advocates. Theoretically at least, members in good standing of a native society or local community are far better qualified to persuade their fellows than is any outsider.¹⁵ They already belong; they know the local

¹⁴ During the decades when the United States Department of Agriculture was primarily concerned with improving the agricultural techniques of American farmers, a variety of persuasive procedures were developed by the county agents. For an analysis of the ways in which the county agents operated see G. Baker, *The County Agent* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939). Apparently these persuasive devices have been used successfully to induce some peasant peoples to adopt such modern devices as the baseboard plow. See, for example, H. B. Allen, *Come Over into Macedonia* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1943); E. deS. Brunner, I. T. Sanders, and D. Enslinger, eds., *Farmers of the World: The Development of Agricultural Extension* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1945); J. H. Boeke, “Agrarian Reforms in the Far East” (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 57, 1952); and the news story “A County Agent Comes to India” (*Life*, Dec. 14, 1951).

¹⁵ On the general subject of the use of local leaders as advocates for what the cultural conqueror wants adopted see J. Useem, “Structure and Power in Palau” (*Social Forces*, vol. 29, pp. 141–148, 1950); and S. Winston, *Leadership in War and Peace* (North Carolina State College Station, Raleigh, 1946).

customs and sentiments; and they have an intimate acquaintance with individual members that no outsider can hope to equal. And those who have achieved office in one or another of the local status groups or organizations have thereby demonstrated the respect in which they are held. In theory, then, the quickest and easiest way to introduce new cultural devices or procedures to a people is via the existing social structures and through the agency of those in positions of authority. In practice this would mean that a medical missionary would persuade and train to his techniques the local magic men, witch doctors, or whoever provided cures for physical ills in the native society; that a religious reformer would persuade and train to his religious beliefs and practices the local priests; that an agricultural technician would enlist the aid and support of the landlords; and so on.

The practical difficulty of following this procedure is that those in positions of authority are rarely subject to persuasion. Unless the social system is already in a condition of marked disequilibrium, in which case their status would be unstable, those in positions of authority have demonstrated exceptional conservatism in achieving their offices. They have, moreover, a vested interest in the maintenance of the *status quo*. As long as things remain constant, their positions are assured; but any change, even the adoption of a new type of plow, may, for all they can foretell, so disturb the existing balance of forces that they either lose their offices or their offices decline in importance. For example, the local plowmaker is, presumably, the authority on plows, their construction, repair, etc. In a culturally stable community his views and his skills will be highly traditional ones; it was through his exceptional proficiency in the traditional skills that he gained status as an authority on plows, and any new plow is likely to render those skills obsolete and deprive him of his authoritative position. And so it is, in one way or another, with witch doctors, priests, the local politicians, etc.

To overcome the foregoing practical difficulty, cultural conquerors have frequently attempted to make advocates out of youths who show promise of gaining positions of authority in their native society in due time.¹⁶ The procedure has been reduced to a formula by the Catholic Church in its requirement that the children of mixed marriages be brought up in the Catholic faith. The assumption is, of course, that such children will grow up to be good Catholics who, becoming in due time parents, will bring up their own children in the faith. If the process actually worked out in this way, the Church should encourage mixed marriages. That the Church does not do so probably reflects the frequency with which the formula fails.

In their attempts at limited cultural, as distinct from military and eco-

¹⁶ An interesting biography of an African native girl who left her tribe, secured for herself some Western education and eventually training in the United States as a nurse, and then returned to her people to establish and maintain a maternity clinic and hospital and gain in time the respect of native women is given in "The House That Saves Lives," by J. C. Furnas (*Saturday Evening Post*, May 16, 1953, p. 22).

nomic, conquest of India the British adopted the policy of educating in England the sons of local Indian princes and, later, bright and promising Indian commoners. To develop advocates for the British Empire system on an even larger scale was the intent of Cecil Rhodes in his founding of scholarships. The over-all effectiveness of these procedures is impossible to ascertain. They did not, at any event, prevent the British Empire from disintegrating. There is at least some reason to think that on the whole the Indians who were educated in England thereby became malcontents rather than advocates for the Empire system. (Something of the same sort has clearly happened with the efforts of the United States Indian Bureau to improve the social life of reservation Indians by educating their children in American modes of life and then turning them back to get along as best they can on the reservations.) The fact that Rhodes designated Oxford as the training agency for his scholars from abroad seems to have limited the effectiveness of the system that he established. Perhaps Oxford was representative of English higher education a half century ago; but within the present century Oxford has become distinctly archaic. Certainly few young Americans who show promise of gaining positions of authority in America currently wish to study (or, more accurately perhaps, to spend some time) at Oxford; and the young man who has the kinds of interests and values which lead him to apply for, and perhaps receive, a Rhodes scholarship is very unlikely to achieve as an adult a position of real influence in American society. As an advocate for British society, he is far more likely to reinforce the adverse American stereotype of the English than to convince Americans, by example and otherwise, that English ways are superior to our own.

As one item in the complex and largely ill-fated attempt to Westernize and Christianize the Chinese, the United States applied indemnity funds that were levied on the Chinese as an aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion to the education in the United States of selected Chinese students. On the whole, the system of selection and preparation of these students was effective; and since the students were free to study whatever and wherever they individually wished, there was a general sampling of American educational offerings. These and other American-educated students who returned to China did for some years provide considerable Western-type educational, technological, and bureaucratic leadership. They could not, however, Westernize the hundreds of millions of their fellows; and in due course they were driven out, destroyed, or forced to abandon their advocacy efforts on behalf of Western ideas and practices. Meanwhile a new crop of advocates, trained in Russia and espousing the adoption of Communism as a way of life, gained military if not cultural ascendancy in China.

Within recent years, the international reforms undertaken by the United States have given rise to at least one new and possibly effective persuasive device. This is the practice, maintained for a period under the Marshall Plan and later under the Anglo-American Productivity Council, of bringing to

the United States groups of English, French, Belgian, Dutch, etc., industrial workers, technicians, and administrators ("productivity teams," as they were called) to see American industrial operations. The effect was that of demonstrating *in situ* the specific ways in which American industry has achieved its high man-hour productivity. After a considerable tour, each team worked up detailed reports for the use of its home industry; and no doubt many of the men became upon their return enthusiastic and relatively effective advocates for the American productive system. The same procedure could hardly be used, however, to induce a foreign people to take over the American family or political system, the "efficiency" of which would be impossible to demonstrate.

PROPAGANDISTIC EFFORTS AT CULTURAL CONQUEST

During the seventeenth century, the Catholic Church established a College of Propaganda for the training of priests who were entering missionary service. The methods by which Catholic missionaries propagated the faith were many and various and were not limited to what is today thought of as propaganda. Currently the term "propaganda" is restricted to one specific method of inducing people to adopt new social items or practices, to what was in an earlier chapter discussed as the conversional technique.

In cultural conquest persuasion would appear to be far more effective than conversion. It is perhaps fairly easy to convert the users of soap to the use of a certain brand of soap by dramatic reinterpretation; but there is slight possibility of developing the attitudes, values, and manual habits which make for soap using by conversional means alone, especially if the would-be converter stays comfortably at home and attempts to reach his subjects by such impersonal, "mass" means of communication as the printed tract or radio broadcast.

The direct, soap-box type of conversional effort no doubt at times serves as a useful supplement to highly personalized persuasive efforts at cultural conquest. The attempt to propagate a revolutionary doctrine, to check the course of a revolution in process, to educate the members of a lower class to their civic responsibilities, etc., by mass-media propaganda would seem, however, to be no more than an exercise in magic. The fact that such efforts are constantly being made and that vast sums are often expended on political, military, and ideological propaganda would seem to indicate that modern men, like their prescientific predecessors, have great faith in magic.

Market Propaganda. As a supplement to more direct means of economic conquest, advertising in all its various forms is no doubt an effective means of control under favorable conditions. By advertising, a manufacturer may convert some soap users, cigaret smokers, ice cream eaters, etc., to the purchase of his product in preference to that of another manufacturer, provided that his product is the equivalent of his competitor's, that it is made as readily available, and that the price is no higher. What he then gets are the marginal

buyers in this specific market—those individuals who habitually purchase the commodity but who have not yet become habituated to purchasing a given brand or who have for some reason (probably an irrelevant one) become dissatisfied with their usual brand. Most modern advertising is brand competition; it would seem to have little appreciable effect upon the size of the total market for the commodity, and its consequences to consumption behavior would seem to be more fanciful than real.

Some of the current American advertising is directed toward the development of markets for new products or new types of old products (as distinct from different brands of the same commodity or device). Such advertising and associated propaganda efforts are an attempt at a low order of cultural conquest; the objective is to induce people to adopt and use something foreign to their prior experience. Over the past quarter century a considerable number of new devices and procedures have won acceptance by the American people—the radio, the electric refrigerator, frozen foods and the associated deep freezer, commercial air transport, television, and many lesser items. In gaining adoption for these new things, propaganda has undoubtedly played some part, but how great that part is has not been ascertained. That it has played only a part is certain. In each instance the new was adopted relatively slowly—that is, slowly, in view of the extremely dynamic nature of current American society; and in each instance word-of-mouth “advertising” and direct example, and in many instances economic incentives, played very important parts. Commercial air transport, for example, received its real impetus during and immediately after World War II. During the war many men lost, under compulsion, their fear of air travel; in the year or so immediately following the war the shortage of rail transport drove many civilians to taking a chance on air travel; and since at the time the railroads were doing their very good best to make rail travel inconvenient and uncomfortable and the commercial airlines were doing the opposite, many who took a chance on air travel came, through actual experience rather than airline advertising, to accept and adopt it.

Political Propaganda. Under the multiparty system of representative government, the efforts of competing political parties for votes involve every known form of control. Votes are bought, directly or indirectly; votes are secured and contrary votes eliminated (as through the intimidation of Negroes in the Southern states) by coercion; and party leaders labor mightily to hold their members in line through persuasion and through intimate forms of conversion. Such are some of the so-called organizational means of achieving or holding party power. Where, as has generally been the case in the United States, two dominant parties have had a fairly equal hold on the voters, propaganda is usually presumed to determine the momentary balance of power. As an election approaches, each party and, in the primaries and the conventions held as the prelude to a Presidential election, each of the several candidates in the party lays down a propaganda barrage. The devices are varied;

the party out of power may, for example, expose for public view corrupt or other discreditable practices on the part of the party in power—e.g., the “mink coat” campaign of the Republicans during 1951–1952. Through speeches, planted news reports, editorials, and the like, each candidate endeavors to convince voters that he will save the nation from disaster, provide good government at small cost, and so on, and that his opponent is, the cause or, if out of office, the potential cause of everything undesirable.

The part that campaign propaganda plays in determining the outcome of elections is unknown. The available evidence, mostly vague and unreliable, is so contradictory that it can be used to support diametrically opposed theories. Thus the historical consistency with which most voting units have supported one party or the other and the fact that in some instances (e.g., President Truman’s 1948 campaign) a Presidential candidate has won election although the weight of propaganda, as measured by newspaper and other mass-media alignment, has been heavily against him, lend credence to the view that campaign propaganda is simply a political ritual and no more important to the outcome of an election than prayer is to the weather. Those who are impressed with the power of the press and other mass media can, on the other hand, point to many instances which would seem to support that impression. The one reasonably scientific study of the factors influencing voting behavior leads to the conclusion that propaganda may mobilize and channelize latent sentiments and attitudes but does not seem capable of changing them.¹⁷ As the practical politician might say, propaganda can get out the votes, but the voter casts his ballot for the man and the party as he very well pleases.

To the extent that political propaganda is directed toward changing the established political loyalties of voters—e.g., toward converting Republicans into Democrats and vice versa—it is an effort at cultural conquest. And to that extent political propaganda is certainly of doubtful value and may well be entirely futile. At any event, the fact that political propaganda has doubtful effects on voting behavior suggests how slight its power is in larger and more fundamental forms of cultural conquest. The voter’s choice of political candidates and parties often has much in common with his choice of cigarets, soap, and other standard commercial products. It may be essentially a choice of “brands”; certainly in the United States today the differences between two candidates for office or the two major parties is more nominal than real. Moreover, the voter can shift from “brand” to “brand” with slight effort; all he need do is change his mind and put his mark in one square or column rather than the other. Finally, the behavior involved in voting is entirely symbolic;

¹⁷ P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Barelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1944).

For a theoretical statement derived from this and the many other researches conducted by Lazarsfeld and his associates on the effect of the mass media see P. F. Lazarsfeld and R. K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action” (in *Mass Communications*, W. Schramm, ed., University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1949).

and there is at least the presumption that the symbolic manipulations which constitute propaganda have their greatest effectiveness at the symbolic level. In voting behavior, if anywhere, propaganda should in all respects be an important means of control.

And yet, as has been indicated, there is considerable reason to doubt that oratory, news distortion, and all the other devices of campaign propaganda actually convert many voters to the adoption of a new political loyalty. It may induce them to express, in the required formal manner, their political preference on election day; it may sway the few who are marginal—unattached by prior experience to either side; but the really important factors that determine voting behavior seem to lie in tradition, empirical experience, and organizational use of coercion, bribery, and persuasion.

The Mass Media and the Illusion of Mass Control. In the opening chapter of this work it was pointed out that a current version of the *Gesellschaft* concept of society revolves around the idea that the mass media—the newspaper, magazine, radio, motion picture, and television—determine in significant measure the conduct of modern peoples. Crucial to this idea is the assumption that modern society, in categorical contrast to premodern forms of social life, is an aggregation of semiautonomous individuals, each responding independently of all the others to communications that come to him via the mass media. The fundamental error of this assumption and hence of the ideas derived from it should now be quite evident.

The recent and continuing stress on the powers, for good or evil, of the press, radio, motion picture, television, etc., is a consequence of the newness of these means of communication rather than of their actual impact on human affairs. Like a child with a new puppy, a society with a new device—especially a material device, the existence of which is self-evident—frequently imputes to it revolutionary social consequences, ignoring the fact that the new device must take its place in the society along with a multitude of preexisting devices, few if any of which will actually be displaced by the new one. Thus the introduction of gunpowder into Western Europe and its application to military uses was judged by the serious thinkers of the time to be an event which spelled the end of war between men, for to their minds the gun was a weapon which made war too terrible to contemplate; centuries later, serious thinkers were expressing the same view about poison gas; and a quarter century after that the atom bomb was being acclaimed the weapon that made further wars unthinkable. No doubt the invention of the bow and arrow was in its day greeted with equivalent hysterical disregard for the role that this new weapon could play in the lives of men.

The point is that the initial social concern accorded a newly developed or recently borrowed cultural item is often entirely disproportionate to the effects that its adoption can have on the cultural system as a whole. Current concern over the effects on contemporary society of the mass media is initial in character and should not be taken as a measure of either the current or

the eventual consequences to social life of the newspaper, the radio, the motion picture, television, and other relatively recent developments in communication technology or uses. In sum, much of the literature—and it is quantitatively impressive—on advertising, political and other propaganda, psychological warfare, the effects of motion pictures, comic books, etc., is by and large about as meaningful as the small child's excited prattle over the new puppy.¹⁸

The new means of communication certainly have, each in its turn, enabled men to enlarge their social organizations; many of the activities of contemporary societies are directly dependent upon one or more of these new devices; and most activities are at least indirectly influenced by them. But it does not follow that these new forms of communication and the new social organizations they have fostered have changed the laws governing human conduct, including those that determine the processes of social control. The laws of biology are the same for rats and elephants; and there would seem to be no reason to think that the laws of social control as outlined in the preceding pages are any different for the peasant village and the modern city, for the old-fashioned country store and the great metropolitan department store, for the blacksmith's shop and the vast plants of General Motors, for government in the time of Machiavelli and government in the time of Roosevelt.¹⁹

¹⁸ Recent discussions of propaganda which at least imply that the procedure is effective include A. Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950); E. Hunter, *Brain-washing in Red China: The Calculated Destruction of Men's Minds* (Vanguard, New York, 1951); and L. Lowenthal and N. Guterman, *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator* (Harper, New York, 1949). Of late years the easy assumption—never proved—that propaganda is a major determinant of the conduct of modern peoples has been subjected to a good deal of critical analysis, often supported by the negative findings of those who have attempted to prove the assumption valid. For such criticisms see W. Garber, "Propaganda Analysis—To What Ends?" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 48, pp. 240–245, 1942); C. I. Hovland, A. A. Lumsdaine, and F. D. Sheffield, *Experiments on Mass Communication* (Vol. III of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1949); J. T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Media* (Bureau of Applied Social Research, New York, 1949); P. M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Infantry Journal Press, Washington, 1948); M. W. Riley and S. H. Flowerman, "Group Relations as a Variable in Communication Research" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 16, pp. 174–180, 1951); and C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1953).

¹⁹ In 1924, when the radio was just beginning to be an important means of mass communication and Presidential political conventions were being held, one of the main topics of conversation and journalistic speculation was the presumed impact of the radio on the traditional convention procedure. It was then freely predicted that the party conventions would have to be radically modified and developed into an impressive and "respectable" operation, since the general public could now listen in on the proceedings.

In the summer of 1952, when television was becoming a popular source of recreation and another set of Presidential political conventions were being held, the impact of television on the political processes was under discussion, and again the view was commonly advanced that political conventions would have to become impressive and dignified—which

The laws of social control, like those of biology, would appear to be constant.

For example, the priests who set out from the College of Propaganda during the seventeenth century and later had no modern means of communication at their disposal. They could not call upon the Pope to speak via radio to the peoples of the world; they could not address tens of thousands via the printed page; they could not pump movies, comics, or television networks with dramatic demonstrations of the evil of heathenism (or, more specifically, of Protestantism) and the benefits which would accrue to those who accepted the Gospel as they taught it. They were nonetheless propagandizing on an extensive scale in a great endeavor at ideological conquest, an endeavor that differed only in form from the endeavors in which the "free" peoples of the world are currently engaged.

The Catholic peoples of the Western world were then being eclipsed by those who worked and fought and conquered under another religious banner. The Holy Roman Empire, never more than a loose ideological federation of divergent and often antagonistic nations and peoples, was being attacked from within and without. The Church made many and varied efforts to re-establish its weakening hold on Western peoples and at the same time attempted an ideological conquest of such heathenish lands as China. In this latter endeavor it utilized every means short of actual military force to bring the benefits of Catholicism to non-Christians. But in the perspective of centuries, it is evident that the Church was no more successful than its Protestant competitors in the mission field. Both Catholics and Protestants made the fundamental error of assuming that mass conversion to a new religious faith is achievable and that such conversion brings about not only a change in the minds of men but in their entire way of life—*i.e.*, that the professed convert to Christianity becomes per se an adherent to all the sentiments, values, social practices, etc., that Christianity meant in Western societies. They ignored the fact that, while it may be possible under special circumstances and through great and persistent effort to make an ideological conquest, ideologies are far more a function of than a direct determinant of other aspects of human conduct.

Recently the United States, with some moral but little other help from other Western peoples, has been engaged in an attempt to preserve, both at home and abroad, certain cultural values and their supporting systems of organization which have appeared to be in jeopardy. This endeavor, like

in this year they most definitely were not—because the public could now look in on the proceedings. What was said in 1952 about the effects of television on the traditional convention antics closely paralleled what had been said in 1924 about the effects of radio; and the criticisms made of the convention procedure in 1952 were on the whole the same as those that had been made in 1924. Actually radio had not changed the processes by which Presidential candidates are nominated by the two major political parties; and only an optimist or a fool should expect television to work revolutionary changes in this or any other aspect of modern American life. See *Time*, July 14, 1952, p. 15.

that of the Church in centuries past, has taken many forms, including military conquest. Relevant to the present concern has been the effort, represented by such agencies of propaganda as the erstwhile Voice of America, to conquer the minds of peoples who have either been forced into the orbit of Russian imperialism or have been in danger of falling under Russian influence. In all such effort it has been assumed that the basic conflict is ideological—that the fundamental opposition is between democratic capitalism and totalitarian communism, each representing a distinctive system of social life, and that victory will ultimately go to that side which secures and holds the most converts to its ideology.

To the errors of the Church under similar circumstances, the American propagandists have added another. They have assumed, without substantiating evidence, that the new means of communication provide a revolutionary method of conquering the minds of men. The Catholic missionaries erred in their basic assumption, but they did take their doctrine directly to the people whom they wished to conquer. The recent American preference has been for conquest via machines—via the printing press and the radio.

The Russians, too, have made massive use of propaganda in their efforts to gain converts to their side; and some of the propaganda devices by which they have endeavored to sway "world opinion," whatever that may mean, are to the Western world quite ludicrous. There is, however, at least some evidence to suggest that the Russian policy makers have been considerably more aware of the laws of social control than their American counterparts. The Communist "Party line" and the other verbal gymnastics of the Russians indicate that they have had great faith in the power of words to shape ideas and of ideas to determine conduct. But it is to be observed that much of the so-called "Party apparatus" and many of their actual operating procedures have served to provide the convert with status in groups whose norms are, by special and usually devious arrangement, conducive to the support of Communist ends.²⁰ Thus while Communist infiltration into American labor unions was accompanied by much sound and fury—i.e., propaganda—primary reliance seems to have been placed upon advocates who worked as individuals to win the confidence and support of two or three others by offering them, in one way or another, status in a "Party cell" as well as the promise of health, wealth, and happiness. In China, as a further example, the Communists made conversion to Communist ideology, China style, simply a way by which restive youths could achieve that sense of belonging and of participation which the disorders of the day denied them and which neither the Nationalists (who had used but since put aside the technique) nor the Christian missionaries provided.

The recent tendency, particularly pronounced in the United States, to rely heavily in both domestic and international matters on the magic powers of

²⁰ P. Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952).

the mass media is entirely understandable. It is far easier to broadcast a political speech to millions than to persuade a single marginal voter by talking to him personally; and it is far easier and cheaper to print and distribute a million leaflets to the peoples of India than to go among them and persuade them that the American way is the way they should adopt. Moreover, these mass procedures are in accord with the process of mechanization in which Americans place such faith and by which they have, in other realms, achieved such great success. But men are not automobiles; and the conduct of men cannot be determined by anything analogous to mass production means.

SOCIAL CRISIS, DEMORALIZATION, AND CONTROL

A theory of social control would be incomplete without at least some acknowledgment of the fact that upon occasion the complex system of social control operating in any society may be disrupted and, indeed, temporarily suspended. It is at such times that revolutionary and other profound social movements may arise and that there may be a pronounced, although never complete, break in the continuity of the culture. No attempt will be made here to develop a systematic theory of revolution and other kinds of social movements as factors in social change. At the present state of our knowledge such an attempt would no doubt be premature; the theories that have so far been advanced have, at any event, revealed social aspirations and ideological pretensions rather than scientific knowledge of the processes that they purport to represent. But the relation between social control and such contracultural movements may profitably be explored, for it does seem evident that no such movement can arise unless the system of social control breaks down and the members of the society are to that extent released from adherence to the institutional and other organizational forms provided by their culture and various subcultures.

Throughout the preceding analysis attention has been focused, as far as possible, upon the nature, operation, and consequences of social control under what may be termed "normal" social conditions. The normal conditions that have been assumed are those which are usual, prevailing, and most common for the given time and place. The very idea of normal social conditions presupposes, however, contrasting abnormal conditions—the unusual and exceptional—even as the concept of a normal personality presupposes the occurrence of personalities that are abnormal or psychopathic.

Under normal social conditions, most of the members of a society value their status in a variety of groupings and, for reasons that have been shown, conform to the norms of these groups, norms which are for the most part in accord with, if not directly representative of, the culture and subcultures of the society. Under these conditions there is invariably much atypical conduct which is in a sense quite as normal as the typical and which should not be mistaken as an indication of the existence of abnormal social conditions. Thus in any society it is an aspect of the normal that some status groups should maintain norms that are in violation of those of most other groups, as do those of thieves and brigands; that some groups should be in the process

of evolving and others of dissolving; that some individuals should be more or less isolated and others should be striving for ascendancy over groups or organizations; and that some groups and organizations should be engaged in the conquest of other groups and organizations. All such conduct is, in the given context, atypical; but it need not be symptomatic of a breakdown of social control and thus a prelude to contracultural social movements of any magnitude. Thieves, for example, do violate the cultural sanctions concerning private property; but they are dependent for their very livelihood upon the preservation of the institution of private property, without which there would be nothing for them to steal. Conquerors strive, it is true, to shatter the system of social control that operates to bind the conquered to their cultural precepts, but only in order that they may impose their own, largely cultural, ideas of how the conquered should behave.

Atypical conduct, both individual and group, is so much a part of the normal life of any people that it can be studied with relative ease; thus the student of crime and criminals never lacks for materials with which to work. The occurrence of abnormal social conditions, on the other hand, is so infrequent, even in a markedly dynamic society such as our own, that actual on-the-spot study of these conditions is seldom possible. Most of what little is currently known about abnormal social conditions and the movements that they make possible has been derived from fragmentary, and no doubt biased, historical records.¹ The analysis that follows is therefore of necessity somewhat speculative and subject to revision as new data are forthcoming.

Catastrophe and the Suspension of Social Controls. The simplest and most striking deviation from normal social conditions is that which may follow upon some marked change in the physical environment of an individual, a group, or an entire society. The person or persons affected by it may define that change, depending upon a variety of factors, as constituting either a disaster calling for emergency actions or as a catastrophe which there is little prospect of surviving. In the latter case the stress of the abnormal circumstance is aggravated by fear that death is imminent—*i.e.*, the loss of all normal social expectations—with the result that those who make this definition immediately enter into a state of psychological shock in which considerations of social status are not operative. They are, for the moment at least, removed from the normal field of social control, in somewhat the same manner as a psychopathic individual may be isolated by his psychopathy from communication with and hence control by other individuals.

Any abrupt and marked change in physical circumstances, such as a cyclone, a flood, an earthquake, a fire, or the collapse of a building, will certainly be

¹ Writers discussing the mass movement still often refer, for example, to the medieval Crusades as illustrating the processes they are attempting to describe. Students of panic behavior have available to them only one systematically observed case, that of the great Halifax disaster of December 25, 1917, which was studied on the spot by a psychologist (S. H. Prince, *Catastrophe and Social Change*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1920).

defined as a disaster and may be considered to constitute a catastrophe. Slight or gradual changes, on the other hand, may, depending upon the experience and training of the participants, be mistakenly defined as signs of impending disaster, be ignored even though they are actually indicative of great hazard, or be interpreted for what they are. An experienced sailor may define the condition of his ship as critical long before the passengers become aware that there is any danger of its sinking; on the other hand, the passengers may mistakenly define a slight listing of the ship as a sign that it is about to capsize. Those who know, either from prior or vicarious experience, the rate at which fire spreads through dry timber or grain fields may thereby be prepared to define the first sign of flame as impending disaster, whereas the uninitiated may be only mildly disturbed; conversely, those who are prepared for a total eclipse of the sun may be delighted by the event, while the uninitiated may interpret that event as a sign that the end of the world is coming.

People who are prepared by prior experience or by training to deal with a particular kind of sudden change in their physical environment, such as fire, earthquake, or hurricane, are unlikely to define the event as a catastrophe. They will most probably define it as a disaster and then shift more or less automatically into the roles suggested by their prior experience or assigned them by training; and when the roles of various individuals are complementary, a new pattern of organization and of social control, the "disaster pattern," comes into operation. This is what happens when a well-drilled crew prepares to abandon ship, when professional fire fighters attack a burning building or a forest fire, and when experienced civilians take cover in prepared shelters at the signal that enemy bombers are approaching.

The defining of an event as a catastrophe, on the other hand, presupposes either an unpreparedness to deal with the event or a kind of event, such as the collapse of a structure in which people are housed or an explosion that wrecks a factory, village, or town, which, momentarily at least, precludes the survivors doing anything on their own behalf. In either case, those involved are psychologically and physically aroused to action by the definition but are blocked from immediate engagement in action. It is this blocked drive to action which constitutes the state of psychological shock.

Psychological shock is in all respects the antithesis of the kind of physical shock that may be induced by loss of blood or other injury. In physical shock the various body processes, such as respiration and heartbeat, become progressively retarded. Psychological shock, on the other hand, involves a rapid and pronounced internal mobilization of the body for action; adrenalin and other glandular stimulants are released into the blood stream in heroic quantities, inducing a sharp rise in respiration, pulse rate, blood pressure, etc. Internally, then, the shocked individual is being driven to action; but since the definition of catastrophe that induced this drive has at the same time interrupted his prior pattern of action and precluded his entering immediately upon some other course of action, the internal pressure to action is built up

many of the men on board the *Titanic* when it sank "manfully" stood aside while women entered the few lifeboats; but had they done so calculatingly, they would not have stood passive while half-filled and unmanned boats drifted away from the ship, as seems actually to have been the case.

A catastrophe offers exceptional, if temporary, opportunity for individual ascendancy. People in a state of shock are to an extraordinary extent stripped of their culture; for the moment the normal status roles and relationships, the normal groupings and organizations, and all the normal standards of conduct are inoperative. Under such conditions any individual may, through inadvertence or his own ability to surmount shock, seize command of the situation. In ship disasters, for example, it has sometimes happened that a humble member of the crew has assumed the role of leadership that is normally the prerogative of the captain and has given the orders that, obeyed more or less automatically by others, prevented mass hysteria and led to successful launching and loading of lifeboats. Such ascendancy is, of course, as short-lived as is the catastrophe that makes it possible. As conditions return toward normal, the prior patterns of organized and interpersonal relationships, including the social controls, reassert themselves. The one who was ascendant may be acclaimed a hero, but his status as ascendant will not endure.

SOCIAL ADVERSITY

What happens during a physical catastrophe is a miniature parallel to what occurs in a far more complex and slowly unfolding way when a social population or segment thereof experiences progressive social adversity and its members come finally to the conclusion that they are faced with a social crisis from which there is no escape except by resort to radical, *i.e.*, contracultural, means. At such a time many of the status-group controls and organizational regulations normally operative break down, and individuals and groups are thereby freed to rebel in some way or other against the *status quo*. Panic behavior is, thus, the dramatic prototype of the social revolution, the mass movement, and other forms of mass upheaval.

The social parallel to the sudden and marked change in some aspect of the physical environment which may induce men to define their predicament as constituting a disaster is change, always complex and usually insidious, which reduces the day-by-day satisfactions of those involved. When the reduction of current satisfactions is progressive and sustained, an increasing number of those so affected will define their plight as one of social adversity. This definition, like that of physical disaster, invokes resort to heroic action in the effort to reestablish the value-fulfilling functions of the *status quo*. It does not result in, although it may be a step toward, the abnormal social condition that would release the participants from social control.

Marxian theory, which has dominated most thinking on the subject for nearly a century, holds that it is a progressive decline in material satisfactions (*i.e.*, the economic welfare) of a people that will ultimately provoke mass

revolt against the *status quo*. In this view, social adversity is always a matter of malfunctioning of the economic order; and in this view the major, indeed perhaps the sole, source of human satisfactions is food and drink and the other material goods that minister to the needs and desires of the human body. There can be no doubt that any marked and progressive decline in the normal flow of material satisfactions will ultimately induce the definition of social adversity; but that a decline in this source of satisfactions is the only way that the definition can be induced, or that such definition is invariably or even commonly so induced, is ideological nonsense. It was not an economically impoverished peasantry that revolted against King John in 1215 and forced him to sign the Magna Charta; it was, rather, his well-fed barons, whose social rights he had increasingly restricted. It was not the unsuccessful farmers or depressed town workers of the American colonies who rebelled against King George IV; it was, rather, the relatively prosperous merchants and manufacturers, who became increasingly restive under British rule as their ambitions and opportunities for economic ascendancy enlarged. Even with such a recent and economically centered mass movement as that of the Townsend Recovery Plan, economic hardship may well have been secondary to the general social impoverishment of the unhappy elders who joined in this fantastic project. They were, at any event, drawn largely from the same class of persons who, a short time earlier, had gathered around the evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson in the hope of everlasting salvation rather than a pension payment every month.³

The definition of physical disaster is not, it will be recalled, an automatic response to a change in the physical environment. It depends upon the perceptions, or lack thereof, of those who are involved in that change. Thus a given change, such as the appearance of smoke in a forest, may be interpreted as a disaster, as an exciting but unhazardous development, or as something so trivial that it is ignored. The interpretation that people will put upon any given social change, even one that brings a decline in satisfactions, depends in a somewhat similar manner upon the value scales and other social characteristics of those involved. The people of Britain have, for example, experienced for a generation and more a steady decline in their material standard of living and in their political position in the world at large; yet they have shown as yet no pronounced tendency to define their condition as an emergency demanding new forms of action. They did not, apparently, see in the outbreak of World War II and their inability to check the advance of the German army a major threat to their political independence; on the other hand, they interpreted the fall of France and the evacuation of Dunkirk as a sign of still worse to come.

There is, no doubt, wide variation between societies and between various classes and other segments of any society in their propensity to define circum-

³ N. B. Mavity, *Sister Aimee* (Doubleday, New York, 1931); H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (Wiley, New York, 1941).

stances as constituting social adversity. Such variation would seem to be a complex collective parallel to the easily demonstrated differences in the ability of individuals to withstand physical pain or endure psychological distress without loss of self-control. Why societies and classes vary in this respect is not yet evident; but the propensity to define circumstances as constituting social adversity is probably a generalized reflection of the level of group morale which obtains in the majority of the status groups within the society or class and which might therefore be described as "general morale," to distinguish it from the morale of a specific status group. Where most of the members of a society, for reasons discussed earlier, place a high value on their membership in the various status groups to which they belong and are therefore willing to make considerable current sacrifice in order to preserve that membership, they also place a high value on the institutional and other devices provided by their culture and will accept with passive resignation considerable and prolonged decline in social satisfactions. Where, on the other hand, status-group morale tends to be low, the resulting unwillingness to make current sacrifices to preserve such groups may predispose people to define political, economic, or other social difficulties as constituting social adversity; *i.e.*, they are inclined to consider any loss in satisfactions as an occasion for prompt and vigorous action.

What will constitute a significant loss in social satisfactions depends, of course, upon the value systems of those involved and their opportunities to find alternative sources of satisfactions. A law prohibiting sidewalk cafés would certainly be considered a great injustice and an intolerable hardship by the French. Americans and English might grumble a bit against such a law as a matter of principle; but since the Americans and English are not accustomed to sitting on the sidewalk to drink their beer and place small value on the right to do so, such a law would not deprive either of them of a source of satisfactions. On the other hand, if either people were by legal fiat denied the right of assemblage in restaurants, coffee shops, bars, soda fountains, etc., they would probably feel that a major right had been taken from them; and they might define this one loss as constituting social adversity.

Social Ideals and Adversity. Ordinarily, as has been indicated, the changes that bring a loss in social satisfactions come slowly; ordinarily, too, even a people with relatively low general morale will tolerate considerable loss in valued satisfactions before they conclude that they are involved in adversity and must take corrective action. This tendency to be tolerant toward the inadequacies of their culturally provided institutions, their class structure, and their other social devices is somewhat comparable to the characteristic tolerance with which status groups view the conduct of individual members, a matter that was discussed in an early chapter. The tolerance with which the members of a society may view increasingly costly political corruption, an increasing tax burden, growing inefficiency in industry and hence a decline in the material sources of satisfaction, and the like is apparently a

function of the complex method by which human beings measure the social normal.

The scale or standard by which men evaluate the social order of which they are a part and through which they live has nothing in common with a foot rule or a butcher's scale. It is, rather, an ideal; or, more accurately, a large number of ideal-types. In any society, each of the culturally designated social roles—*e.g.*, father, mother, landlord, wife—is provided with one or more special ideal-types. An ideal-type is at once a model for people to strive toward and a standard against which to measure their performance or evaluate their circumstances. In old China, for example, Confucianism provided an ideal-type family, an ideal of the filial son, etc.; and in the folklore there were such varied ideal-types as that of the good Emperor (one who stayed in Peking and let his subjects go their way in peace), of the perfect prostitute (to whom poets wrote their praises), and of the successful peasant, merchant, and official. In contemporary America the ideal-types are perhaps less rigid and more variable; but the ideal of the happy family, the good son, the honest man, the beautiful and gracious wife, and even of the competent President and lesser politician is reflected in everything from the motion picture to the beauty contest.

In many instances, the culture provides a number of alternative ideal-types against which to evaluate a given kind of circumstance or person. Thus there might be the ideal small family and the ideal large family, the ideal petty merchant and the ideal great merchant, the ideal blonde and the ideal brunette. Each cultural ideal-type is, moreover, itself multidimensional. It is a perfect pattern of a great many ideal elements. Physically, for example, an ideal young woman is composed of an ideal skin coloring, skin texture, hair coloring and texture, height, body proportions in each of the many dimensions, facial configuration involving such separate but interrelated elements as eyes, nose, lips, and teeth, facial expressions, and body posture, plus an undefinable quality of the dynamics of the whole body that is usually described as style or manner. An ideal wife would include, in addition to ideal qualities of all the foregoing dimensions, a vast complex of ideal performances vis-à-vis her husband, her children, and people outside the domestic sphere. Thus ideally she is perhaps a proficient cook who always provides her husband with those particular things which he happens to want for dinner and who is, depending on his mood of the moment, either gay and exciting or quietly sympathetic; she will, perhaps, either grow old with him gracefully or, if such is the preference, remain charmingly young for him through all the years; she will, most certainly, bear him the proper number of children, properly spaced and of the proper sex distribution, etc. Since an ideal family, from a husband's point of view, will include, in addition to an ideal wife, some ideal children, ideal relatives-in-law, an ideal home on the ideal street, and so on, the number of specific items that will enter into the concept of an ideal family is astronomical.

Men may in a rather vague way struggle toward some or many of their

cultural ideal-types. But in using these ideal-types as standards against which to measure current achievements, and more specifically the satisfactions they are receiving from their current social circumstances, they tend to be quite practical. A naïve adolescent may compare the girls he meets to an ideal; and if he does, he will find all of them wanting. A visionary may compare the world about him to an ideal; and if he does, he will despair of everything he sees. An ambitious man may anticipate during his years of struggle for success that he will, having gained his goal, enjoy the personal satisfactions that are implied in the ideal of the successful man; and if he does, he, too, is certain to experience grievous disappointment. An ideal-type is a mental construct that has no external counterpart.⁴ The elements from which it is constructed have often, no doubt, been derived from experience; but an ideal-type is a synthesis of elements drawn from many sources, and no source conforms in many aspects to the synthetic ideal.

Under what have here been designated as normal social conditions, men tend to evaluate their current social circumstances by reckoning the ways in which those circumstances approximate the ideal rather than those in which they fail to come up to the ideal. As the old saying phrases it, "they count their blessings." As long as some elements of the *status quo* approximate the ideal, the individual has a stake in the *status quo*. As long as there is some good admixed with the bad, he falls short of the Marxian ideal of the man ripe for revolt—i.e., the man with nothing to lose by destructive assault on the *status quo*.

The general tendency for men to count their blessings is everywhere apparent. A girl is beautiful because her hair, her lips, or something about her appearance approaches an ideal; a marriage is a happy one because each has remained faithful to the other, because they have prospered economically, or because it has in some other way approximated the ideal; the job is good because, whatever its disadvantages, it has provided steady employment.

Since the ideal-type against which men evaluate any given current circumstance is multidimensional, and since they normally perceive the respects in which circumstances approximate the ideal and ignore those in which they do not, a deterioration of those circumstances in any single regard may also be ignored or, if not actually ignored, at least accepted with equanimity. The

⁴ A fact which is ignored by those who attempt to ascertain the social life of times past through the artistic and literary records of that time. For the most part such records reveal the ideal-types then current rather than the existing social realities. The body proportions of the Venus de Milo, for example, probably have no more relation to the "average" woman of ancient Greece than those of our own much-doctored photographs of motion picture stars do to ordinary women, or even to the stars themselves.

A major demonstration of the fallacy of using artistic artifacts as an index to the life of times past has been provided by P. Sorokin, who concludes, largely from the study of the pictorial art forms of the period, that the peoples of Western Europe led a highly spiritual (other-worldly) life during the early Middle Ages. See his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vols., American Book, New York, 1937, 1941).

result is that tolerance, mentioned earlier, which most men display toward declining social satisfactions. Only when the declines in satisfactions exceed the tolerances, whatever they may be, are men inclined to reverse the normal method of evaluating their circumstances and "count their evils" rather than their blessings. When they do this, they become, as it were, alarmed at the magnitude of their losses; *i.e.*, they define their plight as one of social adversity.

Apparently men seldom if ever come to the conclusion that all's wrong with the world. They tend, rather, to evaluate their social circumstances piecemeal. Occasionally an idealist will conclude and proclaim that civilization is heading toward total disaster; and there is a general tendency for men to evaluate societies other than their own as entities. But for the most part men judge their own circumstances segmentally, and the definition of social adversity is usually limited to some one phase or aspect of life and associated with some specific social institution or other cultural device, such as the political system, the economic order, or the class structure.

Adversity and the Purge. When an individual comes more or less by himself to define his experiences in some group or organization as adversity, he usually responds, as indicated in an earlier chapter, by withdrawing from that group or organization. Unless he can find a satisfactory alternative, the ultimate result may be social isolation. The action provoked by a definition of social, as distinct from personal, adversity is usually just the opposite. It is an attempt, however random and irrelevant, to rehabilitate the *status quo* and thus recapture through traditional institutions or other devices the satisfactions that have been lost. Thus, to use a simple illustration, should one party to a marriage come to the conclusion that he is getting out of the relationship far less than he contributes to it, he may attempt to withdraw from it; he may desert his spouse or sue for divorce. When, on the other hand, a husband and wife come jointly to the decision that something is wrong with their marriage (which is a quite different matter from one or both deciding that the other one is incapable of being an acceptable husband or wife), their initial response to this definition of their plight is likely to be some more or less vigorous measures undertaken in the hope that they will rehabilitate the marriage.

Characteristically, the measures taken to overcome social adversity involve a tightening of the existing social controls, largely by resort to the more obvious and crass means of control. Tolerance of individual deviation declines; and exclusion and, perhaps, execution are frequently resorted to. Where formal organization is involved, rules are enforced with greater strictness; the organizational demands on the individual member are intensified; and generally the role rights of the individual are reduced "for the duration of the emergency." As when the definition of physical disaster is made, those involved in social adversity are alarmed and aroused and, as a rule, willing to sacrifice some current rights and assume some additional responsibilities in order that the adversity may be surmounted and normal conditions reestablished. An

administrative officer may therefore demand and secure more from his subordinates than he normally does, either through more rigorous enforcement of existing rules and regulations or by the imposition of new demands by administrative fiat. But his demands must be made in traditional terms; for adversity breeds caution, a revival and revitalization of the tried and true. It therefore provides an opportunity for those in positions of authority—politicians, business administrators, etc.—to extend their powers; conversely, it is a circumstance that is unfavorable to new forms of either individual or group ascendancy.

Widespread social adversity gives rise to such "purification" measures as witch hunting, "red baiting," and drives against crime, vice, and other deviant forms of social conduct. The implicit assumption in actions of this sort is that the social adversity has been brought about by individuals and groups who are disloyal to the *status quo*. In some instances new "loyalty tests" have been devised which purport to distinguish between those members of the society, class, or other segment of the population who are doing their best to make the established order operate efficiently and those disloyal individuals who are covertly laboring to discredit the established order. The postwar demand that Americans holding any sort of public office or trust should demonstrate their worthiness by signing a "loyalty oath" is a case in point. Even more irrelevant was the requirement under the New Life Movement in Nationalist China that loyal women should forego such trivial luxuries as lipstick and silk stockings.

The demanding of personal sacrifices, often quite irrational, is in fact a fairly common response to social adversity. Just as a family that feels the pinch of economic adversity may, in the attempt to surmount the difficulty, eliminate all expenditures for luxuries and entertainment, lower its standards of what constitute necessities (e.g., substitute beans for meat), and under the authority of the father set each member to work at something or other, so a community or an entire society faced with adversity in some dimension may tighten up in every conceivable way. Although most of the measures that will be taken violate prior group norms, at least to the extent of reducing individual rights and increasing obligations, they will gain considerable, if not total, sanction by the various status groups involved. Such sanctioning is, however, both temporary and subject to considerations of equity. And the measures so sanctioned may have no effect whatever upon the causes of the adversity itself.

The Cycle of Adversity. If the emergency measures taken and sanctioned by the persons and groups involved in adversity do not seem fruitful, or if the distribution of the emergency burdens is markedly inequable, individuals and groups ordinarily begin to lose faith in the measures taken, in the good will and integrity of those in positions of authority, and so on. As willing support of the emergency measures declines, those in positions of authority may become increasingly autocratic in an effort to secure conformity to the

emergency measures. The result may be a rising cycle of adversity in which the "cures" for adversity are applied coercively but are resisted by those whom they are supposed to aid, with the effect that the adversity is actually intensified, which in turn calls for still more vigorous measures to correct it. Thus adversity may breed further adversity in much the same manner as monetary inflation provokes measures that produce further inflation. The end product of this cycle of adversity is a general resort to coercion, not only to implement measures intended to cure it, but to maintain the forms, although hardly the functions, of the *status quo*, a condition that is exemplified on the political level by a declaration of martial law and by reactionary political dictatorship.

Once a cycle of adversity gets under way, concern for current social circumstances begins to be augmented by growing concern for the social future. Up to this point men are distressed and disturbed; but beyond this point they become increasingly apprehensive. The willingness of the members of a status group to endure current sacrifices depends, it will be recalled, upon the level of their morale, *i.e.*, upon the prevailing state of mind of the members of a group regarding the future of the group. Other things being equal, when that willingness has been exhausted by progressive increase in required current sacrifices, the morale of the group declines. General morale, or the faith which the members of a society have in the ultimate value of their cultural devices, may be similarly lowered by progressive and protracted social adversity. What seems to happen is that beyond a certain point men begin to question whether their normal social expectations—*e.g.*, the belief that under the existing system honesty and industry are in due course rewarded—will be fulfilled.

Even under acute progressive adversity men tend to cling with desperate tenacity to their normal social expectations. It is not that "hope springs eternal," but rather, that the alternative to hope in the future is either despair of the future or abandonment, in the effort to realize a desired future, of everything that is socially familiar—*i.e.*, rejection of the traditional and resort to radical experimentation. Men typically, and not without empirical justification, prefer the traditional to the untried as long as there is the slightest cause to hope that the traditional will once again become productive of social values. This characteristic preference is the basis for the practice, so common with officials whose position is in jeopardy, of giving disgruntled subordinates some slight new cause to hope for the future. By a parsimonious doling out of such new causes for hope, some political dictators, for example, have been able to extend their terms in power. The usual procedure in reviving social expectations consists of robbing Peter (one interest group or other segment in the population) to pay Paul and then robbing Paul to pay Peter. In the long run, however, progressive adversity leads people to doubt and then abandon their hope for the future—*i.e.*, the ultimate fulfillment of their social expectations—and thus lose their faith in the inherent value of the traditional social practices, devices, and structures by which those expectations are normally fulfilled and which have constituted for them normal social circumstances. As

they do this, they redefine their current plight as one of social crisis and become more or less completely demoralized.

SOCIAL CRISIS AND DEMORALIZATION

Occasionally a social crisis is precipitated by some shocking event and is defined as such more or less simultaneously by a considerable proportion of the individuals involved. This was what happened on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor; and something of the same sort occurred in the winter of 1933 when, at Presidential command, the banks of the nation were closed in an effort to avoid a bank panic. In both these instances, as in other similarly abrupt social crises, there had been a considerable antecedent period of growing adversity: in the former instance the strains and sacrifices incidental to preparation for eventual war, in the latter the prolonged and progressive decline in economic activity that began in the fall of 1929.

The conduct of people under conditions of suddenly precipitated social crisis is closely allied to that under conditions of physical catastrophe: the participants experience psychological shock and engage in a good deal of entirely random behavior. Sudden social crisis may not, however, prevent most people from going about their normal affairs, if in a distinctly abnormal, dazed fashion. Thus mimicry may not arise; and if it does, it is generally circumscribed and of short duration. Sudden social crisis usually induces mass hysteria, but it seldom results in outright panic behavior.

As the initial shock of a sudden crisis wears off, usually in a matter of hours or at the most a day or two, the normal determinants of conduct, including social control, reassert themselves. Those in positions of authority may find the period of shock a breathing spell during which they themselves can take measures to cope with the crisis without having to consider the normal sensitivities of the people. Thus during the period of shock a normally democratic political or other administrator can, if he wishes, act dictatorially without much danger of arousing criticism or resentment. But since the shock soon passes and normal controls are reestablished, this kind of social crisis does not offer much opportunity for either individual or organizational ascendancy. Such ascendancy, if it appears, is short-lived.

The sociopsychological effects of a sudden crisis are mainly superficial and are certainly transitory. Quite different, especially in its implications for both individual and organizational ascendancy, is that kind of social crisis which evolves slowly as the result of prolonged and progressive social adversity. An individual who has come gradually and as the result of repeated and intensifying adverse experiences to doubt the inherent value of a traditional device or procedure has undergone a significant and relatively durable personality change. He has acquired new values, sentiments, and interests and possibly new motivations; and these new personality attributes have been superimposed upon those attributes which previously led him to accept and utilize the traditional device or procedure and to expect from it certain kinds

of satisfactions. Since the acquisition of the new attributes does not wipe out the old, with which they are in opposition, the individual experiences internal conflict.

The general nature of the process by which internal conflicts of this order arise can be indicated by means of a relatively simple example: If a young man who has been brought up to regard marriage as a permanent and harmonious union in which the roles of husband and wife are both clearly defined and compatible should marry a girl with quite different ideas of marriage and her part therein, his marital experiences will be of an adverse order. Day after day, incident after incident, it will be demonstrated to him that his wife is not in this, that, and all too many other respects an ideal wife and that his marriage is not, therefore, providing the satisfactions he has been taught to expect from it. He may, perhaps, for a considerable time discount the adversity of the present in hope that his wife will grow up to her responsibilities, that they will work out their difficulties in time, or that the arrival of a child will prove the miracle cure for their marital discord. He is, for the present then, living on futures; his expectations more than counterbalance his current discomfort. But if husband and wife actually become progressively more incompatible, he will gradually learn to dislike, disapprove of, and distrust her. What he so learns may not displace his prior approval and affection for her but may, rather, be superimposed thereon and consequently be in conflict therewith. He becomes, therefore, ambivalent toward her; she arouses in him conflicting feelings, thoughts, etc.

Every human being presumably experiences a variety of internal conflicts; a perfectly adjusted person is a concept, not an actuality. Those internal conflicts which do not, as a consequence of intensifying external adversity, grow progressively more acute may be lived with, just as all human beings live with their minor physical illnesses. Intense conflicts may, circumstances permitting, be dispelled through individual ascendancy or be exhausted in the effort to become ascendant. But when internal conflict is both intense and increasing, as it is likely to become under conditions of progressive social adversity, the individual may finally reach a point at which the stress is intolerable and, like an overstrained piece of metal, break psychologically. That point is, for him, a psychological crisis; he may either restructure his personality in such a way that one or another of the conflicting sets of personality attributes is more or less rejected or else, rejecting both sets, he may invent a new set of attributes, *i.e.*, become psychopathic. Thus an unhappy young husband may resolve the conflict over his wife by rejecting her (*e.g.*, through divorce), by recurrent escape into alcoholic dreams, or by inventing for himself a new world in which he is the happy husband of the perfect wife.

A complex collective parallel to individual psychological crisis is the kind of social crisis that occurs when the progressive adversity experienced by numbers of people brings them more or less simultaneously to the breaking point. They may then adopt a common, rather than individualized, means of

resolving the conflict which they have in common. The characteristic collective resolution of such conflict is the rejection of some aspect of the *status quo* (not necessarily, however, that aspect which is responsible for their adversity) and the adoption, perhaps only in prospect, of a new form which they fervently expect to provide the satisfactions which have not been forthcoming from the old.

The process involved in this kind of social crisis may be described intellectually as one of redefinition; that is, what has been traditionally defined as desirable and personally fruitful (a given system of human relationships, a given form of political organization, or the like) is redefined as undesirable and is abandoned in favor of something new. The actual process is not, however, an intellectual one, although it may be intellectualized by some of those involved. In terms of the tensional hypothesis, the process is analogous to that of shock and panic behavior under conditions of physical catastrophe: the conflict (variously designated as frustration, discontent, malcontent, etc.) that is experienced by each of the several individuals produces tensions which accumulate if they are not continuously released through overt action. When the conflict is of a relatively mild order, each individual may discharge the tensional by-products of that conflict in revelous forms of conduct, either vicariously, as he does when he witnesses a football game, or through participation in some deviant form of collective action, such as a religious revival or a drunken brawl. When, however, tensions accumulate more rapidly than they can be discharged, the individual becomes restive. The accumulating tensions become a drive to action, comparable to the drive to action induced by the definition of physical catastrophe; and, as in the latter, the tensional drive to action has no established channel of expression.

Social Demoralization. The initial effect of the shock produced by the definition of catastrophe is, it will be recalled, an interruption of individual action and a total breakdown of the controls normally influencing individual conduct. The shocked individual is for the moment socially isolated; and where numbers of persons are involved, they cease interacting and become an aggregate of autonomous individuals. In the more complex case of social crisis, the parallel is a more or less gradual detachment of individuals as each reaches the tensional breaking point from the status groups and organizations to which he belongs and a consequent release from their controls. As more and more individuals drop from status-group and organizational membership, the entire system of social control is disrupted. The result is social demoralization, the abnormal social condition in which the laws that were analyzed in the preceding chapters are more or less inoperative.

The outward symptoms of social demoralization are random and inconsistent behavior, mainly individual in character, including a marked susceptibility to suggestion by others and, often, temporary surges of irrelevant action. Since demoralization is seldom total and is usually restricted to some more or less clearly delimited phase of social life, those involved may continue to live and

conduct themselves for the most part in their normal ways. The period of demoralization may, therefore, extend over weeks, months, and even years. Conscript soldiers, who seem almost typically demoralized regarding the military service under which they operate and the military actions in which they are engaged, usually serve out their time—at a low level of efficiency, no doubt—without either becoming resigned to the crisis or taking any sort of joint action regarding it. Dissident labor, racial, and other groups have often remained in a condition of segmental demoralization for decades without coming to any concerted action; and the history of revolutions indicates that a considerable proportion of a social population may remain in a condition of economic or political demoralization for half a century or more before the steadily accumulating tensions find a systematic outlet. During that time there may, of course, be recurrent but transitory and usually local outbursts—*e.g.*, riots, acts of vandalism, and other forms of socially irresponsible conduct.

Just as people suffering from psychological shock are abnormally suggestible and prone to adopt any action pattern that is demonstrated by one of their number, so those who are socially demoralized are abnormally susceptible to control by conversion. They have been detached, to a degree at least, from concern with their status in many of the groups to which they formerly belonged; they are no longer responsive to the controls of such groups; and they have lost their respect for the authority of many of the traditional offices of the society. They are, at the same time, energized by the tensional by-product of the conflict that is induced by the social crisis. Like people suffering from psychological shock, they must act but have no predetermined course of action. There exists, therefore, an exceptional opportunity for a would-be ascendant to gain ascendancy over them through conversional means of control.

Under normal social conditions conversional control has, it will be recalled, very slight potentialities. Under these conditions only a small proportion of the members of a society, a class, or other segment of the social population are sufficiently detached from the prevailing system of cultural and social controls to be tempted by a conversional redramatization to adopt and act in terms of a new role that is known only through symbols, mostly verbal. Some individuals may vicariously enjoy the conversional drama—*i.e.*, the propaganda play, speech, newspaper editorial, etc.; but they will continue to act in terms of their cultural training and the norms of the status groups to which they belong. It is only, therefore, when progressive adversity has culminated in social crisis and has thus led to the detachment of a considerable number of people from adherence to their cultural devices and at the same time has shattered the normal structure and effectiveness of status-group controls that the propagandist ever finds a major market for his wares. He does not, it should be observed, create the abnormal social conditions that provide him with conversion-susceptible people.

This latter fact has not, however, prevented political and other would-be ascendants, individual and organizational, from attempting to produce arti-

ficially through conversional means the demoralization that would favor their conversional efforts. The procedure is somewhat analogous to what would happen should a physician attempt to enlarge his clientele by freely distributing a drug in the hope that it would induce the disease that the drug could then be used to cure with profit to himself. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for conversional means to be used during a political campaign in the effort to induce the electorate to define the political situation as a crisis; according to the propaganda theme, the party in power has, perhaps, become so corrupt or been so inept that the nation (or local political unit) is facing bankruptcy, a war for which it is unprepared, or a general but unspecified disaster. During the prelude to the 1952 Presidential campaign, for example, the Republican Party used Congressional and other investigations to demonstrate conversionally the gross corruption of incumbent political officials; and, as another theme, attempted to foster the illusion that Communists had so infiltrated the government that the United States was in imminent danger of being taken over by the Russians. In countries ruled by a traditional political elite, opposition leaders have sometimes attempted to wring concessions from the entrenched elite by well-staged riots and other demonstrations that the masses are on the move and that the elite is faced with a major social crisis. On a smaller scale, propaganda campaigns are often undertaken in the hope that the general public can be aroused to give support to vigorous efforts to check a purported crime wave or other spurious crisis in local affairs.

There can be no question that a people who are for quite other, and always fundamental, reasons demoralized may at times be effectively directed into a given channel of action by conversional means. But the effort to bring about such demoralization by these same means is entirely futile; it is, as has been said, not unlike trying to sicken healthy people by a drug that is supposed to cure a disease they do not have.

THE IDEOLOGY OF REBELLION

It sometimes happens that a period during which abnormal social conditions prevail within some aspect of the society or some limited segment of the social population comes to a close without any major social movement having appeared. During that period there is invariably much random individual and collective action, and there is usually a great variety of countervailing proposals for action, none of which gains a significant following. In time a new "normal" emerges, which on the surface may appear to be, and often may actually be, no more than the old normal revived. But since the period of abnormal social conditions was brought about by prolonged social adversity, the revived old normal will not long prevail unless significant, if mainly unnoticed, modifications were actually brought about during the abnormal period. Such changes, including functional refinement of some of the old systems of organization, may well have occurred in so piecemeal a fashion and through the efforts of so many individuals—each an ascendant in a minor way—that

only those immediately involved were at all aware of them. Social storms that blow themselves out in this way must be very common; they do not, however, make an imprint in historical records.

The periods of social abnormality that are recorded, however badly, in the records of social history are those which give rise to some new ideology of rebellion or to a refurbished old one which in turn serves as the banner for a social movement of some magnitude. The ultimate consequences to the society of such a movement may be no more profound than a coronation ceremony is to the social life of the British people; but like the latter, such a movement is dramatic and eventful, and it leaves its mark on the records, whether or not it brings changes to the malfunctioning social system that gave it birth.

The general demoralization involved in a period of abnormal social conditions provides a fertile field for the generation and propagation of new ideologies. Ideologies are, it will be recalled, verbal constructs, among the elements of which is a concept of social causation. They are ordinarily used, when occasion warrants, to justify actions that are undertaken for other reasons. The exception to this generalization occurs under conditions of social crisis. People who have become demoralized by social crisis are tensionally motivated to action away from (*i.e.*, in rejection of) what they have defined as the cause of the crisis—invariably some one or many of the traditional institutions, administrative offices and officers, etc. There is, of course, no tradition-sanctioned channel of revolt from what is traditional. Under such circumstances there is, therefore, a functional need for a defined course of collective action away from the old and toward some promising alternative. A new ideology, or an old one in new dress, may offer just such a channel for the release of accumulated tensions.

An ideology that serves as the basis for concerted action on the part of numbers of demoralized individuals is rebellious in character. Such an ideology does not necessarily call for active assault on the *status quo*, although it may; but it designates the cause of the crisis that has induced demoralization and provides some course of action that will neutralize this cause and enable a beneficent cause to come into operation. Invariably, the ideologically indicated cause of the crisis is no more than a symbol and may or may not represent the many actual, and usually intangible, factors that are responsible for that crisis. Thus in recent years British imperialism has been made the ideological cause of the massive poverty (and other troubles) of India, Egypt, Iran, and other countries whose peoples have known nothing but poverty since long before there was a Britain. Marxianism, one of the best-known and most enduring rebellious ideologies, made capitalism the cause of all human ills, economic and otherwise; and this ideology has been used to justify political revolution and partial destruction of existing political, economic, and other social arrangements in Russia and China and among other peoples who have never known capitalism. Racist ideology, which gains local favor in America upon occasion and which was used to justify the near extermination of the Jews in Germany,

makes the local racial minority the "cause" of current crisis, whatever the nature of that crisis may be. Frequently, a class of persons—typically either the elite or the socially dispossessed—is singled out as the cause; *e.g.*, "the landlords" have been a rather standard villain in the ideological dramas of rebellious peasants. In some few instances, a single person or a single office will be blamed for the crisis.

Because there is seldom a discernible relation between the ideologically designated cause of the crisis and the complex social factors that are actually responsible, some social psychologists have concluded that rebellious ideology and the actions predicated upon it are entirely whimsical.⁵ It is true that the actual causes of progressive social adversity that results in a social crisis are unrecognizable; for they are invariably complex and interdependent and are usually intangible—some aspects or the total complex of the organized relationships of the society. Even after a century and more of speculation and study, modern social scientists are still unable to ascertain the specific determinants of such a comparatively simple form of social deviation as juvenile delinquency. It is no wonder, then, that the peasant, the industrial worker, the practical politician, or for that matter anyone else is unable to ascertain and comprehend the specific causes of malfunctioning of the economic order, of maldistribution of the proceeds of production, of the decline of religious faith, etc. And, even if they could ascertain these intangibles, including such intangible personal attributes as values, interests, and sentiments, they would be unable to take direct action against them.

The actual process of selecting a "cause" for the crisis may be random or, on an individual basis, calculating. But in either event what is singled out will be both readily identifiable—a person or class of persons, a law, a substance and its use, a mechanical or other device—and logically acceptable as the cause within the framework of local folk thinking. Ordinarily the latter requirement means that something already in considerable disrepute will be selected as the cause. If, by current definition, the king can do no wrong, it would be illogical to blame him for the high taxes imposed by his government; whereas if he is as a person generally disliked and suspect, he can logically be blamed for any adversity that may befall his subjects, including drought or flood.

The ideological designation of the cause of a crisis often implies the cure: *e.g.*, if Negroes are made the cause of local distress, then it follows, in accordance with the logic of dramatic action, that elimination of Negroes from the local scene would cure that distress. Moreover, the ideology usually specifies, at least in general terms, how a cure is to be effected. For the same reason that the designated cause is readily identifiable, the cure offered is invariably a glittering generality that apparently provides for direct and immediately effec-

⁵ This is the core, for example, of the "frustration-aggression" hypothesis and the "scapegoat" theory. See J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, and R. R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939).

tive action—*e.g.*, “redistribution of land among the peasants,” “public ownership of the means of production,” or “acceptance of the true word of God.”

Ideological Abstraction and the Role of Leadership. To the individual who is converted to it, a rebellious ideology may seem to provide a simple and easy solution to all his troubles, for it is dramatic in form, and he is familiar with the dramatic form and inclined to mistake the form of things for their content.

Like all ideologies, however, a rebellious ideology is actually highly abstract. It provides, at most, a goal and the assurance that the goal can be readily achieved by adherence to some stated course of action. But it does not blueprint those actions; the only detailed designation of their character is that they are different from traditional forms of action. Detailed direction of the specific actions to be taken to achieve the ideological goal is, of necessity, left to leaders, who may or may not be designated by the ideology itself. As a result, the rise of a rebellious ideology provides a unique opportunity for individual ascendancy. Among those who accept a rebellious ideology, however briefly, the antecedent social controls are largely inoperative; and traditional offices and the persons who occupy them are ignored, if not actually subjected to attack. Under such conditions the loudest and most insistent voice tends to dominate, just as in times of natural catastrophe, that individual who acts or orders tends to be mimicked. Ascendancy is here achieved mainly by conversional means, *i.e.*, by the individual's claiming to represent or embody the ideological “cure,” as Hitler claimed to be the personal representative of the destiny of Germany and as Joseph Smith claimed to be the discoverer and hence the prophet of the true word of God.

An individual who succeeds in establishing his claim to being the personal representative of a rebellious ideology thereby establishes for himself a new “office.” Those who recognize this office grant him exceptional powers to rule by autocratic means. For the moment his word is law; and as he solidifies his powers, a new system of status groups tends to develop among his followers, the norms of which conform more or less directly to the rebellious ideology and his interpretations of it. To follow the leader, to conform to his dictates, becomes the basic new norm and hence a means to valued status. It is because the control of leaders of social movements is thus socially sanctioned that they can and usually do exercise extraordinary control over their followers.

As a rule only a relatively small proportion of a social population will be so completely demoralized, and hence detached from the established status groups, norms, and social controls, that they are capable of being converted to the adoption of a rebellious ideology. Rebellion is usually limited to the members of a given socioeconomic class (in the French Revolution, for example, it was the rising middle class) or to those individuals, whatever their class origins, who are, because of personal incompetence or peculiarities of circumstances, most severely demoralized by the conditions of the time. Under some condi-

tions the rebellious minority isolate themselves from the larger society, in which case their conduct may have little effect upon the society as a whole. Many religious movements, such as Mormonism, Father Divinism, and Buchmanism, have followed this pattern; so, too, have those socioeconomic utopian movements that have involved the establishment of self-sufficient communal colonies; and so, too, have such health and other cults as nudism. Revolutionary movements (*e.g.*, German Nazism and Russian Communism), on the other hand, require the subservience to the movement of the society as a whole. A revolutionary movement becomes, therefore, an attempt at conquest; *i.e.*, the revolutionary group endeavors to gain ascendancy over the entire society.

Rebellious ideologies sometimes evolve, through the contributions of many individuals, in a manner not unlike that by which a rumor story develops. In such instances an otherwise trivial event may serve as the seed around which the ideology is built. Such an ideology will ordinarily be no more than a revival and local application of some latent idea, such as the idea that an ethnic minority is responsible for adversity. This is what happened in the prolonged race rioting in Chicago during 1916, when whites attacked Negroes indiscriminately, and in Los Angeles during 1944, when sailors attacked Mexican zoot-suiters, who were supposed to be slackers.

The ideologies that have been involved in the larger and more durable social movements have usually been individual innovations. In some instances the ideology has been promoted, as well as invented, by the same person, as it was in Mormonism, Buchmanism, and Father Divinism. More often, perhaps, the innovator has been an intellectual or an impractical idealist who was incapable of engaging in the active promotion of his ideology or unwilling to do so; Marx, Townsend, and many others merely provided an ideological basis for others to exploit.

During a period of rather general social crisis, promoters of varied and contrasting rebellious ideologies may compete among themselves for ascendancy. Thus, while religious evangelists may offer salvation via the spiritual route, political revolutionaries may propagandize and otherwise labor on behalf of salvation via the overthrow and replacement of the existing government, and would-be cult leaders may advocate salvation through such varied cure-alls as a return to the "natural" life, vegetarianism, colonic irrigation, and mass migration to the moon.

The things which have at some time and in some place or other been advanced as the certain cure for social ills have been limited only by human ingenuity. Most of the cure-alls concocted and advocated have, it is true, never been acted upon. Many have been taken over verbally and made the subject of much hysterical verbal conduct without any effort being made to translate them into action, either because no such action was possible or because some competing ideology proved more attractive.

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The appearance and acceptance of an ideology of rebellion has the immediate effect of restoring hope in the social future and thus somewhat reconciling the faithful to their current adversities. If those who have become converts to such an ideology are induced, through leadership or otherwise, to translate it into overt conduct, the result is a social movement through which the participants discharge their crisis-induced drives to action. Ideologically the social movement is supposed to eliminate the cause of current social adversity and restore, through contracultural means, the old sources of social satisfactions. From the sociopsychological point of view, however, what a social movement does is bring into being a new form of normal social conditions, that is, a system of social and other controls which determines, in considerable part, the conduct of those who participate in the movement. As this system of controls and its dependent status groups and organizations evolve, the sense of social crisis dissipates, and with it the demoralization that fostered the rise and acceptance of the ideology on which the movement is based.

Whether the organized activities involved in a social movement will ultimately bring about an actual correction of the circumstances that make for adversity has no bearing on the movement itself. The participants in the movement are to a very considerable extent literally living on futures; those futures loom so large in their individual and group calculations that current dissatisfactions are defined as sacrifices made on behalf of the future. Moreover, these sacrifices are to some extent offset by the fact that under the new normal social conditions they are sanctioned and rewarded, as they were not under the prior social order, by status groups and organizations. Thus, while it is hardly deemed an honor to go hungry, to fight, and perhaps to die for the preservation of a malfunctioning *status quo*, the participants in a revolutionary movement dedicated to the destruction and replacement of that *status quo* may come to feel that personal sacrifice to the movement is an honor and may be honored by their fellows for such sacrifice.

Social movements run varying courses and come to different ends.⁶ Some are short-lived, returning the participants within months or years to the demoralized condition from which they were lifted. Some, like Buchmanism, run on for years, recruiting new participants as the old become disillusioned and drop out. And some few become so stabilized and so enduring that in time their ideologies and much of the action and organization based upon those ideologies assume the character of culture and are no longer rebellious. In these few instances the new normal conditions wrought by the emergence of the movement evolve into the cultural normal, and a great and complex social cycle is thereupon completed.

The Charismatic Movement. Undoubtedly the most spectacular type of

⁶ T. H. Greer, *American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern since 1865* (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1951).

social movement, if only because most clearly defined, is that which centers around a person or a symbol of a person, such as his grave. The ideology, which may have been devised by that person or may have evolved spontaneously, imputes to that person extraordinary powers that are new and unique. A primitive magic man, a contemporary priest, a physician, etc., all have extraordinary powers; but their powers are defined by the cultural milieu in which they operate and are limited by that definition. The extraordinary powers imputed to an individual by a rebellious ideology of this sort, on the other hand, are not sanctioned by the culture. In terms of the culture, they are powers previously unknown or, at the most, known only in the distant past—e.g., the Christlike power to heal. Such powers are usually described as supernatural or spiritual and are technically known as “charismatic.”⁷

The charismatic powers imputed by the ideology may pertain to some limited field, as do those of a “miracle man” who heals body ills, or they may be all-inclusive, as were those of Joseph Smith, founder and leader of Mormonism. In either case the ideology is rebellious in that it involves a rejection of, although not necessarily a direct attack on, some or all established authority—political, religious, medical, military, etc. Thus a person who is caught up in some new faith cure involving a healer necessarily rejects the established medical practitioners and their techniques, for the faith cure is a contradiction of the established medical practices and violates all prior understanding of the nature of body ills. Likewise, a person who joins a new political movement that centers about some political unknown is thereby denying the value of the traditional political system, its offices, and the persons occupying such offices.

In some instances an individual who has become a charismatic leader has had the charismatic powers thrust upon him, as with Townsend, who was more the victim of a rebellious ideology of this sort than a voluntary ascendant. Usually, however, the individual who has become a charismatic leader has himself devised the doctrine that attributes to him charismatic powers and has himself promoted that doctrine, at least in the initial phases of his rise to leadership. Some charismatic leaders have undoubtedly been charlatans, self-seeking individuals who found in this particular means the easiest way to wealth and prestige. On the whole, however, most of the successful charismatic leaders seem to have believed in themselves—i.e., believed in the validity of the claims they made for themselves. In the terms of nonbelievers, they are psychopaths who have succeeded in gaining subscribers to their delusions. At any event, so many of the successful charismatic leaders have had such a long and dreary history of prior failure that their claims to charismata seem patently abnormal; Joseph Smith, for example, was more or less a social outcast at the

⁷ For the initial sociological analysis of charismatic authority see H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford, New York, 1946, pp. 245–264). For descriptive materials on charismatic leadership see R. Heberle, *Social Movements* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1951), and W. D. Wallis, *Messiahs: Their Role in Civilization* (American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, 1943).

time he "discovered" the so-called Book of Mormon; and Hitler was a shabby and pathetic failure, first as housepainter, then as soldier, and then as political agitator, when he discovered that he was destined to lead the German people into mastery of the world.

Some of the more successful charismatic leaders have been men of great personal charm and, in some cases, imposing physique and manner. In such instances the charismata may be in part a function of the personality, rather than solely a consequence of the charismatic ideology. Some of the exceptional political influence of Franklin D. Roosevelt during his early years as President seems to have been made possible by the fact that as a person he aroused extraordinary faith in his ability to solve the crisis of the depression. On the other hand, many charismatic leaders have been quite commonplace as persons; the faith that they inspired came, not through their presence, but through acceptance of the ideology which imputed charismata to them.

The authority of a charismatic leader approaches the absolute in that area of life to which his charisma pertains. His ability to affect the society at large is limited, of course, to what his loyal followers can accomplish. Whatever they may believe, he cannot, through them or in any other way, move mountains or divide the seas. But he can secure from them almost anything of which they are physically and psychologically capable. The supporting structure of status groups, norms, and social control that invariably develops among his followers reinforces the ideological basis for individual subservience to his authority. At the peak of the movement the morale of these groups is exceptionally high; no current sacrifice is too great to accept, and no role so low in rewards that it is undesirable; for to belong, and to participate in the works of the leader, is to be assured of inestimable rewards in the not-so-distant future.

A movement that depends solely on charismata is always short-lived. When rewards promised to the faithful do not appear, faith begins to give way to disillusionment; the followers drop out one by one, perhaps to join other movements; and the former leader is reduced by social redefinition to the status of a lunatic. Such is the usual pattern of faith healers and of the founders and leaders of many of the more esoteric cults. When, however, a charismatic leader uses his powers to establish an organization or to take control of an established organization, he may thereby obtain sufficient noncharismatic power to perpetuate the illusion that he has charismata. Father Divine, for example, early began to use his charismatic authority to build an organization of the faithful (his "heaven" on earth), to which they contributed wealth and labor and through which Divine was able to demonstrate his charismatic powers to the faithful. In this and similar instances, the operation has some of the characteristics of a fraudulent stock-promotion scheme in which dividends are paid to early investors from current sales of stock; but Divine succeeded in keeping his organization expanding, and hence healthy, for years on end. The charismatic powers of founder Joseph Smith got the Mormon

movement under way, but it was his disciple Brigham Young, a shrewd organizer and promoter, who kept that movement going until the heroic and sacrificial efforts of the pioneers began to pay off and thus provide tangible proof that Smith was, indeed, a favored agent of God. In politics, charismatic authority is usually a supplement to other means of control. Thus many demagogues and dictators, including the infamous Huey Long and Hitler, have claimed and been granted charismata only that they might become ascendant over the existing political organizations or might develop their own substitutes for the preexisting ones. Here the procedure is a sort of conquest from within; for once the charismatic leader gains ascendancy, the organization he rules depends mainly on coercion and pecuniary controls to maintain the new *status quo*.

The Revolutionary Movement. The action of a charismatic movement is away from the *status quo*; i.e., the participants isolate themselves from the old social order and endeavor to erect a new one. A revolutionary movement, on the other hand, is directed, in accordance with its ideological basis, toward the dislodgment or even destruction of certain symbols of the *status quo*, characteristically those persons or classes that occupy positions of authority. Ideologically this action is supposed to clear the way for the subsequent establishment of a new system of organization that will provide the satisfactions denied by the old order.

Local riots against such symbols of the *status quo* as the police may have the quality of spontaneity; but a revolutionary movement is always a highly organized operation subject to the directive leadership of a revolutionary cult, the members of which have been more or less effectively trained in the techniques of military conquest and operate as members of an integrated, quasi-military organization. They act on faith; but they do not rely on the charismatic powers of any one person.

A true revolution, in contrast to a so-called "palace revolt," in which one faction among the ruling elite becomes ascendant over another, is a major social upheaval. It is usually preceded by a long period of progressive social adversity involving a considerable proportion of the social population, by recurrent and short-lived definitions of crisis and equally short-lived rebellious movements of one sort and another, and by the gradual development of a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary organization. That organization may operate for many years as a sort of resistance movement, in that it may consider the established political and economic order and their functionaries as conquerors and may attempt, by sabotage and other devices, to weaken their hold on the society. If the movement prospers, it gains new recruits and increasing covert support from the ordinary citizenry; meanwhile the members of the organization are trained to take over and run the political and economic machinery when D day comes.

A revolutionary movement has no chance of success until and unless a large proportion of the population—including, most importantly, the police, the

military, and other existing coercive organizations—has come to define conditions as critical, has lost its faith in the possibility of restoring normal social conditions by “purification” measures, and has come to doubt the validity of the *status quo* and the ruling elite. When such a state of affairs exists, any abrupt turn of conditions for the worse, especially a dramatic one, may precipitate more or less spontaneous general rioting and other disorders, which provide the revolutionary organization with an opportunity to make an open, frontal attack upon the ruling elite. The attack is essentially military in character.

A revolutionary *coup d'état* is at most the first phase in the revolutionary program. Most revolutionary ideologies propose, in highly abstract terms, replacement of all the major existing forms of organization with new forms—e.g., public ownership of the means of production, government “of, for, and by the people,” the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” etc. In some instances such grandiose proposals for reform have been no more than bait used by the members, or at least the leaders, of the revolutionary organization to secure the support of the general public. In some instances the revolutionaries have taken the ideology seriously, as did those of the first French Revolution, and, having taken over the government and other control organizations, have then attempted to change the society in accordance with their ideological principles.

It is perhaps inevitable that the violence and general disorder which make possible a *coup d'état* and which occur during it should aggravate the very conditions that brought it about.⁸ Upon their ascension to power, revolutionary leaders become responsible for the rehabilitation of a social system that is in the final stages of disintegration. The demoralization that preceded and made possible the *coup d'état* has demonstrated the inability of the former ruling elite to make the old social order function even in a barely satisfactory manner; and their eviction from office has involved an intensification of the social adversities that brought about their downfall. Thus the revolutionary leaders assume command, not of a going society, but of one that has broken down completely. As revolutionaries, these leaders propose to experiment with untried social devices adopted on faith and expected to yield prompt and wholly desirable results. That these new devices will not provide the satisfactions expected of them is almost certain; hence the faith in the revolutionary ideology that provides the revolutionary leaders with their authority is likely to be short-lived; and as that faith fades, the revolutionary movement itself is dissipated.

In some instances revolutionary leadership has been able, during the brief period of faith in the revolution as a movement, to consolidate its position organizationally and thereby to gain coercive and pecuniary means of maintaining its rule during the long period of social experimentation with new social devices. When this has occurred, the revolutionary organization has had the status of military conqueror over the society, and the remnants of the

⁸ D. W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution* (Harper, New York, 1952).

former elite and other dissident elements in the population have been reduced to the role of conquered. In many instances the latter have had the vitality to form a counterrevolutionary movement, which in all salient respects proceeds as the revolution did before it. Should the new elite blunder too grossly, as has often happened, the new counterrevolutionary movement may in turn gain public support and thereby be enabled to recapture something of its former ruling position in the society. In some instances such counterrevolutions have come gradually, segmentally, and relatively peaceably (as after the American Revolution). At other times they have been accompanied by all the violence of the original revolution (as in France during the nineteenth century and in Spain during the present century).

The Mass Movement. The term "mass movement" is sometimes used to encompass all kinds of social movements, on the assumption that in all instances the course of action is determined by the "mass"—*i.e.*, that it is without directive leadership of any sort.⁹ All social movements do grow out of social crisis, demoralization, and the need for action which is thereby induced; and they involve a greater or lesser number of persons. But just as every ship, even that which sails uncharted seas, has a captain at the helm, so every social movement is directed by some sort of leadership, and often by many sorts.

The closest approximation to unled mass action is the movement which occurs on the basis of a mass-made ideology (*i.e.*, one which has evolved, like a rumor story, through the participation of innumerable individuals), which is translated into definite action either by each individual participant or by many small groups, each with its own leader. Such movements are often highly segmental, in respect either to the proportion of the population involved or, as with stock-market and other booms, to the area of social life affected. In some few instances they have been both large-scale and rather inclusive, as may have been the case with the early medieval Crusades and definitely was with the successive surges of settlers westward in America during the nineteenth century.

Booms and rushes may involve such divergent forms of action as the purchase of land or stocks at progressively higher prices and the rapid migration of people to a region in which a new form of wealth, new political freedoms, or some other value has reputedly been discovered. All are, however, sociopsychologically similar in that they grow out of social crisis and demoralization and involve a rejection of some traditional practices, values, sentiments, and ideologies. The ideology on which a boom or rush is based is usually quite simple and fragmentary. Gold rushes and land booms have grown up around nothing more elaborate than the ideas, respectively, that in such and such a place gold is to be had for the taking and that a plot of land in such and such a place will double in value every so often.

⁹ Such is, in substance, the theory originally advanced by R. E. Park and subsequently elaborated by H. Blumer in "Collective Behavior" (in *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, A. M. Lee, ed., Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York, 1946)

The ideology which gave direction to the initial settlement by Europeans of the North American continent and the subsequent westward movements across it was much more elaborate. It evolved slowly and in the process of development acquired a variety of promoters and other functionaries. Action based on the ideology has been in this and similar instances relatively sporadic and uncoordinated. But in movements of this sort, unlike the boom and the rush, translation of the ideology into action has been by groups and their leaders rather than by individuals. The migration across the Atlantic by the Pilgrims was, of course, an organized affair. Few individuals, if any, migrated across the plains to the West Coast during the 1850s. They moved, rather, in groups, each more or less recruited by some enterprising individual and, of necessity, organized under the direction of a designated leader. Some of the movements into the West, such as those into the Ohio Valley during the early part of the nineteenth century, involved somewhat less personal leadership and organization. Perhaps the nearest to a true "mass" migration on record is the immigration of Southern Europeans to America during the latter part of the last century and the early years of this. Even in this instance, however, leadership provided by promoters for the American steamship lines and for American industries recruiting cheap labor played a significant role, propagating the idea that America was the promised land and in this and other, often more direct, ways channeling the discontent of impoverished Italian and other Southern European peasants.

As a rule, people who have become detached by progressive adversity from the authority of the *status quo*, including the norms of their status groups, turn to some other form of authority to provide them guidance. They may generate an ideological basis for action among themselves; more often it is provided for them by some one of their number who is more ingenious and less restrained than the majority. Occasionally they act individually on the basis of this ideology, translating it into action each in his own peculiar way. Far more often, however, they need and secure direction in translating the ideology into action. At the one extreme this direction takes the form of charismatic leadership; at the other it takes the form of local, independent guidance by one of their own number.

THE ADVERSITY OF WAR

To all generalizations about social life there are, it seems, some exceptions; there is even an exception to a generalization about an exception, such as the abnormal social conditions discussed in the preceding pages. Abnormal social conditions, it has been observed, are brought about by prolonged and progressive social adversity which has culminated in the definition of social crisis and resultant demoralization. Under these conditions the normal structure of social and organizational controls is weakened, if not entirely shattered, and the individuals involved wander, as it were, more or less at will unless and until they are caught up in some organizing social movement.

There is, however, one kind of social adversity—war—which, at least in the modern world, is so familiar that its occurrence does not disrupt but rather strengthens the existing system of controls, social and otherwise. The adversities brought about by a modern war are the most severe that modern people ever experience, they are invariably intensified as the war progresses, and the war may continue for many years. Yet no modern people has during the actual course of a war defined their plight as one of social crisis and become demoralized. Only the complete exhaustion and surrender of their military forces seems capable of bringing the people of a modern nation to this abnormal state of affairs.

No attempt will be made here to examine the role of social control, of leadership, or of individual ascendancy under the infinite variety of conditions and circumstances encompassed by the term "war." What is pertinent here is the fact that at least in the modern world, the imminent prospect of war and the actuality of war are a special kind of social condition for civilians, including the civilians who are impressed into military service and forced to serve on a "for the duration" basis as members of military organizations.

For most, if not all, civilians, whatever their nationality, war is a condition of acute and progressive adversity. For some—*e.g.*, the Germans and Japanese during World War II—it may be an adversity that is tempered by the expectation of large rewards in the future. For others it is, at best, adversity from which there is no present escape. Much has been said and written about national patriotism, willing sacrifice in order that the nation may survive, etc. There has even been discussion, historical and otherwise, of "popular" and "unpopular" wars. In all such considerations there has been the assumption that civilian conduct during times of war is significantly conditioned by nationalism, the ideology which is supposed to bind together the many and often diverse peoples who comprise a modern state.

Such evidence as is available indicates that national ideology as such plays an exceedingly small part in the determination of the conduct of civilians during times of war. No war is in any real sense "popular," although some individuals may find the prospect or actuality of war a personally gratifying means to status, wealth, or adventure. What seems to reconcile people to war and to the sacrifices that it entails is the sense of inevitability, a culturally maintained understanding that war, like bad luck and "acts of God," is one of the conditions that man must recurrently endure and, in enduring, hope to survive. Support of war, or of preparations for war, is therefore mainly passive in nature; the passive sanction of most status groups and organizations enables those in positions of authority to assume and exercise special wartime autocratic powers, powers that usually are promptly dissolved, by social consensus, once this special social condition is resolved.

The fact that modern peoples tend to define war as a special condition—specifically, an inevitable one—and, having made that definition, passively submit to forms of control which under normal conditions they would most

violently resist has meant that war is often a political alternative to rebellion. The political elite in jeopardy may, like the German and the Italian dictatorships, dissipate incipient rebellion and repolarize an otherwise demoralized public by precipitating, in fact or in fiction, the special crisis of war. Having done so, their ability to continue in power, for a time at least, is assured by the traditionally passive acceptance by modern peoples of the adversities of wartime. There is thus some reason to suspect that the prevalence of war in the twentieth century is directly related to the rapid and disturbing changes that have occurred and continue to occur within the societies of the various peoples of the contemporary world, changes which strain and constantly threaten the maintenance of the existing system of social and other controls. Perhaps war, which at least temporarily shores up this precarious system, is psychologically less costly to men than the alternative abnormal social condition in which they are divested of the social status that they seem to value more than life itself.

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